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
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THIRD SERIES, NO. IX.—WHOLE NUMBER, LXV.

JANUARY, 1847.

ARTICLE I.

LIFE AND WRITINGS OF JOHN FOSTER.

By REV. GEORGE B. CHEEVER, D. D., New York.

The Life and Correspondence of John Foster: Edited by J. E. Ryland. With notices of Mr. Foster as a Preacher and a Companion, by JOHN SHEPPARD, Author of "Thoughts on Devotion," etc., etc. In two volumes. New York, Wiley & Putnam, 161 Broadway, 1846.

GEOLOGISTS tell us somewhat quaintly, that great and inexhaustible springs are found in connection with what they call faults, that is, breaks in the continuity of the rocks. There must be these breaks in the strata, and if it were not for this benevolent arrangement of Providence, there had been neither running fountains nor rivers, but sluggish stagnant pools. A powerful spring is not to be found but in connection with the existence of a great fault. The despotic crust of the earth must be broken up, before its living fountains of waters can gush in freedom to the surface. There is an instructive analogy in all this.

An Ecclesiastical Despotism would keep the intellectual and moral world without *faults*, that is, without *freedom*: it would circle the globe with the dead, hard, rocky crust and tetter of an enforced religious uniformity: it would have no spontaneous, powerful springs breaking out and running freely to the ocean. But God's benevolent power interposes, and breaks up the despotic continuity, and gives us springs. The strata of establishments being pierced and rent, there are no longer stagnant pools, but deep, living fountains.

The analogy might be extended into something like an argument for the necessity and usefulness of various denominations in the Church of Christ. These things are not necessarily the result of sectarianism, but of freedom ; and God makes use of these *faults*, even if we admitted them to be, not merely in the geological, but moral sense of the term, faults,—for the production of vastly greater good than ever there could have been without them. They are not faults, but blessings ; and though men may abuse them, they are the assurance and the safeguard of spiritual freedom.

Of the English minds that have departed from our world within a few years, none have excited a deeper interest, or wielded for a season a loftier power, than John Foster and Robert Hall. They were both triumphant instances of the superiority of intellect, and the homage that will be paid to it, over all circumstance and mere external distinction. One of the most obvious reflections that rises in the mind of a thoughtful observer of the greatness and power of such intellect, after the first analysis and admiration of its elements, may be that it was a possession and result of what is called the *voluntary system*. These men were two of the “Intellectual Incas” of their race. In the two together, there were combined nearly all the grand qualities that ever go to make up minds of the highest order : severity and affluence, keenness and magnificence, simplicity and sublimity of thought ; ruggedness, power, and elaborate beauty and exquisiteness of style ; precision and splendor of language ; condensed energy, fire, and diffusive richness of imagination ; originality, independence, and perfect classical elegance ; comprehensiveness and accuracy ; nobleness of feeling, intense hatred of oppression, Christian humility, childlike simplicity.

And yet there were greater differences between them than there were similarities. In some respects their minds were of quite an opposite mould. Hall’s mind was more mathematical than Foster’s, and he was distinguished for his power of abstract speculation, and his love and habit of reasoning. The tenor of Foster’s mind was less argumentative, but more absolute, more intuitive, more rapidly and thoroughly observant.

The impression of *power* is greater from the mind of Foster than of Hall. On this account, and for its eminently suggestive properties, Foster’s general style, both of thinking and writing, is much to be preferred ; though Hall’s has the most sustained and elaborate beauty. Yet the word elaborate is not strictly applicable to Hall’s style, which is the natural action of his mind, the movement, not artificial, nor supported by effort, in which his thoughts arranged themselves with the precision and regularity of a Roman cohort. Hall’s was a careful beauty of expression, his carefulness and almost fastidiousness of taste being a second nature to him ; Foster’s was a careless mixture of ruggedness and beauty, the ruggedness greatly predominating. Hall’s style is too constantly, too

uniformly regular; it becomes monotonous; it is like riding or walking a vast distance over a level macadamized road; a difficult mountain would be an interval of relief. We feel the need of something to break up the uniformity, and startle the mind; and we would like here and there to pass through an untrodden wilderness, or a gloomy forest, or to have some unexpected solemn apparition rise before us. There is more of the romantic in Foster than in Hall, and Foster's style is sometimes thickset with expressions, that sparkle with electric fire of imagination.

Hall's mind, in the comparison of the two, is more like an inland lake, in which you can see, though many fathoms deep, the clear white sand, and the smallest pebbles on the bottom. Foster's is rather like the Black Sea in commotion. Hall gives you more of known truth, with inimitable perspicuity and happiness of arrangement; Foster sets your own mind in *pursuit* of truth, fills you with longings after the unknown, leads you to the brink of frightful precipices. There is something such a difference between the two, as between Raphael the sociable angel, relating to Adam in his bower, the history of creation, and Michael, ascending with him the mountain, to tell him what shall happen from his fall.

Hall's mind is like a royal garden, with rich fruits, and overhanging trees in vistas; Foster's is a stern, wild, mountainous region, likely to be the haunt of banditti. As a preacher, Hall must have been altogether superior to Foster in the use and application of ordinary important evangelical truth, "for reproof, correction, and instruction in righteousness." But Foster probably sometimes reached a grander style, and threw upon his audience sublimer illustrations and masses of thought. Foster was not successful as a preacher; his training and natural habits were unfortunate for that; and the range of thought, in which his mind spontaneously moved, was too far aloof from men's common uses, abilities of perception, tastes and disposition. But Hall was doubtless one of the greatest preachers that ever lived. Yet there were minds that would prefer Foster, and times at which all the peculiar qualities of his genius would be developed in a grander combination of sublimity and power. As a general thing, Hall must have been more like Paul preaching at Athens in a Roman toga; Foster, like John the Baptist in the wilderness, with a leathern girdle about his loins, eating locusts and wild honey. He speaks of one of his own sermons, which a man would give much to have heard; we can imagine some of its characteristics. It was on the oath of the angel, with one foot upon the sea, and another on the land, swearing that Time should be no longer; and his own mind was in a luminous, winged state of freedom and fire, that seems to have surprised himself; but no record of the sermon is preserved.

The vigor and upwisting convolutions of Foster's style are the

results simply of the strong workings of the thought, and not of any elaborate artificial formation. For though he labored upon his sentences with unexampled interest and care, after his thoughts had run them in their own original mould, they were always the creation of the thought, and not a mould prepared for it. The thought had always the living law of its external form within it. We know of scarce another example in English literature, where so much beauty, precision, and yet genuine and inveterate originality are combined. It is like the hulk of a ship made out of the smoothed knees of knotty oak.

There is a glow of *life* in such a style, and not merely quiet beauty, whether elaborate or natural, that is like the glow in the countenance of a healthy man, after a rapid walk in a clear frosty morning. But it sometimes reminds you of a naked athletic wrestler, struggling to throw his adversary, all the veins and muscles starting out in the effort. Foster's style is like the statue of Laocoon writhing against the serpent: Hall's reminds you more of the Apollo of the Vatican. The difference was the result of the intense effort with which Foster's mind wrought out and condensed, in the same process, its active meditations. Everywhere it gives you the impression of power at work, and his illustrations themselves seem to be hammered on the anvil. It gives you the picture he has drawn of himself, or his biographer for him, in the attitude of what he called *pumping*. At Brearly Hall he used to try and improve himself in composition, by "taking paragraphs from different writers and trying to remodel them, sentence by sentence, into as many forms of expression as he possibly could. His posture on these occasions was to sit with a hand on each knee, and moving his body to and fro, he would remain silent for a considerable time, till his invention in shaping his materials had exhausted itself. This process he used to call *pumping*." Foster's style is the very image of a mind working itself to and fro, with inward intensity.

The characteristics of power and rugged thought in Foster, are admirably set forth in some of his own images. Speaking in his journal of a certain individual's discourse, he says, "he has a clue of thread of gold in his hand, and he unwinds for you ell after ell, *but give me the man who will throw the clue at once, and let me unwind it; and then show in his hand another ready to follow.*"

He speaks of the great deficiency of what may be called *conclusive* writing and speaking. "How seldom we feel at the end of the paragraph or discourse, that something is *settled and done*. It lets our habit of thinking and feeling *just be as it was*. It rather carries on a parallel to the line of the mind, at a peaceful distance, *than fires down a tangent to smite across it.*" Foster always *smote across* the mind.

"Many things," says he, "may descend from the sky of truth,

without deeply striking and interesting men; as from the cloudy sky, rain, snow, &c., may descend without exciting ardent attention; it must be large hailstones, the sound of thunder, torrent rain, and the lightning's flash; analogous to these must be the ideas and propositions, which strike men's minds." Foster's own writings are eminently thus exciting. And it may be said of him, as he remarked of Lord Chatham, speaking of the absence of argumentative reasoning in his speeches; "he struck, as by intuition, directly on the *results* of reasoning, as a common shot strikes the mark, without your seeing it's course through the air as it moves towards its object." But Foster thought, and reasoned in thinking, most intensely and laboriously; it was not mere intuition that has filled his pages with such condensed results.

Foster and Hall were both men of great independence of mind; but Hall's independence was not combined with so great a degree of originality, and it received more gently into itself in acquiescence the habitudes of society, and the characteristics of other minds. Foster's independence was that of bare truth; he hated the frippery of circumstance, the throwing of truth upon external support. He would have it go for no more than it was worth. And anything like the *imposition* of an external ceremonial, he could not endure. He went so far as to wish that everything ceremonial and sacerdotal could be cleared out of our religious economy. He wanted nothing at all to come between the soul of man and free unmingled truth. The hearty conviction of truth, and the pure acting from it, was what he required. He abhorred all manner of intolerance with such vehemence and intensity of hatred, that if he could have had a living *Nemesis* for the retribution of crimes not punished by human law, it would have been for that. He hated everything that tempted man to dissemble, to seem or assume what he was not. He hated oppression in every form. He hated a state-established hierarchy, as "infinitely pernicious to Christianity."

We have in these volumes a record of the life and correspondence of this most original and powerful mind; yet it was a mind in some respects strangely constructed, or rather, we should say, strangely self-disciplined, and in some respects out of order for *want* of self-discipline. Looking through the whole seventy years and more of Foster's life, and remembering the magnificent intellectual endowments with which it pleased God to create him, and the almost uninterrupted health and comparative leisure enjoyed for nearly fifty years, there will seem to have been by him but little accomplished, there will seem to have been almost a waste of power. We might, in some respects, compare Foster with Coleridge; in respect of originality and power of intellect, they were very much alike; not so in variety, comprehensiveness and profoundness of erudition; for while Coleridge's ac-

quisitions were vast and varied, Foster's were much rather limited. But both were blest with transcendent powers of mind and grand opportunities, and yet accomplished comparatively little; and a severe censor might say, are instances of a lamentable disuse of intellect. Taking Coleridge's miserable health into view, and the fact that he was not, like Foster, at an early period brought under the impulse of true religion, we ought perhaps to say, that of the two, Coleridge accomplished the most. But taking the *character* of Foster's efforts into consideration, their more immediate bearing on men's highest interests must incline us to put the adjudged superiority of amount to his score.

The development of character and opinion in these volumes is intensely interesting and instructive; so is the display and observance of influences and causes forming and directing opinion; so, likewise is the struggle between conscience and habit, between grandeur of impulse and judgment, conflicting with native and habitual indolence and procrastination. There was, in the first place, a strong, peculiar, obstinate, iron mould, which might have made the man, under certain circumstances, as hinted in one of Foster's own Essays, a Minos or a Draco; but which, had it been filled with apostolic zeal in the love of Christ and of souls, would have made almost another apostle. There were tendencies to deep and solemn thought, and to great wrestlings of the intellect and spirit, which, brought under the full influence of the "powers of the world to come," and developed in the intense benevolence of a soul by faith freed from condemnation, and habitually communing with God in Christ, would have given as great a spiritual mastery over *this* world as any human being could well be conceived to exercise. But for this purpose there must have been a holy and deep baptism in the Word of God, an unassailable faith in, and most humble acquiescence with, and submission to, its dictates; a familiarity with it as the daily food of the soul, and an experience of it, as of a fire in one's bones, admitting no human speculation to put it out; no theory of mere human opinion, or feelings, or imagination, to veil, or darken, or make doubtful, its realities.

Now the want of this kind of familiarity with the Scriptures, this profound study and experience of them; this unhesitating, reception of them as the infallible Word of God; may have been the secret of some of Foster's greatest difficulties. There was nothing but this fixedness in God's Word, that could be the helm of a mind of such unusual power and original tendencies. Foster wanted an *all-controlling faith*; he wanted submission to the Word of God as the decisive, supreme, last appeal. Foster's character was somewhat like that of Thomas among the Apostles; gloomy tendencies in it, inveterate convolutions of opinion, seclusion in its own depths, and sometimes only faith enough just to save him from despair.

He had a strong self-condemning conscience, a clear, massive view and powerful conception of human depravity, but not an early and accurate view, or powerful sense, of the infinite odiousness of sin, as manifested by the divine law, the divine holiness, and the divine atonement. He had an instinctive, vigorous appreciation of the ignorance, crime, and evil in human society, a sense of its misery, and a disposition to dwell upon its gloomy shades, which made him, as an observer, what Caravaggio or Espagnoletto were as painters; tremendously dark and impressive in his delineations. But it was quite as much the instinct and taste of the painter, as it was the light of the Word of God, revealing the depths of Satan. It was the native intensity of observation, combined with a saturnine turn of mind, and intermingled with revelations of things as they are, beneath the light of the Divine Attributes.

Mr. Foster came early under the power of religious conviction, but evidently not in the happiest manner, and not so as to bring him at once thoroughly, heartily, confidently, to Christ. Perhaps there may be traced much of what is called *legal* (at least for a long time), mingled with his acceptance of Christ as the only refuge of his soul, or as he would sometimes have denominated it, with his views of the economy of human redemption. There was more of the general reliance of the mind upon that as an economy, than of the personal reliance of the soul upon Christ as a Saviour. One cannot but be impressed with the fact of the great absence, throughout the whole tenor of his letters, his conversations, and the mould of his life and character till a late period,—the great absence and want of habitual, and even occasional reference to the love of Christ, the claims of the cross, the authority of the Word of God, and all that is peculiar to the gospel. Perhaps there may have been an intentional exclusion of these topics, as trite and technical, induced by an extreme of the same feelings with which he wrote so severely concerning the customary diction of evangelical piety, and which passed unawares into a fastidiousness, and almost aversion in his own mind, which became habitual. His letters to Miss Saunders at the close of these volumes, show how entirely he threw off any such embarrassment, when roused to the work of presenting eternal realities to an immortal spirit on the threshold of eternity. But from an early period, his disgust at the peculiar diction of the Gospel, as used by men who seemed to have lost all perception of the sublime ideas intended to be conveyed by it, may have operated insensibly in the way of a prejudice against some of those ideas themselves.

He had indeed a sense of guilt, which became, at a later period, absorbing and powerful; and a sense of the atonement, which grew deeper and deeper to the last, with a most entire reliance upon it; but mingled with this, and influencing his whole habit of thought and feeling, and even of belief, far more than he would himself have

been willing to acknowledge, there seems at one time to have been a secret unconscious reliance on the hope that the Supreme Judge would not be so rigidly severe in the scrutiny of mortals, as the terms of the Gospel and the Law imply ; so that, instead of relying *solely* on the merits of Christ, as a sinner utterly and for ever lost without him, he appeared to rely on the mercy of God as a lenient, compassionate Judge, in whose sight an amiable and good life might also come between the sinner and the fear of an inexorable judgment. We think this feeling is plainly to be detected in what Foster says of the grounds of his hope in the case of his own son. And though in his own case he was always gloomily and severely self-accusing, yet it seemed much like the same experience in the case of Dr. Johnson, whom Foster not a little resembled in some characteristics ; and as in the case of Dr. Johnson, Foster's own personal view of Christ, and reliance upon him, and sense of deliverance from condemnation, were always greatly dimmed and diminished by the ever recurring habit of looking for something in himself, and in his preparation to meet God, as a ground of confidence. A more defective religious experience, for a season, *in so eminent a Christian Minister*, we think is rarely to be found on record. Indeed, compared with men like Newton, Scott, Ryland, Hill, with Mr. Hall, and some others, either but little preceding or quite contemporary with Foster, he appears sometimes almost like a strong-minded, intellectual, but half-enlightened Pagan, in the comparison.

This defective early experience, and Foster's strong antipathy to the *technicals* of evangelical piety, especially if approximating in his view in any manner to cant, together with his want of continued, thorough, systematic or scriptural study of theology, acted and reacted on each other. And at one time he was so disastrously under the power of a tendency to rationalism, and to a choice of what to believe irrespective of the Scriptures, that he seems to have come very near to the slough of the Socinian system. He had a strong corrective in the piety and influence of his friend, the Rev. Mr. Hughes, to whose correspondence and conversation he evidently owed much. But he had great repugnance to anything like a "party of systematics," and he carried his natural independence and hatred of restraint to such a degree, that he would even have dissolved the very institution of churches, with every ordinance in them, and have had nothing on earth but public worship and the Lord's Supper. This peculiarity was akin to his own personal reception of Christianity as a general economy, unaccompanied by a sufficiently close and scriptural study of its elements with a sufficiently entire and sole reliance upon Christ.

But we find ourselves, in our survey of the characteristics of a great and powerful mind, glancing at defective points first, which ought not to be ; and we must not proceed, without the outlines

of the life and opinions of this remarkable man as presented in his letters and biography. In life and character he was most lovely, and original in his simplicity and loveliness; and this, with his grand superiority of thought and style to almost the whole range of modern English literature, makes his whole genius and moral excellence so striking, that it seems an ungrateful task to dwell even upon speculative defects. In this mine of precious metal, the discovery of a vein of very different and contradictory material compels us to a close examination of it, and of the hidden causes that might have produced it. Many are the laborers that have been working in this mine, and bringing out whole ingots of gold for the manufacture of their own pots, and cups, and vessels, who never dreamed, till recently, that there was anything *but* gold in its deep, curious, far-reaching seams of treasure. We shall find that "an enemy hath done this," and that it is one of the most memorable examples of his infernal and partially successful enginery.

Mr. Foster was born in 1770. His father was a substantial farmer and weaver, a strong-minded man and Christian. From early childhood John Foster was reserved and thoughtful, constitutionally pensive, full of emotion and sentiment, but of "an infinite shyness" in the revelation of his feelings. As early as the age of twelve years he expresses himself as having had "a painful sense of an awkward but entire individuality." He possessed by nature an intensely vivid power of association, combined with great strength and vividness of imagination. He was endowed with an exquisite sensibility to the loveliness and meaning of the world of external scenery. There was indeed in him such a remarkable combination of all the requisites for a great poet, that it seems almost strange that the qualities of his being had not run in that mould. He would have made the most *thoughtful* poet that ever lived.

No man that has ever read it can have forgotten the exquisitely beautiful passage on the influence of nature over the sensibility and imagination in the Essay on a man's writing Memoirs of himself. There are similar passages in Mr. Foster's Review of the Philosophy of Nature. His own mind was developed under the power of deep impulses from the richness, grandeur and beauty of the creation, and there was within him "an internal economy of ideas and sentiments, of a character and a color correspondent to the beauty, vicissitude and grandeur, which continually press upon the senses." "Sweet Nature!" exclaims he in one of his letters, "I have conversed with her with inexpressible luxury; I have almost worshipped her. A flower, a tree, a bird, a fly, has been enough to kindle a delightful train of ideas and emotions, and sometimes to elevate the mind to sublime conceptions. When the Autumn stole on, I observed it with the most vigilant attention, and felt a pensive regret to see those forms of beauty, which tell that all the

beauty is going soon to depart." For this reason he would sometimes come back from his walks, after witnessing in the fields some of the flowers, with which Nature prophesies the closing season of their loveliness, and say in a tone of sadness, "I have seen a fearful sight to-day ; I've seen a buttercup !" Though he took great delight in flowers, he would not often gather them, because he would not shorten their existence ; he loved to see them live out their little day.

The youth of this being of such exquisite and original genius was spent mainly in weaving. Till his fourteenth year he worked at spinning wool to a thread by the hand-wheel, and for three years afterwards he wove double stuffs and lastings. Strange indeed ! for meanwhile his passion for learning was such, that he would sometimes shut himself up in the barn for hours, and study what books he could get hold of, and then was tied to the loom again. Thus he was self-educated, sparingly, and not very favorably, until his seventeenth year, when he became a member of the Baptist Church under the pastorate of the venerable Dr. Fawcett, under whose directions he prosecuted his theological studies for a season at Brearly Hall.

In his Essay on a man's writing memoirs of himself, Mr. Foster has remarked, in reference to the effect of much and various reading on the mind in its development, that "it is probable that a very small number of books will have the pre-eminence in our mental history. Perhaps your memory will recur promptly to six or ten that have contributed more to your present habit of feeling and thought, than all the rest together. And here it may be observed that when a few books of the same kind have pleased us emphatically, they too often form an almost exclusive taste, which is carried through all future reading, and is pleased only with books of that kind." His own taste in reading carried him much into the region of the romantic, the imaginative and the wonderful, in history and character. He loved to read books of travels, and always drew illustrations with great force and beauty from his excursions through this kind of literature. On a comparison of his correspondence with the volume of his Essays a most striking resemblance will be found between the habits of mind, the trains of thinking, reading and observation, and the prevailing character of the feelings, developed in the one and in the other. No man ever drew more from himself, in the composition of a great work, or turned more directly into illustration of his subjects the influences that had formed his own being and opinions, or more truly, though perhaps unintentionally, set down the great features of his own nature, than Mr. Foster in the writing of his Essays. Milton's *Paradise Lost* is not more stamped with the grandeur of his own mind and feelings, and the sublimity of his imagination, than Foster's Essays with his. Indeed the Essays

occupy a place in that department of English Literature almost as separate and supreme as the *Paradise Lost* does in the department of its poetry. In power of thought and style they are unrivalled, unequalled.

Young's *Night Thoughts* occupied a conspicuous place among the books which attracted Foster's early notice, and under the influence of which the characteristics of his mind were much formed and developed. The strain of gloomy and profound sublimity in that poem suited perfectly the original bent of his intellect, the character of his imagination, and his tendencies of feeling, so that it wrought upon him with a powerful effect. It even had much to do with the moulding of his style, as well as the sustaining and enriching of his native sublimity of sentiment. Almost all Foster's pages are tinged with the sombre, thoughtful grandeur of the night-watcher; they reflect the lonely magnificence of midnight and the stars. And there are images in Young, which describe the tenor of Foster's meditative life, occupied, so much of it, with intense contemplations on the future life, in pacing to and fro upon the beach of that immortal sea which brought us hither. For no one ever saw him but he seemed to

" Walk thoughtful on the solemn, silent shore
Of that vast ocean we must sail so soon."

His love and admiration of Young's *Night Thoughts* he carried with him through life. Of Milton he remarked that "Milton's genius might harmoniously have mingled with the angels that announced the Messiah to be come, or that on the spot and at the moment of his departure predicted his coming again." He held in great admiration the powerful mind of Johnson. His *Essays*, as well as some of his *Reviews*, are such a proof of the discriminating power, taste and admirable thought and illustration with which he would pass through the range of English and Classical literature, especially as a Christian critic, that they make one wish that he had given to the world a volume on the principles of criticism.

But it should have been in the shape of original investigations; for Mr. Foster's *Reviews*, though full of profound thought and fine illustrations, are not, on the whole, equal to his *Essays*. He was limited by the stuff. Nothing imposed upon him as a task, by a subject presented from abroad, was equal to what grew out of his own mind. *That* was a region of thought; affluence and originality of thought; but it was spontaneous, and the forms it must take should be so, too, if they would exhibit the whole power and originality of the author. Besides, his subjects were often not congenial, and this was a circumstance which made a great difference in the workings of his genius, and of course in its productions. The mind may have vast original stores and capacities; but every talismanic inscription is not the one that can open or command them. The silk-worm weaves from itself, but it feeds

on mulberries; it could not produce silk from rose leaves or the oak. The aliments of genius are almost as important as its elements.

The range of Mr. Foster's *theological* studies does not seem to have been comprehensive, nor does he seem to have cared to have it such; hating *party* systems to such a degree as to be carried almost into the opposite extreme. Some instructive hints as to unfavorable early associations connecting themselves with the system of Evangelical truth are to be found in the second and third of his letters on the aversion of men of taste to Evangelical religion, from which one may conjecture similar unfortunate influences to have operated on Mr. Foster's mind early in life. After he had finished his course under Dr. Fawcett at Brearly Hall, he came under the tutorship of Mr. Hughes, the founder and Secretary of the British and Foreign Bible Society, in the Baptist Seminary at Bristol. Mr. Hughes's mental vigor was "of such a nature," to use the expression of Foster himself, "as to communicate a kind of contagion," while his piety was deep and fervent.

Foster early speaks in several of his letters of an "excessive constitutional indolence, which is unwilling to purchase even the highest satisfaction at the price of little mental labor." He sometimes wished himself "engaged in some difficult undertaking, which he must absolutely accomplish, or die in the attempt." It was not an aversion to the labor of hard thinking, but of writing. It cost him severe self-denial and effort to put pen to paper. Dr. Johnson used to say, a man can write at any time, if he will set himself *doggedly* to it. All that a mind like Johnson's or Foster's needed was the first dogged effort, and then the intellectual machinery would move from mere excitement.

Mr. Foster's first regular engagement as a preacher was with a small auditory at Newcastle-on-Tyne. There were some ten or twelve individuals, who listened to his original discourses with breathless interest, but he remained here little more than three months, and in 1793 went to preach to a Baptist society in Dublin. It was an uncongenial situation, and he abandoned it in little more than a year, having found his greatest enjoyment while there in attending to the children of a charity school, to whom he would talk familiarly, and read amusing and instructive books. He made an experiment on a classical and mathematical school in Dublin, and gave it up after eight or nine months. His opinions on religious subjects were as fluctuating as his employments, and at one time he saw no possibility of coming to any satisfactory conclusions. He would have liked some Arian congregation in want of a preacher, and with as little fixedness of opinion and as much uncertainty, as existed in his own mind, to employ him while he was halting. Had he found such a place, we might have had in his life a counterpart to the early history of Coleridge. What would have exactly gratified him, would have been "the power

of building a meeting of his own, and, without being controlled by any man, and without even the existence of what is called a *church*, of preaching gratis to all that chose to hear." In this state of mind he had "discarded the doctrine of eternal punishments."

Here is something to be marked. We have before us a period of some three or four years, from the age of twenty-two to twenty-six, during which the opinions, the employments, the expectations and intentions of Mr. Foster were utterly unsettled. His course of reading was vague, his course of study was rambling and not disciplinary; it was neither theological nor literary, but embraced projections for both. Sometimes for a year he did not preach at all. Sometimes he taught the classics and mathematics. Sometimes he preached in cleric cloth, sometimes in "tail and colored clothes," sometimes of a Saturday evening perused Dr. Moore's *Journal of a residence in France*, and "adjusted some of the *exteriors* for the morrow," and on Sabbath morning made his sermon in bed, "caught some considerable ideas," and ascended the pulpit. "I seem nearly at a stand with respect to the adjustment of plans for futurity. Whether I am to be a preacher or not, I cannot tell."—"At some moments of life, the world, mankind, religion, and eternity, appear to me like one vast scene of tremendous confusion, stretching before me far away, and closed in shades of the most awful darkness;—a darkness which only the most powerful splendors of Deity can illumine, and which appears as if they never yet had *illumined* it."

Now it is during these three or four years, not so much of the transition, as of the chaotic state, in Mr. Foster's life, that we find, amidst all his uncertainties, one sudden and positive declaration, "*I have discarded the doctrine of eternal punishments.*" He adds, "I can avow no opinion on the peculiar points of Calvinism, for I have none, nor see the possibility of forming a satisfactory one." The discarded doctrine seems to have been cashiered by Mr. Foster with about as little thoughtful investigation, as if he had been laying aside an old coat. The sudden announcement of this negative position is almost the only positive thing to be found in these three or four years of his experience. He was some twenty-four years of age. If this was the manner in which he decided upon the fundamental articles of that Christian System which he was preaching, it is manifest that his theological views could have been but little worth. This announcement of opinion has an abruptness, an isolation, a dislocation from every train of association and employment, which intimates a hasty prejudice, rather than a deliberately formed conviction. He seems to have discarded the clerical dress and the clerical doctrine with about the same independence and indifference; but in neither case as an absolute conviction. If, however, his denial of this grand promi-

ment feature in the Christian system is to be traced back to this period, it is manifestly a denial not based upon any profound or protracted examination of the subject.

Having passed through this period, we find Mr. Foster, in 1797, accepting an invitation to become the minister of a Baptist Church in Chichester. This is one year after the preceding declaration of opinion. After he has been preaching two years at Chichester, we find him saying to his friend Mr. Hughes, that "he holds, he believes, accurately, the leading points of Calvinistic faith; as the corruption of human nature, the necessity of a divine power to change it, irresistible grace, the influence of the Spirit, the doctrine of the Atonement in its most extensive and emphatic sense," &c., &c. "My opinions are, in substance, Calvinistic." It would seem that the moment Mr. Foster began to apply himself in earnestness, and with fixedness of purpose, to the duties of the ministry, his mind began to be settled in the great truths of the gospel. For two years and a half, his biographer tells us, he "applied himself with greater earnestness than at any former period to his ministerial duties, usually preaching three times on the Sunday, and in various ways striving to promote the piety and general improvement of the congregation." The result to himself is full of instruction. No longer left to vague indeterminate musings and readings, the continued effort to teach and improve others wrought a salutary correction and decisiveness in his own convictions.

His intercourse with his former tutor, Mr. Hughes, was of the greatest benefit. The views and facts presented by this gentleman were dwelt upon by Mr. Foster with "great emotion." In a letter to his parents in 1799, he speaks with frankness. "My visit to Mr. Hughes has been of great service in respect of my religious feelings. He has the utmost degree of evangelic animation, and has incessantly, with affectionate earnestness in his letters, and still more in his personal intercourse, acted the monitor on this subject. It has not been in vain. I have felt the commanding force of the duty to examine and judge myself with a solemn faithfulness. In some measure I have done so, and I see that on this great subject I have been wrong. The views which my judgment has admitted in respect to the gospel in general, and Jesus, the great pre-eminent object in it, have not inspired my affections, in that animated, unbounded degree, which would give the energy of enjoyment to my personal religion, and apostolic zeal to my ministrations among mankind. This fact is serious, and moves my deep regrets. The time is come to take on me with stricter bonds and more affectionate warmth, the divine discipleship. I fervently invoke the influences of Heaven, that the whole spirit of the gospel may take possession of all my soul, and give a new and powerful impulse to my practical exertions in the cause of the Messiah."

“ My opinions are more Calvinistic than when I first came here ; *so much so as to be in direct hostility with the leading principles of belief in this society.* The greatest part of my views I believe are accurately Calvinistic. My opinion respecting future punishments is an exception.”

We shall resume the consideration of this latter point, in a particular examination of the tenor of Mr. Foster's mind and writings with reference to it. It was a most strange, unaccountable, and to many persons a startling announcement, that some of the letters in these volumes proved the author of them to have renounced the Scripture truth of the endless punishment of the wicked. We shall see how the thing lay in his mind ; how, while his whole belief and practical course was evangelical, there was on this point a break in the chain ; his convictions kept the continuity, while a doubting, inconsistent, and impatient logic denied it. It was like an arch kept in its position and form without the key-stone, by the frame on which it was constructed ; that frame being in Foster's mind an uninterrupted spiritual conviction and pressure of personal guilt and of eternal realities. To see him in company with the deniers and scoffers of the eternal sanctions of the Divine law, would be as if Abdiel had been found fighting by mistake in the army of the fallen angels.

We have seen his convictions becoming more and more Calvinistic. An extract from a letter to Rev. Dr. Fawcett, in the year 1800, is here in point ; written apparently, in part, with reference to the change of opinion noted in the letter to his parents.

“ I receive with pleasure, but not without diffidence of myself, your congratulations on a happy revolution of my views and feelings. Oh, with what profound regret I review a number of inestimable years nearly lost to my own happiness, to social utility, and to the cause and kingdom of Christ ! I often feel like one who should suddenly awake to amazement and alarm on the brink of a gloomy gulf. I am scarcely able to retrace exactly through the mingled dreary shades of the past, the train of circumstances and influences which have led me so far astray ; but amid solemn reflection, the conviction has flashed upon me irresistibly, that I must be fatally wrong. This mournful truth has indeed many times partially reached me before, but never so decisively, nor to awaken so earnest a desire for the full, genuine spirit of a disciple of Jesus. I see clearly that my strain of thinking and preaching has not been pervaded and animated by the evangelic sentiment, nor consequently accompanied by the power of the gospel, either to myself or to others. I have not come forward in the spirit of Paul, or Peter, or John ; have not counted all things but loss, that I might win Christ, and be found in him. It is true, indeed, that this kind of sentiment, when strongly presented, has always appeared powerfully to both my judgment and my heart ; I have

yielded my whole assent to its truth and excellence, and often longed to feel its heavenly inspiration; but some malady of the soul has still defeated these better emotions, and occasioned a mournful relapse into coldness of feeling, and sceptical or unprofitable speculation. I wonder as I reflect; and am amazed how indifference and darkness could return over a mind, which had seen such gleams of heaven. I hope that mighty grace will henceforward save me from such infelicity. My habitual affections, however, are still much below the pitch that I desire. I wish above all things to have a continual, most solemn impression of the absolute need of the free salvation of Christ for my own soul, and to have a lively faith in him, accompanied with all the sentiments of patience, humility, and love. I would be transformed, fired with holy zeal; and henceforth live not to myself, but to him that died and rose again. My utmost wish is to be a minor apostle; to be an humble, but active, devoted, heroic servant of Jesus Christ, and in such a character and course to minister to the eternal happiness of those within my sphere. My opinions are in substance decisively Calvinistic. I am firmly convinced, for instance, of the doctrines of original sin, predestination, imputed righteousness, the necessity of the Holy Spirit's operation to convert the mind, final perseverance, &c. &c."

Such letters as these afford convincing proof that the mind of the writer was under the influence of that Divine Grace, of which he asserts the necessity in the soul. They afford proof equally convincing, of the disastrous nature of those tendencies, whatever they may have been, under which Mr. Foster found himself "on the brink of a gloomy gulf;" and which, as we shall see, continued, notwithstanding the endearing openness and meekness with which he received the severe suggestions and remonstrances of inferior minds, to harass and fetter his spirit. The tracing of these causes in their operation, so far as it can be done even with any degree of probability, is a matter of much importance.

Yet it seems, we say again, an ungrateful and presumptuous work, to analyse the defects or obliquities in the religious character of a man of sincere piety, and of such vast endowments; though the picture is before the world, and there are reasons for a severe scrutiny of it. It seems still more ungrateful to take the ingenuous confessions of Mr. Foster's own mind, which are in themselves such a delightful evidence of genuine childlike humility, in corroboration of a judgment passed upon his deficiencies. But if Mr. Foster had the frankness and humility of a little child, he had also an entire freedom from anything like morbidness of conscience; if he had a perfect ingenuousness of character, he had also a strong protection, in his hatred of hypocrisy and cant, against overdrawn any of the deficiencies of that character; he would be likely to set down things just as they are, or at least just

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as they appeared to him on discovering them. We use the freedom of those, who have followed Foster's intellect as a guiding star ; who well remember the time when, as if some gorgeous angel had come to them to lead them on in paths of truth never before opened, they remained as it were spellbound by the grandeur of the vision. And now, if the same angel beckons them on towards a tract of error, they are right, if they scrutinize most severely the elements of an intellectual and spiritual development, assuming so unexpectedly such a direction ; elements, every one of which they were prepared at one time to take even on trust as well-nigh perfect.

In 1799, Mr. Foster wrote a deeply interesting letter to his friend Hughes, in acknowledgment of the justness and kindness of a preceding letter, which had been painful to him by the severity of its friendly strictures. "I know it too well," he says, "that for a long course of time, during which I have felt an awful regard for religion, my mind has not been under the full immediate impression of its most interesting character, the most gracious of its influences, its evangelic beams. I have not, with open face, beheld the transforming glory of the Lord. I have, as it were, worshipped in the outer courts of the temple, and not habitually dwelt in that sacred recess, where the God of love reveals all himself in Jesus Christ. And is it difficult to believe that in advancing towards a better state, I may be accompanied awhile by some measure of the defects and the shades contracted in that gloomy sojourn, which I must for ever deplore?"

The state of his mind, while in that gloomy sojourn, may be partially gathered from a letter in 1798. He speaks of "the whole hemisphere of contemplation as inexpressibly strange and mysterious. It is cloud pursuing cloud, forest after forest, Alps upon Alps. It is in vain to declaim against scepticism ; I feel with an emphasis of conviction, wonder and regret, that all things are almost enveloped in shade, that many things are covered with thickest darkness, that the number of things to which certainty belongs is small. I hope to enjoy the sunshine of the other world. One of the very few things that appear to me not doubtful, is the truth of Christianity in general ; some of the evidences of which I have lately seen most ably stated by Archdeacon Paley, in his work on the subject."

This is surely a sad state for a preacher of the Gospel. Say what you will of it, it argues a most defective religious experience, the defects and shades of which did indeed accompany Mr. Foster, in some degree, all through life. It could not have been otherwise, without a great and powerful change, and he was not entirely delivered from the malady of which he speaks in those letters. His mind was veiled ; the shades remained upon it.

But if Mr. Foster had passed effectually and thoroughly *through*

such a state of mind as this, and had come out from it, by the grace of God, in reliance submissively upon his Word, into the clear light of the Cross, and of the love of Christ in the soul, it would have been to him a discipline of incomparable worth. If he had *wrestled* out, as Bunyan did from *his* conflicts, with no possibility of peace, and a determination of having no peace, but in Christ and in God's Word, it had been an element of power and light. But instead of this, he never entirely passed out of it into the clear light; he carried the involving folds of this gloom, in which sometimes he seemed to take a grim pleasure in wrapping himself, even to the end of life. He was always in some respect in the Valley of the Shadow of Death, and exclaiming with Job, "He hath set darkness in my path." He never seems to have felt, as such a strong mind ought to have done, the amazing importance of being *settled* concerning the particular revelations of the Christian religion, by an unhesitating reception and most prayerful study of the Word of God. And his mind seemed sometimes obstinately to turn away from, and forget, the light shed as a flood from that Word upon the future dispensation of our being, to lose itself in conjectures, mysterious, solemn, awful, as if everything beyond the grave were absolutely unknown to us. His feeling in reference to the future world was much like that of Job, "Before I go whence I shall not return, even to the land of darkness, and the shadow of death; a land of darkness as darkness itself, and of the shadow of death without any order, and where the light is as darkness." Certainly his prevailing mood was much more this, than that of Paul; and his prevailing mode of reasoning on some points was rather that of a mind under the dimness of the old dispensation than the glory of the new.

He speaks about this same period, in a letter to Mr. Fawcett, of his having "for a long while past fully felt the necessity of dismissing subtle speculations and distinctions, and of yielding an humble, cordial assent to the mysterious truth, just *as* and *because* the scriptures declare it, without inquiring, how can these things be?" But it is evident that in some respects he never *did* this, and that his mind was continually relapsing from the health and definiteness of divine revelation, into a state of vague, solemn, awful wonder, as to what he called the *absolute unknown* beyond the grave, the mysteries of that dread eternal hereafter. As an instance of this state of mind we may take the following paragraph from one of his letters, written even so late as the year 1834.

"It does always appear to me very unaccountable (among indeed so many other inexplicable things), that the state of the soul after death should be so completely veiled from our serious inquisitiveness. That in some sense it is proper that it should be so, needs not be said. But is not the sense in which it is so, the

same sense in which it is proper there should be *punitive* circumstances, privations, and inflictions, in this our sinful state? For one knows not how to believe that *some* revelation of that next stage of our existence would not be more influential to a right procedure in this first, than such an *absolute unknown*. It is true that a profound darkness, which we know we are destined ere long to enter, and soon to find ourselves in an amazing light, is a striking object of contemplation. But the mind still, again and again falls back from it disappointed and uninstructed, for want of some defined forms of reality to seize, retain, and permanently occupy it. In default of revelation, we have to frame our conjectures on some principle of analogy, which is itself arbitrary, and without any means of bringing it to the test of reason."

Now one is tempted to exclaim, in perusing such a passage, Can the man who writes this have ever seriously read the Scriptures? It may be said that Foster was not here speaking of the general doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, but of the default of any definite knowledge of our state *immediately* after death. But even thus, such language is absolutely unjustifiable on the ground of the information contained in the Word of God, and would seem totally inconsistent with a firm faith in the truth, or a serious examination of the meaning, of our blessed Lord's own declarations as to what takes place after death. There is no such thing as this *absolute unknown*, of which Foster speaks; on the contrary, the blank is so definitely filled up, the mystery is so much cleared away, that our Lord solemnly declares to us that if men will not believe for what is already written, neither would they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead. A sentence which stands in singular and palpable contradiction against what Mr. Foster remarks about *some* revelation being more influential. He has introduced a similar train of reflections in one of his Essays, but with a very different impression. But he seems to have been constantly wishing for something more clear and convincing than we have in the Word of God, in regard to the realities of the Eternal World, and constantly underrating the degree and decisiveness of that information; or what is worse, shrinking back from its admission, and dreading its plain and direct interpretation. Nothing can be more unfortunate than such a state of mind in regard to the Scriptures, especially for a preacher of the Gospel; and few things would render a teacher more unfitted for the instruction of others, in regard to some of the most essential points in the system of revealed truth.

His state of mind was somewhat like that of a disastrous eclipse, and all things looked in it as the vegetation and forms of the world look in an eclipse of the sun at noonday. It seemed as if, while he was advancing forward to the knowledge of Divine things, the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, and to

the possession of convictions and expanded views and a celestial experience, which would have armed him, as with the sword of Michael against the powers of darkness, there had been a strange permission given to those powers to stop him. And they said, We cannot take from him what he has gained, but we will fasten him there; he shall henceforward view all things only from his present limited point of view, and here we will bring to bear upon him all our suggestions of mysteries and difficulty, and if we cannot turn him from his integrity, we will make the very anguish and utterance of his uncertainties the means of shaking others. And he shall, at the least, never make any onset upon our kingdom, notwithstanding the towering pride of his intellect, and the grace of God in him. And in effect, Foster did for a season stop. He seems for a long time to have made little advance in religious knowledge, and little in religious zeal. His life was always pure, his nature noble, and his spirit was always hovering over the awful gulf of futurity, and you might see a gloomy and terrible light reflected from the wings of the soul, as you followed its excursions; but you could seldom see it in the clear serene of heaven. You saw not the shining light shining more and more, unto the perfect day, but a path of involutions and anxieties, sometimes indeed running in that shining light, but sometimes crossing it at right angles and plunging into the darkness. His feelings were of an exquisite kindness and tenderness; his sympathies were strong and deep, notwithstanding his apparently misanthropic aloofness from society. His humility was genuine, his personal reliance upon Christ, towards the close of life, delightfully entire and satisfactory; and yet for a long period there was doubt and gloom.

The position of his mind seemed like that of a man in the dark, confident that he is near some vast, solid obstacle, but not daring to advance. He had a spiritual sense or instinct of the realities of the future world, like the feeling which makes a blind man know that things are near him, even without touching them. And he trembled at times, as a bewildered traveller might stand and tremble in the darkness, when convinced by the deep roar of falling waters, near and below him, that he is on the brink of some tremendous verge, where he dare not stir one step without a guide. What avail would it be for him in such a case, to shout to others, who might be in the same position, There is nothing to fear, the gulf is not bottomless, and if you fall, you will come up unhurt! Why fear for thyself, O man, if thou art so sure of the divine benevolence at the bottom of this fall to others? This fear is the sacred instinct of the soul in the near presence of the reality. Though the soul does not see, or will not see, the form of the reality in the definite light of the Divine Word, yet it feels the reality, almost as if it touched it.

It was under the power of this feeling that Foster lived and

wrote. His very letters issue from the pressure of it ; every coinage of his mind bears its stamp. He could not help it, any more than he could the sense of his immortality. There was always in his soul a sense of vast, dread, illimitable *retribution in Eternity*, to which all sinful beings are advancing, and from which the only escape is in the mercy of God in Christ Jesus *to those only* who in this world avail themselves of it. He felt this ; he could not, did not, reason about it ; he felt it. He questioned it, and yet he felt it. He shrunk back from it, and yet he felt it. It was with him by day and by night, an ever-brooding power and presence from the Eternal World, a truth that woke to perish never, “ a Master o’er a slave ; a presence that was not to be put by.” Beneath the pressure of questioned realities in the invisible world he wrote all his works, and they have, consequently, some of them, an overpowering solemnity. For he could not put off his heritage ; his soul would be weighed down beneath it, notwithstanding all evasive doubts, and shrinkings from its dread solemnity. There was within him

“ That eye among the blind,
That, deaf and silent, read the eternal deep,
Haunted for ever by the Eternal mind.”

And amidst all the uncertainties of his religious experience, and all the vagueness of his views, perhaps there never was a man, who had a fuller, more constant, brooding sense of eternity, as a sense of eternal responsibility, and a danger of eternal ruin. And although custom lies upon our religious sensibilities, if they be not most anxiously cultivated, with a weight, as men advance into age, “ heavy as frost, and deep almost as life,” no religious deadness or insensibility or laxity of view, ever delivered Foster from this powerful haunting sense of Eternal retribution. We think we can detect it even in that late letter on the subject of the Divine penalty, even while summoning all his powers to resist the conviction. A letter, not indeed written in anything like the dotage of the mind in old age, for Foster never lived to that, but bore his faculties with surprising vigor, beyond his three-score years and ten ; but still written when the wheel is beginning to cease its revolutions at the cistern, and when they that look out at the windows be darkened. A letter full of the most surprising inconsistencies, of which the impression remaining on the mind is that of a being crushed beneath some heavy load, and writhing in vain to get out from it.

The manner of Mr. Foster’s reasoning in that letter, combined with the tenor of his practical appeals to the conscience in his writings, reminds us irresistibly of what he himself has said to the “ professed disbelievers in the Christian revelation of an imaginary heaven, and an equally fictitious hell.” “ You must allow me to doubt, whether you really feel in this matter all the confident as-

surance which you pretend. I suspect there are times, when you dare not look out over that field, for fear of seeing the portentous shapes there again; and even that they sometimes come close to present a ghastly visage to you through the very windows of your stronghold. I have observed in men of your class, that they often appear to regard the arrayed evidences of revealed religion, not with the simple aversion which may be felt for error and deception, but with that kind of repugnance which betrays a recognition of adverse *power*."

Just so the argument of Foster against the Scripture view of the eternity of future punishments, betrays not so much a persuasion, as the existence of agonizing doubt, and the recognition of adverse power.

We question if this will not also strike the mind in reading his letter to Dr. Harris, in which he speaks of the transcendently direful nature of a contemplation of the human race, if he believed the doctrine of the eternity of future misery; and speaks also of the "short term of mortal existence, absurdly sometimes denominated a *probation*." Mr. Foster, in writing this, must have absolutely forgotten what he himself wrote in his introduction to Doddridge's *Rise and Progress*, in regard to that very probation, and the shortness of it, and under this very denomination of a *probationary state*. He tells the careless man, with the most overwhelming pressure of solemnity he can bring to bear upon his spirit, to "think of that existence during endless ages, an existence to commence in a condition *determined for happiness or misery by the state of mind which shall have been formed in this introductory period*." "The whole term of life, diminutive as it is for a preparatory introduction to that stupendous sequel, is what our Creator has allotted to us, leaving to us no responsibility that it is not longer." And Mr. Foster draws from the actual shortness of the preparatory time at the uttermost, an argument, not against the goodness of God, but for the conscience of the guilty man, to convince *him* of the infinite madness of making it any shorter, of wasting any portion of it. He tells the man of the world, of the rapidity of the course with which he is passing out of life, rejecting from him all care of life's one grand business, *the preparation for an eternal state*. He tells him that he is madly living as if this life had no connection with that future life, and as if that future life would have "no reference or relation to the previous and PROBATIONARY state." He adjures the idea of ETERNITY to overwhelm that spirit, whose whole scheme of existence embraces but a diminutive portion of time. He calls for the scene of the last judgment to present itself *in a glare* to the being whose conscience is in such awful repose. Let the thought of the Almighty *fulminate* on the mind of that mortal!

Here assuredly is that state most distinctly recognized, and the

solemnity of it with great power enforced, *as a probationary state*, which Mr. Foster, at a later period, declared to be absurdly denominated a probation. But it was "in his haste" that he said it. We pass to a sketch of the succeeding portion of his life, before resuming this subject.

In the year 1800 Mr. Foster removed to Downend, about five miles from Bristol, where he preached regularly at a small chapel erected by Dr. Caleb Evans. Here he resided about four years, and then, "in consequence chiefly of the high testimony borne to his character and abilities by Mr. Hall, he was invited to become the minister of a Congregation meeting in Shepard's Barton, Frome." He removed thither in February, 1804, and in 1805 his great work, indeed *the* work, on which, as a grave profound classic in English Literature, his fame rests, was published. He was now thirty-five years of age. At this time a swelling in the thyroid gland of the neck compelled him for a season to relinquish preaching, and he gave up his charge, and devoted himself with much assiduity to a literary engagement as contributor to the *Eclectic Review*. "So fully was he occupied in this department of literature, that upwards of thirteen years elapsed, before he again appeared before the public in his own name."

In 1808 he was married to an admirable lady of congenial mind and feeling, to whom he had been engaged for five years. From the period of his marriage he lived a number of years at Bourton, a village in Gloucestershire, with a good deal of work and much serene domestic happiness. Though not settled in the ministry, he was preaching nearly every Sabbath, once or twice, for about seven years. In 1817 he became once more a resident and stated preacher at Downend, though for a few months only. In 1818 he delivered his Discourse on Missions. His sermon in behalf of the British and Foreign School Society, delivered the same year, was afterwards enlarged into the powerful Essay on the Evils of Popular Ignorance, and published in 1820. In 1821 he removed from Downend to Stapleton, within three miles of Bristol, and in 1822, at the earnest solicitation of his friends in Bristol, commenced a series of fortnight lectures in Broadmead Chapel. His preparations for these lectures have been printed since his death, and contain some of the finest productions of his genius. He continued these lectures somewhat longer than two years, but on the settlement of Robert Hall at Bristol, he relinquished the engagement as, in his own view, "altogether superfluous, and even bordering on impertinent." He observed that he should have very little more preaching, probably, ever, but should apply himself to the mode of intellectual operation, of which the results might extend much further, and last much longer.

In the year 1825 he wrote one of his most important and powerful essays, the Introduction to Doddridge's *Rise and Progress of*

Religion. On occasion of the death of Mr. Hall, "a preacher," said Foster, "whose like or equal will come no more," instead of preaching the funeral sermon, which he declined by medical interdict, he published, in 1832, his *Observations on Mr. Hall as a preacher in connection with Dr. Gregory's Memoir of his life.*

In a letter to Mr. Fawcett, in 1830, he says, "Pray, do you often preach? I have suffered an almost entire deposition from that office, by physical organic debility as the primary cause, and as an occasional one by choice, from having felt the great inconvenience and laboriousness of doing occasionally what I have been so long out of the practice of; so that for a long time past I have declined wholly our city pulpits, and never go higher than an easy unstudied discourse, now and then, in one or two of the neighboring country villages, where there is a stated ministry. Mr. Hall is in high physical vigor for the age of 66, while often suffering severely the inexplicable pain in his back, of which he has been the subject from his childhood. His imagination, and therefore the *splendor* of his eloquence, has considerably abated, as compared with his earlier and his meridian pitch, but his *intellect* is in the highest vigor; and the character of his preaching is that of the most emphatically evangelical piety."

Of Foster's own last discourse in the series of fortnight lectures, he announces the subject thus: "I had a splendid subject—the three *Methodists* of Babylon, in the fiery furnace; and perhaps I thought, and perhaps some of the auditors thought, that I did it tolerable justice." What would we not have given to have heard that sermon!

In 1832 Mr. Foster's estimable and beloved wife was taken from him, and thenceforward the ten years of favor, added to his three-score, were to be passed in great loneliness. His "old and most excellent friend Hughes" was also taken in 1833. "But for having looked to see the day of the month," says he, "in order to date this letter, the day would have passed off without my being aware that it is the day that completes my sixty-third year, what is denominated the *grand climacteric*. I deeply deplore not having lived to worthier purpose, both for myself and others; and earnestly hope and pray that whatever of life remains may be employed much more faithfully to the great end of existence. But with this self-condemning review, and with nothing but an uncertain, and possibly small remainder of life in prospect, how emphatically oppressive would be the conscious situation, if there were not that great propitiation, that redeeming sacrifice, to rest upon for pardon and final safety."

We have spoken of Foster's constitutional and habitual horror of the labor of writing. It could not have been imagined, till the publication of these volumes of letters, what an amazing amount of time and labor he spent in the work of revision, remoulding

and condensing, and sometimes amplifying his sentences. The new edition of his *Essays on Popular Ignorance* was in effect rewritten ; he made a new work of it ; and the revision occupied him several months. For weeks he says he was at it, " without intermission or leisure to read a newspaper, review or anything else," having never undergone the same quantity of hard labor within the same number of weeks together in his whole life. " My principle of proceeding was to treat no page, sentence or word with the smallest ceremony ; but to hack, split, twist, prune, pull up by the roots, or practise any other severity on whatever I did not like. The consequence has been alterations to the amount, very likely of several thousands." " It is a sweet luxury, this book-making ; for I dare say I could point out scores of sentences, *each one* of which has cost me *several hours* of the utmost exertion of my mind to put it in the state in which it now stands, after putting it in several other forms, to each one of which I saw some precise objection, which I could at the time have very distinctly assigned. And in truth there are hundreds of them to which I could make objections as they *now* stand, but I did not know how to hammer them into a better form." We must confess we wish that instead of so much of this revising work, Mr. Foster had spent the same amount of labor on some additional production.

This kind of labor, so much of it, was not necessary for the perfection of his work, as is manifest from the consideration of his greatest production, the *Essays*, which do not seem to have been thus labored, and are in fact in a more perfect style. The *Essay Introductory to Doddridge's work* was written by Mr. Foster, according to his own account, as a mere task, a piece of hard, unwilling, compulsory labor, throughout ; a perfect fag. He had made the contract for it with the bookseller ; it was so long unfulfilled, that the whole edition of Doddridge lay upon the shelves of the warehouse for years, unbound, waiting for the promised *Essay*, much to the damage of the publishers. He had himself a very poor opinion of the work, to which he was actually driven by dint of expostulations and remonstrances, and he says " it was almost all labored under a miserable feeling of contraction and sterility." And yet it is one of the most powerful *Essays* in the language, and it sparkles with illustrations, which are the result of profound thought and a Miltonic imagination wrestling together, while it is pervaded, more than any other of Foster's writings, by the solemnity of the *Retributions of Eternity*. A man who could write thus on compulsion ought to have written more abundantly of his own free will.

But perhaps the happiest example of Foster's fineness, originality, and affluence of suggestive thought in connection with a powerful imagination, are to be found in what is called in the biography, his *Journal*. This is a series of striking reflections,

observations and analogies, extended over a number of years, and marked to the amount of some eight or nine hundred. They are not all given by his biographer ; some hundreds seem to be omitted ; for what reason we cannot tell. Certainly, articles which had been prepared and left on record by Mr. Foster himself, with great care, must have been far more worthy of publication than so strange and inconsistent a letter as the one to a young minister, which the writer himself, could he have been questioned as to its publication, would probably have condemned to the flames. On what principle any part of the Journal is kept back, while the letter is published, we cannot imagine. The pages occupied with this Journal are among the most intensely interesting, vivid, and suggestive portions of the volume. The observations seem often to be the result of a whole day's experience, or study, or self reflection, or inspection of others, or meditation on the processes of nature, in a single sentence ; reminding us of a remark once made by Dr. Chalmers in answer to a question put to him by a foreigner, What is John Foster now about ? " Why, sir, he is thinking as intensely as ever he can, at the rate of about a sentence a week." The analogies and illustrations are like flashes of light, in their suddenness, with the illumination remaining as the steady light of day.

The massive hardihood and sternness of thought distinguishing all Mr. Foster's writings is owing in great measure to the gloomy depth and accuracy with which he had gauged the boundlessness of human depravity. If there was one fact that had the mastery over his mind, and colored all its delineations, it was that of the desperate and black corruption of our nature. No man saw more clearly, or painted more strongly and impressively, the native predominant evils of the heart and of society. Instinctively he stripped off all disguises, and at a touch what was fair to the outside appeared full of rottenness. There reigned in his soul an indignant contempt of all forms of pride and hypocrisy, and of all cajoling of the race into a complacent sense of goodness, conveyed sometimes in sentences of withering sarcasm, sometimes in instances, as points, from which the malignity and intensity of supreme evil seem to hiss off, as it were, into the atmosphere. He keeps up in his delineations with the furrow of fiery ruin laid open by the Apostle to the Gentiles. He was the first to unveil to the English nation the frightfulness of an *education* in such depravity ; to bring out into notice the hideous features of a race of children, who " know no good that it is to have been endowed with a rational rather than a brute nature, excepting that they thus have the privilege of tormenting brutes with impunity."

The work on the Evils of Popular Ignorance is in many respects the greatest of Foster's works ; it shows to best advantage the comprehensiveness of his views, the prodigious

strength of his mind, and the intense energy with which it worked, on a subject that possessed his soul with a sense of its importance. For its burning, impetuous, cataractical, yet grave and steadfast tide of description ; for the concentration and continuity of an impression gloomy as night ; for the overwhelming power with which it takes the convictions as by storm ; for the strength and almost ferocious energy of its blows, blow after blow, as if you saw a giant sweating at his anvil, as if it were Vulcan forging the armor of Achilles, it has no instance to be brought in comparison. For the manner in which the strength of the English language is tasked in its combinations to express the conceptions of the writer, there is nothing but some pages in the *Paradise Lost* to be placed before it. There are passages in it, which make the same impression on the mind as Milton's description of hell, or of the Messiah driving the rebellious angels out of heaven. In all English literature it were vain to look for passages of greater power, than the author's delineations of the abominations of Popery, and of Pagan depravity and misery. And there are other passages of equal sublimity and power of imagination in more captivating exercise.

The paragraph on the effect of a conscience darkened in ignorance, or almost gone out as the inward light and law of the being, is one of the most striking instances of the grand part which Foster's imagination was made to play in the exhibition of his subjects.

“ As the man moves hither and thither on the scene, he has his perception of what is existing and passing on it ; there are continually meeting his senses numberless moving and stationary objects ; and among the latter there are many forms of limitation and interdiction ; there are high walls and gates and fences, and brinks of torrents and precipices ; in short, an order of things on all sides signifying to him, with more or less of menace,—Thus far and no farther. And he is in a general way obsequious to this arrangement. We do not ordinarily expect to see him carelessly violating the most decided of the artificial lines of warning-off, nor darting across those dreadful ones of nature. *But the while, as he is nearly destitute of that faculty of the soul which would perceive (analogously to the effect of coming in contact with something charged with that element which causes the lightning), the awful interceptive lines of that other arrangement, which he is in the midst of as a subject of the laws of God, we see with what insensibility he can transgress those prohibitory significations of the Almighty will, which are to devout men as lines streaming with an infinitely more formidable than material fire.* And if we look towards his future course of life, the natural sequel foreseen is, that those lines of divine interdiction, which he has not conscience to perceive as meant to deter him, he will seem nevertheless

to have, through his corruptions, a strong recognition of, but in another quality,—as temptations to attract him.”

From about the period of his sixtieth year, Mr. Foster prepared little or nothing for the press. His last article in the *Eclectic Review* was published in 1839. From the year 1806 to that period he had written one hundred and eighty-five articles; sixty-one of these were collected and published in two volumes by Dr. Price, the Editor of the *Eclectic*, only twenty of which have been republished in this country. From the year 1830, we see the mind of this great writer mainly in his letters. They are filled with profound, solemn, interesting feeling and thought. He took great interest in political affairs, though necessarily a gloomy view. He had a most profound sense of the desperate depravity and selfishness of political intrigues, and an intense hatred of the domineering perniciousness of the Establishment.

In what manner the shades of solemnity were folding and deepening over his soul in the prospect of the eternal world, and what was the ground of his hope for pardon and blessedness, in “*the grand Futurity*,” a few short extracts from his letters will strikingly show. They reveal a solemn anxiety inconsistent with that dismissal of the doctrine of eternal punishment, of which we are to speak. “Whatever may be our appointed remaining time on earth,” says he, in a letter in 1836, “we are sure it is little enough for a due preparation to go safely and happily forward into that eternal hereafter.” In 1837, speaking of the death of a friend, “I have regretted to understand that she was a confirmed Socinian; greatly regretted it; for it does appear to me a tremendous hazard to go into the other world in that character. The exclusion from Christianity of that which a Socinian rejects, would reduce *me* instantly to black *despair*.” “It is fearful to think what the final account must be at the award of infallible Justice, for the immense multitude of accountable creatures.”

In a letter of retrospection, to a dear friend, in 1840, he says, “The pain of a more austere kind than that of pensiveness is from the reflection to how little purpose, of the highest order, the long years here, and subsequently elsewhere, have been consumed away—how little sedulous and earnest cultivation of internal piety—how little even mental improvement—how little of zealous devotement to God and Christ, and the best cause. Oh, it is a grievous and sad reflection, and drives me to the great and only resource, to say, God be merciful to me a sinner! I also most earnestly implore that in one way or another what may remain of my life may be better, far better, than the long protracted past. PAST! What a solemn and almost tremendous word it is, when pronounced in the reference in which I am repeating it!”

In 1841, confined with illness, he says, “The review of life has been solemnly condemnatory—such a sad deficiency of the *vitality*

of religion, the devotional spirit, the love, the zeal, the fidelity of conscience. I have been really amazed to think how I could—I do not say have been, *content* with such a low and almost equivocal piety, for I never *have* been at all content—but, how I could have *endured* it, without my whole soul rising up against it, and calling vehemently on the Almighty Helper to come to my rescue, and never ceasing till the blessed experience was attained. And then the sad burden of accumulated guilt! and the solemn future! and life so near the end! O, what dark despair but for that blessed light, that shines from the Prince of Life, the only and the all-sufficient Deliverer from the second death. I have prayed earnestly for a genuine, penitential, living faith on Him.” “There is much work yet to be done in this most unworthy soul; my sole reliance is on Divine assistance, and I do hope and earnestly trust (trust in that assistance itself), that every day I may yet have to stay on earth will be employed as part of a period of persevering and I may almost say *passionate* petitions for the Divine Mercy of Christ, and so continue to the last day and hour of life, if consciousness be then granted.”

Again, in 1842, “Within and without are the admonitions that life is hastening to its close. I endeavor to feel and live in conformity to this admonition; greatly dissatisfied with myself and my past life, and having and seeking no ground of hope for hereafter, but solely the all-sufficient merits and atonement of our Lord and Saviour. If that great cause of faith and hope were taken away, I should have nothing left.”

In October, 1843, the very month of his death, he says to a friend, “I have now not the smallest expectation of surviving a very few months. The great and pressing business is therefore to prepare for the event. That is, in truth, our great business always; but is peculiarly enforced in a situation like mine. It involves a review of past life; and oh, how much there is to render reflection painful and alarming. Such a review would consign me to utter despair, but for my firm belief in the all-sufficiency of the mediation of our Lord.” In his last letter to Mr. Hill, he says, “What would become of a poor sinful soul, but for that blessed, all-comprehensive sacrifice, and that intercession at the right hand of the Majesty on High?”

Of the same affecting and solemn character was the tenor of his last conversations. He frequently spoke of the value, and often turned the conversation on the subject of the separate state. “After the death of any friend, he seemed impatient to be made acquainted with the secrets of the invisible world. On one occasion of this kind, rather more than a twelvemonth before his own decease, he exclaimed, They don’t come back to tell us! and then, after a short silence, emphatically striking his hand upon the table, he added, with a look of intense seriousness, But we shall know *some time*.”

“ Speaking of his weakness, to one of his two servants, who had lived with him for about thirty years, he mentioned some things, which he had not strength to perform ; and then added, But I can pray, and that is a glorious thing. On another occasion he said to his attendant, Trust in Christ, trust in Christ ! On another time the servant heard him repeating to himself the words, O death, where is thy sting ? O grave, where is thy victory ? Thanks be to God, who giveth us the victory, through our Lord Jesus Christ.” Thus in the night, entirely alone, but Christ with him, October 16th, 1843, all that was mortal of a being most “ fearfully and wonderfully made,” slept peacefully, and expired.

We must now recur to that grand subject of interest in these volumes, on which we have already dwelt in part. We have referred to Mr. Foster’s letter to a young minister on the eternity of future punishments, in which he attempted what he called a moral argument against it. This letter was written so late as the year 1841. But in the meantime, what shall we say of the moral argument *in support* of it, all the while working itself out in Mr. Foster’s personal convictions as to the *sole* ground of *safety* in Eternity, and enforced so powerfully, with such impressive, such awful solemnity, in some of his writings ? What a strange and unaccountable inconsistency for such a man in his letters, in his spontaneous convictions, in his practical writings, to be speaking of the *second death*, of the inevitableness of *despair* without reliance upon Christ, of the *perdition* in eternity, except there be that reliance, and at the same time instituting an argument, according to which there is really no second death, there can be no such thing as despair, and no possibility of perdition ! According to which, if a man had asked Mr. Foster, “ Sir, what is that second death, of which you speak ? ” he must have answered, “ I know nothing about it, except that it is *not* eternal, but is a mere introduction into everlasting life ! ” What has a man to do with despair, who believes that the whole human race will be everlastingly blessed, and who, if he reasons closely, will have to acknowledge that any prior discipline of human misery would but enhance the rapture of the blessedness, and might actually be a thing, in the long run, to be chosen ?

The inconsistency of which we speak, appears more marvellous still, on comparing the letter to a young minister with Mr. Foster’s Introductory Essays to Doddridge’s Rise and Progress of religion in the soul. It would scarcely have been imagined that two productions, so dissimilar, so contrary, could have proceeded from the same writer. The whole solemnity and power of the Essay is owing to the doctrine of an endless retribution ; take that away, and it is as a gaseous jelly, which sparkled with phosphorescence in the night, but becomes a cold putrid pulp in the day. Take away the belief of the reader in the writer’s deep personal convictions of

the truth of what he is uttering, and you disenchant his pages of their power. It is the belief that the consequences impending are eternal, that creates that power. The very blade of Mr. Foster's keen weapon was forged in the fires of that endless perdition, which, in the letters to a young minister, he denies; its handle sparkles with gems that flash forth the warnings of insufferable ruin. He bids the soul tremble at the thought of dying unprepared; he makes it acknowledge that the "entirely depending interest of its futurity is vast and eternal." He bids it think of that existence during endless ages,—an existence to commence in a condition determined for happiness or misery by the state of mind which shall have been formed in this introductory period. He bids it regard the melancholy phenomenon of a little dependent spirit, voluntarily receding from its beneficent Creator, directing its progress away from the eternal source of light, and life, and joy, and that on a vain presumption of being under the comet's law, of returning at last to the sun!

He bids the man of the world remember that nothing will be gained, and ALL BE LOST, by refusing to think of it. He tells him that a preparation to meet God is that one thing, of which the failure is PERDITION. He tells him that no tempest nor shock of an earthquake would affright him so much as this horrible neglect of his eternal salvation, if it could be suddenly revealed to him in full light. He speaks of the *supreme* interest of his existence, and of the *whole question* of safety or utter ruin, as depending. He speaks of the necessity now of "applying to the soul the redeeming principle, without which it will PERISH." He speaks of the madness of delay. "The possibility of dying unprepared takes all the value from even the highest probability that there will be prolonged time to prepare; plainly, because there is no proportion between the fearfulness of such a hazard, and the precariousness of such a dependence." He tells man that his corrupt nature, if untransformed in this world, must be miserable in the next. He tells him that the subject is one which he cannot let go, "without abandoning himself to the dominion of death." And he arrays the melancholy spectacle of a "crowd of human beings in prodigious, ceaseless stir to keep the dust of the earth in motion, and then to sink into it, while all beyond is darkness and desolation!"

Now what is the meaning of all this? To suppose that these solemn adjurations were used merely to keep up an appearance of belonging to the orthodox faith on this subject, would be revolting in the extreme; it would make the reader throw the book from him in contempt and disgust; but to suppose that the author used such language because, though himself did not believe the truth which it would be held to convey, he nevertheless thought it would make the book more impressive—would be very little better. And what would have been the effect, if the author had prefaced the

work with something like the following announcement:—The writer of these pages does not believe in the doctrine assumed in the work to which they are introductory, namely, that the retributions of eternity are eternal, and holds very different ideas as to the mercy of the Universal Father, from those ordinarily held by the divines of Dr. Doddridge's mode of thinking. Nevertheless, something was necessary to give the work a credit and currency with those who hold his opinions; and besides, it must be confessed, that nothing but the idea of eternal consequences is of any weight either to bring men to religion or to keep them from vice.

The effect of such a declaration, should the reader of the work keep it in view, would be almost ludicrous, if the subject itself were not too solemn for such an emotion; it would be powerfully neutralizing as to any deep impression; nor could any statement as to the author's belief in limited punishment retain under any efficacious impulse of amendment, the careless hearts to which the work was directed. It would be like attempting to hold a ship, that is dragging her anchor in a storm, by a kedge attached to her bulwarks.

What shall we say of the conflicting states of mind revealed in Mr. Foster's intensely interesting epistolary biography, and intensely powerful practical writings on this great subject? From the age of seventy we must revert back to the seed-time of his opinions, and we shall find the noxious root of a plant exhaling poison that grew into obstinate toughness, in spite of the accompanying growth of all gracious herbs. We have seen that Mr. Foster's mind, richly endowed as it was, seemed to make a disastrous pause in the comparative twilight of Divine truth. He seems to have felt it himself. And the clue to a solution in part may be found in the 21st letter in the biographical collection, in which Foster says he has just been reading an author, "who maintains with very great force of reasoning, that no man could, in any situation, have acted differently from what he has done." "Though I do not see how to refute his argument," says Foster, "I feel as if I ought to differ from his opinion. He refers to Jonathan Edwards as a powerful advocate of the same doctrine. He says such an expression as, I will exert myself, is absurd. It is an expression which, notwithstanding, I am inclined to repeat, as I view the wide field of duty before me."

That this book had a lasting effect upon Foster's state of mind and trains of opinion, is manifest from a letter written about a year after this date, in which he runs the circle of the reasoning of a perfect Necessitarian, and consoles himself, amidst his despairing views of the wretched state of man, with the maxim, Whatever is, is right. "If sin be traced up to its cause," says he, "that cause will be found to have been—the *nature and state of man*; but this cause was precisely so fixed by the Creator, and evident,

ly with a determination that this fatal consequence should follow; or he fixed it so, that he saw this consequence most certainly would follow. He who fixed the first great moving causes, appointed all their effects to the end of the world. Whatever is, is right. Thus, regarding God as strictly the cause of all things, I am led to consider all things as working his high will; and to believe that there is neither more nor less evil in the world than he saw accurately necessary toward that ultimate happiness, to which he is training in various manners, all his creatures. In this view, too, I can sometimes commit myself to his hands, with great complacency, certain that he will do for me, in all respects, that which is the best."

Now this reasoning was precisely that which might well have led to utter and disastrous *Universalism*. But Foster was saved from that, though he here seems ready to throw himself, and his whole system of theology, into the central involutions of the chain of Necessity from eternity. The theory that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good involved, in a mind like Foster's, such a palpable accusation of the Divine benevolence, that while writhing in the folds of that moral Anaconda there was no resource to his soul, shrinking from the fatal consequence, but to throw himself on the conclusion, that since men were *of necessity* sinners for the greatest good, they would be also *of necessity* saved, for the greatest happiness; God, the author of this system, would conduct it safely to its end, and therefore the anxious, self-accusing, self-condemned mortal might, at times, under the comfort of being a certain link in the chain of Necessity, commit himself with great complacency into God's hands. The whole chain passes indeed through the medium of sin, but it is only to come out brighter in the atmosphere of eternal glory.

If this was, at any time, any prominent source of Foster's complacency of mind, it may be asked, could he at the same time have been intelligently resting his hopes for eternity upon God's free sovereign mercy to the sinner for the sake of Christ? We believe that at times there was a great occultation in Foster's mind, and a sad veiling from it of the true nature and glory of the Atonement; and that under the influence of such trains of reasoning, and such grappling with difficulties insurmountable by the human reason, he did not accept fully, heartily, the Bible view of man as a sinner wholly and solely to blame, and saw not clearly, fully, in joyful experience, the Bible view of salvation to the penitent, as wholly, solely, of grace. He passed into a better state of mind, but his abiding horror of eternal misery, unaccompanied by an anchor of the soul, in the depths of God's word on that subject, tossed him perpetually on a sea of doubt. In the same degree it palsied his plans and efforts after usefulness, and diffused over his soul, in reference to the Missionary Enterprise, a chilling atmosphere, in which the zeal of an Apostle himself would have frozen. Com-

bined with the latent influence of his prejudices in favor of the Scheme of Necessity, it sometimes brought him to the verge of a startling irreverence in his conclusions. He dismisses the whole subject of the Missionary Enterprise, on one occasion, with the summary sentence, that if the sovereign Arbiter had INTENDED the salvation of the race, it must have been accomplished! The intimation in his train of argument is, that he did not intend it, but so far as he did, it will certainly be accomplished, and therefore there is no great need of impotent creatures like ourselves, amidst such a sea of troubles of our own, taking much care about it.

Just so, in the same letter to Dr. Harris, Foster dismissed the common representations of the Deity as being deeply moved with compassion for the heathen, and earnestly intent on human salvation, with the exclamation, or perhaps we should say the daring sneer, "And this is the Almighty Being, whose single volition could transform the whole race in a moment!" The tone of this letter, whatever excellences there be in it, is like that of Cain, "Am I my brother's keeper?" And Cain himself might as well have answered the Deity, "Thou mightest by a single volition have removed my brother Abel from my sight and taken away my temptation. Thou didst never INTEND that I should not kill him." Or Adam himself might have answered for *his* sin, "Thou mightest have veiled the forbidden tree from my vision. Thou didst never INTEND that I should not eat of the fruit of it." We acquit Foster of all impiety in such reasoning, though the tone of it savors in one part more of the spirit of Cain, and in another of that of Jonah, "I do well to be angry," than of the spirit of Paul or of John. Nor can any one fail to remark the different manner of reasoning in regard to the depravity of the heathen employed by Foster, and that employed in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. The inspired writer condemns man wholly as without excuse, and justifies the ways of God to man; the uninspired writer excuses the depravity of man as a thing forced upon him, an element of dire necessity, and condemns God as annexing an eternal retributive penalty for such depravity!

We acquit Foster of all impiety of spirit, but he certainly indulged almost to the last degree of permissible freedom, and to the verge of presumption and irreverence, in his speculations on this subject. His own mind was so tortured with it, with the scene of human existence, as "a most mysteriously awful economy, overspread by a lurid and dreadful shade," that he had to "pray for the piety to maintain an humble submission of thought and feeling to the wise and righteous disposer of all existence." But he carried out the prejudices of his own mind with a degree of independence amounting to obstinacy, and not at all characterized by that profound submissiveness to the Divine Wisdom, which on this, as on every other subject, we should have supposed so supe-

rior an intelligence as Foster's would have exercised. And late in life we can see coming out in his opinions the ineffaceable mark which that book on the system of Necessity had left upon his mind.

Besides this work, Foster speaks of an old and nearly unknown book, which he must have seen at an early period, in favor of universal restitution. A book which made an impression on a mind like Foster's, was likely to make it deep; and if he met these two books together, the currents of thought would run into one another with great power. The scheme of Necessity at one end comes fitly out in restitution at the other. If Foster had been at this time deep in the Scriptures, neither of these works could have much affected him; and there may have been some radical distortion in his view of some doctrines, which he accepted without hesitation, that made him shrink back from others in the plain truth. Truth in the Scriptures leads on to truth; but if a man's view of the first step be distorted, he may easily be turned aside from the second. If Mr. Foster believed that every individual soul was created evil by the Supreme Deity, there is little cause to wonder at the dreadful struggle in his mind in regard to what he conceived to be eternal punishment for the inevitable result of such creation. If he did not believe the depravity of man to be voluntary, but threw that depravity upon God as his creation, then, indeed, he *could not* receive the doctrine of an endless retribution, and still hold to the goodness of God. And we are inclined to think that this was in some measure the awful dilemma of his mind; for he dismisses the whole subject in his letter with the reckless argument that if *the very nature of man as created, every individual, by the Sovereign Power*, be in such desperate disorder, then we cannot conceive that the race thus impotent will be eternally punished for that impotence.

Now, it is a most remarkable fact that Mr. Foster himself, in his Introduction to Doddridge's Rise and Progress, has taken up and rebuked just this angry argument, as supposed to be used by a desperately careless man, as an excuse or almost a justification for his stupid and defying indifference to consequences, from the *moral impotence of our nature*. But he does not *there* use the astounding argument, with which, as a desperate slug, he has loaded his letter. He replies in a very different way. "The reasoning faculty of such a man is a wretched slave, that will not, and dare not, listen to one word in presence and in contravention of his passions and will. The only thing there would be any sense in attempting would be, to press on him some strong images of the horror of such a deliberate self-consignment to destruction, and of the monstrous enormity of taking a kind of comfort in his approach to the pit, from the circumstance that a principle in his nature leads him to it; just as if, *because there is that in him which*

impels him to perdition, it would therefore not be he that will perish. Till some awful blast smite on his fears, his reason and conscience will be unavailing."

Is it not remarkable to the last degree, that Mr. Foster should have rebuked as "monstrous," a mode of reasoning in behalf of the individual, which he himself uses in behalf of the race. Because there is that in the race, which impels it to perdition, Mr. Foster argues that therefore the race will not perish. But when the same "moral impotence of our nature" is urged by the hardened man, as if, on account of it, it will not be *he* that will perish, the reasoning faculty of such a man is justly asserted to be a wretched slave. That, however, which ought to have been rebuked as itself a "monstrous enormity" and a hideous distortion of theology, is the supposition that a *created moral impotence* can be the subject of punishment at all; or rather, in the first place, the outrageous supposition that there is such a thing as a *created moral impotence*, and in the second place, if there is, that such a creation can be punished. It might be called an argument black with the smoke of the pit, for it must be malignant spirits that delight so to obscure the ways of God to man. But the smoke which issues in such a jet from the close of Mr. Foster's letter is not so much, as by him assumed, against the doctrine of eternal punishment, as against any punishment at all.

But where did Mr. Foster learn this truly despairing theology, which prepared him so fatally to listen to the arguments of Necessity and Universal Restitution? He could not so have read the Scriptures. It must have been the malignant intrusion of a darkening philosophy, which was set, as an heir-loom of his education, in the recesses of his mind, and wove a tissue of palsyng lurid doubt through one whole region of his speculations. It was this, and not the eternity of punishment, that was to him as a shirt of fire thrown over the body of his theology.

Where did these principles come from, and whence their singular outbreak at so late a period in life, as if some demoniac art had "buried the seed and kept it artificially torpid, that it might be quickened into germination," at a time when there would be less questioning of its nature, less suspicion of its truth! If it came as an element of Foster's instruction in his early days, it reminds us of his own warning "that whatever entwines itself with the youthful feelings, maintains a strange tenacity, and seems to insinuate into the vitality of the being. How important to watch lest what is thus combining with its life, should contain a principle of moral death!" And it may be considered the master policy of the Spirit of Evil to put principles into the mind beforehand, under the guise of truth, which it is foreseen will act as powerfully *against* the truth, as if there were "a shield invisibly held by a demon's hand," or if not act against it, will veil and

darken it, will fetter and perplex it, and make it enclose the soul like a net, instead of surrounding it like a luminous atmosphere.

It was just thus that even a mind of such power, and a soul of such undoubted piety, as Mr. Foster's, became *entangled* in the truth, instead of walking at liberty and illuminated by it. Accursed be the intrusion of the mud and poison of such philosophy into the clear running stream of the Word of God! Could it be seen as mud, it would be rejected as mud; but men drink of it as the water of life. How dark a stuff is mere human speculation! What a series of caves are the recesses of the mind consigned to it; recesses of such depth, that if you take a light to examine them, you find the air itself is mephitic, and you are in danger of having your eyes put out by the bats that fly from them.

But Mr. Foster's argument, concerning "the moral impotence of the race," does not altogether wear the air of a sincere conviction even in his own mind. It seems to have been a sort of angry exaggeration and distortion of the scriptural view of human depravity, which he threw out in the impatience of a tempted spirit, to justify his efforts against the awful reality pressing on his soul. He shields himself behind an angry and irreverent *if*; for he did not dare to put the supposition in the shape of an assertion. Grant the *if* indeed, and the conclusion follows. If God himself created "a desperate disorder," it follows that he created the inevitable results of that disorder; and if so, then both the disorder and its results are good; for an absolutely and infinitely good being can create nothing evil. Nor is it conceivable that punishment of any kind should be annexed to a disorder, of which God himself is the author, unless, indeed, the punishment also be considered as a good, leading to a higher good, which it is not, if it be eternal. It cannot be considered a good for the wicked, however it may subserve the interests of the universe of God.

But Foster's mind is occupied with the fate of the wicked exclusively, and their salvation *at all hazards* is resolved upon. The care of the good, the effect of sin upon them, released from an eternal retribution, the necessity of some penal safeguard for the universe, the inevitable failure of the Atonement, without such a safeguard, the demand through all eternity for an adequate manifestation of the Divine justice, all these great considerations are put out of view; they are not *permitted* to occupy the attention; or if spoken of, they are presented as "lightly assumed and presumptuous maxims respecting penal example in the order of the divine government," while the doubt as to the Divine goodness from "the awfulness of the economy" of eternal retribution is morbidly enlarged and dragged into notice.

Mr. Foster seems to have written some of these letters in a terrific mood. It is as if we saw a Christian Diogenes in his tub. It is as if Job were before us on his dunghill giving vent to the

bitterness of a wounded spirit. And there are some vast sneers at the mode of preaching the exhibition of the divine compassion, which are as if Satan had stood by the road-side when our Saviour wept over Jerusalem, and had exclaimed, And this is the Being who could by a single volition make the soul of every person in Jerusalem receive him with delight !

Aye ! and it *was* Satan by the road-side in Foster's own mind. And instead of a bold unhesitating appeal in answer from the Word of God, we hear again the hiss of the serpent ! “ Perhaps there is some pertinence in a suggestion which I recollect to have seen in some old and nearly unknown book in favor of universal restitution.” The hiss of the serpent, old indeed and pertinent ! *Has* God said, ye shall not eat ? Yet God doth know ye shall not surely die. Apollyon in this conflict has taken from Foster's hand the sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God, and in its place has slipped into his grasp a figurative symbol or accommodation of that Word, and the power of the Word is all gone. And instead of the voice, Ὑπαγε ὀπίσω μου, Σατανᾶ, *Get thee behind me, Satan*, or the mighty word, γέγραπται, *it is written*, we hear the tongue of unbelief, *strongly figurative expressions* ! A man like Bunyan would have recorded this style of experience as a besetment by the fiends in the Valley of Tophet, and with the greatest truth and accuracy ; and what seems amazing is the morbid craving after doubt, the voracity with which suggestions of difficulty and darkness are seized and ruminated upon, to the exclusion of what is clear and incontrovertible, so that at length light seems to retire, and the clouds roll thick and heavy over the firmament.

Amidst these doubts and difficulties, wrestling with them and grimly pressing on, beneath the “lurid and dreadful shade of a mysteriously awful economy,” we behold this great mind out at sea, amidst darkness, hurricane, the wind howling, the waves roaring. Sometimes the image is as that of a powerful steamer, thrown on her side by a mountain billow, her fires still burning, her engine crashing on, her wheels on one side buried and ploughing the deep, on the other as iron wings thundering in the air amidst the tempest. For with Foster's mind it *was* a tempest ; and if he speaks of it but briefly and calmly, it was because all his emotions, as stirred by mental conflicts, were compressed with a severity of condensation that allowed of no noisy or superficial escape. The great doubt with him supplied the place of ten thousand minor ones ; for it was a doubt even as to the benevolence of the Divine economy ; a temptation which in such a mind wrought with a force terrible and inevitable. The wind that raised the waves, compressed them and kept them from breaking, or the ocean had been sheeted with foam. He had piety to pray for submission, and God's arm held him, and amidst all conflicts

he never failed to exercise a prayerful watchful faith in God's merciful superintending providence over his own life and destiny.

There is a striking resemblance between his experience, and that of the author of the 73d Psalm, though absolutely the reverse in almost every point, and a resemblance of powerful contrast. The scepticism in the Psalmist's mind was in regard to the allowed prosperity of the wicked, and the seeming want and denial in the divine economy, of any adequate retribution. It took such a deep hold of the soul, and spread such a "lurid and mysterious shade" over God's dispensations, that the mind was almost driven from its balance; the feet of the saint had well nigh gone, his steps had almost slipped, and he was on the point of renouncing his faith in the goodness of the Deity. He was losing his hold on the goodness of God, *because it seemed to him that God had no retributive justice*. He was brought back, his feet were placed upon the rock, he was brought as a madman or a beast to his senses, by coming into God's sanctuary, and there knowing what God *would* do in the eternal world. Was there ever a more instructive lesson? Was there ever a more instructive and solemn contrast and resemblance between this man's doubts and the cure of them, and Foster's doubts, with his *failure* of a cure, until he went not merely into the sanctuary of God, but into eternity itself! Foster's scepticism was as to the goodness of God, *because* of his justice, because of the undeniable looming up in the Christian system of the doctrine of ETERNAL RETRIBUTION! There was no resource in the sanctuary for that; there was no help in God's Word for that; nor any cure, even if one should rise from the dead, for the scepticism of a man who would not believe on the power of God's Word in that. If a man persisted in that doubt, there was no cure for such scepticism, but to go into eternity, to enter what Foster called the *absolute unknown*, but which, in the light of God's Word, is as absolute a *known* as, to the eye of faith, God could make it.

Pressed, then, by this doubt on the one side, and the awful language of the Word of God on the other, and yet exclaiming, It is too horrible! I *cannot* believe! ETERNITY, my soul shudders at the thought! God *cannot* be good, and yet appoint an Eternal Retribution!—exclaiming thus, and still holding to the scepticism arising from his limited view of the Divine government and attributes, and his intense fixedness of contemplation on one point, ETERNITY, we do not wonder that such a mind even as Foster's had well nigh slipped, nor that he, like the Psalmist, was as a beast before God. But let the contrast be profoundly marked. The Psalmist doubted of God's goodness *for want of retribution*. John Foster doubted of God's goodness *because of retribution*. The Psalmist was convinced and made submissive and trustful by what he was *assured would be* in Eternity; but Foster was racked

with distrust and doubt by what he *feared would be* in Eternity. The Psalmist was convinced by God's Word, and rested on it ; but Foster's mind was thrown into anguish by the plain interpretation of that Word, and sought to evade it. Foster would not bow unhesitatingly before the majesty of God's Word ; he wanted a firm unquestioning trust in it ; he wanted faith. His grand defect was a gloomy self-reliance on his own reasoning powers, in lieu of an humble inquiry, What saith the Lord ? He stood like Thomas in the presence of his Lord, demanding the wounds in his side and the prints of the nails.

Nor can anything be more unphilosophical and erroneous in principle, or dangerous in example, than Mr. Foster's mode of reasoning on this subject. He demanded, on a subject of faith alone, an evidence destructive of the *nature* of faith. He demanded that God should *force* conviction on every mind. He demanded that the doctrine of eternal retribution should be so presented, "as to leave no *possibility* of understanding the language in a different, equivocal, or questionable sense ;" that it should be so presented, as to render "*all doubt or question a mere palpable absurdity.*" Now, it is plain that this, in regard to anything that demands *belief*, and is not matter of experience, personal experience, is impossible. The very fact that God is *cannot be* so stated, as to leave no *possibility* of understanding it in a questionable sense. The doctrine of eternal retribution, as demanding belief, cannot be so stated as to preclude belief, and form experience. This world must be changed from a world of preparation for the eternal world into an experience of the realities of that world, before this can be the case ; in other words, God's present system of probation under the power of the atonement, by which the penalty of his law is kept from execution, and men are warned of it, and commanded and urged to prepare against it, and to prepare for blessedness instead of misery in the future world, must be broken up ; and instead of warnings of what is to come, and descriptions demanding belief, and the revelations of principles requiring faith, the fires of the eternal world must be kindled in this ; and instead of a picture so graphic, and a description so awful, of the sinner in the place of torment, that anything beyond it would transcend the province of faith, and set aside all the laws of the human mind in regard to evidence, there must not only be exhibited here a sinner in torment, but every individual accountable agent must be put into the same torment, and then told *this* is what punishment means, and *this* is to be eternal ! But even then, this *latter* truth as to the *eternity* of retribution could not, without the experience also of that, be so framed as to preclude all possibility of question. For when the declaration had been made, and in the most explicit terms that human language can command, the mind of the sceptic might say, This cannot be ! there *must* be

some other way of understanding this! it is absolutely inconsistent with God's goodness, and *must* have a different interpretation. And if God should *speak* the truth audibly to every individual, every day of his existence, instead of leaving it simply written in his Word, the case would be the same. And if he should write it in characters of fire in the firmament, or make such a disposition of the planets in heaven, as that they should read it nightly to the soul, the case would be the same. There would be no possibility of *forcing* conviction without experience, no possibility of doing this, and still leaving to the soul the alternative of believing or of disbelieving.

A conviction absolutely irresistible, can only be that of experience. But this would destroy the element of free-agency, and the possibility of the voluntary formation of character, the choice of principles of action. It would destroy the system of preparation for the Eternal World, under which we evidently are placed, and would make this world, instead of that, the world of retribution. On the theory that eternal retribution is true, it is impossible to make it a matter of *experience* in a world for the trial of character, but it *must* be left as a matter of faith, as in the Scriptures. On the theory that it is *not* true, the Scriptures, which are the only authentic source of the idea of eternal retribution, and of all our information in regard to it, are, on that subject, glaring with falsehood. On the theory that it *is* true, there is no conceivable mode of presenting it to the mind *as an article of belief*, which the Scriptures have not taken; and their main power over the soul consists, in the acknowledgment even of those who deny the doctrine, in the awful terror in which the retributions of eternity are actually there shrouded. The dread power of the doctrine over Foster's own mind, proves the tremendous distinctness with which it has been *somewhere* revealed; but an original distinct source of it anywhere but in the Word of God it is impossible to find, except we take the universal intimations of conscience in answer to that Word, and the intimations of retribution in the souls of the heathen, as such a source.

Now it is a remarkable fact, that in regard to another [fundamental truth of the Christian revelation, which Foster, with his whole heart accepted, but which others have denied (as indeed, where is the truth revealed in the Scriptures which men may not deny, if they will, not being forced into conviction?), he adopted a mode of reasoning diametrically opposite to that which he attempted in regard to eternal retribution, and destructive of it. In one of his admirable letters to Miss Saunders, after a simple repetition of many of the passages in the Word of God in regard to the atonement, he meets the objector thus: "There are persons who revolt at such a view of the foundation of all our hopes, and would say, Why might not the Almighty, of his *mere immediate*

benevolence, pardon the offences of his frail creatures when they repent, without any such intermediation and vicarious suffering? It is enough to answer, that Supreme Wisdom was the sole competent judge in the universe, of what was the plan most worthy of holiness and goodness; and that, *unless the New Testament be the most deceptive book that ever was written*, the plan actually appointed is that of a suffering Mediator."

Now, a candid mind cannot read the New Testament free of all attempt to evade its plain meaning, without finding the truth of an eternal retribution *as fully and explicitly revealed as that of a vicarious Redeemer*. And to Foster's own objections on the score of his limited views of the Divine Benevolence, it is enough to answer, that Supreme Wisdom was the sole competent judge in the universe of what was the plan most worthy of holiness and goodness; and that unless the New Testament be the most deceptive book that ever was written, the plan actually appointed embraces an eternal retribution.

Furthermore, if the condition of faith in a suffering Mediator be the only condition of eternal salvation, a truth fully received by Foster, then, on the ground of his own reasoning in regard to eternal retribution, *that truth ought to have been so presented* "as to leave no *possibility* of understanding the language in a different equivocal or questionable sense;" it ought to have been so presented, as to render all "doubt or question a mere palpable absurdity." For if the danger of eternal retribution be so awful, as that God ought thus to *force* conviction on the soul, the only condition of eternal salvation is so infinitely important, that he ought in like manner to force conviction of that also. And if any alleged possibility of doubt in regard to the meaning of the language is to be held a sufficient ground for denying the first, the same possibility is an equally sufficient ground for denying the last, and Foster's mode of reasoning would cut the soul equally from the belief in a suffering mediator and an eternal retribution. But Mr. Foster never seems to have had the shadow of a thought that the *condition* of eternal *salvation*, as the *only* condition, was not revealed with sufficient distinctness, or that, if it be the only condition, it ought to be revealed with a power absolutely overwhelming, and forestalling all *possibility* of doubt. Why, then, attempt any such reasoning in regard to the truth of eternal retribution? In neither case was it possible to force conviction by experience; in both cases the evidence comes as near to absolute physical demonstration, as could have been, without violating the laws of the human mind in regard to *belief*. In both cases the evidence is positive, clear, incontrovertible; not to be set aside in any way without evasion; and in every way so palpable, that if it be denied, the New Testament instantly becomes *the most deceptive book that ever was written*.

Precisely the same reasoning annihilates the force of Mr. Foster's remarks as to the unreasonable shortness of the time of our probation, if an eternal retribution be the evil from which we are to escape. So, likewise, if the *condition of eternal salvation* be the *only* condition on which man can be saved, a truth which Foster constantly, and with all the power of his intellect, asserts, the shortness of the time of our probation is equally unreasonable for meeting that condition. The objection which would release the mind from its obligation to believe the one truth, is equally valid against the other; though of utter futility and falsehood in both cases. And the same may be said of what Foster has advanced in regard to the *preaching* of the truth of eternal retribution; namely, that if true, it ought to be screamed into the ears of every creature; it ought to be proclaimed, as with the blast of a trumpet, "inculcated and reiterated, with ardent passion, in every possible form of terrible illustration, no remission of the alarm; for the most prolonged thundering alarm is but as the note of an infant, a bird, or an insect, in proportion to the horrible urgency of the case." Assuredly, the same may be said of the *ONLY* condition of eternal salvation, that if true, it ought to be proclaimed in like manner, as with the blast of a trumpet, no remission of the alarm.

And accordingly, it ~~is~~ so proclaimed; both these mighty doctrines being true, they are, with equal passion, inculcated and reiterated, in every possible form of terrible illustration. The sacred writers do but turn from the one to enforce the other, and use the one to burn in the other; so that the whole material of revelation, well-nigh, is the mutual support, reverberation, and "thundering," as well as persuasive proclamation of these truths. "Knowing the terror of the Lord, we persuade men." By his terrors we persuade them to embrace his love, and by his love we persuade them to shun his terrors. And this doctrine of a suffering Mediator, which Foster avows, is proclaimed with no less thundering alarm, than that doctrine of eternal retribution which he hastily and presumptuously rejects. "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him."

It would have gone beyond even Mr. Foster's power in the use of human language, to have invented stronger terms than these, or to have proclaimed a suffering Mediator and eternal retribution in notes of more thundering alarm. For the passage is, in spiritual meaning, power and distinctness, like the crash of an earthquake, like the thunder of the Almighty from one end of heaven to the other. And not to name the scores of similar notes of alarm "proportioned to the horrible urgency of the case," the passages in the sixth Hebrews, 4-6, and tenth Hebrews, 26-31, are sufficient examples of the united and equally awful sanctions of terror in preaching both a suffering Mediator and eternal retribution.

These two elements indeed are so combined in the Word of God, so indissolubly twisted together, so wrought into each other's fabric for mutual support, power, and illustration, that the one without the other is ineffectual, and can scarcely, by a logical mind, be received.

And, in fact, in the very next breath after the utterance of Foster's demand for thundering alarm on the ground of eternal retribution, he does himself declare that the larger proportion of what is said of sinners and addressed to them in the Bible, is plainly in a tone of menace and of terror. And he repeats the deliberate affirmation of Dr. Watts, that of all the persons to whom his ministry had been efficacious, only *one* had received the first effectual impressions from the gentle and attractive aspects of religion; all the rest from the awful and alarming ones, the appeals to fear. And this, adds Foster, is all but universally the manner of the Divine process of conversion.

Now what an inconsequence is here! most strange indeed for a reasoner like Foster. We have him in one breath demanding, as the result, enforcement, and proof of a certain doctrine which he doubts, that it be proclaimed, reiterated and thundered without cessation; and in the next, declaring that such is the tenor of the Scriptures; and yet denying the doctrine, and in effect charging the Scriptures with proclaiming, reiterating and thundering an alarm, behind which there is no reality, and for which there is no foundation!

But worse than this, he proceeds to say that a number of ministers of his acquaintance have disbelieved the doctrine, but yet have thought they should better consult their usefulness by appearing to teach it; they were unwilling to incur the imputation of a want of orthodoxy, and they found the doctrine itself, even in its most terrible form, so strangely inefficacious to deter men from sin, that they "did not feel required to propound any qualification of it, since thoughtless and wicked men would be sure to seize on the mitigated doctrine to encourage themselves in their impenitence." This is but to say that, seeing that the truth failed to bring men to God, they thought they should be more useful by the inculcation of a LIE. The lie being supposed by most men to be imbedded in God's Word as the truth, and being found the only efficacious means of reclaiming men from sin, these ministers have deemed it most useful to make use of the lie! If this course be charged upon the Scriptures, it is one of the worst forms of blasphemy and infidelity. And how can this consequence be avoided? On the supposition that the doctrine of eternal punishment is so taught in the Scriptures, as that nine-tenths of mankind find it there, and the most spiritual and heaven-instructed preachers proclaim it, and that it is, as thus understood, the sole element of irresistible efficacy in the Scriptures, on what ground can the conclusion be avoided

that the Scriptures are a book of "infinite deception?" The difference between an eternal and a temporary retribution is infinite; the propounding of an eternal retribution, if it be not true, is an infinite lie. And they who lend themselves to this are acting on the principle, on which the great Apostasy has been builded, and to which is annexed the seal of the Divine reprobation, "Let us do evil that good may come."

Of the disingenuousness of such a course as Mr. Foster describes in the ministers of his acquaintance, their preaching or apparent preaching of this doctrine in public, their disbelief of it in private, and their whisperings and circulations of such disbelief in familiar circles, we need say nothing. We wonder that a mind of such independence, nobleness, integrity, sincerity, and fearlessness as Mr. Foster's, could have been warped at all into any excuse of such a course, much less any sanction of it by example. The habit of such casuistry must be powerful beneath the teachings of an Established Church, which propounds Thirty-Nine Articles of belief to be sworn upon as the conditions of earthly emolument and usefulness, with the understood provision that the oath of belief may or may not *mean* belief according to the opinion of the swearer. But out of the Establishment could it have been supposed that such casuistry would prevail? Let a man believe or disbelieve at his pleasure, and if he chooses, teach it wholly, or keep it to himself. "While it remained, was it not thine own? And when it was sold, was it not in thine own power?" But to *appear* to preach it in public, and in private to circulate the mischief of unbelief; in public to proclaim the terrors of the Lord, in private to reduce them to a vast and glaring deception; in public to maintain the sanctions of the law, in private to disarm them by reasonings against the penalty;—this is a course which nothing can justify, and which tends to unsettle the foundations of theology and morality together.

In reference to Foster himself, the truth seems to be that his own mind was never really settled on this subject, but was swayed to and fro, and sometimes, perhaps, in dreadful agitation. In no other way can we account for the inconsistencies of his reasonings, and the contradiction between the menacing tenor of his writings in the prospect of the Eternal World, and the hesitating plunge into a complete denial of eternal retribution in his letter to a student in theology. But then, what a picture of vagueness and indetermination in theological opinion is presented in a man, whose practical writings are of so definite, compact and powerful a tissue, and whose personal solemn impressions of the eternal world make many of his pages look as if written in the light of the vast pyre of eternal burnings! We cannot but contrast what we have seen him saying in 1841, with his opinion and advice on the same subject in 1801. In that year he had occasion to write to the Rev.

Dr. Ryland a criticism upon one of the Doctor's sermons, the subject of which was the eternal punishment of the wicked. It is said to have been a sermon in its delivery eminently powerful and successful, and Foster himself acknowledged in very strong terms the ingenuity, the variety, and the forcible description with which it abounded. But we can easily conceive that a sermon of this character which would be powerful and useful preached from the heart of a man glowing like Paul with love to the souls of his audience, might not be so well fitted for the press, without the tones and persuasions of the preacher. Mr. Foster advised him to keep it without printing, and told him he was afraid that those who had expatiated most on infernal subjects had felt them the least. But he did not tell him, as he did forty years afterwards the student in theology, that if the tremendous doctrine were true, surely it ought to be almost continually proclaimed as with the blast of a trumpet, inculcated and reiterated, with ardent passion, in every possible form of terrible illustration. But he said that it struck him as a kind of *Christian cruelty* to go into such illustration, and he gave an opinion in regard to the voice of the New Testament on the subject, which for the sake of comparison and contrast we place beside his opinion on the same at the later period.

1801.

The utmost space I would allot in my writings to this part of the revelations of our religion, should not, at any rate, exceed the proportion which in the New Testament this part of truth bears to the whole of the sacred book, the grand predominant spirit of which is love and mercy.

1841.

I do say, that to make the milder suaves, the gentle language of love, the main resource, is not in consistency with the spirit of the Bible, in which the larger proportion of what is said of sinners, and addressed to them, is plainly in a tone of menace and alarm. Strange if it had been otherwise, when a righteous Governor was speaking to a depraved, rebellious race.

It would seem that Foster had not, on this subject, come to the Scriptures to settle his mind there, with the same unhesitating acquiescence and faith, with which he received from the same Scriptures the doctrine of a suffering Mediator. And it would seem that he had not looked very narrowly into the profound and fundamental connection of the great truths of the Gospel scheme with one another, and their mutual dependence on each other for their separate demonstration, sanction, and power. He was not what can be called a profound theologian, neither in the Scriptures, nor in the systematic study of theology. He never pretended to be. Nor is this a derogation from the greatness of his merit and the originality and power of his thoughts as a practical writer; though we love to see the tide of practical thought and emotion sustained, compressed, and, so to speak, flung back upon itself, by a rock-bound coast of theoretical systematic truth, which offers

points of command over the ocean, and strong harbors where the soul may securely ride at anchor. But Foster carried his mental independence, and his hatred of the restraint of systems, to the verge of error. He would have been a more useful preacher, a more massive thinker, a more comprehensive writer, had his mind, from an early period, been more deeply imbedded in the knowledge of the Scriptures. On whatever point a man's anchorage does not hold there, his reasoning is unsafe.

That Foster could have reasoned on the ground of mere prejudice and doubt, without taking into view known and admitted facts and relations, would have seemed incredible. And yet in the instance of the future retribution he has done it. He has adopted a line of reasoning with an admission in the course of it, fatal to the very principle of the argument; a line of reasoning taking up in its course a mighty fact to support it, which overthrows it completely from its very foundation. He brings in the agency of Satan, the intervention and activity of the great Tempter and Destroyer, to lessen our sense of the desert of endless punishment in man, and thus to make the truth of such punishment appear inconsistent with the Divine goodness; not appearing to remember that the admission of the truth of the Scriptures in regard to the existence and agency of such a Tempter and Destroyer, is inevitably the admission of an eternal state of sin and suffering; which is as inconsistent with the Divine benevolence in reference to Satan and the fallen angels, as it would be with reference to man. Eternal retribution being once admitted in reference to any created sinful intelligences, *must* be admitted in reference to all; the disproportion between endless misery and any limited duration of punishment being infinitely greater than any possible disproportion between the guilt of one class of finite sinful intelligences and another class. It could not possibly consist with the Divine benevolence, to punish one class of sinners eternally, and not another. Admitting, therefore, the sin and the punishment of Satan, you have overthrown the very foundation of any argument against the Divine benevolence, from the truth of eternal retribution as propounded in the Scriptures. This Mr. Foster has done; taking up thus into the texture of his argument (which, indeed, is but a texture of doubts and reasonings from mere emotion) a fact that rots the whole of it, a single thread that turns it all to dust. It is as if a man should attempt to pass off as a costly *antique*, a vase that has on it the name of the manufacturer at Potsdam. It is like the attempt to prove that Moses was mistaken in the date of the world by a temple alleged to have been built before the deluge, but in which a hieroglyphical inscription being read, fixes the time of its erection under the Roman Empire. Bringing up Satan as the Tempter of man, to prop up an argument against Eternal Retribution as inconsistent with the benevolence of God, Mr. Foster has

merely produced an instance of an intelligent, sinful being, *actually suffering such retribution*; an instance which inspiration itself lays hold of to prove the certainty of such retribution, in the case of wicked men. "For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell, the Lord knoweth how to reserve the unjust unto the Day of Judgment, to be punished." We take the case of Satan as being, in Mr. Foster's argument, a case of eternal retribution; for we do not suppose that Mr. Foster would have admitted a possibility of Satan ever being converted, or as he would rather have phrased it, ever being brought under the economy of grace. The existence of an immortal being so malignant as to make the perdition of immortal beings his delight, is the existence of eternal sin and misery; and that being given, the argument against the Divine goodness from eternal retribution, is as futile as would be an argument against the Divine existence from the alleged eternity of matter.

The great Truth of the Atonement was another admitted, practical, sun-like fact, which Foster held, most fully and firmly, but yet maintained an absolute insensibility to its bearing upon this point of an endless retribution. Either there was a voluntary absence and denial of any effort of his attention that way, an anxious withdrawal of his mind from that conclusion, almost as if he had said within himself, "That way madness lies;" or there was an original defectiveness in his reception of the doctrine, a sheer cutting away of the whole of one side of the Atonement from his moral vision. His reasoning on one divine truth apart from its connection with and dependence on another, was as if a natural philosopher should reason on the motion of the tides, without taking into consideration the influence of the moon; or should undertake to predict the moon's changes, without considering her position with respect to the sun.

There are three ways in which the Atonement may be disposed of to favor the doctrine of universal salvation. The first is the utter denial and rejection of it, as needless in the government of God, and in the economy of the human system. This summary mode is in favor with many.

The second expedient is to extend the virtue of the Atonement over the whole human race, irrespective of moral character, as also of the question whether the expedient of salvation offered to the race is accepted of by them. But a God who could save men without repentance, might as well have saved them without an atonement. This second expedient was not admitted by Mr. Foster, for he made eternal salvation dependent on the condition of repentance and faith.

The third plan is, that of saving some by the Atonement through faith, and leaving the rest to be saved by suffering the penalty of the Divine law, that penalty as pretended, not being eternal. This

seems to have been the view taken by Mr. Foster. On the least profound examination it is full of palpable absurdities. The idea of an Atonement at all, if salvation could come in any other way, is absurd. The idea of an Atonement for some, and purgatory for others, is absurd. The idea of an Atonement because the Divine Attributes required it, is rendered absurd by the supposition of the salvation of some without it. If any could be saved by punishment irrespective of an Atonement, nay, having despised and rejected an Atonement, why not all? The idea of the innocent suffering for the guilty is absurd, if the guilty can be saved by suffering for themselves. The idea of the innocent suffering for the guilty because God could not save them in any other way consistent with the honor of eternal justice, is made perfectly absurd the moment you suppose any to be saved through their own suffering. But such is the case with those who suffer the penalty of the divine law, if that penalty be not endless. They serve out their time, they sin, and suffer for it the appointed measure of suffering, and are restored. Suffering is their savior, irrespective of an Atonement. They have nothing to do with Christ.

But the only ground on which divine revelation propounds the Atonement by the innocent suffering for the guilty, is because it was not consistent with the divine attributes to pardon the guilty in any other way. "For myself," says Mr. Foster, "I never feel any difficulty in conceiving that while the Divine Mercy would save guilty beings from deserved punishment, it should yet be absolutely necessary to the honor of eternal justice that an awful infliction should fall somewhere." But in Foster's plan it falls both upon the innocent and the guilty; for while he supposes those who trust in the sufferings of the innocent to be saved by *them*, he also supposes those who do not trust in those sufferings, but despise them, to be saved by *their own*, saved by the endurance of the penalty of the law, which, they might say, we can well afford to endure, there being an eternity of blessedness afterwards. The idea of an Atonement for part of the human race, and Salvation for the rest by limited suffering, is well nigh the most absurd that ever was broached in all theological speculation. And yet this is absolutely Mr. Foster's idea, believing, as he seems to have endeavored to do, that all mankind will be saved after a limited endurance of penalty.

A limited endurance of the penalty! Here we strike upon another remarkable inconsistency in Mr. Foster's mind and train of reasoning; remarkable for him, because it could not have been supposed that a severely disciplined mind would have admitted it. He institutes a moral argument from "the stupendous idea of Eternity," and he goes the whole length of supposing that man's necessary ignorance and narrow faculty of apprehending it precludes him from having a competent notion of it, and so inevitably

prevents the salutary force of an impression from the threat of an eternal retribution. But if incompetent to comprehend the idea of *unlimited* duration of punishment, then necessarily incompetent to apprehend any approximation to that idea, and consequently the smaller and more limited the nature of the threatened retribution, the more powerful its effect upon the mind. The power of the impression increases in an inverse ratio to the magnitude of the danger. This is a strict and inevitable result from Foster's reasoning. He endeavors to institute a series of approximations to the idea of eternal misery, and then showing that they all fail, he demands that man, if there is an eternal retribution for sin, "be apprised of the nature and measure of the penal consequence." He intimates that it is something "totally out of the scope of his faculties to apprehend," and therefore unfit to deter him.

But what is it about which Mr. Foster is reasoning, and on which, in its very definiteness and supremacy of horror, he founds his whole argument *against* the doctrine, as against the goodness of God? Why, it is the actual, overwhelming and intolerable dreadfulness of this very judgment, of eternal misery; a thing so overwhelming and intolerable, that the human soul starts back from it aghast. It is then, after all, a thing of which the human soul may form a very definite conception; and the consequence inevitably is that it is of all things the best adapted to deter the soul from sin. And if that soul can form such a conception of it as to reason *against* it, *because* it is so supremely horrible, it must, if once admitted on the authority of God, constitute a deterring impression against sin, of an energy that all the motives in the universe cannot equal.

Mr. Foster's reasoning oversets itself at every step; and if this be the material out of which the private conversations of unbelief in eternal retribution, of which he speaks as among certain ministers, were composed, we wonder at the occultation of reason, which must, on this subject, have come over the intellectual circle. Nor can we conceive in what school of intellectual philosophy a circle of minds could have been disciplined, to reason so disastrously concerning those spiritual ideas, which are the birth-right and possession of the soul in its very constitution. The idea of eternity is perhaps the simplest and most omnipresent of all our ideas; the easiest to be appealed to, the most universal and absolute; pervading the mind like an unconscious atmosphere, and brooding over it even more constitutionally than the idea of the immortality of the soul. Eternity is, indeed, a simple idea, one of the inevitable forms in which the human reason works, if it works at all. There is no possible approximation to it, or forming of it, by measures or degrees; the soul overleaps them all, and is beyond them; it is there in Eternity, it was there before them. They may help to awaken the consciousness of the

soul, and quicken its sensibilities, but they cannot give the idea ; just as a galvanic machine may quicken a palsied nerve, but cannot impart or create life. It is in the soul, a law and development of its reason, or computations could no more impart it, than they could to the beasts that perish. Mr. Foster says, " all that is within human capacity is to imagine the vastest measures of *time*, and to look to the termination of these, as only touching the mere commencement of eternity." But the absolute falsity of this proposition in the philosophy of the human mind is quite demonstrable. It reminds us of a humorous and powerful exhibition of its absurdity by John Paul Richter.

Nor is the " feeble efficacy of the terrible doctrine itself as notionally admitted " owing to any incompetency in the mind to apprehend it ; for this would convey a dread imputation indeed against the goodness and justice of the Creator, in putting under an eternal moral accountability a race of creatures whom he had made absolutely incompetent to apprehend the idea of Eternity ! And this is but one of the monstrous consequences, which would follow from Mr. Foster's argument ; the grossest fatuity, we had almost said, that ever a great intellect was betrayed into.

But the feebleness of that efficacy is owing to the voluntary moral insensibility of the soul to all spiritual ideas and apprehensions ; a consequence of its depravity and not of its constitution. And that depravity is such, that we apprehend present self-interest outweighs even the consideration of *eternal* consequences, unseen, and infinitely more so of any merely *limited* consequences. The habit of looking at and living for the things which are seen and temporal produces an utter insensibility to the things unseen and eternal ; so that, though the idea of Eternity is full, clear, and simple in the intellect, it is not admitted into the heart ; there is a disconnection between it and the practical affections, as between the brain and the nerves in the case of some forms of paralysis. But still the idea rules as a monarch in the intellect, and exerts in *its* turn a paralysing power over all motives, all forms of inducement, addressed to the soul as based upon anything *less* than Eternity. The idea of Eternity in the soul reduces to ashes, as an Omnipotent Magician, whatever accumulations, either of horrors or beatitudes, may be attempted before it in any duration short of Eternity. Such tricks of accumulation, though the forces of the planetary universe were called in aid of the computation, as Foster has done, are as a hollow jugglery, which the soul sees through in an instant, and darts beyond, infinitely out of the reach of all limited efficacy. So that it may with truth be said that a being to whom God has given the idea of Eternity, is absolutely beyond the reach of efficacy even by Omnipotence, with anything less *than* Eternity. A mind with all the intense energy of thought and language, and all the power of

imagery, that not only Foster, but an archangel could command, might exhaust itself in piling horrors upon horrors, with all forms of illustration supplied by the universe, and all exclamations of dread before the misery of incomputable ages of torment ; but the soul darting into the Eternity beyond, exulting spreads its wings in triumph ; and laughs at the scarecrows of a limited duration. A depraved man, assured of an eternity of blessedness, will be affected by nothing *less* than an eternity of misery. It is absolutely in this way that the power of this idea of Eternity is most thoroughly tested among mortals, by its rendering *inefficacious* all ideas but those drawn *from* Eternity, and on the other hand, the power of human depravity is tested and demonstrated in this, more than anything else, its power to render the inducements of Eternity itself absolutely inefficacious unless wielded by the Almighty.

There is in one of Mr. Foster's valuable articles on Chalmers's Astronomical Discourses a most impressive argument as to the necessity of an eternal and infinite demonstration of the Divine Omnipotence and Wisdom, by a practical boundlessness in the created universe ; the mighty tracts of creation sweeping endlessly along, and merging into an awful and mysterious infinity. The greatest of created beings will never to all eternity be able to survey the whole of the material creation. "For must it not be one great object in the Creator's design, that this magnitude should make a sublime and awful impression on his intelligent creatures ? But if the magnitude is to make this impression, what would be the impression made on created spirits by their coming to the end, the boundary, of this magnitude ? It is palpable that this latter impression must counteract the former. So that if the stupendous extension of the works of God was intended and adapted to promote, in the contemplations of the highest intelligences, an infinitely glorious, though still incompetent conception of the Divine infinity, the ascertaining of the limit, the distinct perception of the finiteness, of that manifestation of power, would tend with a dreadful force to repress and annihilate that conception ; and it may well be imagined that if an exalted adoring spirit could ever in eternity find itself at that limit, the perception would inflict inconceivable horror." Each of the elements of the manifestation of an Infinite Being, therefore, Mr. Foster argues, will have a practical infiniteness relative to the capacities of his intelligent creatures ; and the universe itself must be one, of which it shall not be within the *possibilities* of any intelligence less than the infinite to know the termination.

Now this is truly important and powerful as to the true nature of our idea of eternity, and the worthlessness of any impression as a motive on the soul of an immortal being, which does not coincide in its extent with its own and the Divine existence. If this reason-

ing holds good in regard to God's Omnipotence, much more in regard to his moral perfections. If the utmost conception of creative vastness and glory possible to a created mind, would be reduced to an overwhelming impression of littleness on coming to the absolute limit of its display in the bosom of eternity, how much more in regard to any and every manifestation of God's moral attributes.

If an adequate impression of the Divine perfection of Omnipotence be required to be produced, Foster's reasoning shows that anything absolutely short of eternity is nothing; nay, is of a force the contrary way. And so, if an adequate impression of the Divine holiness is requisite in the sanctions of the Divine law, anything short of eternity in that, is equally of force the contrary way. If an adequate impression of terror for sinful beings under a respite of mercy on certain conditions be required, an adequate deterring impression by the penalty of the law, Foster's own reasoning shows that anything short of eternity would fail. The eternal and infinite dreadfulness of disobedience could not be shown by anything less than eternal suffering on account of disobedience; the eternal and infinite dreadfulness and terribleness of sin, if required to be manifested in extent, would sink into an impression of nothingness, when the absolute limit of the evil should be reached.

And the experiment having once been tried, we can assume with certainty that the universe of created intelligences would feel released from all fear of God as to any consequences of rebellion against him. The penalty would be the scorn of all evil beings, and no object, either of solicitude, of confidence, or of reverence, to good beings. The arrival at the end of it would inflict inconceivable horror on those spirits who have looked to it as the manifestation of the Divine holiness and justice, and the protection of themselves, and of the interests of the universe against the encroachments of sin, and would fill with inconceivable exultation and delight those spirits, who, in spite of its threatenings, have dared to rebel. And we can conceive of a period in duration, from which all that has been passed through of suffering, though in a circle of ages beyond the possibility of human computation, would be looked upon as less than the remembrance, by a man on the verge of three score years and ten, of the sting of a wasp, or the minutest emotion of sorrow in his childhood.

But if the creation of the universe be assumed as undertaken for the display of the Divine perfections, the government of that universe by rewards and punishments must be so assumed, much more. And consequently, on Foster's own reasoning, the extent of such display in each of these directions, in each of the elements of the manifestation of an Infinite Being, must have a practical infiniteness, relative to the capacities of his intelligent creatures; and the demonstration of the terribleness of sin, and of God's

holiness and justice in the punishment of sin, must be one, of which it shall not be within the *possibilities* of any intelligence less than the Infinite to know the termination. We wonder that this necessary consequence of Foster's argument should not have occurred to his own mind, when pressed with doubt and difficulty in the doctrine of eternal punishment.

Some of the questions respecting our state in the future world, which Foster was ever proposing to his own mind, are comparatively trifling, though invested with a solemn curiosity of spirit that communicates its own mysterious shade to every article of inquiry; reminding us of the illustration, which Coleridge has somewhere used, that the colors of the chameleon darken in the shadow of him who bends over to look at it. So the mind of Mr. Foster sees in the eternal world a reflection of his own dim imaginings, instead of the realities which a man may and must see, if he looks through the telescope of God's Word, and not the smoky glass of his own fancies. Mr. Foster's letter to Rev. Mr. Clowes, the 213th in the biographical collection, written in the 70th year of his life, in regard to the intermediate state, is an interesting exhibition of the posture of his spirit. He sets out with "assuming in entire confidence the soul's consciousness after death; this is implied in many passages of Scripture; but a number of them, often cited, assert it in so plain a manner, that nothing but the most resolute perversity of criticism can attempt to invalidate them."

And could Mr. Foster have admitted anything *less* than this, concerning the number and vast variety of passages, which teach so clearly the doctrine of an eternal retribution? On some of those passages the very truth of the soul's consciousness after death hinges. Why did not Mr. Foster apply his canon of judgment to the consideration of eternal retribution, asserted in those passages in so plain a manner, that nothing but the most resolute perversity of criticism can attempt to invalidate them?

But he goes on in this interesting letter, to present a variety of questions, which he would put to a messenger from the unseen world, could he have such an one to converse with, and intimates his opinion that we are, by some *punitive* dispensation, "denied such a knowledge of the invisible world, as would have tended to make the prospect of that world more influentially impressive."

In view of such a singular position as this, we cannot but bring a previous state of Mr. Foster's own mind in contrast with it. There is a most striking passage in his introduction to Doddridge's *Rise and Progress*, in which he dwells upon the mighty assemblage of considerations, that should irresistibly compel a careless soul to thoughtfulness, but to which it is insensible. "The very emanations of heaven, radiating downwards to where you dwell, are intercepted and do not reach you. It is the frequent reflection of a thoughtful mind in observing you,—what ideas, what truths,

what mighty appeals, belong to the condition of this one man and of that, devoted and enslaved to the world? Oh! why is it impossible to bring them into application? A few minutes of time would be sufficient for the annunciation of what, if it could be received by them in its simple, unexaggerated importance, would stop that one man's gay career, as if a great serpent had raised its head in his path; would confound that other's calculation for emolument; would bring a sudden dark eclipse on that third man's visions of fame; would tear them all from their inveterate and almost desperate combination with what is to perish, and amidst their surprise and terror would excite an emotion of joy that they had been dissevered before it was too late, from an object that was carrying them down a rapid declination towards destruction. *And the chief of these things, so potent if applied, are not withheld as if secreted and silent in some dark cloud, from which we had to invoke them to break forth in lightning; they are actually exhibited in the Divine revelation."*

There are, then, things enough revealed from that invisible world, emanations from Heaven radiating downwards, alarming ideas and mighty appeals enough, if men would look at them, to render the prospect of that world so influentially impressive, that if a bolt of thunder had fallen, or the ground had opened at his feet, or a great serpent had reared its head in his path, it would not tend more certainly to arrest our steps, to tear us from our desperate combination with what is to perish. And these things are not withheld, secreted, or silent in a dark cloud, but they actually break forth in lightning from the Divine revelation! This is the impression of a mind beholding these things itself, and endeavoring to take hold of them, to turn them, as by an infallible and potent conductor of the lightning, upon the insensible minds of others. Mr. Foster, in this state of open spiritual vision, sees through the Word of God these "mighty truths, requisitions, overtures, promises, portents, menaces, close to the sinner, suspended just over him, of a nature to demolish the present state of his mind, if brought in contact with it," and the insensibility of the man amidst all this is with him a matter of "indignant speculation," and he is "excited to a benevolent impatience, a restless wish, that things so near and important to the man should take hold upon him." He wishes that an austere apparition, as from the dead, might accost him, who is living as if life were never to have an end!

This is the mood of mind, this the state of vision, this the anxiety of heart, in a man endeavoring to urge upon others the importance of religion. But how different the speculative letter of the same being at seventy years of age. He wishes for something from the invisible world, more influentially impressive! He begs for a few of the special facts of that world, "that might keep our minds directed under a graver impression, to a preparation for

it." And with the declaration of our Saviour directly before his mind,—neither would they believe, though one rose from the dead,—he endeavors to diminish the amount of the meaning of that declaration, to what is barely and absolutely *necessary* to understand by it. A state of mind so singularly obstinate against any but compulsory conviction, assuredly comes near to that very disease of unbelief, of which our Saviour speaks. What revelation *could* be made to satisfy it? Here again is Thomas among the disciples. Believe on *such* evidence? Show me the point of his nails, and let me thrust my hand into his side!

Mr. Foster goes on. "We must submit to feel that we *are* in the dark . . . A contemplative spirit hovers with insuppressible inquisitiveness about the dark frontier, beyond which it *knows* that wonderful realities are existing—realities of greater importance to it than the whole world on this side of that limit. We watch for some glimpse through any part of the solemn shade." Would not one imagine that he were in the presence of some highly cultivated and powerful pagan mind, without a revelation, soliloquizing on the unimaginable future, as a dark, unfathomed, palpable obscure, rather than listening to the speculations of the greatest minds in the world, under the full light of the Christian dispensation! This is one of the most remarkable examples on record of that perversity of mind, which suffers its ignorance and impatience about that which is unknown, to diminish its confidence, and obscure its perceptions, in regard to that which is known.

Now, in regard to the detail of Divine revelation, there can be no doubt that both the amount of light given and that withheld, the subjects made to stand out in clearest day, and those held back in comparative obscurity, the degree, the distribution, the direction of that light, and the combination of light and shade, are exactly what is required for a perfect revelation to mortals in our state. To give the realities of the future world their full power over our minds in this world, there must be that sublime and awful mingling of the definite with the indefinite, which presents absolute truth, but truth which carries us wandering through eternity; there must be that absence of all such exactness, as would make the inquisitive speculator say, Now I have it all under my command and comprehension. Had revelation been occupied with answers to such inquiries as Mr Foster demanded, its power over the soul would have been immeasurably lessened. It is the solemn reserve of the Scriptures in regard to such comparatively unimportant questions and particulars, and their solemn and awful fullness and clearness as to great fundamental truths, that constitutes one of the greatest incidental proofs of their Divine inspiration: their fullness on all points essential to the soul's eternal interests: their reserve on all points of mere intellectual and speculative inquisitiveness; on all points on which *men* would have resorted to

fullness and minuteness in *their* communications, on purpose to excite and attract the curiosity and admiration of mankind. Revelation would have greatly lost its power to keep the mind directed under a grave impression of preparation for the Eternal World, if it *had* been constructed and arranged according to Mr. Foster's demands.

And the nature of Mr. Foster's own unsophisticated, almost unconscious impressions, and the amazing power with which he could convey them, in regard to what awaits the soul in Eternity, may be much better learned from his practical writings, than his impatient speculative questionings. Take, for example, his incidental passage in regard to the death of Hume. After examining the manner of the philosopher in meeting death, the low and labored jokes, the suspicious buffoonery, by which his companions could be so much diverted, but which looked much like "the expedient of a boy on passing through some gloomy place in the night, who whistles to lessen his fear, or to persuade his companion that he does not feel it;" he observes that "to a man who solemnly believes the truth of revelation, *and therefore the threatenings of Divine vengeance against the despisers of it*, this scene will present as mournful a spectacle, as perhaps the sun ever shone upon. We here behold a man of great talents and invincible perseverance, entering on his career with the profession of an impartial inquiry after truth, met at every stage and step by the evidences and exhortations of religion and the claims of his Creator, but devoting his labors to the pursuit of fame and the promotion of impiety, at length acquiring and accomplishing, as he declared himself, all he had intended and desired, and descending towards the close of life amidst tranquillity, widely extending reputation, and the homage of the great and the learned. We behold him appointed soon to appear before the Judge, to whom he had never alluded but with malice or contempt; yet preserving to appearance an entire self-complacency, idly jesting about his approaching dissolution, and mingling with the insane sport his references to the fall of superstition, a term of which the meaning is hardly even dubious when expressed by such men. *We behold him at last carried off, and we seem to hear, the following moment, from the darkness in which he vanishes, the shriek of surprise and terror, and the overpowering accents of the messenger of vengeance. On the whole globe there probably was not acting at the time, as mournful a tragedy as that of which the friends of Hume were the spectators, without being aware that it was any tragedy at all.*"

Now we need not say that the sentences in this impressive paragraph marked in italics convey a more solemn and effective impression by far, than if their place had been supplied by anything more definite. The soul broods over the awful undefined imagery covered up in darkness, yet half disclosed in light, behind which

the great fact of sudden and terrific vengeance rushes with overwhelming certainty.

We have spoken of the morbid passion for doubts, or rather we ought to say, the fascination by them, and irresistible drawing towards them, as a bird to the glitter of the serpent's eye, beneath which the great mind of Foster seemed sometimes wrestling. His was not the *depravity* of unbelief, but the *temptation*. "If thou be the Son of God, command these stones that they be made bread." Some men feed upon doubts, and search for them, and make sale of them. And some men pretend to sport with them even on the brink of the grave; "a low vivacity," said Foster, in the case of Hume, "which seems but like the quickening corruption of a mind, whose faculty for perception is putrefying and dissolving even before the body."

But Foster did not seek for doubts; they were borne in upon him; they were a source of anguish to him. A man who loves them, is likely to perish by them. We have heard of men in search of mud-turtles held by the viscous soil, till the tide flowed over them, and they were drowned; or of men digging mud itself in their boat, and sinking with it; some *minds* are swamped in the same manner.

There are subjects, on which it is impossible *not* to doubt; and the plainest truths of revelation may be driven to extremes beyond the limit of human faculties. The attributes of God, and the elements of our own being may be tortured with questions, that admit of no other answer than an *unquestioning* acquiescence in the Divine Wisdom. On some of these questions, if created minds were left to themselves in controversy, it would be eternal. The one party might invent arguments that would seem in their explosion to level all the ranks of the justifiers of the ways of God to man, like Satan's new artillery against the serried files of angels. But they again might be overwhelmed with arguments like the seated hills, and together so the war would be eternal. There is nothing but the coming of Messiah himself that can calm the soul, and stay the surges of its chaos.

We cannot help attributing most of the defects and difficulties in Mr. Foster's theological views to the low position he was content to keep through life in regard to personal experience in the great things of religion. He had but little animating faith in the power of religion, because he looked at it and experienced it more through the medium of human imperfections, cares, anxieties, troubles, distractions, than of Divine grace. He did not look into the perfect law of liberty, nor hold up to his own view and the view of others, the examples in the New Testament. To use one of his own illustrations applied in conversation to another subject, his piety did not rise high enough to keep the sharp and rugged prominences of truth, which reason cannot scale with safety, beneath the surface;

because his own experience was not deeper, they rose, or were suffered to rise, into occasions of mischief and difficulty. Had the powerful spring-tide of piety as well as mind overflowed his being, there would have been no breakers in the sea. Had Foster's mind been lifted, for example, to a post of observation like that of Edwards, when he wrote the history of Human Redemption, what a very different view he would have taken of the economy of human existence with its lurid shades. He has such a post now, we doubt not, amidst the "sanctities of heaven."

The truth of Eternal Retribution is a citadel defended by many batteries. So fast as to the vision of an enemy one seems to be demolished, another rises. In the Scriptures, in human reason, from analogy, from the nature of things, from the character of God, from the character of man, the evidence is solemn and overwhelming. You may play your game of escape, if the laws of evidence be disregarded, but with one who holds you to logical conclusions, in every possible move you are check-mated. You cannot put the various doctrines of the Bible in any relative array but they lead to this; you cannot exclude this from any possible combination. And any one of the elements of the Scriptural problem given, may lead you through the whole circle of Truth. Given, the Atonement; to find the character of man, and its relation to the element of retribution;—that would do it. Or, given, the character of man and the character of God; to find the element of retribution; that would do it. Or, given, the necessity of Divine Grace to fit the soul for heaven, the atonement being the sole condition of that grace; to find the element of retribution; that would do it. Or, given, the existence and agency of fallen spirits; to find *man's* retribution; that would do it. Or, given, the bare offer of eternal life; *that* would do it. Or, given, the benevolence of God, the axiom of the universe, God is Love; that would do it. For all retribution is invested with the atmosphere of Love, and had not God been Love, he might have let the guilty go unpunished. But Justice only does the work of Love, and Love works by Justice for the purity and blessedness of the universe. Where there is sin, Love without wrath, without retribution, would only be connivance with iniquity. There is no such thing as Love without Justice, or Justice without Penalty, or Penalty without execution, or execution *with* end, so long as there is sin.

Even in our natural theology, sin being given, pain is absolutely necessary, in order to prove the benevolence of God. So that the problem and the answer might be stated thus: Given, the fact of sin, how will you demonstrate that God is a good being? Answer: Only by proving that God punishes sin. In this view, the actual degree of misery with which earth is filled, so far from being a difficulty in God's government, goes to establish it as God's. A malevolent being would have let men sin, without making them

miserable ; therefore, God could not be proved benevolent, unless, in a world of sin, there were the ingredient of misery.

But the arrangement in this world is imperfect, even to a pagan mind, and leaves the system open to doubt as to God's justice, because sin is so often without punishment, and the wicked escape. But if they escape here only to meet a perfect retribution hereafter, the doubt is removed. Here, then, in this world, we see only the seeds, the roots, the imperfect development of a system, which has its perfection in the eternal world. Such is the inevitable argument from our natural theology. A mind like Bishop Butler's, not withheld, as Foster's was, by permitted doubts as to the Divine goodness, from pressing the argument to its logical conclusion, finds in the eternal world the completion of the system, which is but begun in this. Then there comes in revelation, to bring the prophecy of our natural theology to an absolute certainty, detailing beforehand the perfect provisions of the Divine government, and showing that the *partial* flashes of justice in this world are but the *restraint* of the Divine indignation, under a system of mercy through the death of the Son of God ; so that while there are *intimations enough* of retributive justice to warn men of what is to come, if they do not avail themselves of that mercy ; there is *restraint* enough of retributive justice to constitute a perfect probation, and leave unembarrassed the entire free-agency of man. There is retribution enough to show that God can and will punish sin ; retribution so little, as to show that what he does not do here, he will do hereafter.

In such a system, the very provisions of mercy are manifestly an overwhelming proof that there can be mercy in no other way. The provisions of mercy, if rejected, return into sanctions of the law, and are the greatest assurances of an endless retribution. Just thus is the argument conducted in the Scriptures. And it must be a most singular perversity of mind, that, accepting humbly of those provisions for itself, as the only possible way of salvation, at the same time condemns the goodness of God in not saving without those provisions, the persons who reject them. It is turning the whole foundations of argument upside down, and putting things in the very reverse order from that which they occupy in the Scriptures. It is this reverse order which Mr. Foster takes. Given, Justification by Faith alone ; to save that part of the world which continues rebellious, *without* faith. Or, in other words, given, the Atonement for Believers ; to save unbelievers in spite of it.

There is no shadow of such a problem presented for solution in the Word of God. The question is not even mooted of the *possibility* of such salvation. If there be any form of question about it, it is presented in such a shape, as to constitute a new and more impregnable variety in the argument of retribution ; not, how can

they be *saved*? but, how can they *escape*, who *neglect* so great salvation? Given, by God's mercy, the Atonement; what must become of those who reject it? That is the solemn path, into which our inquisitive thoughts are turned in the Scriptures.

There is a marked contradiction between Mr. Foster's line of reasoning on this subject, and his practical solemnity and power in the enforcement of repentance. Take, for example, those admirable letters written to assist a soul on the verge of the Eternal world in its preparation for the change from this world to that. He never glances at a possibility of there being safety in the Eternal world, without a previous reliance upon Christ in this. His whole argument, in all the solemnity which Foster, of all men, possessed a surpassing ability to throw around it, so that it seems as a dark cloud coming to brood over the spirit with mutterings of thunder, is constructed here and elsewhere on the impossibility of blessedness in heaven without regeneration by Divine grace; the impossibility of that grace, except on a personal application to, and reliance upon, the Divine Mediator; the impossibility of guilt being taken away but by relying wholly on the Saviour of the world; the impossibility of pardon, without seeking pardon through his blood. To all this he adds the inveteracy and profoundness of human depravity, the utterly perverted state of every heart. "It is *here*," says he, speaking to a dear and most amiable young friend, "that we need pardoning mercy to remove the guilt, and the operations of the Divine Spirit to transform our nature and reverse its tendencies. It is thus *alone* that we can be made fit for the community and felicity of heaven." And to all this he is wont to add the emphatic pressure of the danger of delay, lest the opportunity be passed by, and the immortal spirit be "driven away in its wickedness," unprepared to meet its Judge.

What is there behind all this? What does it indicate? A deep, unfathomable conviction of the danger of eternal retribution, a conviction which sinks Foster's sentences into the conscience as with the pen of a diamond; a conviction which goes beforehand with the reader, and prepares the mind to receive the impression from Foster's solemnity of appeal, stamped as with the weight of a mountain. The conviction in Foster's mind was indeed habitually wrestling with doubt; but whenever he addressed himself to the work of warning an immortal being, the instinctive energy of the conviction, quickened by anxiety for another, seemed to thrust the doubt down, and the tide of solemn thought pressed unimpeded onward. Such declarations of Foster's belief as this, that it is only by the Scriptural view of the Mediator that "all our guilt can be removed from the soul, *and dissevered from its destiny in the life to come*," indicate a reef of thought on this subject, over which the anxieties of his mind were thundering incessantly. The student in theology, or young minister to whom he addressed a letter

so palpably inconsistent with the practical tenor of his writings, might have answered him with the question, What mean the breakers on that reef? What is that destiny in the life to come, from which *guilt cannot be dissevered*?

And he may be answered now, in Foster's own language, taken from his earlier work on the Importance of Religion, with a positive answer in the shape of a returning question: "The question comes to you, whether you can deliberately judge it better to carry forward a corrupt nature, uncorrected, untransformed, unreclaimed to God, into the future state, WHERE IT MUST BE MISERABLE, than to undergo whatever severity is indispensable in the process of true religion, which would prepare you for a happy eternity. Reflect that you are every day practically answering the question. Can it be that you are answering it in the affirmative? Do I really see before me the rational being who in effect avows:—I cannot, will not, submit to such a discipline, though in refusing it and resisting it, I renounce an infinite and eternal good, and *con-sign myself to PERDITION*?"

He may be answered with another sentence, taken from the same powerful work of Mr. Foster, and applied by Foster himself, as the *final* answer to those who question the truth of that "appalling estimate of future ruin," presented by the evangelical religious doctrine:—an answer which the writer himself would have done well to put up in characters of fire over his own entrance to the consideration of the subject:—"We have only to reply, that, as he has not yet seen the world of retribution, HE IS TO TAKE HIS ESTIMATE OF ITS AWARDS FROM THE DECLARATION OF HIM, WHO KNOWS WHAT THEY ARE, AND THAT IT IS AT HIS PERIL HE ASSUMES TO ENTERTAIN ANY OTHER."

Here we rest. This single sentence contains a wisdom that quite sets aside Mr. Foster's whole letter on the subject of Divine Penalty. God only knows the retributions of eternity, and it is at our peril that we assume to entertain any other estimate of them, than that which his words distinctly reveal.

We cannot better close our notices of this subject, and of these intensely interesting volumes, than by quoting two of the remarks in Mr. Foster's Journal, numbered 321 and 323.

"We are, as to the grand system and series of God's government, like a man who, confined in a dark room, should observe through a chink in the wall, some large animal pacing by;—he sees but an extremely small strip of the animal at once as it passes by, and is utterly unable to form an idea of the size, proportions, or shape of it."

"How dangerous to defer those momentous reformations, which conscience is solemnly preaching to the heart. If they are neglected, the difficulty and indisposition are increasing every month. The mind is receding, degree after degree, from the warm and hopeful zone, till at last it will enter the arctic circle, and become fixed in relentless and eternal ice."

Out of the first three hundred articles in this Journal, prepared with great care by Mr. Foster's own hand, only twenty-eight have been published; of the others, likewise, many are omitted. We cannot conceive the reason for this procedure. It would seem proper to have published the whole of the Journal; it will be strange indeed, if it be not demanded by the earnest desire to know all that *can* be known of the mental and spiritual processes of so remarkable a mind. Appended to these volumes are some deeply interesting notices of Mr. Foster, as a preacher and companion, by John Sheppard, author of *Thoughts on Devotion*, and other productions.

We have spoken of that delightful trait in Mr. Foster's noble nature,—his childlike ingenuousness. There was in him a striking combination of simplicity of purpose, independence, originality, and fearlessness of human opinion. Now if he had possessed, along with these qualities, a greater degree of wisdom in practical judgment, we believe we should have seen in the memorials of his biography more of positive faith, and less of the workings of anxious disquieting, and sometimes agonizing doubt. There are seasons of doubt and darkness in Christian experience, which man should keep from man, and carry only to God. He should keep them, not because he fears the tribunal of human opinion, but fears to add what may be the wrongfulness of his own state of mind to the sum of error and unbelief in the world. He should cease from man, and wait patiently upon God for light, because he loves his fellow beings, and is unwilling by his own uncertainties, which may spring from he knows not how many evil influences, to run the hazard of balancing their uncertainty on the wrong side. It is no part of a childlike ingenuousness to give utterance always to whatever may perplex the soul in its conflicts with the powers of darkness.

The admirable constitution of the mind of Robert Hall in reference to this subject has been developed by Mr. Foster himself in his own original and forcible style. In that part of his remarks on Mr. Hall's character as a preacher, he has alluded to the peculiar tendency in some minds to brood over the shaded frontier of awful darkness on the borders of our field of knowledge. "There are certain mysterious phenomena," says he, "in the moral economy of our world, which compel, and will not release, the attention of a thoughtful mind, especially if of a gloomy constitutional tendency. Wherever it turns, it still encounters their portentous aspect; often feels arrested and fixed by them as under some potent spell; making an effort, still renewed, and still unavailing, to escape from the appalling presence of the vision." Mr. Foster is here evidently disclosing something of the habit of his own experience. He was longing to have the oppression upon his mind alleviated; and he thought that the strenuous deliberate ex-

ertion of a power of thought like Mr. Hall's, after he had been so deeply conversant with important and difficult speculations, might perhaps have contributed something towards such an alleviation. But even Mr. Hall could have effected nothing of this nature for a mind which would not exercise a childlike faith. Carry our knowledge up to the last point to which the strongest mind ever created could advance it, and there is still the same need of faith,—contented, quiet, submissive faith. And how is faith ever to be tried, how can it be proved that it is the faith of an humble and submissive mind, except in the midst, or on the border of great difficulties?

Mr. Foster speaks, almost with a feeling of disappointment, of that peculiarity in Mr. Hall's mental character, by which he appeared "disinclined to pursue any inquiries beyond the point where substantial evidence fails. He seemed content to let it remain a terra incognita, till the hour that puts an end to conjecture." We confess we see a deep wisdom and beauty in this trait of character. It was wrought into Mr. Hall's constitution not by nature only, but by the power of grace divine. And the more the soul is absorbed with the known realities of our being, and the overwhelming importance of what is clearly revealed of our destiny in the world to come, the more anxious it will be to *press that knowledge*, the more unwilling to distract the attention from it by the pursuit of doubt and inquisitive speculation, and the more content to leave the obscure and the mysterious to the hour when we shall see as we are seen, and know as we are known. "My efforts," said Mr. Foster, in his journal, "to enter into possession of the vast world of moral and metaphysical truth, are like those of a mouse attempting to gnaw through the door of a granary." It was also a curious remark which he made, that "one object of life should be to accumulate a great number of grand questions to be asked and resolved in Eternity." Inquisitive wonderer in the presence of mysterious and incomprehensible truth! Art thou *now* in a world, where faith is no longer needed? Or do the answers that in the light of eternity, the light of Heaven, have burst upon thy redeemed spirit, only render necessary a still higher faith, and prepare thee for its undoubting, beatific, everlasting exercise?

ARTICLE II.

HUMAN JUSTICE; OR, GOVERNMENT A MORAL POWER.

By PROF. TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D., New York University.

WE propose to examine the true nature of Human Justice. In doing so, we maintain, 1st, That government is a *moral*, as well as an economical power,—the term *political* being employed as embracing both departments; 2d, That morality is something absolute, or an *end* in itself, to be sought and upheld for its own sake; 3d, That unless morality is thus upheld and regarded as an end in the punishment of crime, the State will fail in accomplishing even the economical purposes for which it is designed; And 4th, That government, being a moral power, is, on this account, a Divine institute, with Divine sanctions, a proposition which can be most abundantly demonstrated by most sure proofs from Holy Scripture.

Justice, then, or that aspect of it which is styled punitive or punishment, may be regarded as having a relation to both departments, and as being both moral and economical. According to the largest division, it may be viewed as *retrospective* and *prospective*. It *looks back* to the intrinsic demerit of the crime as a deed done with an unalterable desert, logically irrespective of everything extrinsic, and it also *looks forward* to the influence which it may have upon the future conduct of others, or of the criminal himself. In this latter aspect, it may be again subdivided, and regarded as *preventive* or *reformative*. The word *retrospective* is employed as furnishing the best antithesis to the mere prospective view. The more significant term, however, is *retributive*, as denoting that which assigns suffering to crime, according to an inherent fitness, as a debt due to law. Hence it may also be styled *Vindictive* Justice, as that which the law vindicates or claims, as a reparation of a wrong done to itself, irrespective of any individual injury or individual vengeance.

We may, therefore, regard punishment as, 1st, Retributive; 2d, Preventive; and 3d, Reformative; or, in other words, in its relation to law regarded as a representative, whether perfect or imperfect, of the Eternal Justice,—or in its relation to society, or in its relation to the individual.

In regard to this division, questions at once arise which receive different and even opposite answers from those who belong to opposing schools of moral or religious philosophy; or who resort to different methods in interpreting the decisions of the moral sense. Some would deny that this retrospective or retributive aspect of

punishment had any real foundation, in any correct view of law or government, be it Divine or human. They would say that it has no place in the laws of man, and that it must be abhorrent to any right views of the moral administration of God. Such might still use the terms penal, and punishment, but would apply them only to what we have styled the preventive and reformative aspects. Others advance a step farther. With them punishment also as preventive or *in terrorem* cannot belong to the Divine government, though they might, perhaps, concede it to an imperfect state of human justice; to be superseded, however, by something better when their boasted period of political perfection shall have arrived.

In this view, the true idea of penalty has, in fact, no place whatever. In the administration of God, nothing is done through an appeal to the fears. All suffering is disciplinary, or else is reduced to the law of physical consequences, ever self-remedying, and having no more of a strictly moral character than the law of gravitation. The only acknowledged end of punishment is reformation, and this can consistently be conceded alone to the Divine administration. It must be denied to men as far as its exercise would require the use of force against wrong-doers, and this on the ground that such forcible reforming power does not belong to us by nature, and has never been delegated to us by God.

There are again others, who, in consideration of certain conclusions to which they would inevitably be led, and which they would struggle to avoid, admit that the retributive principle enters into the Divine administration, but contend that it has no place in the human. Their sagacity, or their philosophy, or their orthodoxy, makes them perceive, that if in God's government sin is not punished for its intrinsic demerit, there are no grounds on which it can be properly punished at all. They must see that in regard to the universal spiritual law of God, a universe of beings who are just kept from overt acts by the *in terrorem* principle of punishment, are already intrinsically sinners, and have already incurred the penalty. They must also acknowledge that the position, that punishment in the world to come is for the reformation of the criminal, is at war with some of the most solemn revelations of the Bible. They cannot avoid the conclusion, that a denial of punishment as based on intrinsic desert, must be a denial of such intrinsic desert itself, or result in the position, that what is styled sin, is a disease, a nuisance, a political mischief, a mere state to be regretted; and then along with this must go all moral conviction of such demerit, leaving a condition of soul in which punishment could have no real preventive or reformative efficacy, even if such had been its main design. Even the terrors of the Divine Justice have no true moral power, severed from the idea and conviction of desert. If the penalty is demanded by this, then the conscience re-

quires no other reason. If there is no such absolute desert, the infliction of punishment on grounds of expediency, aside from this, can only produce a sense of injustice instead of a disposition to obedience. In other words, the penalty of the Divine Law will not even keep men from sinning, if this, aside from intrinsic demerit, is felt to be the only, or highest ground of its infliction. Even conceding, then, that prevention and reformation were important ends of the Divine penalty, they could not be secured if the higher principle is regarded as having no existence. It might be proved, that from the degree of strength and purity with which this is preserved in the mind, comes all the real moral power of the two others; and that thus the principle of prevention, which would be spiritually powerless, if it were the only end of the Divine law, becomes quickened by an energy not its own, in consequence of being associated with that superior element which looks only to the absolute. But this will come in better in another part of our argument, for which we have reserved it.

For these reasons, many, who are not yet prepared to take part with Universalism, or with Infidelity either in its vulgar or more transcendental forms, admit that the principle of retribution does enter into the Divine government,* and that, *there*, sin is punished *as sin*, that is, as something opposed to the eternal righteousness, irrespective of the deterring effect upon others, or of any reforming influence upon the criminal himself.

They deny it, however, of the human. Whilst the former positions satisfy their orthodoxy, it is quietly assumed that, in this respect, human government differs radically from the Divine; that although the terms, *law, justice, punishment, &c.*, are used of both, yet they must be taken with an essential distinction; and that, in short, when predicated of the latter, it is only by that sort of accommodation, by which lower things of an altogether different nature are sometimes taken as arbitrary symbols or representatives of those that are higher. Hence, although the words are retained, they denote only shadows, and do not signify real entities, as in their application to the Divine administration. Crime, in its relation to human law, is not strictly crime, but only inconvenience to society; of another species, perhaps, physically, but differing in no *moral* respect (as far as human laws can take cognizance of it), from madness, or contagious disease, or a pestilential atmosphere. Ill desert is not strictly ill desert, in the moral

* We had supposed this to be admitted by almost if not quite all who in any way profess to believe in the commonly received doctrines of Christianity. There is evidence, however, that some who would claim the name of orthodox or evangelical, do actually go so far as to make expediency, aside from desert, the sole ground of punishment in Divine as well as human law; or, if they admit the word *desert* at all, it is only by such a perversion as would make it synonymous with expediency, or that measure of suffering, be it more or less, which might be just enough to operate, *in terrorem*, in keeping others from offending.

sense, but only the economical relation borne by one who has occasioned this inconvenience. Punishment is not punishment, in the moral sense, but the method society employs to abate a nuisance which cannot be tolerated. In short, there is, strictly, no justice, no crime, no ill desert, no punishment, in anything like the absolute import of those terms in their relation to the Divine government. The object of human law and human penalty is not moral but physical evil. If it even has the semblance of dealing with the former, it is only in reference to the physical inconveniences that may incidentally flow from it.

Since, then, there can be but one true and absolute sense to all these words, and this they have when used of the Divine law, it would follow that human government is in no sense a moral power. It has, consequently, only an apparent, and no true or real right and wrong. It has nothing to do with the moral turpitude of acts in themselves, or aside from the fact of such moral turpitude being the measure or evidence of some inconvenience to the political economy. In short, in this theory, government has no right to punish actions because they are *wicked* or *morally wrong*. It cannot, therefore, consistently use towards them any language implying moral distinctions or intrinsic demerit. Of course, it can have nothing to do with the conscience. It ought not, as we expect hereafter to show, to have any regard to intention. It can rightly have no honors, or degradations, or anything involving the idea of moral worth or its opposite. All these consequences are inseparably linked with the position, that in human justice, crime is not punished as crime, or because of its intrinsic demerit, but as a mischief or inconvenience. Even should it be conceded to the theory of expediency, that the great and highest end of human punishment is prevention instead of retribution, still the moral power of government may be said to be maintained, if it can be shown that this end is the prevention of crime, *as crime*, and not simply as a nuisance or a mischief.

We maintain, however, that the principle of retribution or the punishment of crime for its intrinsic demerit, not only enters, but necessarily enters into that constitution of things which is styled law and government, in its lowest, as well as in its highest departments—whether regarded as perfect or imperfect, as intended for this world, or the world to come.

The argument admits of a three-fold division. It may be maintained, 1st, on the *a priori* ground; 2d, by the *a posteriori* method; and 3d., by direct proof from the Holy Scriptures. By the *a priori* argument we mean that which is derived from the moral sense as interpreted in the universal sentiments of mankind. As evidence of this, we bring the unvarying concurrence of language, showing by the uniformity, not simply in the primary etymological senses, but in the *usus loquendi* and applications of the

terms employed, an inseparable connection in the moral sense, between such terms and certain fundamental ideas; thus maintaining that there is not a true and apparent, or, in other words, a distinct divine and human justice,—a real and an apparent crime, a real and an apparent punishment, an absolute and a relative morality; but that there is, throughout the universe, one justice, one moral desert, one nature of punishment, one morality, and that when we depart from these ideas, we bring in something to which we may falsely attach the same names, but which are, in reality, counterfeits, having nothing of the essence of the originals. The method *a posteriori* would be a demonstration from expediency, or consequences, that a true utility does itself require that retribution, or something higher than what is ordinarily styled expediency, should form an element even of human government, in order to give it the essential moral character of government; in other words, that the highest good of society demands such a principle, and that those expediencies which some would make the only aim of government, could not themselves be sustained without this superior conserving element. The third argument, or that from Scripture, requires no explanation beyond a direct citation of the law and the testimony.

In reference to the argument from the moral sense, as evidenced in the universal forms of language, a late writer* thus speaks:

“How could any one have given the most superficial attention to the laws of language, and yet speak of any idea as being inseparably attached to a word, is altogether beyond our comprehension. We had supposed that it was known to everybody, that the connection between words and ideas is not only *conventional*, but that nothing is more common than for words to acquire entirely new meanings. The attempt to settle the meaning of a word as it is used at the present day in reference to a particular subject, by an appeal to etymology, and thereby to illustrate a grave question in philosophy, is a kind of pedantry which we had hoped was obsolete among philosophers. Is modern science to be dug up out of the roots of Greek, or Latin, or Hebrew terms, &c.?”

We are compelled to differ very widely from this learned writer in respect to his views of language and its true philosophy. It certainly may be doubted whether it was known to everybody, that the connection between words and ideas is only *conventional*. On the contrary, we had thought that no one who had, in any respect, a philosophical habit of mind, would ever have hazarded such an assertion, as false as it is superficial. Such convention, or conventional understanding, has no more reality than the social compact from which some would derive all political ideas. When measured by the rule of this writer's philosophy it may seem a paradox, yet still is it true, that the outward forms, or the names of things, are but the smallest part of a language. They are but the external drapery, varying

* Democratic Review, August, 1846.

in every age and nation but within and beneath all this is the soul, which in all tongues utters the same spiritual voice, and proves itself the offspring either of Divinity or of one universal human mind. This spirit is found in the bounding, classifying, and combining of all ideas that have their seat in the soul itself (especially the moral nature),—aside from that knowledge which is wholly from without, and which may therefore give rise to conceptions having every variety of change both in kind and degree. The outward forms may be matters of express or *tacit* conventional agreement, although even here, perhaps, to a much less extent than is generally maintained; but this inner soul has never been the creation of conventions or social compacts. Proceeding originally from the inspiration of God, or coming forth as a necessary emanation of the rational mind, it has, in turn, reciprocally re-acted upon the soul, shaping its ideas, and giving permanency to all those first principles or universal truths, which lie at the foundation of all moral science. One of the profoundest thinkers of the age* has affirmed, that, in this respect, “language follows an inward necessity, and must therefore possess inward truth and necessary correctness.”

This soul of language being an emanation from the human soul, must therefore be the best interpreter of its intuitive ideas, especially of its intuitive moral ideas, if it have any such. The questions then—whether there are any first truths grounded directly on the moral sense, and whether there are certain terms in language by which they are immutably conveyed, present one and the same inquiry. It is not affirmed that this is true of all departments of knowledge to which language is applied. It is of little or no authority in the physical sciences. Here not only do the phonetic representatives vary, but even the ideas, or rather conceptions, expressed by them may be differently bounded, classified, and combined in different ages and nations. The language of commerce, of war, of agriculture, of manufactures, of fashion, in short, of all *conventional* economies, must vary as those departments vary, and that, too, in regard to its soul as well as to the body. The things themselves are conventional, and of course the corresponding terms must be conventional likewise, not only in their forms, but also in the quantity, quality, and modifications of meanings expressed by them.

But if there are ideas which are not conventional, ideas eternal and immutable, which the soul knows as such, or knows them not at all, and never can acquire from any foreign source—in respect to these, language, in its primary and universal conceptions, must be our clearest and most trustworthy guide, and our surest index to those unchanging laws of the human spirit that are

* Schleiermacher.

to us our highest evidence of the highest truths. Surely this must be the case in respect to some truths, and above all others, those that pertain to our moral nature. Do, then, our words *justice*, *retribution*, *law*, *morality*, &c., represent ideas belonging to this class, or are these as changeable and as flowing as the shifting nomenclature of the physical sciences, or of the mere political expediencies? The words *metal*, *alkali*, *money*, *currency*, *labor*, *capital*, *rent*, &c., may mean more or less in one age than in another. The corresponding terms may mean more or less in one language than in another. They may even receive such changes, additions, and diminutions, as in time to represent a wholly new conception. But the *idea* of justice is a *whole* in itself; it is a *unity*. There can be, therefore, no addition or subtraction of any element, without destroying such idea for the mind; and every word which is then used for such perversion, only represents a phantom. If these ideas are really absolute and unchangeable entities, they become such, not in themselves, but relatively to us, through the laws of the human soul; and we might, therefore, conclude, *a priori*, that these laws will ever give rise to terms having a correspondence to the ideas as immutable as the source from whence they emanate. If, then, we believe in this absoluteness in respect to the idea, we turn to the investigation of language with the most sure confidence, that there will be found its highest proof.

“Nothing is more common,” says the writer to whom we have referred, “than for words to acquire new meanings.” True,—but have the ideas represented by these, and similar moral terms, thus varied, or have they not, on the other hand, been so uniformly the same in all nations, and all ages, that the new philosophy must either do violence to the established sense, or substitute other representatives in their stead? This is the great question, and we maintain the affirmative. As far as investigation has been carried, it would confirm the statement, that there are in all tongues corresponding words, representing ideas which through all changes of forms, and of men, and things, are as immutable as the laws of the human mind.

It is remarked by some one—we think by George Combe—that the *idea*, as he styles it, to which we give the name *horse*, might have been just as well expressed by *equus* or *hippos*. We partially admit the truth of this most profound observation. We would further admit, that men may so vary their conceptions of a thing, whilst they retain the same names, as to call a spade a shovel. But no man, or combination of men, or age, or nation, has a right to call justice expediency, either by applying the same name to both, or by transferring a long established word from one to the other. Neither have they a right to call justice benevolence, or benevolence justice, or happiness good, or good happiness, as long as the human soul, in its most divine department, clearly witnesses

to their being essentially distinct ideas. The unanswerable proof of this is, that all tongues, as the surest interpreters of the moral sense, have ever had, and doubtless ever will have, radically distinct terms for them. Neither would such abuses, should they ever take place, be of any long continuance. There is a recuperative elasticity in language which will ever, on moral subjects, bring it back to its natural state of harmony with the primary laws of the soul. Certain theories, such as that of a late work on the "Rationale of Crime," can never be set forth without a continual perversion of the established senses of fundamental terms. Their advocates cannot speak without making discords, and the human soul, whilst it retains the temperament which God has given it, cannot long endure the moral dissonance.

To change the mode of argument on this head, we would say, that on some subjects, the reasoning, from the very nature of things, must be wholly external. Among these, for example, are questions of social or political expediency. Such a mind as that of Bentham can reduce them to figures,—to a summation not only of profit and loss, but also of pleasures and pains. If the inquiries concerning justice, law, punishment, morality, &c., belong solely to this class, then it might be admitted, that they would of course require no higher philosophy. This, however, would be a sheer begging the question. Others would contend that they belong to a department different from the inductive understanding. The very statement of such a position, then, at once changes the jurisdiction. If there be such a superior department, it must have the power, not only to decide questions belonging to it, but also to adjudicate on the previous question, whether it does belong to its jurisdiction or not. As soon, therefore, as the plea is put in, the cause is at once, by this very fact, transferred to the higher tribunal,—to be dismissed and sent back, or to be retained and adjudged. This Supreme Court for moral questions is the moral sense—the *moral reason*, in distinction from the scientific or inductive. From the very nature of the case, its decisions must be final. We may mistake its voice, but if it speak at all, it must speak with authority.

The great inquiries now brought before this solemn tribunal, are these : Does intrinsic demerit, aside from inconvenience, enter into the one unchanging moral *idea* of crime ? Does retribution, or the suffering for such intrinsic demerit, enter into the one unchanging idea of punishment ; so that whatever government, Divine or human, employs it at all, must employ it with this inseparable idea, or substitute something radically different in its place ?

Now, the first difficulty in conducting such an appeal, is this—If it is made to the moral sense of your opponent, perverseness, or ignorance, or a misinterpretation of its decisions, may lead him to deny that *his* moral sense pronounces any such judgment as is con-

tended for. With him, then, you can in this direction go no farther, unless it can be shown that he does not utter its true voice. The next resort, therefore, must be to the universal conscience of mankind; on the ground that human nature is one, and that what has been held *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*, or what has been held universally in opposition to a few individual eccentricities, must be this true voice which speaks for God in the soul of man. In order, however, to understand this evidence, we want next its true interpreter. Some might say that this was history—the history of moral opinions; but a more unerring guide, we contend, is found in language. Nothing conducts us so directly to the heart, the moral sense of the race. Nothing, on moral subjects, and on all subjects that pertain to the innermost man, is a more sure type of that humanity from whence it emanates. As an illustration of this, is affirmed, that in languages invariably, the terms corresponding to our word punishment, are formed upon the idea of suffering for the intrinsic demerit of crime, and that in none of them do the utilitarian ideas, as constituting the sole or highest ground of punishment, human or Divine, have place.* This fact is arrived at, not by a mere dissection of vowels and consonants, or through merely imagined primary senses, but by evidence of the *usus loquendi*, and of the idiomatical connection in which such terms are ever found.

Against this reasoning from language it is objected, that even the terms for spirit were, in the first place, employed to denote material objects. The objector, however, should be informed, that this is the case with all words whatever signifying mental entities, properties, or acts. They all present in their primary sense, as far as they can be traced, and from the very nature of things must *present*, some material agent, or some sensation, or some sensible action, as the inner word which does itself *re-present* the abstract or spiritual notion. This must be so, as long as ideas, in their passage from mind to mind through the flesh, are necessarily arrayed in the robes of the flesh. Instead of favoring materialism, this only shows how much the human mind has ever abhorred it, and manifested its tendency to the spiritual, by selecting (since it was compelled by the law of its present being to make use of material representations) those of the most ethereal kind. Language thus proves conclusively, that the soul, in all names for itself, has ever endeavored to get as far from matter as it possibly could. But would it be pretended, that the outward sounds, *spirit, anima, πνεῦμα, ruah*, &c., or even the inner word or symbol, *air, breath, fire*,

* The simple primary etymological sense in this case, is always *pain*; which, it is admitted, does not necessarily imply pain for intrinsic demerit. This, however, is the obvious bearing of the idiomatic connections in which it is ever found, as is shown by such phrases as, *dare pœnas*, *τιμὴν δίδωμι*, &c., ever implying the ideas of satisfaction, debt, compensation, restoration of a disturbed balance, &c.—in short, the very conception contained in the Divine *lex talionis*; and this, too, without any association of views derived from the utilitarian scheme, or harmonizing with it.

æther, &c., have represented variant and changing notions, instead of the unchanging and unchangeable idea of a positive self-energizing essence, originating its own actions, in distinction from the inertness and negative passivity of matter, even in its most ethereal states? In short, have any of these words ever denoted ideas of a nature so utterly different, as those of justice and expediency?

In like manner we say, in respect to the moral terms in question, there has ever been *one* justice, *one* morality, *one* idea of crime, and *one* idea of punishment.

If so, we use it as an argument that each is in its nature *one*, and that what does not embrace the essential idea is a phantom to which the name is erroneously applied. There is, therefore, not a human justice differing from the Divine and which is not retributive; there is not a human crime which has no moral criminality; there is not a human punishment which is wholly utilitarian, without any reference to moral demerit.

Lower economical truths are doubtless intimately embraced in the application of these ideas, although not of their essence. Yet even these related utilities lose all their vitality when severed from, or put in the place of, the higher. The relative vanishes when we lose sight of the absolute. None but an age low both in faith and philosophy, would ever countenance the separation of the divine from the human, either in morals or politics. Some think, however, that nothing is easier than to make the distinction. It is no more difficult than to draw a mathematical line from one point to another. They will make it as plain as any geometrical diagram. On the one side they place divine justice, and on the other human; on the one side divine punishment, and on the other human, &c.; and we admit the distinction as far as respects degree, or subjects of application, or measure of perfection. But this principle of retribution or desert cannot be a matter of addition and degree. From its very nature, and its high place in God's justice, it can be no incident belonging to some species of true punishment and not to others. It is essential and elemental in all real justice, and in all real punishment, or it is nothing; it has no existence anywhere. Again, if it is not elemental in the very idea, it has no place in the divine justice. Those more consistent reasoners, then, who deny all retribution are right; and all that pious declamation which some are so fond of employing about it, as something sacredly reserved to the administration of God, is only a rhetorical flourish. If, on the other hand, it is essential and elemental, then, of course, *where* it is *not*, *there* is not justice and punishment; and language has been all wrong in applying these words to those human proceedings in which they have been so long and so invariably employed. This is insisted on at greater length, because those who think that they can securely occupy this middle ground, and make this distinction between the divine and human, should

be driven to the place to which they belong. The only position where they can at all sustain themselves, is that which rejects the elemental idea of justice, as essentially connected with retribution or desert, from all law, divine as well as human.

Against such a course of reasoning as is here employed, there are objected the contemptible and puerile etymologies of Horne Tooke. Of him it need only be said, that he was of that Hobbean school to which belonged most of those who deny all retribution. He wished to prove by language, that the human soul recognized nothing fixed, absolute, or eternal. His method of reasoning, we admit, if not the reasoning itself, was based on right grounds. Had his moral theory been correct, language would unquestionably have furnished important evidence in its support. His philological conclusions, however, were false and contemptible, and nothing can show more conclusively how much language is opposed to this irreligious and atheistical school, than the wretched results at which he arrived. The true answer, then, is, not that Horne Tooke's method of reasoning from language was wrong, but that his philology was utterly false. Every scholar knows that it is unworthy of all serious notice. *Right* never came, as he absurdly maintains, from a word signifying "that which is ordered or commanded." This is no part of its radical idea. Right is *straightness*. In the principal languages, the corresponding terms have ever reference to a straight line, one of the truest emblems of perfection and unchangeableness. The English *Right*, the Latin *Rectitudo*, and the Hebrew *Jasher*, do, in this way, all present to the mind the idea of an absolute and perfect *rule* or canon, *out of man* (of course in God), and not something which bends and turns, rises and falls, with the internal moral condition or circumstantial expediencies of those who are required to conform to it. And so also in respect to his views of the word *truth*, in which the writer referred to knows no better than to follow him. Truth, we say, is not that which is *trowed* in the sense of *opinion*, but rather, as derived from another and a better view of the root, it is that in which we firmly *trust*—that which is believed. It is the object of *faith*. It is *troth*. It is the Greek *πιστις*, instead of *δοξα*. It is *αληθεια*, that which cannot be hidden, that which manifests itself by its own light, the *real* or *absolute*, in distinction from the phenomenal. It is the Hebrew *Amuna*. It is the *Amen*.

Such has been the pressure of the argument on this subject, that the most consistent opponents have been driven to deny the right of human government to punish at all, if the word is to be taken in the sense ever attached to it among mankind—unless, in violation of all the ends and proprieties of language, it is to be retained after the corresponding idea is rejected. One of the most popular writers on that side has lately made this admission in the fullest terms. He regards the word punishment as one from

which, without great violence, the penal or retributive idea cannot be separated.

“It is unfortunate,” he remarks, “that our language furnishes no word which expresses the idea of that *procedure* which the state can rightfully take for the prevention of crime and reformation of offenders. We call it PUNISHMENT, which to most minds conveys a *wrong idea*. It imports *vengeance*, &c. This compound idea of punishment is wrong.”

He does not mean to say that it is philologically wrong, for in this respect he has rightly defined the term as “importing vengeance” and desert; but the *idea* which the moral sense of mankind has attached to the word, this he means is wrong. The new philosophy of Sampson and of our Matron of the Sing-Sing prison, cannot tolerate it. To us, this war with language and fundamental ideas, is an all-sufficient reason why we should not tolerate the new philosophy. The admission is all-important, as showing how firmly the reprobated notion is connected with the word; but to what absurdity is he driven to supply its place? Why is it that “our language has no term for the *idea of that procedure*, &c.?” It is certainly copious enough for all other purposes. How is it, then, that a “procedure” which they tell us is so simple, besides being so constantly required, should for so many centuries have had no name, except one which is admitted to be associated with such false ideas? Is it not proof that the “procedure” spoken of is a chimera of the writer’s own imagination, having no real place in the truth of things? And then, what a circumlocution to express this nameless conception: “*The idea of that procedure which the State may rightfully take*,” &c! Surely we ought to feel grateful to a conservative Providence for having so cared for language, that certain forms of irreligious philosophy can never use it to any great extent, without being compelled to exhibit its own irrationality, in its war with ideas, and its conflicts with the first elements of thought.

Our second, or a *posteriori* argument may be regarded as grounded on the terms of the following propositions:—1st, A true utility and a true expediency, do of themselves require that the idea of retribution, or the punishment of crime from moral considerations, that is, for its own intrinsic demerit, or in other words, something above what is ordinarily and justly styled expediency, should enter into government.—And 2d, The lower expediencies which some would make the sole end of the state, cannot themselves be sustained without this higher element, which so intimately associates itself with that most *useful* thing—a sound national and individual conscience.

It has something of the air of a paradox, but this is the form in which some of the highest truths at times appear. It is the argument, from expediency, for something higher than expediency. It

affirms that it is in the highest sense *useful* for the *prevention* of crime, and of all *mischief* resulting therefrom, that retribution, desert, or the punishment of crime simply because it is wrong and wicked, should be acknowledged as an essential element of jurisprudence.

"You are not punished because you have stolen a horse, but in order that horses might not be stolen." A very stale anecdote, which is about on a par with the oft-repeated story of Franklin's jackass, attributes this profound saying to a certain English judge. We much doubt the truth of the story; but, at all events, we have no hesitation in maintaining, that even on its own low ground it is false, and that the law will fail even in preventing horses from being stolen, if it tells the thief, and all other offenders, that this is the highest and sole ground on which it inflicts punishment. It will fail to prevent crimes, viewed even as mischiefs and inconveniences, if it assumes such an aspect as to imbue the popular mind thoroughly with the doctrine, so evidently implied, that in its "procedures" it has nothing to do with any moral considerations; or produces the impression everywhere, that "moral guilt," as the writer in the Democratic Review maintains, "is in no sense the ground of punishment."

Such a doctrine, when it has become popularised, must inevitably take away from that sacred feeling with which law ought ever to be viewed, if it would exert its best economical as well as moral influences. It must take away from the reverence due to ministers of justice, now openly declared to be truly ministers of justice no more, but of a mere economical expediency; in respect to which—since all moral considerations are gone—the offender may have some plausible grounds for regarding it as only based upon the convenience of the stronger, or more numerous party, in opposition to his own. He is taught to regard it as a question of temporal expediency only; and this expediency being connected with none of those moral ideas which take hold on the invisible and the eternal, and having, therefore, nothing to keep it to any permanent standard, may sink lower and lower, dragging down the law, and the courts, and the people with it; until it may well come to be doubted, whether, since there is no question of "moral guilt," the horse thief is not as good as other men who become a mischief and inconvenience to society by owning more horses than the rest. Some such result, in a greater or less degree, we may rationally suppose, would be a consequence of attempting to rule men solely through a mere intellectual calculation of expediences, instead of that method which we believe God has ordained for all real government, namely,—through the moral perceptions and the conscience.

In the first place, the full doctrine implied in this significant fable of the horse thief, would, if carried out to all its legitimate results, involve a very wide departure from the spirit and language

of jurisprudence in past ages. We hazard nothing in saying that as yet, in almost all civilized countries, the law does assume to be a moral power proceeding on moral grounds. Express declarations to this effect may not be found formally announced by legal writers, or in statutes, or in judicial decisions; and yet, we contend that the spirit of criminal jurisprudence does most abundantly and most clearly exhibit it. It becomes absolutely necessary to the language of accusation, if it would have any force whatever. In the proceedings of our common law the criminal is charged with having acted, not simply mischievously, but *wilfully, feloniously, maliciously*. He is declared "not to have had the *fear of God* before his eyes," and to "have been moved and instigated by the Devil." The law makes it the duty of courts to inquire most minutely into intention. Days and weeks are patiently occupied with the question of sanity, or, in other words, whether the criminal is a moral agent. The law of evidence implies our doctrine on almost every page. Counsel, too, can neither prosecute nor defend, without the constant necessity of employing language implying that "moral guilt is a ground of punishment." The judge cannot charge the jury, or pass sentence, without adopting the same style. The Legislature cannot define crimes, or assign penalties, without using words which imply that law does and must recognize moral distinctions.

This, we say, is yet the spirit of the law in all civilized countries, although in some places it may have been paralysed to some extent, and begun to yield to the influence of an ungodly philosophy. Let us, however, suppose that this influence has become at last triumphant, and has been carried out with all its consequences and implications. It is no longer confined to Reviews, but has diffused its virus through all the forms and proceedings of law. All terms implying moral ideas of any kind have been carefully expurgated from the statute, from the writ, from the indictment, from the pleadings, from the evidence, and from the judgment. All language implying any connection with the conscience has been extracted from the very roots. Suppose this to be thoroughly done in strict accordance with the economical theory. The criminal is no longer a criminal, as far as human law is concerned. He is, in its eyes, no *worse, morally*, than other men. He is told that "moral guilt forms no ground for punishment." In fact, in the true view of the law, he is not punished at all. His true relation is that of a man who suffers, because his views of his own convenience have happened to clash with the estimated convenience of others who are stronger than himself. All distinctions of honor and degradation, arising out of crime, vanish from the letter and spirit of jurisprudence. In short, the law knows no *moral* difference between the righteous and the wicked, between those who fear God and those who fear him not.

It may be said, however, that the mere negative exclusion of moral ideas, is a very different thing from the State's assuming a positive immoral and irreligious attitude. It need not be proclaimed throughout the land that the law knows no moral desert. Men may be left to venerate it under the old mistaken notion, that it has something to do with the fear of God, whilst, practically, it follows only the economical scheme. But let the system, in reply, have fair play. Let it rely upon its own intrinsic merits, and not call to its aid, in times when it needs strength, ideas derived from foreign sources. There must not be, and if the doctrine is fully carried out, there will not be, an esoteric class who are initiated into the greater mysteries of the new progressive philosophy, whilst the masses are left without to their ancient prejudices.

It would, doubtless, require several generations before such a scheme would have its full effect; for, the soul would be under the influence of old and strong associations, long after the outward change in the letter had taken place. But it is at length triumphant, and its spirit has everywhere penetrated the popular mind. How long under such a philosophy, so known and promulgated, would it be, before the whole moral sense of the nation would sink as low as the law, which ever must be, to a great extent, its standard, teacher, and guide?

But it may be said, offences would still be visited with inconvenience, and as inconveniences; and why should not that consideration *deter*? Our first answer is, that under such a system, the moral sense of the community having received a deadly wound in being accustomed to the idea of a complete separation between law and everything of a moral nature, and being, moreover, taught to regard certain acts as inconveniences instead of crimes, would not submit to that classification of offences that now exists, and which has been based chiefly on the old moral grounds. In its fall it would draw everything down with it. Law, loosed from its connection with the moral and eternal as sustaining powers, must sink lower and lower, because it is anchored on nothing which can give it a right to speak with authority to the deadened conscience.

Our second answer is, that in such a state of things, crime would be less likely to be prevented or the offender reformed, because punishment would then be destitute of that moral power, which is essentially requisite for the production of such effect in any degree of strength and purity. Reformation must be the most unsubstantial of all things without repentance. Repentance is an absurdity when severed from the idea and conviction of ill desert. The idea of ill desert is indissolubly associated with retribution or punishment for intrinsic demerit. Punishment, then, apart from these, can give rise to no genuine repentance; consequently, no genuine reformation. Indeed, it would be most likely to produce just the contrary effect. We can easily imagine the healing influence on

the soul of the criminal, when in the solitude of his thoughts he is led to the conclusion, that he thus suffers simply because he *deserves* to suffer ; and that this is no delusive feeling, but presented directly to his mind by the authority by which he is condemned. The mere thought, that his acts have interfered with what others deem their interest, is most likely to generate a feeling of opposition, and to cause him to take the ground that society is his enemy. Passion having no moral corrective derived from anything in the law or the sentence, may so pervert his reason as to make him believe that he was right and society wrong. But let the feeling come home,—I am here because I deserve to be here, I suffer because I deserve to suffer,—and there is *superadded* to other influences, a moral efficacy possessing a reformatory vitality which nothing else could have produced. Here, we say, is a moral power. Law comes in contact with the conscience, and now there is ground for a real reformation. Thus the *good* of society, and the *good* of the offender, are both best promoted, when some eternal principle, higher than both, is brought in relation to them.

But how is it on the other scheme? The man suffers from no ill desert ; for this, it must be kept in mind, is both its direct and its implied teaching. The law does not pronounce him *guilty* on any *moral* sense. Society and he are only at variance. As the stronger power, it dooms him to constraint and pain, and in doing so, expressly disclaims any higher motive than its own selfish convenience. For this extraordinary act, it claims no authority from God, no sanctions drawn from any moral ideas, or from anything higher than human wills. Which, we would most solemnly ask, is the most likely to produce that angry *vindictive* feeling about which some talk so loudly? Which scheme partakes most of the character of revenge,—that which punishes the criminal because he *deserves* to be punished, or that which puts in pain a man whom it does not charge with any “moral guilt,” simply because his actions are inconvenient to those who are stronger? How much more noble, manlike, Godlike—aye, and in the truest sense, more *useful*, too, for the criminal himself, that even in his degradation he should be treated not like an animal, but as a moral agent. Who has sunk to such a depth, that, if his crimes had made it necessary, he would not thus prefer to suffer because he deserved to suffer, rather than regard himself as the victim of a system having no higher sanctions than that against which we contend? A system which confines him like a biting dog to his kennel ; or, should some merely utilitarian theory of political economy require it, would put him to death, with no more regard to any moral considerations than would be acknowledged in killing a goring ox.

Again, we maintain, that unless the soul associates with punishment the ideas of desert and retribution, it loses not only its reforming efficacy, but also its highest power to *deter* others from

the commission of crime. We admit that in its mere economical aspect it might have some effect, but add to this the idea of *suffering for desert*, and let it so enter into the very soul of the law that it rises spontaneously to the mind whenever a case is presented, and there is certainly a new pungency and vividness which could have come from nothing else. Punishment becomes at once in contemplation a more fearful thing. It penetrates below the animal fears, or mere aversion to pain, down into the conscience, and calls up with greater or less distinctness, what all true moral considerations cannot fail to present, the thought of law and retribution as connected with their invisible and eternal source. The contemplation of suffering, as *suffering for sin*, has actually more pain for the mind, and, of course, more deterring efficacy, than that of any other suffering. How much more terrible is the thought of the gallows, as connected with this idea of retribution, than when regarded as the instrument of a merely economical expediency. In this way, too, how much more efficacy has it to secure the ends of this very expediency, than any scheme which looks to nothing higher. Take from the punishment of death its awful ideas of guilt, desert, and retribution, and the moral sense could not endure the lower aspect. Some pretend to be in favor of capital punishment solely on the economical grounds. Its more consistent opponents, however, perceive instinctively that the lower cannot stand without the higher, and justly regard the overthrow of the one argument, as a complete subversion of the other.

Again, the preventing power of the punishment for murder must be, to a great extent, in the degree in which it produces a feeling of the sacredness of human life. The opponents of the death penalty contend very foolishly, but very consistently for them, that this is best done by sparing the life of the murderer. Others maintain the propriety of capital punishment on the expediency principle alone; and to such our present argument is addressed. Which, then, we would ask, presents this idea more vividly—the thought that the murderer is put to death by retributive justice, because he thus deserves to die for the intrinsic moral desert of his awful crime, or the doctrine that he suffers, not as a criminal, not on the ground of any moral guilt, but solely for the convenience of society? We leave the question and the reply to the moral sense.

And so in respect to the lower department of property, it would not be difficult to determine which view has the greater restraining power—that which connects the crime with conscience, or that which appeals only to the sense of inconvenience—that which tells the thief that “moral guilt is not at all the ground of his punishment,” or that which teaches him that several property among men is recognized by a law higher than human,—that its protection is the subject of one of God’s eternal command-

ments, and that when punished for theft, he is not simply treated as an inconvenience, but visited retributively, because he has committed an immoral and a wicked act. Let the physical suffering be the same in both cases, yet the latter ideas, when habitually connected with it, must give to that suffering a more direct access to the conscience, and, of course, a pungency and a *detering* power utterly unknown to any merely economical proceeding.

It may be said that the office of law is simply to command, to forbid, and to prescribe the consequences of disobedience. This may be true of the letter ; but there must be, as we have remarked, an ultimate ground to the law, which must ever manifest itself in its proceedings. Its spirit must be moral or immoral. *There can be no neutrality.* And if immoral in the merely privative sense, it cannot long remain thus, without assuming the positively immoral and irreligious aspect.

We may then sum up what has been advanced on this subdivision of our argument, by a brief application to the famous anecdote of the English Judge. Instead of giving to the criminal the naked letter of the maxim, we would accompany it with the following comment or paraphrase for his better instruction. He is punished, we would admit, *prospectively, that horses may not be stolen* ; but then, he is also punished *retrospectively, for having stolen the horse* ; BECAUSE, if this retrospective moral element does not enter into the idea of the punishment, it will have no hold upon the conscience, either of the criminal or of others, and will, consequently, so lose its true moral, warning, restraining, and reforming power, that it will not, in the end, even *prevent horses* from being stolen.

The old Themis, with her sword and scales, will not, however, be so easily driven out of the world as some of our reformers imagine. The necessities, even of our temporal and most earthly relations, require that she should retain her *moral aspect* as the daughter of Jove, connecting earth with Heaven. She must first *look back* to the crime and its intrinsic demerit, if she would effectually *look forward* to the preventing power of punishment. Only thus can she secure either the higher or the lower utilities. Then, as old Hesiod tells us, is she indeed the mother of a fair and legitimate offspring :

Εὐνομίην τε Δίκην τε καὶ Εὐφροσύνην τεθαλυῖαν.

Nothing could more impressively show the deep sentiment of this inherent nature of justice, transmitted through all ages, and coming down to our own times in spite of an irreligious philosophy, than the fact that this very ancient representation is now the pictorial emblem of our own most democratic State, sculptured and painted on all our legislative and judicial edifices, and forming the frontispiece to every volume of our statute book. Ancient Themis

with her scales, the emblem of satisfaction, and her sword,—regarded in all ages, in books sacred and profane, in the New Testament as well as in Æschylus, as the symbol of the idea of retributive justice,—yet stands majestic on the dome of our capitol; and that, too, notwithstanding the irreligious radicalism that has prevailed around her, and uttered its great swelling words of vanity in her very presence. We have often wondered why some of our infidel iconoclasts had not long ago attempted to have this most expressive pictorial emblem removed from our statute book. Heaven, we trust, will preserve her from their profane hands. Whether the emblem perishes or not, the idea must remain in the human soul; for God has placed it there. Nature, as Horace says, will come back, however rudely she may have been thrust out. Even should the new philosophy, or the new “rationale of crime,” prevail for a season, still, when those who have destroyed are compelled to reconstruct society from its very elements, this sublime idea of retributive justice will be again enthroned as the only safe guardian of all lower interests, the only true security for the prevention of crime.

It has been well said, that if utility was the sole ground of punishment, then there might be cases in which it might be useful to punish the innocent as well as the guilty;* since nothing but extrinsic expediencies are allowed to control the determination. The writer to whom we have before referred, affects to demolish such a position at a blow. “It is very true,” says he, “that if utility is the sole ground of punishment, and *if* it were useful to punish the innocent, then it would be *right* to punish the innocent.” It will be perceived, of course, that the power of this rebutter is intended to lie in the second italicised *if*. “And *if* it were useful to punish the innocent,” says the writer. Now this very innocent query most effectually blows up the position with which it stands connected. This *if* is the concealed torpedo which utterly destroys the assailant’s own machinery. The engineer is hoist by his own petard. “But,” he replies to his proposed query, “it never can be useful to punish the innocent.” Now it should be kept in mind that this has no force in an argument respecting the moral power of government, unless it be taken as the language used by or for the legislator; or the law assigning the *grounds* on which, as a *practical* agent, it cannot punish the innocent, and the reason why it cannot even listen to any outward inductive evidence that such a procedure could be ever useful. Neither is it simply the position of the legislator, but in some form or other resounds in all our courts of justice, and in almost all our trials for crime. It is a maxim of law, not expressed in the statute book but pervading it everywhere with its spirit. It proclaims aloud—

* Dr. Cheever, in his late work on Capital Punishment

It cannot be useful to punish the innocent ; under no possible state of things can it be useful to punish the innocent. It is as eternal and as immutable a principle, as that, " The Judge of all the earth must do right."

But why not? How does the law or the legislator know that it can never be useful to punish the innocent? Have all the facts and circumstances been examined, in connection with which the proposition might possibly be maintained? If government is solely an economical agent, it ought not to take, and it cannot take this for granted, before it has been abundantly settled by inductive experimental testimony. In the low character here assigned to it, the law, of course, can know nothing of any higher kind of proof. Any *a priori* hypothesis would immediately connect it with moral considerations. Perhaps, then, it might possibly turn out, that, in certain circumstances, it would be useful to punish the innocent. But no—the law utterly refuses even to examine any witnesses on the point. It does speak *a priori*—*It can never be useful to punish the innocent.* It is forced to utter the language of the moral sense, *and to adopt its decrees among the grounds of its own proceedings.* Not more sudden is the repulsion between the opposing poles of the magnet, than the war of ideas between the terms punishment and innocence, when brought in contact in any of the proceedings of jurisprudence. But how does the law say this unless it has to do with the conscience, or something higher than anything which goes under the name of expediency? Let the act be ever so mischievous—a thousand fold more so than many others which are the proper subjects of penalty—let it be an act which from the nature of man is most likely to be committed, and also most difficult to be prevented ;—if only by reason of insanity, absence of evil intention, or other ground, it can rightly be connected with the term guiltless, the law affirms without proof or experiment—*It cannot be useful to punish it.* It may be prevented by the employment of force, even to the infliction of pain, if necessary, but it cannot be *punished.* No reason can be given, why the maxim is not as elemental in human as in Divine law. Wherever the terms law, punishment, and crime, have place, there it also necessarily belongs. We cannot separate what God has so indissolubly joined together.

Jurisprudence has unquestionably a wide department, which we have styled economical. It may be, practically, of greater extent than the moral, although not so important or high in its nature. The two departments may be sometimes so blended, that both may be externally combined in one set of proceedings ; and again, they may give rise to different tribunals. Certain acts, also, may pass from the economical to the moral side, by reason of being violations of positive statutes, without which they would have had no moral character of obedience or disobedience. But with these

explanations, we may say, that whatever resemblances may be in the outward forms of proceedings, the nature, the ideas of the two departments must remain distinct, and can never be fused into one. There are nuisances to be removed, insane persons to be kept from mischief, and contagious diseases to be guarded against. We may even imagine a case of this latter kind so fatally mischievous in its effects, as to have no other effectual preventive, except the removal of its unfortunate victim from life.

Now, in such instances, how would the law proceed? There must be a tribunal of some kind, a commission, a court—call it what you please. There would also be declaration, evidence, and adjudication. But how changed the whole vocabulary. The law is removing a mischief,—its only business, say some,—but in this case how utterly out of place would be such words as accusation, condemnation, crime, penalty, &c.? The moral sense revolts at the very thought. If, however, the *object*, above all, if the *ground* and *reason* of the law are the same in both cases, what is there so startling in the idea of using the same or similar language, although there may be some difference in the incidents?

But hold, one may say, your reasoning is very illogical; your propositions do not admit of illative conversion. Punishment is the removal of a mischief—True, says the objector, we hold to that, but then every removal of a mischief is not punishment. If, however, punishment is simply the removal of a mischief, and, as far as human law is concerned, contains nothing more in its generic idea,—if one phrase is commensurate with the other in regard to the essential character, and they differ only in their application to various modifications of mischiefs,—then, we say, either the predicate is arbitrarily extended beyond the subject, or the proposition, as far as human law is concerned, is capable of the most general conversion. Mischiefs may vary in innumerable ways; but to the law their removal is essentially the same thing, so long as the ground on which it is placed regards them as mischiefs *and nothing more*. When no other element or idea is allowed to come into the one than into the other, we act irrationally in giving them, generically, different names, although they might have subordinate specific terms of difference.

The truth, then, is, that punishment is the removal of a mischief,—and something more; and this something more is not an *incident* merely, or a specific modification, but enters into the constituting idea; so that when this is removed, it ceases to be punishment, and may then be regarded as falling into the lower class. The other part, namely, its employment *as a means* in the removal of a mischief, may more properly be viewed as an incident, belonging to a subordinate, yet an important, aspect both of divine and human law. The essential element by which it differs from everything else, is the idea of moral desert as the ground of inflic-

tion. It is this which makes a generic, instead of a mere specific difference between it and every other thing which may be called—*the removal of a mischief and nothing more*. It is this, too, which, more than all things else, gives and conserves its great utilitarian efficacy, in remedying those mischiefs to which it is applied.

Again, the opposing argument may take this shape. The chief object of punishment, it may be said, is to *deter* ; but the punishment of an insane man, who had committed a homicide, would not deter others, and, *therefore*, it would not be useful. But why would it not deter ? This brings us round and back again to the same old ground upon which we are ever forced by the moral sense. *It would not deter, because it is unjust*. It might produce indignation and dislike, but no salutary moral fear. It would never reach the conscience. Mark the sequence of reasons—It would not be useful because it would not deter, and it would not deter because it would be unjust. The law, then, it is most clear, must acknowledge an idea back of and higher than utility, from which the utility itself depends for its support. Let the reader ponder well the two propositions—*It is not useful because it is unjust*, and, *It is unjust because it is not useful*. How immense the difference ! It is no mere war of words. Right in this point, this question of the precedence of the relative or the absolute, is exhibited that antipodal distinction which runs through so many departments of philosophy, and in reference to which men must array themselves under different banners in politics, morals, and religion. If the second proposition be correct, then, in every given case, the utility or the contrary must first be established by outward induction as matter of fact. If the other be true, then the moral element stands first in the order of ideas, and a moral agent, be it an individual or a state, cannot legitimately proceed a step, without in some way acknowledging the necessary priority. In the common applications of law, utility may sometimes *practically* precede ; when the subject is elevated into the higher region of immutable ideas, or those abstractions of which some speak so slightly, it is found that all expediency goes out, when severed from that which constitutes its true life.

To some, much of the reasoning we have employed may, perhaps, seem like a continual paradox. It would appear to make it a duty to aim at an object by losing sight of it. It is, however, in strict accordance with that philosophy of the New Testament, which declares that, “He who would find himself, or find his life, must first lose it.” It is true of the individual ; it is true of the State. It can only secure our best temporal or economical well-being, by ever maintaining a connection with ideas which lie above and beyond it.

This, too, is no abstraction removed from our familiar experiences. A man may have a certain object, and yet be able to

effect that object, only by means deriving all their efficacy from being associated with higher aims. A little knowledge of ourselves, or of human nature, might teach us, that no one will so certainly be miserable as he who makes his happiness the great and sole end of his existence ; and we may be assured, on the other hand, that for no one are there reserved such unspeakable joys, as for him who utterly forgetting his own happiness, as the aim of life, becomes completely absorbed in the love and glory of God. To apply the principle to more ordinary instances,—it may be proved, that those schemes of social reform, like that of Fourier for example, which profess to take into view this life only, must inevitably defeat their object by the very means they adopt for its attainment. He doubtless does the most, in the end, to advance the best temporal or earthly good of individuals and communities, who is most successful in faithfully directing their minds to the invisible world, and in urging men to live with continual reference to its most solemn verities. What can be more useful than religion ! and yet its blessings will never be known by him who seeks it ultimately for no higher end, than its adaptedness to promote his own worldly happiness.

So also in regard to the State. We may say that although justice is most highly useful to preserve society, yet that, in fact, the great end of society itself is the conservation of justice, and, in that, the conservation of our moral nature. It is not merely to preserve the social peace, to maintain personal rights, to secure property,—but above all these, to school the moral sense, to train the soul to reverence for law as law, and to a constant contemplation of moral ideas, through those temporal forms, which God, in the Divine institution of government, intended as real, although imperfect types of a higher law and a Holier Justice.

It is not unfrequently assumed, that those who contend against the expediency doctrine in certain aspects, do not hold that government is for the good of the governed. Sometimes we find men in this way undertaking the defence of the Divine administration ; as though there were really any who held that God's government had not reference to the highest *good* of the universe. There is in all this a miserable *petitio principii*, and a stupid confounding of certain words, when the whole inquiry turns on the issue, whether or no they really mean the same thing. They use the word *good*, as though it were capable of the most easy explication, and were not in reality one of the most transcendent of all terms. That God acts for the highest good, is a self-evident proposition. It is the same as saying that he acts for the Godlike. But what is this *summum bonum* ? Here reason cannot be so confident. By the aid of the Scriptures, elevating the range of her vision, she might modestly affirm, that it is God himself and the manifestation of his moral glory. Whenever, however, she asserts dog-

matically that this end is happiness, and that this happiness is the greatest amount, on the whole, of pleasing sensations felt by all varieties of being, she affirms that of which she knows nothing, and to which revelation yields not its sanction. Although the dispute is very ancient, it is yet far from being decided that the *ἡδὴ* is synonymous with the *ἁγαθόν*. There may be a thousand species of good, each one far above what is often styled happiness. Even from our own dark cave, we may sometimes get a glimpse of the truth, that a sound moral sense is a higher good, and more to be desired by every rational being, than any amount of happiness, or *pleasing sensations*, as the term has been defined by a late writer on moral philosophy.

But leaving these abstractions, as some would style them, let us meet these writers on their own ground. Let us take the principle quoted from Blackstone, that "the sole object of punishment is the prevention of crime." This may be admitted, yet still the positions are unaffected, that crimes are to be punished *as crimes*, and that government in this acts primarily as a moral power. The proposition also in a lower sense is unexceptionable, when contemplated from a certain point of view. It may be true, when we take into account simply the individuals who are instrumentally employed in the enactment, or declaratory statement, or execution of law. Such may be the *object*, we may even say, the sole object, not only of the sheriff, but also of the judge; not only of the judge, but also of the legislature, and even of the people by whom these are ultimately appointed. We do not intend to trifle with words, but to set forth what we regard as a most important distinction. The *object*, the sole object, of all these, may be wholly economical or utilitarian, and may have no reference to absolute moral desert. Such, we say, may be their *object*, their motives, or the influences operating on their individual or collective wills. But this, we maintain, is a distinct thing from the *ground* and *reason** of law, viewed in its application to ourselves. In its highest sense, law is not the creation of legislators or people. *Lex est neque sententia hominum ingenii excogitata, neque scitum aliquid populorum, sed eternum quiddam*. Legislators may declare it; they may shape its forms, and have their objects and their motives in the use of it. The present people may also have theirs. These may be high or low, right or wrong, and having in view a large or a small, a moral or an immoral, expediency. But the *ground* of the law, the *reason* of the law, comes not from them. These it derives from its connections with the eternal and the universal; or in other words, with its parent—the Law of God.

Government is certainly so far dependent on the popular will

* Reasons and motives are clearly distinct, though so often confounded. One is ever absolute, the other relative. One is out of man, the other one has respect to the individual. A man may have very bad motives, and very good reasons for the same act.

with its objects and motives, that men, if they will risk the responsibility, may have it or not, as they please. So far it may be called their creation. But if we have law and government at all, and not miserable counterfeits of them, they must be received with all the ideas and principles belonging to their eternal essence, and which, in no sense, do they derive from us.

So, also, in respect to punishment. It may be used by judges, legislators, and people, with various objects having reference to higher or lower utilities. These may be strictly economical, or there may be in addition those of a moral kind. But the *reason* of punishment, existing absolutely in itself, out of and beyond the motives of the legislator, judge, or people,—the idea or ground of punishment, must be ever one and the same in all law, and in all government throughout the universe. Whenever it loses this idea, it becomes something else, and the retention of the same name is an unreasonable and arbitrary misnomer.

Let it be conceded, therefore, for the sake of the argument, that in regard to the legislator, &c., an utilitarian prevention may be the sole object. For this purpose, however, there is employed the instrument punishment. This the legislator borrows from a higher world of truth. The true power of applying it is not his own. In itself, it belongs not to him or to the people. It comes down, as we expect elsewhere to show, from God, and without this, man would have no right to punish his fellow man at all, either on economical or moral grounds. The instrument, then, must be taken as it is, and if it necessarily involves in its application the ideas of desert and retribution, then must it not be dissevered from these, or, as we have shown, it will, in the end, be powerless to accomplish even the economical *objects* to which it is applied.

Still, it may perhaps be objected, that it does not follow that the State has *practically* anything to do with these abstractions. It may employ its instrument without concerning itself about the philosophy of its efficacy. These moral ideas, if they are so important, may be inculcated by private teaching. But whom, we ask, is the state to trust for the purpose of securing this important auxiliary result? Shall it be confided to a Church, viewed as separate and superior, or as in alliance and subjection, or regarded, according to Dr. Arnold's view, as identified with the body politic? But when there is that complete divorce, which is now so much insisted on, what guaranties can there be for the preservation of those ideas on which so much depends for lower as well as for higher good? Especially, too, if the state itself is no longer regarded as a moral power, or as having any moral ends, or as employing any moral means.

Education is now the talismanic word which is to remedy every difficulty—and education, too, in morals. All over the land, this is now the popular cry of demagogues who have never bestowed an

hour's thought on what they mean by the term moral education, or on the immense difficulties, which their own theories of the State must unavoidably throw in the way of carrying out this very popular measure. How can the State rightly teach, or get taught, what she does not herself possess? Our children must certainly be taught morals—it is everywhere said even by those radical reformers who would reduce all morals to a system of physics. Virtue or morality the foundation of our liberties, is the current cant; mere scientific education, it has become fashionable to repeat, will never do. But what morals, and with what sanctions? Shall our children be taught from old formularies, that "Every sin deserves God's wrath and curse, both in this life and that which is to come?" That would be preaching religion, uniting Church and State, and bringing in divine justice, with other ideas dangerous to our liberties. Shall they be taught, then, that crime will be punished by the State, *as crime*, because it is *morally* wrong, or for its intrinsic desert? Oh no! That would be a false idea. The State as such, is said to know no moral distinctions. Whence, then, we ask again, is to come this system of morals for common schools, and which is said to be so important for the preservation of our republican institutions? There is nothing answering to the name as derived either from Heaven or Earth. The State, on the theory we are opposing, can only give its sanction to some such system of physical ethics, as has lately been inculcated in the Sing-Sing State Prison, where the text-books were Fowler on Amateness and Combe's Constitution of Man.

If sound morals then are necessary, the State, on this scheme, has no means in itself of procuring them. It must trust to accident, or to some extraneous aid for whose continuance it has no security, and which may fail at the very time when its assistance might be most needed. Nothing can show more clearly than this, the utter monstrosity of the doctrine, that a sovereign organism, which, if it is truly such, should have within itself all the means necessary for its own conservation, and which has thus to do with some of the highest interests of humanity (to which the State must, from its very nature, be friendly or adverse), should be in a condition so powerless for good, so powerful for evil.

Our next argument under this head is, that without the ideas of desert and retribution, or of a moral ground of punishment, it will be impossible to maintain a true gradation of penalties, or avoid such a derangement of the scale, as by shocking the moral sense, will tend to defeat the very end for which it is said punishment is designed. As yet, in almost all systems of jurisprudence, the general gradation has been based on the moral sense, with incidental modifications called for by the economical department of law. When, however, the moral ideas and degrees become greatly deranged, the injury to the public and individual

conscience, and through this to the economical welfare, must be very serious. It must be so, since men are so made, that they do not in general separate their practical views of right and wrong very widely from the law with which they are in the nearest and most constant association. The reason of this, as founded in the purpose of God, has an intimate connection with the third branch of our argument, namely, the express Divine institution of government; but here we simply take into view the fact. We cannot sufficiently estimate the law's educating power for good or evil. It is admitted that the moral and economical administration, although logically distinct, must be to some extent blended in practice. This may also give rise to a partial blending of ideas. The common feeling of mankind has ever connected the thought of retribution more with the higher, whilst the notion of mere expediency has more generally mingled with the punishment of the lower order of crimes and misdemeanors. In witnessing the punishment of theft, or of slight personal wrongs, the security of property and the public peace are most naturally suggested; in contemplating the doom of the violator, the midnight incendiary, or the murderer, the moral ideas of guilt, desert, and retribution most readily arise to the soul.

“It does not appear,” Dr. Arnold well remarks, “how on any other than purely moral considerations, the state is justified in making certain abominations penal; such acts involving in them no violence or fraud upon persons or property, which, according to some, are the only objects of a state's care” (Arnold's Lec., p. 70). There are some most shocking crimes, which, away from their immediate agents, are productive of little or no injury to society,—at all events, of far less than other crimes involving a much lower degree of moral guilt. Even to the perpetrators, the injury is more of a moral than a physical kind; consisting mainly in a degradation and a brutalizing of the moral nature. They are also such as are not likely to become very frequent. So odious are they, even to fallen humanity, that they require no painful *interrorem* penalty to prevent their being often committed. If, however, they were left unpunished, or visited with a less penalty, the moral sense would cry out against the anomaly as an utter subversion of the fundamental principle of all righteous government. Indeed, it may be maintained, that this injury to the public conscience is done, whenever a crime of less moral magnitude is punished more severely than one involving greater guilt; unless it can view the penalty, in the former case, as divided, and a part referred to the economical proceeding which it is admitted the state may rightly take. It is, however, such a mingling of lower considerations with the higher, as a wise legislator would use with the utmost caution, lest it should result in that most inexpedient of all things, a derangement of the public moral sense.

Blackstone is sometimes quoted in support of the position that de-

sert is not the ground of punishment. There need be no great objection to this, when viewed simply as the opinion of a lawyer having his mind upon the outward preceptive part of the law, regarded as practically commanding, prohibiting, and punishing, without reference to the ultimate ground and reason. In respect to the true nature of government as a Divine institution, and of the magistrate wielding the sword of justice as "a minister of God," we must esteem his philosophy and his authority as far inferior to that of the Apostle Paul; and yet his statement may perhaps be admitted when contemplated from his own point of view. It is, however, most interesting to observe, how soon his own moral sense compels him (unconsciously perhaps), to use language inconsistent with the doctrine attributed to him. Very soon after his proposition respecting the object of punishment, he tells us, that "the penalty in certain cases ought to exceed the damage sustained by the sufferer, because it is *contrary to reason and equity* that the guilty should suffer no more than the innocent has done before." Here is a direct appeal to moral considerations, aside from that measure of pain which, without reference to desert, might be enough to deter from the crime. Reason and equity demand something more. It is on the ground, too, that the deterring power would be weakened by the sense of injustice arising from the moral irregularity. Here, likewise, is something very much like the idea of expiation, satisfaction, or the reprobated *lex talionis*.

Again he says (Vol. iv., 17), "It is moreover absurd and impolitic to apply the same punishment to crimes of different *malignity*." Here, too, are moral ideas, regarded as an independent and ultimate ground lying farther back than the economical, and which the latter department cannot disregard without greatly impairing its own efficacy. "It is impolitic," that is, it is *inexpedient* because it is *unjust*, and not unjust because it is inexpedient. Here comes up again that most important distinction, to which we have before called attention, exhibiting even in the mind of one who would seem to maintain the other theory, the necessary and eternal priority of moral ideas to the economical and the expedient.

"When men," Blackstone again remarks, "see no distinction made in the nature and gradation of punishment, *the generality* will be led to conclude that there is no distinction in the guilt" (Vol. iv., 18). But if moral desert is not the ground of punishment, what have they to do with the guilt, unless the *generality* are to be treated as the exoteric multitude, who are not to be initiated into the more philosophic views of jurisprudence? A most important admission this, that law, even human law, is, and of necessity must be, that moral or immoral educating power which we

contend it is ; and that, therefore, if for no other reasons, it must have regard to desert as a ground of punishment.

To be sure, he would have us believe, that only to the generality is the law such a necessary schoolmaster ; yet how clearly is it proved by the intuitive manifestation of his own moral sense, that to this generality of conscience-taught men, belonged even the great jurist himself. "Men," he says, "will be led to conclude that there is no distinction in guilt ;" but if it is generally understood that "moral guilt," as the writer in the *Democratic Review* maintains, "is not the ground of punishment," then this effect ought not to follow ; men should not be led thus to conclude. This, however, has not yet become established as "*The Rationale* of crime." It is not so understood ; and cannot be so understood, without fatally corrupting and changing the moral and political constitution of humanity from its deepest foundations.

If it be true that the state, in dealing with crime, cannot make "moral guilt a ground of punishment," it would follow, of course, that it could neither make, nor countenance, any such distinctions as would imply moral degradation. The law might inflict its amount of pain, just enough, according to some Bentham estimate, to deter the criminal or others from a similar mischievous act ; but it could not regard him, in the act, as morally worse than any others in the community. Degradation, therefore, could form no part of punishment, or be lawfully regarded as one of its just consequences. If it be said that it may be employed to deter, even in the economical scheme, as well any other species of pain or uneasiness, the answer is, that the moral sense revolts at the very thought of any such use, disconnected from moral ideas. Indeed, severed from these, it could no longer be degradation. All the mere physical power of human, or even of divine law, could not make it such. If, then, the State cannot thus employ it by way of punishment, much less can this be justly done by that thing called society, viewed as something different from the organized State. If the employment by the one is an usurpation of the prerogative of God, much more is this true of the other which has even less claim to a divine sanction or a divine institution.

It may be easily conceived what an effect such a doctrine must have upon the mind of a criminal, and how greatly it must modify and diminish the restraining and deterring power of punishment. The lesson has of late been taught with great assiduity, not simply to a select few who are initiated into the higher mysteries of this philosophical Eleusis, but to "the generality" in our state-prisons. "Your position is so humiliating," said an acquaintance to a prisoner, as we were lately told in a letter in one of the public journals,— "your position is so humiliating, that I should think you would rather shun than meet your old friends." "Oh, no," he replied, "there is nothing humiliating about it ; it is *unfortunate*,

to be sure, but nothing more." It is just the lesson that might have been learned from Sampson's Rationale of Crime, or from our State Prison Matron's new phrenological library, and is in strictest accordance with the physical theory of crime and punishment. But if moral considerations form a ground of the law's proceeding, or if they have any place whatever in criminal jurisprudence, then he *ought* to have felt humiliated, and, unless he did so feel, his punishment was not producing upon him any true reforming or preventing effect.

"This is the very spirit of pharisaism," say some. "You would shut out the unfortunate man with the unfortunate cerebral organization from all return to society, and of consequence from all reformation." We are aware how very popular, even with those who pretend to be conservative, is the cant that talks of "lifting the fallen soul from its degradation, of inspiring the debased with a true self-respect, and winning him by love from the paths of sin and shame to those of virtue and honor." Some who use such language are very fond, too, of setting forth themselves as peculiarly Christ-like, whilst they maintain a doctrine which not only takes away all grounds for repentance and humiliation, but denies even the very existence of sin. With them, the great object would seem to be to keep the criminal from all sense of humiliation, as inconsistent with that "self-respect" which alone furnishes a ground for reform. How really opposed is all this to the spirit of that gospel which teaches repentance and atonement; how cruel, too, when rightly viewed, is such a course towards the wretched being himself. This silly sentimentalism prattles of the redeeming power of music, "of its touching memories lingering in the soul like a glance of its early sunlight, and of the *aspirations* it produces to be once again pure and good, &c.;" as though in the experience of the world the discovery were yet to be made, that one may melt under the influence of a song—especially if that song falsely appeals to his most selfish sympathies as a poor wronged victim of society—and the next day, if unrestrained, commit the worst of crimes against that very society towards which he is thus made to believe that he stands in a hostile relation. Every view that a criminal takes of himself, whether inspired by music, or poetry, or phrenology, or anything else, that is unaccompanied by a painful repentance and true humiliation, is productive of a false feeling; and it is yet to be proved that all false feeling, like everything else that is false, does not generate a disposition favorable to, rather than averse from crime. If experience did not abundantly prove it, the true philosophy of the affections might demonstrate that nothing is ultimately so hardening to the soul as spurious emotion connected with no right feeling of the real moral condition of the unhappy subject of its influence.

We maintain, then, that the apparently sterner view is, in

reality, by far the most humane, not only for society, but also for the criminal himself. The one would make restoration to a higher moral grade, a previous step to reformation; the other would give him that place only when after fair trial, and competent tests, he could be truly pronounced reformed. The previous humiliation, according to the philosophy of the Bible and all right views of human nature, is a most important part of the necessary means to such a result. The course practised at the Sing Sing State Prison has a direct tendency to prevent this; or, most likely, to produce a sentimental reformation, having no real ground in the conscience, furnishing no real strength against temptation, and no security against the worst of crimes. Moreover, to treat the criminal as though he were not degraded, is a lie on its very face; it is not honest; it is not acting according to the truth of things; and, like everything else that is hollow and deceptive, must be mischievous. There is a want of that sincerity without which there can be no hope for good. The philanthropy is unreal and affected; the reformation resulting must be of the same character. Genuine repentance would turn away from it to that better sympathy, which to some may seem like pharisaism, but which has, in reality, more of the true feeling of brotherhood in proportion as it is more sincere, and is therefore more truly efficacious for good, because it does not attempt to separate ideas which God has indissolubly joined together.

Our third argument, or the one from the Scriptures, is necessarily deferred to another occasion.

ARTICLE III.

THE BIBLE ITS OWN INTERPRETER.

By PROF. HENRY P. TAPPAN, D.D., New York:

THE BIBLE is the voice of our Father in Heaven, speaking to us, his ignorant and sinful children. He speaks to us that he may enlighten and correct us—that he may make us wise and good like himself. It is to be presumed that he speaks in a way adapted to our ignorance and our wants—that he speaks so that we may understand him, and of things which it behoves us most of all to know.

Now we do not find in this Bible a system of science or of art, by which the efforts of the human mind are anticipated and rendered unnecessary. These have been left to our own thought and

skill to work out, and slowly to ripen from age to age. He has presented us the objects of science, and the materials of art in the universe around us; and he has planted deep within our minds the elements of truth, and the principles of investigation and reasoning—and here he has left us.

But there were truths and interests too high and momentous to be given up to the slow development of ages,—even if the human mind of itself could have grasped them. But there were truths and interests which the human mind of itself could not reach, or in a degree very limited and insufficient. Redemption from sin and all its attending and consequential evils, and the state of man after death, are the two great problems before which all mere philosophy and science have ever stood abashed. The highest cultivation of the intellect and the taste still leaves the heart corrupt; and the most glorious and ripened knowledge of the visible and temporal, contains no adequate data of the invisible and the eternal. The high hope, the illimitable destiny, the final well-being of men lie in these solemn and sublime problems, but he does not find the solution within himself, nor in the mechanism of the world around him. It is on these great questions that God speaks to him. He will not leave his poor child in darkness—He will not abandon him to the power of evil.

In accordance with His benevolent purpose, the language which He employs, is the familiar language in use between man and man. And while he employed men as the instruments of his revelation, and so inspired them that they should communicate the truth adequately and without any admixture of error, he still permitted them to speak both according to their vernacular idiom, and their individual peculiarities of style, and according to the usages of language generally, in respect to illustrations, figures, and graces of speech.

The Bible, therefore, is not a book of philosophy, for it does not profess to treat of philosophical subjects; nor is it a book of science, for it does not profess to treat of scientific subjects; but it is a book of history and biographies, of religious and moral truths, and institutions; a book of laws, prophecies, comminations, and promises; a book wherein is revealed the origin, the condition, the duty, the salvation, and the immortal hope of man.

It is true, indeed, that the topics of this Book have most intimate relations with various parts of philosophy, such as ontology and psychology; and that facts are introduced which seem to involve, to some extent, particular views of science, such as geology and astronomy; but, then, no philosophical discussions are interwoven—no philosophical terms are employed—and no scientific doctrines are professedly and systematically given, but every kind of knowledge appears in practical moral relations, and under turns of thought and forms of expression according with the popular

apprehension. With the exception of prophecies relating to remote events, where the import is designedly and for obviously wise reasons, concealed under mysterious symbols and imagery, the Sacred writings are so written as to be easily understood by those to whom they are addressed. Moses wrote under the Divine inspiration and direction, for the information and instruction of his countrymen, in the vernacular idiom. There is no doubt that he meant to be understood, and that he was understood.* The book of Job was an intelligible book to the readers of his age. All the Sacred historians evidently wrote on the same principles, and were, at least, as well understood by their countrymen, as the historians of other nations are by their countrymen. The Psalms, and the devotional parts of the Bible, generally, were intended, like all devotional books, for popular use and edification; and furnished to the devotional heart apt, natural, and beautiful expressions.

Those predictions which related to events near at hand, such as the prediction delivered to Hezekiah respecting his death, and the predictions of Jeremiah concerning the captivity, were delivered in plain and direct language. The same is true of the New Testament. The discourses of Christ were at first delivered openly to the people and to his disciples, plainly with the intent to instruct them. And it cannot be questioned that all who heard him with a right spirit—like Mary sitting at his feet—were instructed. There was no man that ever spoke like this man, whether we consider the wisdom or the plainness, the sincerity or the authority with which he spoke. It is true, indeed, that he sometimes spake in parables which seemed to require an explanation. But that nothing was intended to be concealed is evident from the fact that the explanation was given to the disciples as soon as requested by them, and now stands upon the pages of the Gospel, a perpetual record. Nor is there any reason for believing that it would not with equal readiness have been afforded to any other sincere inquirers from among the multitude. Christ did not choose to cast his instructions like pearls before swine, but put them often in a form which was calculated to test the sincerity and earnestness of his auditors;—if they sought for the explanation they obtained it, and then when it was obtained, the truth appeared the more vivid

* "The plainest and most natural view of the language of the Sacred Historian is, that his expressions ought to be received by us in the sense in which they were understood by the people to whom he addressed himself. If, when speaking of the Creation, instead of using the terms light and water, he had spoken of the former as a wave, and of the latter as the union of two invisible airs, he would assuredly have been perfectly unintelligible to his countrymen: at the distance of above three thousand years his writings would have just begun to be comprehended; and possibly three thousand years hence, those views may be as inapplicable to the then existing state of human knowledge, as they would have been when the first chapter of Genesis was written."—*Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, by Charles Babbage, Chapter V.*

under this form of representation.* When Christ preached on the hills, in the plains, and in the streets of Judea, none could fail to know and comprehend, who would attentively and candidly hear, earnestly inquire, and devoutly meditate; and so at the present time, none can fail to know and comprehend these simple, weighty and beautiful discourses, who read them earnestly and thoroughly, and with an humble and childlike spirit.

The discourses of the Apostles as recorded in the book of The Acts, are of the same simple, direct, and earnest character. It is plain that they meant to give instruction—that they meant, if possible, to satisfy the understanding of their hearers. Hence, when they address their countrymen, the Jews, they borrow illustrations and authorities from the Old Testament;† and when they address the Greeks, they quote admired passages from their own poets.‡ The Apostolical Epistles were addressed to the Churches, and undeniably from the whole style and manner, and from the general character of the salutations with which they open, as well as from express charges to this effect,§ were intended to be read openly for the instruction of all the members. It does not appear from anything contained in these Epistles that any system of philosophy, or deep erudition of any kind, was necessary in order to understand and profit by them; addressed to the people they seem honestly intended for the instruction of the people. Indeed, the chief writer of these Epistles, although himself a man of learning, is very explicit in representing their “calling” as not effected through the wisdom or eloquence of this world.|| It was instruction given in simplicity and faithfulness to the ordinary human mind—it was instruction designed not particularly for the select classes—the noble, the wise, the philosophical, but for the masses, and for the select classes only as merged in the masses. Throughout the whole course of this Divine instruction, from the preaching of Christ onwards, it was a Gospel preached to the poor—it was, like the light of the sun and the ambient atmosphere, a universal gift, for there was a universal want. There is, however, one aid announced, an essential and indispensable aid to the right understanding and reception of the Divine gift, and that is the Divine Spirit himself in his illuminating and regenerating power;¶ but it is an aid held out freely and sincerely to all, as freely as our daily bread, and as sincerely as the proffer of this bread made by the parental hand.**

The Bible is, therefore, as we have said, the voice of our Father in heaven speaking to us his ignorant and sinful children, and

* Luke, Chap. viii.

† Acts, Chap. vii.

‡ Acts, Chap. xvii., v. 28.

§ 2 Thess., Chap. v., v. 27.

|| 1 Cor., Chap. v., v. 18—31. *Κλησεις*, v. 26, evidently refers to the means or agents—and Chap. ii., v. 1—5.

¶ Ibid., Chap. ii., vs. 9—16.

** Luke, Chap. xi., v. 9—14.



speaking in the most apt way to meet our condition and to bring us back to himself. The prodigal son understood the voice of his father when he received him and forgave him, and rejoiced that the lost one was found again; and cannot we understand the heavenly voice? He who made the human mind must perfectly comprehend all its capacities, and be able to trace and estimate its nicest movements; He who gave the power of language, must be capable of using language with the utmost skill and effect for all the ends of language—for teaching and persuading. The Bible, therefore, is to be received as the best book, not only in respect to the facts and doctrines which it contains, but also in respect to the style of its composition, as designed to set forth clearly and fully these facts and doctrines.

One thing is not to be forgotten here, and that is, that the Bible while written so as to be intelligible to those to whom it was at first addressed, is written, also, so as to be intelligible to men of all ages and nations. This is indeed the characteristic of all those great works in literature which stand as everlasting monuments of Truth and Beauty—which simple and massive as the pyramids are even more enduring, because founded on universal principles and addressed to the common mind and heart of man. But a just and impartial criticism must award this merit in a supereminent degree to the Sacred Writings. Even in that most remote patriarchal age we feel at home. The beautiful pictures of the form of that early life of man are fresh with the colors of nature and of truth—we understand and are impressed by the characters—our hearts respond to the sentiments. The same holds true of all the descriptions, and the histories and biographies of this precious volume—they belong to the human race. Nor do the strictly didactic parts fall short in this characteristic of universality—indeed it is the more admirable here, for it is in this species of writing that human wit has most signally failed. Many of the most illustrious philosophers were wont to affect obscurity in their writings, as if the wisdom which they professed to make known were too august to be presented to men without a veiled countenance. Even Plato and Aristotle are often obscure to their most enraptured disciples: Scholasticism delighted to pile mountains of subtleties upon the green fields of truth, as if it were better to be amazed than to be fed. The fathers took their familiar walks amid the labyrinths of multiform philosophies. But the Bible conveys the most momentous truths in language so simple and under illustrations so striking that the reader of every nation and of every age recognizes its import, and seems to be in intimate converse with a kind and venerable wisdom, teaching him as earnestly and appropriately as if he were the only listener, and the only object of its benedictions. And this suggests to us the remark that the Bible, in its universality is still individual—it speaks to all by speaking to each one.

Hence it is not required that any interpreter of hidden mysteries should come between the human being and his God; just as no mediator is required in the work of salvation save that one great and perfect Mediator, who is both God and man. This is the distinguishing excellence of this book, that it relieves us from the doubtfulness and mistakes incident upon the obscurities and imperfection of mere human teaching, by giving us in the place thereof a Divine teaching. Here every individual may go directly and for himself to the pure fountain of truth, and directly and for himself to the Saviour of men. To enter the Court of the King of Kings, no costly dresses and equipages, no stately formalities, no bribing of the cunning for the aid of their address, no worshipping of courtiers for their patronage, are necessary:—The gates are thrown wide open—the entrance is lowly, unpretending, but pleasant, so as neither to attract the proud, nor to abash the humble; and whosoever entereth there with a broken heart and the docile spirit of a child, shall find acceptance and be made wise unto salvation.

It is, of course, not denied here, that the labors of the learned have been put in requisition in various ways in the dissemination of the Word. The translation of this book into the different languages must ever belong to them. So also all that philological labor which goes to elucidate the sacred text, and consequently to perfect translations, is invaluable. Researches, too, in Oriental Geography and Antiquities, enable us to explain many local allusions, and prepare us to receive more vivid impressions from the imagery employed. But it is plain that all these efforts of learning only bear upon one point, namely, to place the sacred writings fully and distinctly before the reader,—they are not an interpretation of the sense, but an exposition of the symbol;—they aim to bring the modern reader, as nearly as possible, into the same relation to the Divine Word, as he who heard it at the mouth of the prophet, or read it as a recent record in his vernacular tongue.

Hermeneutics, or the science of interpreting language, has been exceedingly elaborated in our time, and presented under scholastic forms, while its importance in various ways has been sufficiently signalled. That it is laudable, nay, indispensable that the principles of interpreting language should be presented under scientific forms, no one will be disposed to question. All legitimate, scientific and philosophical labor is laudable,—no practicable field of research should be passed by. Wherever the pearls of truth are buried or scattered, there we should dive for them, or seek to gather them up. And in respect to the sacred Scriptures, the learned are at liberty to apply the principles of Hermeneutics for their private satisfaction, just as they would apply them to any other writings: for undoubtedly these Scriptures can abide the ut-

most severity of just interpretation. But on the other hand, it must by no means be pretended that these writings are shut up from the unlearned and common reader, until the learned Exegete apply to them his formula. The principles of Hermeneutics, after all, are principles which lie in the common mind, and which every man applies in the daily use of language: every man who speaks, every man who hears, spontaneously applies these principles. As well might we contend that an acquaintance with scholastic logic is necessary to a right apprehension of the Scriptures, as that an acquaintance with scholastic Hermeneutics is thus necessary. We all believe that we can address our fellow men on momentous topics, and make ourselves understood, although they be unacquainted with these formal sciences. What we shall say, shall indeed be good reasoning, and expressed in appropriate and correct, although in the simplest language, and the common mind will follow our reasoning, because it is the prerogative of all mind to reason, and will apprehend our language because always accustomed to the use of language. It is on this principle that the orator of popular assemblies proceeds, when speaking on topics which involve the destiny of nations, or which reach forward to the destinies of eternity. It was on this principle that Demosthenes, Patrick Henry, and George Whitfield, addressed assemblies of the people. Now it is thus that the Bible addresses men—it does not intend to overleap, but to meet their understanding—it addresses them as beings capable of thought, and accustomed to the use of language. And if he is the most skilful orator who, understanding the minds and relations of his auditors best, employs reasonings and language nicely appropriated to them; then, may we well believe, that the Allwise and most merciful God, in undertaking to teach his poor children of the earth the truths and duties which involve their eternal state, has not, at least, fallen behind any the most skilful human teachers or orators. Nor is the strength of this position at all weakened by the admission that God teaches truths which human reason never could have composed, and which it even now is unable to comprehend and explain. Be the truth ever so mysterious, nevertheless it is stated in intelligible language, and under intelligible illustrations. I may not comprehend the nature of light, yet I may understand the proposition affirming that light moves in right lines; and so, also, I may not comprehend the nature of the incarnation, and yet I may understand the proposition which affirms that “God was made flesh, and dwelt among us.” I may not comprehend the eternity of God, and yet I may understand the affirmation of the prophet, “that God inhabited Eternity.” Besides, if the truths are such as God alone could reveal, then they are truths which God alone can explain, or at least can best explain, and therefore the sacred exposition must be received as the most clear and judicious, and the best adapted to human

apprehension. But we are not called upon to admit that *any* aids of learned investigation are absolutely required after the word faithfully translated is prepared for every reader in his vernacular tongue, not even that which relates to biblical antiquities and geography; for such is the simplicity and universality of the Bible, that its leading import, its cardinal facts and doctrines, are not suspended upon any of these subsidiary knowledges. The history of Joseph, the story of Ruth, the lives and preachings of the prophets, the Psalms of David, the proverbs of Solomon, the discourses of Christ and the apostolical epistles, open themselves readily in the main, to the simple-hearted and earnest reader. And whatever explanation the New Testament requires, as connected with, and following another dispensation, is easily found in the Old Testament. The history of the Church, and the biographies of the pious, warrant the assertion that those have apprehended the way of salvation most clearly, and have been most imbued with the Heavenly wisdom, who, like Bunyan in prison, have been shut up to the study of the simple Word. In fine, the great feature of this revelation is, that give it to each individual in his own tongue, and he comes directly under a Divine Teaching, by which, in all that relates to salvation,—to that which forms the great burden of this teaching—he is made independent of all other teaching. Give the Bible to any man who can read it, and he at once is taught by prophets, and by Christ and his Apostles. Are not these the most perfect teachers? Will not the Holy Spirit be present as he earnestly reads? Is he not now before the open gate of Heaven?

Nor can anything which we have said above be justly construed as disparaging any legitimate branch of learning, or learned men, or a learned ministry. The more we cultivate the intellect, the more we honor Him who constituted our minds after the image of his own; and the more we search after knowledge, the wider becomes our view of the Divine benignity and wisdom. All the influences of the Bible tend to inspire the most earnest love of all truth and knowledge, and of self-cultivation. “Wisdom is the principal thing, therefore get wisdom: and with all thy getting, get understanding. Take fast hold of instruction; let her not go; keep her; for she is thy life.” Such are its exhortations. And he who penned these words was commended of God, because he chose wisdom first of all. Among its finest characters, too, were men of learning, such as Moses, Joseph, David, Daniel, and Paul. The most thoroughly learned man, both understands the simplest truths best, and can set them forth most simply and effectually. He who is the light of the world, and the eternal fountain of wisdom—even the Divine Logos himself, when he dwelt among men, gave the most beautiful illustration how the profoundest mind can teach the ignorant in the ordinary forms of speech. There is a wide difference between the mysti-

cism which learning, in its pride and pedantry, puts on, to excite the wonder and admiration of the vulgar, and that pure light which, from its own interior illumination, it throws around all subjects, so that common minds, and even little children, may understand them. Therefore let all the appliances of education be made as common as possible; and let him who would proclaim God's truth, lay hold upon all knowledge if he can: Thus, in the expansion of our noblest faculties, will a preparation be made both for receiving and imparting Divine knowledge.

But then those philosophies and sciences which, by our native powers, we achieve, are not to be put in the place or in the way of God's truth, which was intended not for philosophers and men of science in particular, but for all men, and for men who had no greater knowledge than those plain and common men to whom the Divine Word was at first addressed. If the Infinite, who is familiar with all philosophy and science, out of regard to poor simple men, did not pile upon his revelations the splendors and subtleties of erudition, shall we with our murky knowledges attempt it? If He had chosen to make his Bible a scientific book, he might easily have done so; and that He did not choose to do so, ought to teach us humility and forbearance in the use of our poor learning in respect to it. He, the Great Teacher, chose to teach us the awful and momentous lessons of duty and salvation in a plain and practical way. It is safest and wisest, and certainly most reverent, to learn of him the mode of teaching, as well as the truth to be taught. But the question may be asked, wherein is the necessity and value of a Ministry at all, seeing that the Bible is so plain, and all sufficient in itself? Without entering, in this place, upon a full consideration of the Gospel ministry, it will be enough to reply, that the Bible requires to be put into the hands of men, and their attention requires to be called to it by reasonings and persuasions, drawn both from their actual condition, and from the teachings contained in the book itself. The preacher goes forth among men for this very purpose, to bring them to attend to God's Word; and then, indeed, does he feel that he has succeeded in his mission, when he has brought them earnestly, candidly, prayerfully, and perseveringly to read it: now he looks for deep conviction and a striving to enter into the strait gate; now that they have the truth, they will be sanctified through the truth.

There is the same demand for Spiritual Teachers that there is for any other Teachers—a demand lying in the actual state of the world. However wide and free the field of knowledge,—and truly the world is full of invitations to thought and investigation,—still, men choose generally to engage in other pursuits; and then the few whose minds are imbued with a divine spirit of wisdom feel themselves constrained to become the Teachers of their fellows in the Sciences and Arts. Now, there are many things that

they will do in the outset, simply to set forth the charms and value of these higher pursuits; and they think much is gained when they have won over the devout attention of their auditors and disciples. And being themselves more practised in this way, they will next lead on the others kindly by persuasions, by the force of example, and by giving them tastes of knowledge in anticipation of their own study and researches. Now, all this applies to Divine truth likewise; for, although the Bible is plain and all sufficient of itself, still only the few are inclined to study it devoutly; and hence, these of necessity must become the guides and Teachers of the others, until that day of universal illumination come, when it shall be no longer necessary for every man to teach his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord; for all shall know him from the least to the greatest.

In teaching the Sciences, some last authority is always appealed to, as in natural science, experiments and observations are appealed to which all men may make for themselves; and the clearness and authoritativeness of the Science, to the general mind, will be just according to the perfection of this last authority. Now, it is just this relation which the Bible holds to all human teachers of Divine things; it contains the last authority to which every man may appeal for himself. Human teachers by their learning may clear up doubtful passages by a more accurate translation, and by biblical geography and archæology; and, in respect to these, the common mind will repose upon the universal consent of the learned, as well as upon the greater consistency of the whole, made apparent to them by simply comparing Scripture with Scripture: but any received translation, like our English translation, for all the ends of a Revelation, is clear as noon-day. As God's book, the Bible is a perfect and unquestionable authority; and, therefore, to it must the teacher of religion refer at last, as the natural philosopher refers to the phenomena of nature.

The Bible, however, as a last authority, is more simple and available, and involves far less of learned authority than any acknowledged criteria of Science. For, although there be many facts of Science which are open to all men, still there are many also,—and these, too, of the last importance,—which lie beyond the field of ordinary observation; while the most momentous and central facts of Christianity—those which absolutely determine and fix the character of the religious system, are just those which lie most open to the common reader. Hence, hermeneutics, and philology; biblical archæology, and geography, have cast light only upon isolated passages without modifying essentially the great body of Truth: what the early Christians received and found efficacious to the Salvation of the Soul, we, at the present day, receive and find efficacious in like manner. From the age of the Apostles, onward through every subsequent age, there has been

but one genuine and vital Christianity; and this has been known to every true disciple, however he may have been led through custom or philosophy, to add on extraneous dogmas—or however he may have failed, through lack of learning, to perceive some curious secondary points.

A question has been raised respecting the progressive nature of our knowledge of the Holy Scriptures. It has been maintained, that with the advance of science and philosophy, there must be a corresponding advance in biblical interpretation; and hence, that many conclusions drawn by the dim lights of crude and unripened knowledge, must necessarily be modified, or even laid entirely aside under the splendors of modern discovery—that the Bible, like nature, is a collection of facts which are imperfectly apprehended and liable to misinterpretation, until a ripened philosophy gives the exact laws of observation and interpretation. Astronomy, geology, and psychology, are particularly noted for their bearing upon Biblical interpretation. But astronomy, geology, and the natural sciences, generally, do not bear upon the construction of any passages which involve the moral interests of man; and as the Bible does not profess to teach these sciences, but only alludes, incidentally, to certain phenomena connected with them, and in terms according with the popular conceptions,* it is hardly probable that we shall obtain any clearer view of its teaching through their advancement. The great aim of the Sacred Writers, in alluding to natural phenomena, is to represent God as the Creator and Governor of the Universe, and to illustrate his Majesty, Wisdom and Benevolence—this it does without deciding between the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems, or revealing the laws and processes of geological formations.

Psychology, or the philosophy of the human soul, is, indeed, intimately connected with the moral and central truths of the Bible; and it cannot be denied, that when this philosophy is perfected, these truths, as connected both with God and man, will stand forth in a more resplendent light. But psychology, in its essential and practical aspects, appears, in certain cardinal facts, well known to the universal human consciousness. The distinction between right and wrong—moral obligation based upon moral freedom—the adaptation of the laws of duty to the well-being of man—the evil of Sin—immortality and retribution—and the being and attributes of God, can be apprehended without any nice psychological analysis. All things in heaven and earth have their philosophy. The insensate mechanism of nature hath its philosophy; and the living mind hath its philosophy. But as the philosophy of nature governs atoms and masses in their unthinking passivity, so the mind spontaneously yields to the great principles

* See page 97, note.

of its interior constitution, where reflection or philosophical self-recognition is still undeveloped. And in the harmony and fitness of the universal order, this spontaneous action is most easy and lively just where it is most needed, in everything relating to the social and moral state of man. Hence, man readily unites in the constitution of society, acknowledges the authority of law, and becomes a subject of government. Now, there is nothing in the Bible but what addresses itself plainly to the conscience, moral sense, and spontaneous reason of man. The mind here, as in many other things of daily and vital moment, naturally apprehends and judges without staying to reflect psychologically upon the nature and laws of its cognitive faculties.

As to its grand scope, its moral ends, therefore, the Bible is to be received as both complete and clear in itself. When first given it did not develope itself in sciences and philosophies then extant, so that the learned had to approach its meaning through preliminary investigations, profound, difficult, and doubtful; nor did it conceal itself in sciences and philosophies afterwards to be wrought out by human genius and industry, and thus adjourn its blessed illumination to a distant day. It rose upon our world, at first, as the bright and beautiful Sun of the young Creation, giving light to every eye, and making all things plain to behold; and, it has been the same bright and beautiful Sun ever since, revealing the heaven and the earth, and cherishing by its genial warmth the soul of man. We may not comprehend how its exhaustless urn is supplied with light, or how its rays so swiftly travel from the far distant heavens, or how it produces its gracious effects; but this does not hinder us from experiencing these effects, nor lessen the joyous beauty of its shine. The philosopher who measures the orb of the sun, analyses the eye, and discovers the laws of light, hath no keener sense of light than the unlettered man who goeth forth to his work from the morning until the evening. The truths and facts of the Bible stand connected with great and curious questions in philosophy; but it is only the truths and facts which it propounds. The truths and facts may receive a philosophical explanation, and thus certain demands of the speculative reason may be answered, but it is only by the truths and facts that the Bible accomplishes its mission. When the great questions in philosophy shall be solved, human reason will have done its work, and will receive its crown of light: but even then, the truths and facts of the Bible, as the basis of duty, as the source of hope, as the efficacious means of salvation, will stand just where they did before. It will then be as true as it is now, "except ye be converted and become like little children, ye shall in no wise enter the kingdom of heaven."

The human reason has ever been struggling to do its work—it has sought to solve the great philosophical problems springing up

in the path of Christianity. But here began a great and portentous error. Philosophy is progressive; but Christianity, in its true sphere, and, as to its true aims, is complete. Dogmatic Theology is constituted by philosophical speculation upon revealed truths. Had philosophy first been perfected, and then legitimately applied, Dogmatic Theology would have been a determinate and indisputable science. But as philosophy has ever been assuming new phases, and branching out itself into a variety of schools, often fiercely opposed to each other, Dogmatic Theology has correspondingly appeared under various systems, some of which have possessed points of agreement, while others have diverged into open hostility. It was unavoidable that philosophy, in its progress towards a complete development, should assume various and conflicting forms. It was unavoidable that Theology, as a Science, should go along a similar track in its progress to a clear noontide. And what was here demanded, was unlimited freedom of thought and investigation. It is only in this way that the Speculative reason can legitimately and adequately do its work. The portentous error was the ever renewed attempt to identify a particular dogmatic science with Christianity. Some crude and unripened philosophy gave birth to a crude unripened science. The particular science was adopted by the Church; the Church lay embosomed in worldly power, wealth, and dignities; the Schools which gave birth to the science, lay embosomed in the Church. Thus the particular science became ascendant; and the hope both of the scholar and the ecclesiastic—the hope of all fame, of all preferment, hung upon it. The philosophy triumphs through the dread authority of the Church—authority which she professes to have derived from the Holy Apostles—from the great author of Christianity himself; to the keys of the kingdom of heaven, she adds the sword of State, and thus it triumphs through the state likewise, as the adjunct of the Church. The creed embodying the dogmatical science is formed—the very language is stereotyped, and made sacred and authoritative. Heaven and earth defend the creed. Woe be to him who opposes the creed! He is a heretic, a traitor—let his body be burned—let his soul take its place among the damned!

The evil is manifold. Philosophical investigation is impeded or even brought to a pause. Free thought may give birth to new conclusions; and new conclusions may attack the dogmatical science of the creed. There must be no thought, therefore, beyond the established forms and dogmas. Thus the natural rational criteria of truth are exchanged for the voice of the Church and the State; and no hope remains for the progress of philosophy unless through the violence and crimes of a revolution, the only effect of which may be to transfer the sceptre of this tyranny over mind from one school to another. On the other hand,

instead of the simple majesty of gospel truth speaking in the language which she brought from her native heaven, we are imposed upon by the stately antics of ambitious men, and our ears stunned with the barbarous jargon of scholastic ignorance: we have lost the teaching of the prophets of Christ and his Apostles, and we have instead thereof the teaching of Doctors and Fathers; the blessed Gospel which every man might carry about him in his bosom, is sealed up and laid away, and spacious libraries are opened where huge tomes in triple rows stand frowningly to teach us what to believe and how through the Church to enter the kingdom of Heaven. The discourses of Christ, as if too miscellaneous, and disjointed, and unscientific, are supplanted by elaborated creeds, confessions, and didactic systems! We have thus developed a Christianity of the Church and State, and of the Schools. These are leagued together, and yet possess distinct elements, and, therefore, require to be analyzed apart, in order to be comprehended in their union. The Christianity of the Church represents the Church as endowed with Divine gifts, clothed with Divine authority, as containing within herself a vicegerency from the King of Kings, the Lord of Lords, by virtue of which she interprets the word, enacts ecclesiastical laws, prescribes rituals, decides controversies, bestows privileges, enjoins penances, works miracles, regulates kingdoms, anathematizes heretics and infidels, forgives penitents—in fine, holds the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, opening and shutting the gates with a plenary wisdom and power.

The Christianity of the State is simply the Church, uniting its authority with the secular power. There is thus a mutual sustentation. The State enables the Church to awe into submission by the dread of civil penalties; and the Church gives the State the majesty and force of Divine sanction.

The Christianity of the Schools is the form of doctrine determined by the form of philosophy which has received the sanction of the Church.

Now, to all there is opposed the Christianity of the Word:—Christianity, not under the interpretations, remodellings, and additions of the Church, and not under the expositions and explanations of any school of philosophy; but Christianity as fully and clearly set forth in the simple Word itself. A Christianity not requiring the interpretations of the Church, for the interpretations of the Church are but the interpretations of men; but this comes from the Father of lights himself, and is its own sufficient interpreter to every one who will give his heart and his mind to it: a Christianity not requiring the remodellings and additions of the Church—for, coming from a Divine hand, the touch of a human hand can only mar what God hath perfected, and can give no additional grace to what hath sprung from the fullness of the Divine conception: and a Christianity not requiring the dogmatism of the

Schools, because given in the simplicity of a higher wisdom to all the simple hearted, that those whom human wit has only dazzled or led astray, may find, without mistake, the way to Heaven, and walk therein with a cheerful and certain hope : a Christianity by which every man is brought, without any human mediation, directly to the Great Mediator himself, for light and salvation.


No religion ever appeared in our world under so meek and unpretending a form as Christianity ; and yet none ever appeared with such divinity and dignity ; none ever appeared with so little display of argument or erudition, and yet none ever appeared with such authority of truth. It came into our world without causing its voice to be heard in the streets, without garments rolled in blood—it came in gentleness and love, and calmly reposing upon the consciousness of its own worth and purposes, it performed its mission without respect of persons, and in perfect independence, fearing no man, flattering no man, but loving all men. It claimed to abrogate the priesthood and priestly rites, by fulfilling at once their whole intent. It claimed to supersede all philosophies, in the matter of human salvation, by a Wisdom from on High. It claimed to separate itself from all earthly dominion by proclaiming its kingdom not of this world, and the true authority and might of this kingdom to be manifested in the heart of man.

It was unavoidable that such a system should meet with stern opposition. The Hierarchies opposed it—the Judæan Hierarchy put to death its Divine Author, and with mortal hate persecuted his disciples. And they fled from Jerusalem only to be met by the Pagan Hierarchy at Rome with fire and sword, and the fury of wild beasts in the arena. The schools of philosophy opposed it, whether at Jerusalem or at Athens, when they denied the resurrection of the dead ; and in the pride of learning and eloquence, despised as foolishness the preaching of the Cross. The State opposed it. The imperial Cæsar frowned upon a system, which, instead of deifying his authority and clothing his decrees with the terrors of superstition, reduced him to the condition of a culprit before the King of Kings.

But all opposition melted away before the unendurable splendors of heavenly Truth ; and the Priest, the Philosopher, and the Emperor, were alike fain to make friends with the majestic visitor. But how did they make friends ? Did the priest yield up his sacred pretensions, the philosopher become a little child at the feet of Jesus, and the Cæsar throw down his royal diadem to receive it again only from the hands of Love and Justice ? By no means. The priest assumed to be the appointed and only legitimate minister of the heavenly grace—to be Christ's Vicegerent ; and reared an altar on which, in a portentous mystery, he professed to offer daily the victim who was once offered on the Cross of Calvary. The philosopher boasted himself the expounder of the truths and facts of

Christianity. And the emperor, emblazoning the Cross upon his standard, proclaimed, By this sign we conquer. The Hierarchy, the schools, the State, indeed, adopted Christianity, but it was only to corrupt, to debase, and to mould to their own purposes. They bowed to the universal voice of humanity in yielding to Christianity an apparent triumph; but in reality they triumphed still. They assumed the titles and professions of the kingdom of heaven; but they only the more securely established the ancient mysteries of error and the kingdom of this world. A true Church remained, but it was a Church in the wilderness; there were faithful souls who still, as at the beginning, bore and had patience, and labored and did not faint, but as at the beginning they were confessors and martyrs. At the beginning they were put to death under the infamy of the Christian name; it was a strange revolution by which they were now put to death as heretics from the Christian Faith! The enemy sowed tares among the wheat, and the dark counterfeit overtopped the golden ears.

“Truth, indeed, came once into the world with her Divine Master, and was a perfect shape most glorious to look on: but when he ascended, and his Apostles after him were laid asleep, then straight arose a wicked race of deceivers, who, as that story goes of the Egyptian Typhon with his conspirators, how they dealt with the good Osiris, took the virgin Truth, hewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to the four winds. From that time ever since, the sad friends of Truth, such as durst appear, imitating the careful search that Isis made for the mangled body of Osiris, went up and down, gathering up limb by limb, still as they could find them.” As the “sad friends of Truth,” let us seek for her scattered limbs, and attempt something for the restoration of her glorious form, still looking, with the noble Milton, for “her Master’s second coming,” when “he shall bring together every joint and member, and shall mould them into an immortal feature of loveliness and perfection.”



ARTICLE IV.

CHRISTIANITY IN CONFLICT WITH POLITICS.

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ANTAGONIST influences exist in our world. Principles of action, differing in character essentially from each other, obtain as the basis of sentiment in the community. There is on the one hand the wisdom which is of this world, and which is throughout affected by the poison of an ignorant and narrow-minded selfishness; on the other, there exists the legislation of Heaven—Christianity, inculcating the lessons of an enlightened and expansive benevolence. In most cases, the former has ever had the control of the human mind,—has shaped the thoughts and directed the conduct of men. But with this the latter is in stern conflict—pronounces it foolishness, and seeks to overthrow its dominion, and to introduce in its place higher principles—the wisdom which is from above, and which is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy.

Our object at present is to speak of this latter system of influence in one of its many aspects; namely, its conflict with politics. We use this term in its widest sense, as comprehending both the frame-work and the administration of government. We wish to call attention to some of the more prominent points of this conflict, and then to show that Christianity will triumph—will bring all the arrangements of man's political condition into sympathy with its own legislation. Its great object, we are well aware, is a spiritual one—the salvation of men; but in effecting this it will gain other victories—will subdue opposing influences, and convert them into important auxiliaries to its main design. Whatever, therefore, there is in the principles and practices of men, or in the arrangements of their social and political condition, which is unfriendly to the great object of Christianity, is destined, we believe, to be known only as that which has been. It matters not where or what the obstacle may be; if it is in the way of the coming of that kingdom which is righteousness and peace, it cannot continue. The decree has gone forth. Christianity, in the attainment of its chief object, is to triumph on the soil of our sin-burdened world. In gaining this it will effect many subordinate ends—will bring into friendly relation to man's spiritual interests the whole influence of his political condition.

Our first business is with the points of conflict. We begin with the origin of government, or the source of civil power. The wisdom of the world makes this to be the will of the people. It teaches that government originates with man,—that the civil power comes from the social compact,—or, in other words, that the foundation of all government—the origin of the right to govern, and of the correlative duty to obey—is *expediency*—is in the conviction of men, that it is for their interests. But this view diminishes the influence of law, and weakens the power of government. It attenuates the moral atmosphere around men, and thus takes immensely from that pressure, which, under different teaching, would be felt by the disturbing forces in society. Hence, in places where this view prevails, the surface of society is ever and anon ruffled and thrown into commotion, and the rights of individuals trampled upon, in the mad effervescence of men, who have been brought up in the school of political expediency, and who feel that subjection to law is enjoined only by the statute book—that human rights have no higher protection than that of a human authority, based simply upon the convictions of men that it is for the general good.

Christianity denies this position, and opposes all the loose and mischievous conclusions drawn from it. It gives to government a far higher origin—to law a more sacred sanction. The powers that be are ordained of God. He made man—constituted all the relations of life—and has prescribed the action proper in each. The power to make laws, to govern, and to enforce obedience, comes from him. By him kings reign, and princes decree justice. The people are the medium—not the source of the civil power. God is the fountain of all authority. He ordained government; and it has power from him to enforce its legitimate acts. For while Christianity does not teach a passive obedience to *whatever* government may enjoin, nor leave the correction of evils in the political system to “the reactions of outraged nature,” since it commands us to obey God rather than men,—yet it does insist upon obedience to the powers that be in all things, which do not contravene the biddings of a higher authority; and it does this on the ground that government is of Divine institution. He, therefore, who resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and will be treated accordingly. This is the teaching of Christianity,—this the mighty pressure with which it binds the hearts and consciences of men. In thus giving the highest sacredness to authority and efficiency to law, it secures, in the most effectual manner, the peace and order and happiness of the community.

Christianity is in conflict with politics as it respects the object, or end of government. In most cases this is practically made to be the elevation of rulers, and of those in the subordinate places of power. The great end is their own personal aggrandizement.

In many instances, men in power look upon office as something created for them, or as existing for their honor and enlargement, and not as the means of good to others—not as an elevation from which they can act more efficiently and extensively for the general good. It is desired and entered into simply for the sake of the emoluments connected with it; and not for the sake of diffusing, through all its channels of influence, the spirit of an enlightened and virtuous patriotism. The great object is put aside, and the whole bearing of government perverted, and made the means of cultivating, in one form or another, the spirit of a most revolting selfishness. In our country great advances have been made of late years in this fearful work of perversion. Some have gone so far in this iniquity as to speak of the avails of office as “the spoils of victory!” of elevation to the places of power as “the reward due” to the leaders of a political campaign. We know of nothing more corrupting to morals, and subversive of manly freedom. It perverts the great end of government. The effect of it is to convert the ordinance of God into a political mart, where office will be sold to the highest bidder—to the man who has the most money to expend in gaining it, or the least conscience in going all lengths in intrigue and reckless effort to gain the ascendancy of his party. Christianity countenances no such perversion. It makes government a *benevolent* institution, ordained, not for the aggrandizement of a few, but for the good of the many—for the social, intellectual and moral elevation of the people. Its great object, as developed in the Bible, is to secure order and peace in the community—to protect the rights and lives of its citizens, and thus to minister to their industry, prosperity, and happiness. The ruler is clothed with authority in order to effect these high ends of benevolence. Office is created for the general good; and the first, great object of the man who enters it, should be to promote that good. Christianity, consequently, can never sanction any action, which changes the main design of government, and converts the institution into a machine, whose first and chief object is the benefit of those who manage it—their elevation above the people—the enslavement of men to their will. With such selfishness it has no sympathy, and can hold no possible communion.

Another prominent point in this conflict respects the kind or form of government which should exist. In most instances, that which exists is incompatible with the great end of government—the highest good of the people. The foundation principles are wrong. Feudalism has shaped the whole formation. The central element which has given form to the entire system, is the mischievous idea, that the many are made for the few—the peasantry for the nobility—the people for the sovereign. In framing these governments, therefore, the plan has been to exalt the few—to clothe them in all the magnificence which wealth and power can

give them—to make them the protectors of the people, and the people in turn subservient to them. But this form of government fails to secure the high ends of that institution. It is injurious to the people. In many ways it interferes with the freedom of speech—lessens the manliness of action, and impairs most of the sterner and more independent virtues of men. It injures the privileged order. It places them in circumstances which cherish and develop the worst passions of our nature. Born to power, they feel that it is to continue with them. Inheriting pre-eminence, they know that it is to be theirs—that conduct cannot lessen it—that character cannot take it from them. Corrupted by wealth, inflated with the idea of their elevation above the rest of mankind, they are, as a class, proud, indolent, and vicious, and consequently, exert a disastrous influence over those below them. It is the testimony of an eminent living witness,* himself a member of the class which he describes, that “the tendency of aristocracy is to produce among the people a general dissoluteness of manners, eagerness in the pursuit of wealth, and extravagance in its employment; and not only to vex and harass, but to enslave men’s minds. They become possessed with exaggerated notions of the importance of the upper classes; they bow to their authority, ape their manners, and affect their society. Hence there is an end to all independent and manly conduct.” The minds of the people are depressed.

This form of government is also exceedingly burdensome and oppressive to the people. While the few enjoy the most princely fortunes, and have all that the resources of a nation can give them, the people generally are poor, and must be under such a system. For, in a level surface, hills and mountains can be made only by lessening the general elevation, or by making deep valleys somewhere. The higher the summits are raised, the greater of course must be the surrounding depression. So, wherever the form of government breaks up the surface of society, creates arbitrary distinctions, gives to a few an elevation in wealth, rank, and honor, above others, there must, and will be a corresponding and general degradation, occasioned by the forced accumulation around the privileged portion. The means of aggrandizing the few are taken from the many. In all countries, therefore, where these artificial distinctions exist,—where there are kings, princes, and nobles,—the people are poor, are oppressed by the enormous exactions made upon them in order to sustain the magnificence of those who are thus raised above them. This evil is inherent in such forms of government. It was distinctly pointed out by the prophet when the Israelites, in their folly, determined to change the republican character of their civil polity into the monarchical; and the pen

* Lord Brougham.

of inspiration has recorded his stern rebuke as the legislation of Heaven against the change.

This form of government, we say, oppresses the people—makes them poor. In order to sustain such a system in England, for example, and it is the very best conditioned monarchy on the globe, an enormous taxation is necessary. In that country, according to their own showing,* there are “taxes upon everything—upon every article that enters the mouth, or covers the back, or is placed under the foot—taxes upon everything pleasant to see, hear, smell, or taste—taxes upon warmth, light, and locomotion—taxes upon everything upon the earth, and the waters under the earth—on everything that comes from abroad, or is grown at home—taxes on the raw material, and on every fresh value that is added to it by the industry of man—taxes upon the sauce which pampers man’s appetite, and the drug that restores him to health—on the ermine that decorates the judge, and the rope which hangs the criminal—on the poor man’s salt, and the rich man’s spice—on the brass nails of the coffin, and the ribands of the bride.” Is it strange that the mass of the people in the British isles are poor? How can it be otherwise, while they are subject to exactions, which exhaust their resources, and make life a burden? With any such system of civil polity, Christianity is, and must, in the nature of the case, be in conflict. For, while it does not prescribe any particular form, as of Divine authority, it teaches us explicitly, that the end of government is the good of the people—their elevation, as social, and intellectual, and moral beings, and thus favors that system of polity, which best secures this end. It throws all its influence on the side of that which improves the condition, and ennobles the character of our race. In its principles, and in its teaching, it is, therefore, opposed to monarchy and aristocracy in all their forms; to thrones, principalities, and powers—the mountains and hills of pride and ambition. They are based on anything but benevolence; have for their object anything but the good of the people. They are burdensome, crushing even to their best interests. It is in vain to say, as has often been said, that they impart stability and firmness to the government—that they “give bone to the constitution.” Our reply is, they produce too much bone. “Ossification in politics is as dangerous as it is in physiology.” What Christianity may tolerate, what it may teach its disciples to endure, is one thing; but what it approves, what it sanctions as right, is a very different thing. It may instruct Christians to bear with despotism, as the very way to destroy it—to show in their quiet endurance of its oppressions, the iniquity of the system, which crushes them down, and thus work its overthrow. But it can sanction no form of government, which depresses millions in order to elevate a few.

* *Edinburgh Review.*

Nearly allied to this point of conflict, and in some measure a part of it, is the connection of Church and State. Here the kingdom of God on earth has long suffered violence. Men have entirely mistaken its nature and its power. They have looked upon the Church as some feeble thing, which must be nursed, and eared for, and held up. They have, therefore, thrown the arm of State around it, and have attempted to legislate it into influence among men. But in doing this they have entirely mistaken both the end of government, and the interests of the Church. The object of government is to protect the rights of men, not to interfere with, and control the exercises of religion. It is based on the great principles of justice and equality. Its wing should, therefore, be spread alike over all. But if it favors only a part, it just so far abandons its province of protection, and becomes an oppressor. When, consequently, the State allies itself with the Church, when, in other words, it establishes certain forms of worship and of ecclesiastical order, and throws all its influence in favor of the same, it departs from the legitimate ends of government, and places itself in the attitude of hostility to the interests of a part of the people; denies to them rights and privileges which it allows to others; and always to a greater or less extent, becomes illiberal and persecuting, where its sole object should be to secure men from intolerance and persecution. This alliance is not only opposed to freedom of opinion and equal rights, but is, in many cases, the very means of upholding and perpetuating the most pernicious errors, and is thus a mighty barrier in the way of truth. Systems of error, which could not continue a single year, if free discussion were allowed, and light permitted to come to the people, exist in all their degrading and corrupting influence on the intellect and the heart, because they are countenanced by the government, and sustained by the bayonet. In consequence of its alliance with the government, the Greek Church is able to resist all attempts to reform her idolatrous worship, either in Greece or in Russia. Upheld by the State, Romanism maintains itself unharmed in Italy and in Austria. For centuries the scimitar has been the defence of the Koran. Nothing sustains the dead formalism of Europe but the bayonet; and nothing arrays this force against the truth but the connection of the State with the Church.

This alliance injures the Church. In leaning upon a human arm, she loses her strength; comes down from her spiritual elevation, and identifies herself, in feeling and action, with the world. Hence, an intolerant and persecuting spirit has ever been manifested by her while in union with the State. The Church, which is not allowed to call down fire from heaven upon men, has, in consequence of this unhallowed connection, put men into the fire. She, who is permitted only to bless, has been clothed with curses; Her kingdom, which is one of righteousness and peace, has been

changed into one of injustice and deadly strife. The light of the world, in such cases, has gone out; and the salt of the earth lost its savor. Men, who might otherwise have been won to the truth, have been thus driven into a hopeless infidelity; and prejudices created, which centuries will not remove. Christianity surely can approve of no such alliance; can have no possible sympathy with it. Her strength is weakened by such union. Her limbs are fettered by the iron mail of the state. She can conquer, but not with carnal weapons. All that she needs, is to be let alone. All that she asks, is an open field—freedom for every man to think and act for himself on the subject of religion. Give her this—put this boon into the hands of men, and her triumph is certain. The truth is mighty, and wherever it is allowed to have free course, it will prevail. Error is weak, and where it is left to stand alone, it falls to the ground and perishes in its conflict with Christianity. In itself error has no strength.

Another point of conflict respects the exercise of the elective franchise. In most cases, government has been so framed as to exclude this privilege in the higher departments of authority. In these office is inherited. Power comes into the hands of individuals, just as a farm comes into the possession of the heir, or a plantation of slaves passes from one owner to another. Hence, men are often in the highest places of power, whose character is the antipodes of everything virtuous; and whose influence, like the atmosphere of the deadly Upas, is destructive to the moral life of men. What an aspect, for example, did the throne of England present during the reign of Henry VIII., the murderer of his wives; and more recently, during that of George IV., the most heartless libertine that ever walked the earth! But we pass by these cases of exclusion. The point of conflict is, where men do exercise the elective franchise, and respects the manner in which it is done. In many, perhaps a large majority of instances, this is not in sympathy with the spirit and instructions of Christianity. On this point the Bible speaks with great plainness and with peculiar urgency. And there is a reason why it should. The influence of station is great. It has much to do in forming and continuing the character of public sentiment; and, consequently, bears directly on the high interests of virtue. Hence, the Bible commands us to put into the places of power good men—men who fear God—men of truth, hating covetousness, and who will be a terror to evil doers.

The conduct of many, however, is not conformed to these precepts. Little regard is often paid to the moral character of those who are candidates for office. Worth, honesty, capacity, is overlooked; and the fervor of party zeal made to take the place of higher qualifications. And hence, the profane man, the Sabbath breaker, and even the adulterer, are not unfrequently clothed with

authority. The whole moral power of the elective franchise is thrown away. So strong is this party influence, that even Christian men have not hesitated to put into the ballot-box a vote, disgraced with the names of those who scoff at religion—who trample on domestic happiness—and who live in open and unblushing defiance of virtuous sentiment. The gambler, the duellist, and the libertine, are elevated to the places of power and influence, and good men set aside.

The ballot-box is a sacred place, in the estimate of a virtuous patriotism. It is here, that the voice of the people is heard—that the high functions of freemen are exercised—and that the lofty spirit of liberty makes itself to be felt. It is here, that men decide who shall be their rulers; what influence shall go out from the high places of power; and, consequently, whether the nation shall be exalted and rejoice, or be depressed and mourn. Here, therefore, the voice of patriotism and virtue should speak aright; should elevate to office men, whose influence will sustain all that is lovely and of good report. But this duty of freemen is sadly neglected. Character is overlooked. Other considerations are allowed to have greater weight. In the choice they make, thousands virtually say:—"Not this man, but Barabbas"—not this upright, pure minded citizen, but that reckless politician, whose length exactly suits the Procrustean bed of the party; not this honest, incorruptible patriot, who rises above the degrading slavery of commitment to a set of opinions, whether right or wrong, but that subtle declaimer, who allows others to think for him, and who willingly incases himself in the armor of an unfaltering partyism. This, at least, is the tendency of things in our day. Party is rising superior to patriotism. The bearing of political action is to bring men into bondage; to fetter the freedom of opinion; to force men to vote in obedience to orders, issued from some central Court of High Commission, or from some Star Chamber of political dictation. The lofty spirit of American freedom is tamed down. The Bible is forgotten; its commands disregarded; and men put into office, whose influence is injurious to the best interests of the land. To us, nothing is more revolting than to clothe with sacred authority some living skeleton of vice, whom, when thus invested, we are bound *to honor*! to put the balances of justice into the hands of a man, whose foot is resting, in crushing weight, upon domestic virtue; but whom, while holding those balances, we are commanded *to fear and reverence*! Against such conduct Christianity is committed in ceaseless hostility. It frowns upon any exercise of the elective franchise, which overlooks character, and gives a higher importance to other considerations. Its high mandate is to select good men—men who fear God—men of truth, hating covetousness, and to clothe them with authority, that righteousness may abound, and that the land may rejoice.

There is much also, in civil legislation, with which Christianity is in conflict. The laws of any country exert a powerful influence in forming the character of those who live under them; for, while they respect primarily, the outward civil conduct of men, yet, in controlling this, they do necessarily affect their thoughts and feelings. The external bears upon the internal. The mind is acted upon by what it creates. In framing a rule of life, it gives being to that which operates on the intellect and the heart—that which gives direction to thought—existence to feeling—and character to the life. Laws, therefore, are something more than mere outward regulations. They have an inward influence. They act on the mind of men, and help to form their character. Legislation, then, ought to be in sympathy with the interests of our moral nature. The arrangements for the outward conduct ought to conform and be subservient, in their influence, to the good of the inner man. We do not say that government should undertake to legislate for the heart, or attempt to extend its dominion over the territory of thought and feeling; but we do feel that the bearing of the outward regulation should be friendly to the inward life. The voice without may not dictate to that within; but, in all its commands, there should be heard echoes in harmony with the spiritual. The colors of the outer bow of legislation, which spans the earth, can never appear as distinct and beautiful as those of the primary arch; but they should be essentially the same; should exhibit a perfect correspondence, and be the reflection of the inner and more brilliant glories.

In many things, however, this is far from being true. We see a manifest want of conformity. In some cases, we can see no outer arch at all—cases where human legislation is in direct opposition to the wisdom which is from above, and where it does not seem to recognize even the existence of that wisdom, or at least does not admit any obligation to be influenced by it. In many of its arrangements, we can see but little evidence of any sympathy with the facts of man's existence—any shaping of its enactments to meet the perils of the present, or even indirectly to secure the interests of the future. It creates distinctions, which cut men loose from the holy sympathies of brotherhood with each other,—sanctions practices, which corrupt and degrade men,—and continues customs, which cherish the feelings of pride, ambition, and revenge. In many places it imposes burdens, which crush men to the earth,—makes exactions upon them, that impoverish and that render life one incessant struggle for the bare means of subsistence,—and takes from men all that dignifies human nature—all that exalts man to the elevations of intelligence and virtue. It is impossible for the serfs of Russia—for the poor in Great Britain, or for the slave population of this country, to rise above their present degraded condition, while the laws of these countries remain as

they are. Prostrate—with mountains' weight of iniquitous oppression upon them, they cannot rise. They may indeed show signs of uneasiness—and, in moments of giant despair, may change their position,—and thus shake the land and the sea, but they cannot rise. The pressure downward exceeds their strength to overcome it. While, therefore, this weight is upon them, they will remain in their degraded, outcast condition. There is no hope for them. Christianity may seek to soothe their sorrows—may pour into their bleeding bosoms the oil and wine of her heavenly consolations, and point the troubled spirit to a better country; but she can never raise them up from the earth, and remove them to the inn of her charities, and take care of them, while the foot of murderous oppression is on them. She cannot make them feel that *they are men*—or cause them to stand erect and firm in virtue,

“ in beauty clad,
With wealth in every vein,
And reason throned upon their brow.”

And can she then look with approbation on a system of legislation, which thus circumscribes her dominion over the minds and bodies of men? Both are hers. For both atoning blood has been shed. Both she seeks to raise up to the elevations of redeemed humanity. With all in legislation, therefore, that hinders this work of love and mercy, Christianity can have no friendly connection—can look upon it with no approbation whatever.

There is one other point of conflict, to which we must call attention, namely, the foreign policy of nations. There are various aspects in which this policy is in direct opposition to the laws of benevolence. Each nation thinks, and plans, and acts for itself, without the slightest regard to the interests of other countries—frames its whole policy in reference to them, on the basis of an undisguised selfishness. In many cases, the effort of each nation is to make itself perfectly independent of others in all that pertains to the necessities, and to many of the luxuries, of life. This course, however, is injurious to man—is selfish—is contrary to the design of the Creator. He has made us all one family—mutually dependent on each other—and binds us to the duties which grow out of this common relationship. He has also so arranged things as calls for and facilitates national intercourse. He has so diversified the surface of the earth with his gifts, as makes one place, to some extent at least, dependent on another, and thus brings men to an interchange of thought and feeling, and of the results of toil, with each other. There are two, and but two, states or conditions of human society. One is, where each individual lives to himself and for himself—where he works for himself and supplies himself with all that he needs, and is dependent on no one for anything. This is an unnatural and savage state, and is inju-

rious to man as a social, intellectual and moral being. The other is, where one labors for many, where, in other words, each one does what he is best qualified to do, or what his circumstances best fit him to accomplish, and, in return, is rewarded for his labor by the results of the industry of others. Here, there is a general interchange in the results of labor—a general dependence felt—and of course a constant intercourse maintained. This, therefore, is the proper and natural state of society, viewed either in separate parts, or as embracing all—and is beneficial to man. It binds men together in a brotherhood of being, and is the ground of a thousand tender charities, which gladden life. For

“ mutual wants our happiness increase,
All nature's difference keeps all nature's peace.”

Now we look upon the effort of a nation, by its restrictive policy, to make itself independent of all others, as an attempt to make a world of itself—to live to itself and for itself—as an attempt to cut itself loose in sympathy from the rest of mankind. Government must indeed in each case be supported, and a revenue from duties on imports seems to be as easy and equitable a way of providing the means of this, as any other. And we see no objection, in imposing these duties, to such action as will stimulate the industry, and develop the resources of the country. It is certainly for the general good, that they should be developed. But we are speaking of that policy which aims to make a nation independent of all others; and we see not why it is not just as selfish and as hateful, as would be the effort of an individual to live to himself and for himself. If a nation may do this—if it may wall itself in—and cut itself loose from all others, then may each man do the same. For Christianity teaches us that nations are to act on the same principles substantially, as govern the actions of individuals,—that one State sustains relations to other States analogous to those of a man to his neighbors,—and that it is therefore bound to pursue the same line of policy—the same enlightened and benevolent course of conduct toward other States, that an individual is bound to pursue towards those around him. Whatever, therefore, is mean or cruel, or selfish in the action of man towards his fellow, is equally so when found in the conduct of nations towards each other.

Another feature of this policy, of kindred character with the foregoing, is its mode of defence. The plan with each nation is, to make itself as formidable as possible in the means of *injuring* others—to plant every assailable point with the weapons of defence—to draw around itself a fiery cordon—a wall of bulwarks and battlements, and to cover the ocean with its floating thunder. In order to sustain this system, an enormous draft is every year made upon the resources of the country, which is the more intole-

nable from the fact, that it is unnecessary. There is a better means of defence, and one which is encumbered with no such crushing expenditure. A nation may ascend to a higher and safer elevation. It may plant itself on the ground of sacred regard to justice, and of an unfaltering dependence on God, and, consequently, be more secure. It *may* do this. The same result may be found here, as in the case of an individual. A nation may come as fully into the securities of right action—may put itself in the same attitude of trust in God—may stay itself as really upon the Lord, and, as the consequence, realize the same peace—the same safety. We say, therefore, that there is higher ground of security than that which we are considering. We know, indeed, that in some very rare instances, it may be the duty of an individual to resort to force in order to protect his rights, or secure his personal safety; still, as a general rule, the man, who acts justly and who trusts in the Lord, is more secure than he, who, acting unjustly, depends on the prowess of his own arm for protection. It is certainly a manifold experience that the humble, the upright and the believing, as if shielded by an invisible hand, do walk the most safely and the most prosperously through the world. If nations will act in the same way, they will find a similar result. As long as the Jewish people feared God and obeyed his commands, they were safe—their rights were respected—and no weapon formed against them prospered. But when they departed from the Lord, and ceased to stay themselves upon him,—when they put their confidence in the strength of their own arm, and in that of their allies, the enemy came in upon them, triumphed over them, and crushed them to the earth. There is then a safer, a more economical course. Millions of treasure are spent every year in sustaining this means of defence. Fleets and armies are mustered into being to protect a nation's rights, and a nation's independence. But if anything like the same amount were expended in enlightening the people, in sustaining institutions, which promote the order, peace, and virtue of the community, a far greater degree of security would actually be effected, than is accomplished by all the array of force which floats upon the sea, or which threatens from a thousand battlements on the land. But it is in the *application* of this mode of defence that its terrible character is developed. The expense of it is as nothing when compared with the unfathomed evils of war, the destruction of morals, the infliction of suffering, and the whirlwinds of death, which follow in its train. Such a policy Christianity cannot approve. It is opposed to war, and to all its arrangements. It is the advocate of peace. All its influences conspire to usher in that day when every sword will be beaten into a ploughshare, and every spear into a pruning hook, and when the nations will learn war no more.

These, then, are some of the more prominent points in the conflict of Christianity with Politics. What the final result will be, no one, we think, can reasonably doubt. The former will triumph. Its principles are right; are identified with the highest elevations of man in intellectual, social, or moral being, and ought to prevail. So far as it gains its great spiritual object, its influence must be to bring into friendly relation to this, all the arrangements of man's political condition. And as it is certainly to succeed in attaining its main design, as it is one day to mantle the earth with truth and righteousness, it must triumph in the case under consideration. For no one can fail to see that the evils, of which we have spoken, and others analogous to them in Politics, are in the way of human improvement; and are, therefore, unfriendly to the work of the Gospel in saving men, and must, consequently, be removed by Christianity in its progress over the world.

The past proves this. Christianity, certainly, has effected great changes in the political condition of men. When it gained the ascendancy in the Roman empire, and its peaceful banner floated over the palace of the Cæsars, it elevated the tone of public sentiment, changed the feelings of the people, modified the spirit of their legislation, levelled down the high summits of pride and oppression, extended the boundaries of human freedom, and awoke in thousands of hearts a sympathy with the interests of a down-trodden, bleeding world. Again, during the Reformation Christianity gave a mighty impulse to the work of political improvement. The correction of abuses in the Church prepared the way for even a greater reform in the State. The spiritual worked out the temporal deliverance. A radical change was produced. The people began to think for themselves, to learn their rights and privileges, to understand the end of government, and the great principles upon which it ought to be administered. In what it has done, therefore, we see evidence of what it will yet accomplish. In the steady, onward movement in this work, which it has effected, we have the proof of that higher elevation, to which it will one day bring the political condition of our world. We know, indeed, that there have been many fluctuations, many apparent reverses; what Christianity has thus gained for the people in one age, has seemingly been lost in another. But this is a mistake. It has lost none of its achievements. Its work has advanced. Progress there has been, in storm and sunshine. What has seemingly been against it, has worked for it. The frosts and winds of autumn do indeed strip the tree of its leafy covering, and leave its naked limbs to the cold and icy grasp of winter. But this process ministers to the growth of the tree, causes it to shoot its roots down deeper into the earth, and thus gives it a firmer position, and prepares the way for it the next year to send out its branches higher and wider, and to put forth a more abundant foliage. *Alternation*

is the mode of advancement in the work of human improvement. The depressions of to-day are antecedent and auxiliary to the elevations of to-morrow. The backward movement has respect to the onward progress. On the shores of the ocean there is a constant vibration in the waters of the rising tide. Each receding motion is followed by a greater advance. The retiring waters come back more forceful, and reach a higher point. So rises the tide in human affairs. Recession is followed by advancement, which ministers to a more exalted attainment. Here reverses are victories. The darkness and the light are both alike. All things work together for the good of those objects, which Christianity seeks to secure. The cloud which at times rests upon any of these objects, causes the instrumentalities, by which it is carried forward, to feel more deeply their dependence, and to keep in mind more constantly the source of their success, and thus fills them with greater strength, and fits them for higher action. When difficulties present themselves in the track of human improvement, and when, in consequence of these, the wheels of the enterprise are reversed, and all things connected with it move back for a time, it is to the intent that those engaged in that enterprise, may kindle the fires into an intenser heat, and come back under such a pressure of the motive power, and with such increased momentum, as will carry them up that difficult ascent, and place them on higher ground. The shadows, then, which pass over the scene of any moral enterprise, and which dim the prospect, and seemingly embarrass its progress, are subservient to its advancement. They lead to reflection, and send the minds of men kindling to the throne of God, that they may thence return to the conflict with mightier energies, furnished, like Milton's angels, with resources till then unknown, with which to overwhelm whatever opposes.

There is much in the aspects of the present, which shows that Christianity will triumph in this matter. Wherever it exists, or its influence is felt, we see movement in this direction. It differs in different countries only in degree. In all there is some advance towards improvement in the political condition of the people. Every vessel afloat on the bosom of this common tide, whatever may be its structure or management, and however other forces may act upon it, is moved forward by this mighty current beneath. Even that old crazy ship, which, for a thousand years, has been anchored in the Tiber, darkening its waters, begins at length to feel the force of this rushing tide, and seems half inclined, under the guidance of a new and more wakeful Palinurus, to weigh anchor, to spread some canvass, and to sail in the same direction. In all places, there is improvement. In many aspects of men's political condition, there is a manifest advance. The ends and uses of civil government are better understood, and the conviction deepening that its powers cannot be lawfully exercised except for the general good. Enlightened principles are gaining

the ascendancy, and legislation is coming into a closer sympathy with the true interests of men. Prejudices, the growth of ages, are yielding to the force of truth. Selfish and oppressive laws are disappearing from the statute-book. The rights of the people are assuming a higher place in the action of governments. The control of affairs is passing from the hands of the few, into the power of the many, and, consequently, the labor of the latter is ceasing to be taxed, in order to sustain the pomp, and splendor, and magnificence of the former. The recent triumph in England, in favor of the laboring classes, over the long continued and oppressive policy of an idle and bloated aristocracy, is a sign of the times—is proof enough of the strength and the direction, which Christianity is giving to the currents of human legislation—proof enough of that overpowering sympathy with the injured and oppressed, which it is awakening in human hearts. A noble elevation was it, on which the late premier planted himself; and a fine spirit did he breathe, when, on retiring from office, after his memorable victory over a restrictive policy, which for ages had oppressed and starved the laboring population of Britain, he said:—"I shall leave a name execrated by every monopolist, who maintains protection for his own individual benefit. But, it may be, I shall leave a name sometimes remembered with expressions of good-will in those places, which are the abodes of men whose lot it is to labor and earn their daily bread by the sweat of their brow—a name remembered with expressions of good-will, when they shall recreate their exhausted strength with abundant and untaxed food, the sweeter because it is no longer leavened by a sense of injustice."

We see also the certainty of this triumph, on the part of Christianity, in the character of its principles. These are right—are the principles of benevolence, and are mighty. They will be inculcated wherever the gospel is preached; and will be embraced wherever it is believed; and when adopted, will as certainly control the conduct of men. In every heart in which these principles, therefore, find a lodgment, they will awaken an interest in man—will lead him, who is influenced by them, to overleap the barriers of cast and color—to pass by the boundaries of all selfish action—to take the part of the oppressed and downtrodden—and to look upon man, wherever found, and however degraded, as a member of the human family, and as possessed of the same rights and privileges, and to act for their elevation as social, intellectual, and moral beings. As these principles spread, the work of human improvement will go forward. Like the returning sun of spring, they will thaw the icy selfishness which freezes up the sympathies of mankind, and cause the heart, like the smitten rock, to pour forth a stream of pure, benevolent feeling, which will gladden the face of a sorrowing world. Interesting man in man, these princi-

ples will, of course, affect nations in the same way when they gain an ascendancy in their counsels. They will ally them closely to each other—make them feel that they are brethren—and by the sympathy thus awakened—by the fellow-feeling thus produced—and by the thousand other ties growing out of these, will bind them together in the harmonies of an uninterrupted peace: and thus banish from our earth that terrible scourge, whose history is written in blood, and published to the world in groans. A striking instance of the *cohesive attraction* thus produced, has recently been seen. When some turbulent spirits endeavored to stir up England and this country to hostile action respecting a point of territorial jurisdiction, a voice in both nations, loud as many waters, and with a feeling of indignation, as deep as the ocean that rolls between them, cried out, shame!—burning shame on the thought! and thus rebuked the foul spirit from both lands.

We say once more, that Christianity will triumph, because it is pledged to this result. It is committed on the point of filling the earth with truth and righteousness. This work, therefore, will go on. It cannot be arrested. “Men might as well plant their feet on the earth, and thus expect to stop its diurnal revolution,” as hope by any resistance in their power to stop the progress of this revolution, which Christianity is producing in the political condition of men, and which will ultimately place them on the high elevations of virtuous freedom, and in the enjoyment of an unbroken brotherhood of being with each other. This is its promised, glorious achievement, and it will be accomplished. No power on earth or under the earth can prevent it. The rulers, who will not yield to this gentle breeze in favor of human interests, will be swept away by the storm which their opposition will call into being. “Through this house, or over it,” said Lord Brougham, in the English Senate, “this reform bill must pass.” So we say to the nations of the earth on the point before us. *Through each Cabinet—through each Hall of Legislation, or over it, this Reform Bill of Christianity must—WILL pass.* The governments which take their stand against it, and attempt to prevent this elevation of mankind to the enjoyment of their rights and privileges, will be dashed in pieces like a potter’s vessel. The work is of God, and they cannot succeed. Government is his institution. He ordained it for the good of man. It must and will, therefore, be made to exist for that great end; and, consequently, will be changed into those forms, and be administered on those principles which will best secure that end. Christianity will advance—will add one victory to another, until it thus brings into friendly relation to its main design every arrangement, and every influence of man’s political condition. The whole of its promised work will one day be accomplished. The entire completion of its unfolding apocalypse will be seen, and the nations of the earth will rejoice in the light and glory of its achievements.

ARTICLE V.

RELIGIOUS CHARACTER OF LORD BACON.

By REV. SAMUEL M. HOPKINS, Avon, N. Y.

WHAT may have been the religious character of Lord Bacon, or whether he had any, may appear to some readers a question of very little consequence at the present day. He was the father of the inductive philosophy, and he was the degraded chancellor of King James. He served his generation and the world as a student of Nature; he dishonored genius and humanity as a courtier. This is to most people,

The whole amount of that stupendous fame—
A tale that blends the glory with the shame.

We venture, however, to think it a question of some little interest, whether the great philosopher was or was not a good man. We write for those who believe the prophets; whose God is the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob; whose faith peoples the unseen world with the immortal dead; and who expect to mingle in personal intercourse with the spirits of great men and of just men made perfect. They cannot think it an obsolete question, or one ruled out by a literary statute of limitations, whether any great light of former ages set in the blackness of darkness, or not. We feel some personal concern in the inquiry, whether when Judas and Lord Bacon went each to his own place, they took the same direction. As those who profess to be seeking a better country, we may take some interest in knowing who of the eminent benefactors of mankind, once resident like us in the city of Destruction, are already dwelling on Mount Zion. It was Pliable indeed who asked, What company shall we have there? but it was Christian who answered, on the word of the governor of the country, There we shall be with seraphim and cherubim, creatures that will dazzle your eyes to look on them; there also you shall meet with thousands and tens of thousands that have gone before us to that place; none of them hurtful, but loving and holy; every one walking in the sight of God, and standing in his presence with acceptance for ever. And Cicero but gave utterance to the common sentiment of those who think of immortality, when he anticipated the happiness of meeting in the islands of the blest, not only his own lost friends, but the eminent patriots and sages of preceding generations.

But on this subject, so far as Lord Bacon is concerned, no one has thought it worth while to attempt satisfying our curiosity. Bacon the philosopher, Bacon the fawning courtier and the corrupt judge, has furnished matter for large comment. Bacon, in the only character that is of any moment to him now, as a man, a sinner, a penitent, has been allowed to pass without notice. History and criticism have delighted to dwell upon his relations to science; his relations to God have not been thought worthy of attention even by biography. No auto-record has let us into the secresy of his soul. No contemporaneous hand thought it important to tell us how he walked before God, or how he met his end. The most the world knows of him, it has learned from the bitter couplet of Pope; and since that barbed shaft struck him a century ago, more noticeably still since the accomplished hand of a modern reviewer has stretched him on the ground, every passer-by feels entitled to spurn him; and making an apologetic bow to his genius, gives an unsparing kick at his character. His fate has been to have "the morals blackened, though the writings 'scape;" to be at once exalted to heaven, and thrust down to hell.

We are not about to undertake the canonization of Lord Bacon—we shall not try to set him on the same platform with those ninety and nine which went not astray; still less to class him with the great religious lights of the world, who had as much less genius as they had more faith; the seraphim of this lower sphere, whose office was not to know, but to love. But we think there is something remaining for that posterity which he left the guardian of his memory to do in his behalf. It is worth showing, that there was more of Lord Bacon than brilliancy of intellect and meanness of character; that there is at least as much evidence of his repentance and salvation, as of that of the crowned scholar, his only peer in the realm of thought, who also dragged the robes of genius in the dirt, and whom yet the Church would not willingly consign to infamy.

In estimating the character of Lord Bacon, we cannot leave out of view, with any justice, the circumstances of his early life. There are men, who, starting from unfavorable positions, choose out a career of ambition, and school themselves in the art to rise. Bacon seemed born a courtier.

" At his birth,
Nature and fortune joined to make him great."

He was the son of a favorite Lord Keeper of Queen Elizabeth's. The all-powerful Burleigh was his uncle by marriage. His cousin, Robert Cecil, was early started in the road to distinction, and Elizabeth rendered his destiny inevitable, by pronouncing him in his boyhood, her little Lord Chancellor.

Experience teaches us that early impressions have often a decisive influence in fixing the character of the mind and the direction of its aims for after-life. A father's example, the tone of his familiar conversation, the character and position of his friends, the subjects that seem most to interest them, or even the casual remarks they let fall, frequently result in deciding the subsequent pursuits of a child, and the spirit in which they are followed. A passing remark at the fire-side makes of that unnoticed child, apparently occupied with his playthings or his books, a future statesman, soldier, or divine.

We may easily imagine the sort of company to which the promising younger son of the Lord Keeper would be sometimes shown at Gorhambury, and the kind of conversation to which he would be an eager listener. Walsingham would be there, talking like a great minister, as he was, of the business of the Court, and not forgetting, like a good man, to throw in some reflections on the transcendent value of things unseen and eternal. The great Burleigh would sometimes bring his learned lady to pass a night at her sister's; and unbending from the solemn dignity of his official manners, would ask of his hopeful nephew's progress at Trinity College, and how he agreed with worthy Doctor Whitgift. At these times, too, Robert Cecil would be there; a forward, conceited, disagreeable youth, to talk largely of his prospects at Court, and engage in country sports with Francis; not always ended, we imagine, without a scuffle and a bloody nose. The conversation would turn on vacant posts, and important claimants urging their pretensions at Court, whom Elizabeth, according to her usual policy, was keeping long in suspense. His Lordship would repeat with some glee the good pun he had lately made her Majesty on the subject. Madam, said he, you do well to let suitors stay; for I shall tell you, *Bis dat, qui cito dat*; if you grant them speedily, they will come again the sooner. Young Bacon would lay this up against the time when, under the operation of the same rule, he came to know "what hell it is in suing long to bide." Or the Earl of Leicester might pay a complimentary visit with his splendid retinue; a fascinating instance, in the eyes of Francis, of a successful courtier's advancement; and when the Earl would ask Sir Nicholas his opinion of two persons whom the Queen seemed to think well of, with what a hearty laugh the fat old Lord Keeper would reply,—By my troth, my Lord, the one is a grave counsellor; the other is a proper young man, and so he will be, as long as he lives. Or the Queen herself, on some royal progress, would rest a while at Gorhambury, and struck with the simplicity and moderation of the establishment, would say,—My Lord, what a little house you have gotten. To which the high functionary, with the prompt felicity of a practised courtier, would return—Not so, Madam, but it is you that have made me too great for my house.

Such were some of the scenes and incidents that must have helped to mould the temper of Francis Bacon. All his ideas of success and honor were connected with Court favor. His earliest associations must have tended to fix this impression in his mind ; and old Sir Nicholas did not fail to cherish it by giving him an early introduction to the politician's *Gradus ad Parnassum*. He sent him while still a boy, to study diplomacy with Sir Amyas Paulet, in France. In short, he had but one course to pursue. No rustic who holdeth the plow, and glorieth in the goad, that driveth oxen, and is occupied in their labors, whose talk is of bullocks, is more fatally destined, as the son of Sirach thought, to obscurity, than Bacon was destined by example, education, rivalry, patronage, and the promise of rare talent, to a life in Courts.

For all this he was not to blame. We sometimes hear Bacon reproached for descending from the watch-tower of philosophy to join in the struggle for place and power ; but, in fact, he was entered a student of politics before he had taken his first lesson in science. He had the example of his father and of his uncle to encourage him ; he had the competition of his ill-natured cousin to provoke him ; he had the consciousness of uncommon powers to bear him on ; he was surrounded by politicians, not by men of science ; the only avenue of distinction for a man of peaceful pursuits seemed to lie by the Court ; and the only way to climb the ladder of Court favor, was unbounded adulation and unceasing importunity. In suing for office and promotion, ingratiating himself with the favorite, and flattering the powerful, Bacon only took the beaten road to success ; the path that Coke, and Egerton, and the Cecils, had not disdained to travel ; the path that Williams and Ellesmere, and the series of Attorney Generals and Lord Chancellors, traveled afterwards. Even the high spirit of Sir Henry Yelverton struggled with but partial success, and that to his own ruin, against the general current of servility.

If Francis Bacon then, was destined to the Court, as was unavoidable under the circumstances, it is not strange that he very early clothed himself with adulation as with a garment. The haughty despotism of the Tudors reduced all their subjects nearly to the same level, making the spirit and language of a slave no singular dishonor ; and the inordinate personal vanity of the two whom Bacon served, encouraged the most shameful excess of flattery. No subject of Luggnogg crawling towards the throne, licked the dirt of the presence chamber with more obsequious homage than did the courtiers of Elizabeth and James. To tell the most extravagant lies to their faces about the personal charms of the one, and the inspired wisdom of the other, was the daily usage of soldiers, scholars, and churchmen. It is humiliating, doubtless, to read such things now, but none of them seem to have

blushed at their own degradation. It was the common conventional falsehood of the Court.

Bacon, it must be confessed, was no inapt scholar in this discipline of slaves. He remembered even when a boy at school, where he was noticed by the Queen, that he was just two years younger than her Majesty's happy reign. He thought it worthy of his pen to give, in mature years, a schedule of her beauty, as minute almost as that in which the sapient King inventoried the charms of his fair Egyptian spouse ; and he went as far as who went farthest in encouraging the vanity and usurpations of "the Solomon of our British Israel."

But we are to remember that in addition to all the influences he shared, as belonging to that servile and sycophantic age, his own spirit had been most carefully broken and subdued by a course of royal training. For years he waited in vain for one crumb of favor from the Court, constantly put off, snubbed and discouraged ; he saw others, his inferiors in merit and title, preferred to places to which all the world says the Earl of Essex named him. When he considered "the obscurity of his successful competitors, he concluded with himself that no man ever read a more exquisite disgrace ;" so that he had resolved "to retire himself with a couple of men to Cambridge, and there spend his life in studies and contemplations, without looking back." He thought the probation which required him *tolerare jugum in juventute sua*, had lasted long enough ; and when changing his hand, he attempted once to play the patriot, he got a fright from the imperious daughter of Henry that completely cured him of that taste.

The influence of such treatment upon a mind taught to look forward to advancement at Court as the one thing needful, can scarce be misunderstood. If it did not wholly alienate and disgust, it would lead to a more diligent practice of all the methods of success. Office is the prize to be achieved,—*rem, quoquo modo rem*. One degree of importunity and adulation has failed ; a lower prostration may perhaps be effectual. A discerning princess will not always be negligent of merit ; powerful relations will relax in the vigilance of their jealousy ; more favored rivals will at length be provided for, and will cease to obstruct the rays of royal favor. Patience, humility, and usefulness, will one day lay a successful claim to reward ; and meanwhile, everything is to be forborne which may stand in the way of promotion.

These considerations, it must be further acknowledged, had a material to work upon, naturally open to their influence. The tempers of men differ as widely as their genius. If some are sanguine and bold, others are as naturally timid, pliable, and easily discouraged. And it is by no means a general rule that the highest mental, and the highest moral qualities, are found united in the same subject. The man of genius is not always the heir

of resolute courage or high spirit ; nor have the pursuits of scholars any certain tendency to nurse the sterner or more magnanimous virtues. It should be thought nothing strange, then, if the philosopher and student, produced on the stage where adventurers, soldiers, and divines were vying in the race of adulation, should, however above the throng in intellect, be their partner in baseness. Have we not warrant to say, that the man of books, turned office-seeker and courtier, is more likely to be pliant, adulatory and manageable, than others of his trade—and this notwithstanding the Christian or the clerical character ? We incline to think some instructive illustrations might be drawn even from the limited field of American politics.

To Bacon, nature, however bountiful, had not given quite “every virtue under heaven.” To his capacious understanding, he united a liberal and humane temper. He had nothing of the coarse violence or narrow parsimony that disgraced his great law rival. He had nothing of the mean jealousy of able men, that made the Cecils studiously suppress and discourage merit. He had nothing of the fierce ecclesiastical bigotry of his old tutor, Whitgift. But he had also nothing of the bold and generous spirit of Raleigh, and of Essex. He was a man of peace ; a man of books and contemplation ; and when nature showered her endowments upon him, courage and magnanimity stuck in the bottom of the cornucopia. This was his misfortune ; the weak point in his defences, through which trouble and disgrace broke in upon him. But this defect, we suppose, is scarcely to be imputed to him as a crime. Courage, hopefulness, and magnanimity, are no more to be required of every man, than the beauty of Alcibiades or the strength of Milo. Yet it was only the want of these qualities, in the circumstances of the age, that covered the name of Bacon with dishonor ; that made him slavish as a courtier, timid and unfaithful as a friend, pliant as an official, open to gifts which stained his reputation though they never perverted his soul to injustice ; profuse and careless in prosperity, abject and unmanly in affliction.

Unless we mistake, an unfavorable influence on the dignity of Bacon’s character was exerted even by his reverent study of the Scriptures. The Sacred Scriptures, taken together, contain the sum of all wisdom for the life that now is, and for the life that is to come. There is nothing like them as a guide for men in all the circumstances and relations of life, in public and in private walks. Yet it can scarcely be doubted that there may be a too faithful study of detached parts of them. The Epistle to the Romans, alone, might make, in the phrase of the Commonwealth, a Solifidian, and the Epistle of James, alone, a Pharisee ; one chapter of Peter makes a Millerite, and one verse of John a Socinian. This is one of the very errors against which Lord Bacon has warned us, as likely to warp the mind from truth ; it is the *idolum*

specus, under one of the forms enumerated, viz: *lectio librorum, et auctoritatis eorum quos quisque colit et miratur*. Yet into this error, so far as the Scriptures are concerned, Bacon apparently fell. The Book of Proverbs seems to have been his favorite Gospel; and those parts of it especially, which have an economical and political bearing. The profound wisdom of these venerable maxims, perhaps the distilled essence of human experience from the days of Adam, may well have recommended them to a seeker after truth. The shrewd counsels to the politician, the cautious prudential line marked out for the statesman, the reverence for kings, and the sort of sanction given to adulation, may no less have recommended them to the seeker after greatness. No one, certainly, who will take the whole Book of Proverbs as his guide, will be in any danger of going astray in the pursuit of happiness. The great truths which serve as a corrective for ambition and worldliness, are so strongly brought out, that the fool need not err therein, to say nothing of the philosopher. Often and reverently as our attention is turned towards the Prince, it is directed with much more impressiveness and frequency to the Lord; and the morality of the prudential maxims, though cautious, is always sound.

In this respect, as in others, the Book of Proverbs asserts its canonicity above the Book of Ecclesiasticus. The aphorisms in the latter, bearing on the relation of man to God, are not less forcible and sublime than those of the former. But the morality of the book is perceptibly of a lower grade. It is shrewd, practical, smacking of deep experience, but worldly. There is a sly and selfish air to it. The fox thrusts his head out of the hole, where we saw before the sagacious but honest countenance of the beaver. "My Grandfather," we fear, dwelt in the town of Carnal-policy. Get thyself the love of the congregation, quoth he, and bow thy head to a great man—separate thyself from thine enemies, and take heed of thy friends. As near as thou canst, guess at thy neighbor, and consult with the wise. Be not slow to visit the sick, for that shall make thee to be beloved. My son, let tears fall down over the dead, and begin to lament as if thou hadst suffered great harm thyself; weep bitterly and make great moan, and that for a day or two, lest thou be evil spoken of; and then comfort thyself for thy heaviness.

The same characteristic difference appears even in the family and table maxims. Solomon is content to say on these subjects: The rod and reproof give wisdom; but a child left to himself bringeth his mother to shame. Correct thy son and he shall give thee rest; yea, he shall give delight unto thy soul. When thou sittest to eat with a ruler, consider diligently what is before thee; and put a knife to thy throat if thou be a man given to appetite. Be not desirous of his dainties, for they are deceitful meat. Upon this our respectable old friend improves as follows:—Cover thy

child, and he shall make thee afraid; play with him, and he will bring thee to heaviness. Laugh not with him lest thou have sorrow with him, and lest thou gnash thy teeth in the end. Give him no liberty in his youth, and wink not at his follies. Bow down his neck while he is young, and beat him on the sides while he is a child lest he wax stubborn. On the other topic he discourses like a master of etiquette, winding up with a dietetic climax worthy of Galen himself. Eat as it becometh a man, those things which are set before thee; and devour not, lest thou be hated. Leave off first for manners' sake; and be not insatiable, lest thou offend. A very little is sufficient for a man well nurtured, and he fetcheth not his wind short upon his bed. And if thou hast been forced to eat, arise, go forth, vomit, and thou shalt have rest. In short, the collection contains much that is admirable; but only what the spirit of inspiration saw fit to leave out in dictating a series of Proverbs for mankind. The dirt mingled with it, indicates a sweeping up of refuse material. We think it no great loss to any congregation of faithful men that the son of Sirach is no longer listened to for instruction in life and morals, any more than for confirmation of doctrine.

The economical maxims of Solomon, it must at the same time be admitted, superior as they are to those of Ecclesiasticus, contain a discipline which, if too exclusively resorted to, would be likely to form a somewhat disagreeable character; a character of very little amiable impulse, and much politic management. With these the cautious and apprehensive temper of Bacon would seem to have taken up as his statesman's manual. He could not hear too much of the wisdom, the inscrutability, the formidableness of kings. It seemed to justify the intense loyalty with which he regarded the Lord's anointed. Take, for instance, the first example he gives from the Proverbs (De Aug. viii., 2) of rules for our guidance in particular circumstances; *Doctrina de sparsis occasionibus—Mollis responsio frangit iram*. The only application he makes of this is to the case of a culprit servant and angry sovereign. Thus: Solomon, in such a case, recommends two things; First, that an answer be given; Second, that it be a soft answer. The first head includes three cautions; 1. To beware of a sulky and contumacious silence; 2. To avoid hesitating or asking time; 3. Actually to make a reply; that is, not merely an acknowledgment and submission to mercy, but an explanation and defense. The second head is, that the answer be humble; not too confident or spirited.

A more elaborate commentary is given on Eccles. 10: 4. *Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne dimiseris: quia curatio faciet cessare magna peccata*. We are here taught how to conduct when fallen under displeasure of the King. The precept is twofold; First, that the offender should

not desert his post ; secondly, that he make the most diligent use of all remedies appropriate to his political distemper. It is not unusual for afflicted officials, sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear, and sometimes from an ostentation of humility, to withdraw from the discharge of their public functions, and even to tender their resignations. Solomon, with good cause, disapproves of this method of cure ; for, in the first place, it operates to publish the disgrace—thus encouraging enemies and disheartening friends ; secondly, the wrath which might otherwise have subsided of its own accord, becomes more seated, and inclines to complete the ruin it has begun ; and finally, such withdrawal savors of resentment and disloyalty, and adds the mischief of suspicion to the mischief of hate. The proper remedies are such as these ; First, to guard, above all things, against showing, whether from dullness or pride, too little sensibility under the affliction ; let the countenance be schooled not to a sulky sadness, but to a grave and judicious melancholy ; repress any accustomed vivacity in the transaction of business ; and get some friend to draw reasonable attention to the depth of your distress. Secondly, keep at a cautious distance from anything that may rub the old sore, or lead the great offended to lash you in the presence of others ; thirdly, take every occasion to be useful, both by way of displaying your anxiety to atone for the fault, and of suggesting how excellent a servant will be lost by your dismissal. Fourthly, shift the blame sagaciously on to some one else's shoulders ; or insinuate that your intentions, at least, were good ; or divert attention to the maliciousness of those who played the informer and exaggerated the fault ; and finally, keep your eyes wide open, and watch the progress of the cure.

These were excellent studies for a courtier. With such meditations in the closet, we need not wonder at the practice of the life. There the broad comment makes the text too plain. *Abeunt studia in mores*, must be eminently true of the serious meditation of the Scriptures ; and that this was the character of Bacon's study appears everywhere in his writings. "Thy creatures have been my books," he exclaims, in that most affecting prayer which breathes the very soul of penitence, "but thy Scriptures much more. I have sought Thee in the courts, the fields, and the gardens ; but I have found Thee in thy temples." This very reverence for Scripture ministered to Bacon's degradation. The light that led astray, was light from heaven. His naturally timid and servile temper found encouragement in the cautious and deferential policy recommended to the servants of kings. To exalt the royal prerogative, to study the royal pleasure, to pacify by the humblest protestations the royal indignation, seemed piety as well as prudence. Servility to princes was obedience to God.

It is a question of great interest how far it is to be expected that

true piety will change the original elements of a man's character. Since there is none righteous, no, not one, the tempers of all need to undergo a radical change. The apostasy, in some of its developments, is found in every bosom—

Avarice, envy, pride,
Three fatal sparks have set the hearts of all
On fire.

Every congregation is but a synod of the vices and weaknesses of our nature, where depravity in its more imposing or its more abject forms, comes in half-subdued or half-masked, to sit in the pulpit and the pews. The Gospel comes in its power to persons of very opposite moral qualities—to one man of a high-toned, generous, and self-respecting spirit; to another whom nature and education have made cautious, calculating and mean. A genuine conversion changes the relations of each of them to God. It abates the proud, unbending impenitence of the one—the slavish fear and hate of the other. It begins to approximate the two characters, from their opposite poles, towards a common centre. But though, as respects the attitude of their hearts towards God, old things have passed away, yet the men remain characteristically as they were before. The grace of God has taught one of them humility; but it has not extinguished the customary loftiness of his sentiments and spirit. He remains as a Christian, 'a man of high, generous, sensitive feelings; and the sin that easily besets him all his life is an inclination to self-reliance and pride. It has inspired the other with a noble ambition, but it has not elevated him into a hero; he remains what long habit has made him, 'a man of cautious and sordid mind. No observing man will entertain the least doubt that there are persons of genuine piety who, from infelicities of nature and education, will for ever remain narrow-minded, cold-hearted and abject. The most candid and charitable reader, we venture to say, has cases in his view, where a piety which he dare not question is united to a natural temper, the exhibitions of which stumble and distress him.

This line of remark, it may be said, is betraying Christianity for the sake of an individual. You do well to show that a man may be of base and abject temper, and a very good Christian notwithstanding. But what greater difficulty, we ask, is there in this case, than in that of the opposite vices? No one will think it dishonoring to the Gospel, to admit the union of piety with the less glaring and offensive developments of pride; with fastidiousness of taste; with a certain social exclusiveness; with a high and sensitive honor; or with the love of unnecessary expensiveness in dress and equipage. Yet these are, at least, as far removed from the Christian temper, as vices towards which we are far less tolerant. God hates pride, we may believe, as much as baseness.

The latter is not farther removed from Christian humility, than the former is from an allowable Christian decorum. Nay, it bears a resemblance to those virtues which are everywhere insisted on in the Gospel, as of fundamental necessity; without which we cannot enter the kingdom of God; while the former, in all its shapes and modifications, is everywhere resisted, assailed, and trampled on as the deadliest sin of man, and the condemnation of the devil. It is only through that false medium which pride has generated that we look with less disgust on rampant than on reptile vices.

We must not forget, in our judgment of Bacon, the background of brilliant qualities, against which his faults are relieved. He appears the meanest, chiefly because he was the brightest of mankind. It is

As darkly painted on that crimson sky,

that his selfishness and timidity stand out with such shocking distinctness. Other men, of inferior gifts, could be signally imperfect, and their faults fail to divert attention from their excellences. There are spots on Mars, as well as on Hyperion. But the dead fly is offensive in proportion to the preciousness of the ointment. The flaw which passes unnoticed on a crystal, ruins a diamond. *Similiter in viris singulari virtute præditis, minima quæque vitia statim in oculos et sermones hominum incurrunt, et censura perstringuntur graviori; quæ in hominibus mediocribus, aut omnino laterent, aut veniam facile impetrarent.* Erasmus could be selfish, timeserving, and false to his convictions of truth; but these things scarce awaken any positive aversion towards one who so pleasantly confesses his own weakness, and makes us laugh so heartily at that of others. Cranmer's spots seldom attract attention on the mild neutral tint of his character. We willingly forget that Addison was ever jealous, vindictive, or bibulous. Few persons feel their admiration of Sir Thomas More lessened at recollecting, that he could apply his own arm to the lever which was racking asunder the limbs of a beautiful and accomplished heretic. Even Bacon's faults might have been buried with his bones, had not the immortal malice of the satirist made the evil that he did live after him. There are features in natural scenery and in moral character, which attract no attention until some sharp-eyed and officious critic points them out. "Do you see yonder cloud, that's almost in shape of a camel?" Did you never observe that singular obliquity in character? Few persons make an original discovery of the couchant lion at the Cape, or even of the expressive features of the man in the moon; but once get the eye fixed on them, and the recognition is ever after unavoidable. And so Pope's couplet stands like an everlasting finger-post, directing the looks of generation after generation, to the base and shameful parts of Bacon's character.

We are now prepared to remark, that Lord Bacon's faults, great as they were, were not such as to be inconsistent with the idea of a genuine piety. He is chargeable with no profaneness, irreverence, or bodily excess; vices from which he was far removed. He practised no dishonesty or fraud. He was not unmerciful or oppressive. He was not covetous. But he indulged, according to the fashion of the age, in excessive adulation of his sovereign. When he could not save his friend and benefactor, he had not heroism enough to drown with him. He struggled to the surface; and to aid his rise, even planted his feet on the breast of the sinking suicide.

It was a grievous fault,
And grievously hath Cæsar answered it.

Absorbed in philosophy and politics, he paid no attention to domestic economy, and suffered a lavish expenditure, which dug a pit for his fall. To repair his wasted fortunes, he accepted gifts, as other chancellors had done before him, supposing them to be only freewill offerings, after judgment rendered. Only one or two of them seem to have been received, in any sense, *pendente lite*; and like his predecessors, he might have passed unscourged, had he not happened to fall on evil days. He exercised his functions at a time when enormous abuses had roused the spirit of the Commons, and rendered redress and a victim unavoidable. His misfortune was to be in the way when the ruin fell. Justice could not strike at the real authors of the abuses under which the nation groaned, James and his favorite. It made an example, the highest it could reach, of one by whose corruption no man was wronged in property or in person. The vulture rapacity of Buckingham and his creatures raised the storm;—the bolt fell on the head of Bacon.

Dat veniam corvis, vexat censura columbis.

All this, to be sure, is saying but little. Multitudes of men have no vices inconsistent with the idea of piety, who yet are not pious. Bacon, certainly, might have been very superior, as he was, in the tone of his morals, and the exhibition of Christian feeling, to most men about courts, and yet have come short of the kingdom of heaven. There is a positive side to the question, however, as well as a negative. If the great man whose character we are contemplating, ever found peace in believing, it was only through the same course of experience with all other sinners:—through a genuine conviction of guilt, a hearty repentance, and an evangelical faith. At what period in his life he may have been the subject of this experience, we cannot tell. If before his fall, the cares of this world and the lusts of other things, had perhaps choked the word, and rendered it unfruitful; and then his affliction came upon him as a part of that Fatherly correction secured for

the people of God when they forsake His law. If after his fall, it was the blessed fruit of mortified ambition ; the bitter medicine that brought healing to the soul ; the grievous chastisement that wrought the peaceable fruits of righteousness.

We incline to the latter opinion. Bacon was a man of contemplative and serious mind ; conversant with the Scriptures and with religious truth ; and accustomed, according to the style of that age, to the use of a sort of religious dialect. But there is nothing remaining of a probable date earlier than his degradation, that indicates deep religious feeling. If God wrought out His designs of mercy toward that great soul which He had endowed with such rare gifts, by humiliating providences, prostrating his pride, and bringing him into the dust, it is only what Eternity will reveal, as the course by which he has brought many other sons to glory. " God, before his Son that bringeth mercy, sent his servant, the trumpeter of repentance, to level every high hill, to prepare the way before him, making it smooth and straight. Christ never comes before His way-maker hath laid even the heart with sorrow and repentance. Not only knowledge, but also every other gift which we call the gift of fortune, have power to puff up earth. Afflictions only level these mole-hills of pride, plough the heart, and make it fit for wisdom to sow her seed, and for grace to bring forth her increase. Happy is that man, therefore, that is thus wounded, to be cured ; thus broken, to be made straight."*

Especially towards the wise, mighty, and noble, who have been called,—men whose chief temptation and danger lay in their prosperity and self-confidence, it is probable this has been the common method of grace. It was needful to show that their prosperity was but a reed, and their confidence a dream, before they could be brought to God, as their only satisfying portion. Multitudes in Heaven, and on the way to Heaven, have blessed the kind severity that stripped them of their earthly comforts, and blasted their cherished hopes,

" That forced their conscience to a stand,
And brought their wand'ring souls to God."

The theological remains, so called, of Lord Bacon, mostly bear internal evidence of being the work of his last years. The exceptions are the tracts on Church Controversies, and Pacification of the Church, which were offered to King James in the opening of his reign. Upon these we shall not remark, our object being to illustrate, not the opinions, but the character of the author. They breathe a spirit of moderation and charity, kindred to that of the best British reformers. The undervaluing of mere ceremonies, the tenderness toward those " calling for reformation," and towards churches under a different regimen, and the zeal for

* Bacon. *An Expostulation to the Lord Chief Justice Coke.*

sound intelligent preaching and practical religion, honorably distinguish him from the bigots of that and of subsequent ages. These were lessons he never learned from Whitgift.

But it is when we turn to the devotional pieces of Lord Bacon, that he appears unambiguously invested with the "highest style of man." They are few and brief: but such that quantity would not enhance conviction. It is the profound knowledge of Christian experience; the deep humility; the justification of God in his judgments; the filial temper of soul; and the hearty reception of the whole Gospel system, that expresses the genuine penitent. The prayer entitled "A Prayer or Psalm, made by the Lord Bacon, Chancellor of England," for pathetic beauty of expression, is second to nothing of the kind but the penitential Psalms of David. We cannot refrain from quoting this entire.

A PRAYER OR PSALM, &c.

"Most precious Lord God, My merciful Father from my youth up; my Creator, my Redeemer, my Comfortor: Thou, O Lord, soundest and searchest the depths and secrets of all hearts; Thou acknowledgest the upright of heart; Thou judgest the hypocrite; Thou ponderest men's thoughts and doings as in a balance; Thou measurest their intentions as with a line: vanity and crooked ways cannot be hid from Thee.

"Remember, O Lord, how Thy servant hath walked before thee; remember what I have first sought, and what hath been principal in my intentions. I have loved Thy assemblies; I have mourned for the divisions of Thy Church; I have delighted in the brightness of Thy sanctuary. This vine which Thy right hand hath planted in this nation, I have ever prayed unto Thee that it might have the first and the latter rain; and that it might stretch her branches to the seas and to the floods. The state and bread of the poor and oppressed have been precious in mine eyes; I have hated all cruelty and hardness of heart; I have, though in a despised meed, procured the good of all men. If any have been my enemies, I thought not of them; neither hath the sun almost set upon my displeasure, but I have been as a dove free from superfluity of maliciousness. Thy creatures have been my books, but Thy Scriptures much more; I have sought Thee in the courts, fields, and groves, but I have found Thee in Thy temples.

"Thousands have been my sins, and ten thousands my transgressions: but Thy sanctifications have remained with me, and my heart, through thy grace, hath been an unquenched coal upon Thine altar. O Lord, my strength, I have, since my youth, met with Thee in all my ways, by Thy fatherly compassions, by Thy comfortable chastisements, by Thy most visible providence. As Thy favors have increased upon me, so have Thy corrections; so as Thou hast been always near me, O Lord; and ever as my

worldly blessings were [exalted, so secret darts from Thee have pierced me; and when I have ascended before men, I have descended in humiliation before Thee. And now when I thought most of peace and honor, Thine hand is heavy upon me, and hath humbled me according to Thy former loving kindness, keeping me still in Thy fatherly school, not as a bastard, but as a child. Just are Thy judgments upon me for my sins, which are more in number than the sands of the sea, but have no proportion to Thy mercies; for what are the sands of the sea?—earth, heavens, and all, these are nothing to Thy mercies. Besides my innumerable sins, I confess before Thee, that I am a debtor to Thee for the gracious talent of Thy gifts and graces, which I have neither put into a napkin, nor put it, as I ought, to exchangers, where it might have made best profit, but misspent it in things for which I was least fit. So I may truly say, my soul hath been a stranger in the course of my pilgrimage. Be merciful unto me, O Lord, for my Saviour's sake, and receive me into Thy bosom, or guide me in Thy ways."

These are worthy to be the last strains of that almost inspired harp; *Divini hominis tanquam cycnea vox et oratio*. His day, which had been darkened with such a fearful gloom, was now shining again with a moderated lustre towards its close. The storm subsides. The clouds lift a little above the horizon; a brief radiance, a fragment of a broken rainbow, the sun's rim dips, and is gone—"at one stride comes the dark." True to the last to his investigation of nature, Bacon, struck with some thought respecting the preservation of bodies, stopped, while riding towards London, attended with his own hands to the experiment which was performed with snow, and in the operation contracted his death-cold. He was sixty-six years of age,—five years old, to use his own phrase, "in misery," and had arrived at the appointed bound which he could not pass. He took refuge in the house of the Earl of Arundel, which was near, and after a week's illness, of which we have no record, expired. The last glimpse we catch of him is here; a brief letter to his absent host, written apparently under the impression that the crisis of his danger was past. He says he had come near losing his life, as Pliny the elder did, from too great devotion to philosophy. Religious sentiments were scarcely to be expected in a brief note of this kind, nor are they found. He was not now to think of death for the first time; he had often meditated upon it before, and found it the least of evils. He "had not made love to the continuance of days, but to the goodness of them;" and without wishing for death, referred himself calmly "to that hour which the Great dispenser of all things had appointed" him. He maintained these among other "Paradoxes," that a Christian's "death makes not an end of him. His Advocate,

his Surety, shall be his Judge ; his mortal part shall become immortal ; what was sown in corruption and defilement, shall be raised in incorruption and glory ; and a finite creature shall possess an infinite happiness." It was leaning on this staff, we doubt not, that he walked through the valley of the shadow of death, and feared no evil.

The absence of any account of Lord Bacon's last hours, is a loss we cannot sufficiently lament. Did all men abandon fallen greatness at the last hour, in this as in other instances ? Why was there no good Griffith, to "tell us how he died ?" Where was Doctor Rawley, his lordship's chaplain ? Or did he suppose that posterity would not require, at his hands, even the slightest mention of the way his great master spake and acted in quitting life ? And "his very good friend, Mr. George Herbert," to whom he dedicated his versions of the Psalms—gentle and holy George Herbert, where was he ? Might he not have found time during the six years that he survived the Chancellor, to paint his character and end ? Something of the kind there may have been among those private papers of his, which, as worthy Izaak says, "were destroyed at Hingham house by the late rebels, and so lost to posterity." In the meantime we can only know, that

" His overthrow heaped happiness upon him,
For then, and not till then, he felt himself
And found the blessedness of being little ;
And to add greater honors to his age
Than man could give him, he died fearing God."

And so pass to thy grave, thou great crushed and contrite spirit !
For thee, also, there was balm in Gilead, and a physician there.
Thou, too, hast taught us, that though knowledge is great, and
faith is great, yet the greatest of these is charity.



ARTICLE VI.

THE SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

By Rev. S. M. SCHMUCKER, Germantown, Pa.

SHORTLY after the introduction of Christianity into the world, the spirit of speculative inquiry began to appear, in the examination of its principles. Soon men became wearied with their plain and unsophisticated import, and sought for recondite meanings and far-fetched interpretations. On the page of dogmatic, as well as ecclesiastical history, many schools of discordant doctrine stand forth to view. Ere the halo of apostolical purity had faded from the Church, the notions of Cerinthus appeared, containing the germs of Gnosticism, as afterwards developed by Bardesanes, Valentinus, and their coadjutors. Next, this science is handled in the allegorical style of the school of Alexandria, headed by the great Origen. In later ages it is subjected to the philosophical speculations of Leibnitz and Wolf. Now, it is mixed up with the neological perversions of Semler and Eichorn. Then, again, it is expounded in the exegetical mode of Michaelis and Ernesti. Afterward it is discussed in the biblical style of Storr and Knapp; and lastly, it is set forth in the evangelical school of Tholuck and Twisten.

The study of these various systems is deeply interesting and instructive; but none are more worthy of regard than that Scholastic Mode, which held dominion in the schools during the Middle Ages. This department of Dogmatic History has not received as much attention among us as it deserves. We, therefore, propose, in this article, to give a condensed view of its history and most striking features.

The difficulty of producing a thorough exposition of the inward and outward characteristics of the Scholastic Systems, is duly acknowledged by the distinguished Dr. Ritter, in the Preface to the last volume of his History of Philosophy. Says he—"In some cases I have almost despaired of being able to discover the sense of a complicated dialectic, whose doctrines are, for the most part, very far removed from us." (Biblioth. Sac., Aug., 1844, p. 598.) No labor, indeed, could be more perplexing, than to trace the intricate thread of some abstract process of ratiocination, of some *longa series dialectica*, as elaborated by one of the Scholastics. Accordingly, in our present discussion, we do not propose to give an exposition of the esoteric systems of the different schools—their shades of doctrine, or points of difference. For such investigations, we do not indeed possess the proper materials in this coun-

try. But our aim shall be, to exhibit a general view of the doctrinal character, as well as outward history of the Scholastic Theology, to present its general characteristics, and show the effects which it produced upon religion and theological science in general.

This mode of studying and discussing the doctrines of our holy religion, employed the ablest minds for many centuries. It was the channel through which a vast degree of intellectual vigor was expended. It exerted a mighty influence upon the moral and intellectual condition of those countries where it prevailed. It had a marked bearing upon the destinies of the Papacy itself, with all its far-reaching ramifications. It gradually became introduced into all the Universities during the Middle Ages. It there secured the • approbation of the ablest votaries of science; and he who could employ the art of dialectics most acutely, was regarded as having attained the highest standard of intellectual power—as having made the most successful advances in the search of truth. How far this confidence was merited, and these occupations were founded in justice, the sequel will show.

I. THE ORIGIN OF THE SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY.

The memorable discussion which occurred between *Lanfranc* and *Berengarius*, and which was protracted from 1050 until 1075, on the subject of Transubstantiation; together with the agitations which occurred throughout the Christian world, about that period, in reference to the celibacy of the clergy, and other similar innovations, first served to create and disseminate a fondness for intellectual inquiries. The establishment of these two doctrines as dogmas of the Church, by the Council of Placentia, in 1095, tended to increase the current which had already set in, and draw the attention of men more extensively, to kindred themes. In the middle of the eleventh century, the old question of the Grecian schools concerning Universal Ideas, was revived. It was fiercely disputed by Roscelin, a celebrated professor of logic, at that period. Partisans were soon formed, and marshalled in hostile array against each other, concerning this portentous question.

In the twelfth century, the first great Universities of Europe were established. Those of Paris, Oxford, and Bologna, were successively erected and endowed; and toward these celebrated seats of learning, where was preserved the knowledge which had survived the inundation of Northern barbarism, the aspiring youth of Europe directed their steps. There the most thorough intellectual training was imparted. There were collected the most learned and renowned instructors. There were accumulated the most extensive and valuable libraries. And there, too, the Scholastic Theology found its most congenial home.

Previous to the establishment of the Universities, the course of instruction given comprehended only what were termed the

Trivium and *Quadrivium*. The former comprised Grammar, Rhetoric, and Logic; the latter Algebra, Music, Geometry, and Astronomy. No progress had been made; no further improvement had been attained, during the lapse of ages, in the discussion of these sciences. Among all the Universities which subsequently arose, that of Paris was most distinguished for Theology. The writings of Aristotle had become known to Christian Europe, through the translations of the Arabs and Moors in Spain. They now became the basis of instruction in all the Universities, and soon his authority was supreme. It is true, that this authority was assailed by portions of the Romish Church, first at the Synod of Paris, in 1209, and afterward by the Papal Legate, in 1215. But these remonstrances and prohibitions were entirely inadequate to resist their accumulating ascendancy.

Several men of extraordinary talents now came upon the stage of action, and directed their energies to the study and defense of the new Theology. St. Anselm of Canterbury there labored and taught; a man of extraordinary intellectual vigor, some of whose arguments and processes of reasoning are still retained among theologians, for want of any better substitutes. His most distinguished pupil, Peter Abelard, filled the chair of theology at Paris; whose original and profound investigations, though frequently adventurous and incorrect, awakened the minds of his cotemporaries still more, to a sympathy with intellectual pursuits. His more celebrated scholar, Peter Lombard, the author of the memorable book of Sentences, succeeded him. He was a man of greater, as well as safer, talents.

In proportion as men progressed in general culture, and as the restoration of the civil, together with the reformation of the common, law, advanced, the Universities were enlarged and improved. These changes of course increased the celebrity of these institutions. The number of students became much enlarged. The amount of mind thus brought into active contact, was much augmented. The love of contention was aroused and cultivated. The two great orders of Dominican and Franciscan monks made Aristotle their text-book, and soon elevated him to that same eminence in theology, which he before possessed in philosophy. These questions becoming invested with supreme importance, on the intellectual arena of the age, soon engrossed the attention of the most celebrated thinkers. These causes gradually moulded the character and destiny of the Scholastic Theology. The history of these eminent men forms its most important and prosperous era. Their merits also confer upon it its highest honors.

II. SKETCH OF THE MOST EMINENT SCHOLASTICS.

Peter Abelard, *Venerabilis Inceptor*, may properly be termed the great originator of the theology of the schools. By his means,

it first obtained a definite form, as well as a decisive pre-eminence in the republic of letters. He was born of noble parentage, at Nantes, in 1079. He was first initiated into Theology by Roscelin, the founder of the school of the Nominalists. He was distinguished for his intellectual ability at an early age. When twenty years old he became the pupil of William de Champeaux, under whose tuition he studied dialectics. He soon established a rival school, which soon eclipsed his master. He subsequently continued his theological studies under Anselm. Disagreeing with his illustrious instructor, whom he seems to have excelled in acuteness, but not solidity of intellect, he established an independent school in theology also, which soon became celebrated.

At the age of forty, he was guilty of the seduction of his pupil, the beautiful and accomplished Heloise. She retired to a convent, and Abelard, after suffering a disgraceful punishment for his crime, resumed his lectures in theology. He now published his celebrated system. This work brought upon him the charge of heresy, and was burned by order of the council of Soissons, in 1121. He retired from his persecutors to a forest in Champaign, where multitudes of students soon gathered around him, and where he established the monastery of the Paraclete. This establishment he afterward presented to Heloise, of which she became Abbess. He was again charged with heresy by St. Bernard, "the last and best of the Fathers," and set out for Rome in 1140 to vindicate himself. He stopped on his way at the celebrated monastery of Clugny, where, after remaining two years, and lecturing once more on theology, he died at the age of sixty-three.

His works are chiefly his Epistles, a History of his Life till 1134, his Confession of Faith, his Commentary on Romans, and his Introduction to Theology, in Three Books. His life and adventures are among the most remarkable in history. They present a singular combination of great talents and great misfortunes. The latter he undoubtedly brought upon himself by his own imprudence. They served to embitter his days, as well as deeply tarnish his brightest honors.

Next in the order of time among the great lights of scholasticism, is St. Thomas Aquinas, *Doctor Angelicus*. He was born in 1225, at Aquino. When thirteen years of age, he was sent to the University of Naples. At seventeen, he commenced his novitiate at the Dominican convent in that city. This step was contrary to the wish of his father, Landulph, Count of Aquino. To avoid his family, he left Naples for Rome. Thence he fled to Paris. He was forcibly brought home, and confined in the paternal castle. Here he contrived to escape. Obtaining the encouragement of Innocent IV, he connected himself with the Dominicans at the age of twenty. At twenty-five, he began to lecture in Theology at Paris. Here he formed a close intimacy with St. Bonaventura,

another eminent scholastic, and wrote his celebrated *System of Theology*. Having attended the council at Lyons, he was seized on his return with a fever, and died at a Cistercian abbey, near Terracina, in 1274, at forty-eight years of age. He was canonized by John XXII., and is the great ornament of the Dominican order. His works are, a *Commentary on the Sentences of Lombard*, his *Summa Theologica*, *Questiones Disputatæ et quodlibet Liberales*, *Opuscula Theologica*, and *Catena Aurea*. They exhibit great acuteness and mental vigor. He belonged to the Nominalist school. His followers received the doctrines of Aristotle and Augustine.

His most distinguished antagonist and rival was Duns Scotus, *Doctor Subtilis*. He was born in 1275, at Dunstan, in Northumberland. He studied philosophy, jurisprudence, and theology, at Oxford, and there opened his career by giving lectures on theology. In 1304, he visited Paris, and defended the immaculate Conception with unparalleled *éclat*. In 1308, he lectured on theology in Cologne, and died there at the age of thirty-three. His works consist of Commentaries on Aristotle and Lombard's *Sentence*. He was the head of the Realists, and adopted the principles of the Platonic philosophy. He was regarded as the profoundest metaphysician of his age, and some derive his name (Scotus) from his depth of obscurity. He was the pride of the Franciscan order. He was, doubtless, a Semipelagian, for he answers affirmatively the question: *Utrum liberum arbitrium hominis sine gratia possit cavere omne peccatum mortale?*

The last name of greatest preëminence which meets us in the annals of the Scholastics, is William Occam, *Doctor Singularis*. He was born in Surrey, and became a disciple of Duns Scotus. He belonged to the Order of Franciscans. At the beginning of the fourteenth century he occupied a theological chair at Paris. But soon becoming dissatisfied with the principles of his master, he became the head of the Nominalists. His fondness for speculation and his disregard for authority, soon led him into difficulties with the people. He asserted that, in temporal things, the emperor was subject to none but God, and superior to the pope,—thus maintaining Ghibeline views. He was excommunicated by John XXII., in 1330. He then fled to the Court of Lewis of Bavaria, where he died, in 1347. His works consist of Commentaries on Lombard, several works on Logic, Metaphysics and Philosophy, *Colloquium Theologicum*, and a tract on the Eucharist. He was preferred by Luther to any of the Scholastics. Says he: *ejus acumen anteferebam Thomæ vel Scoto*.

Besides the great intellectual giants just enumerated, there were some other very eminent writers among the Scholastics. But inasmuch as their works present no remarkable features, and as they were not the founders of any systems or heads of schools, it will be unnecessary to narrate their personal histories. Of these, the

most deserving of notice, besides those whose names have already occurred, were *Hildebert of Larardino*, *Gilbert de Porret*, *Robert Pulleyn*, *Albertus Magnus*, *Alexander Hales*, *Hugo of Sancto Caro*, *Richard of Saint Victor*, and *Raymond Sully*.

III. PROMINENT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY.

A want of acquaintance with Biblical and exegetical learning strikingly characterized the writings of all these men. This lamentable deficiency constantly forces itself upon the attention of those who examine their pages. In our day, the man who attempts to construct a theological system, without reposing its foundations upon the dicta of the Bible, is regarded as absurd, as is that man who should attempt to rear a stupendous Gothic edifice upon the drifting snow. The foundations of the temples which the Middle Ages produced, were far more extensive and appropriate, than those of the systems of doctrine preached in them. We seldom hear these writers appeal to the sacred text as a final and conclusive authority. They discuss at the most unprofitable length the minutest points, and although a reference to the Greek or Hebrew would settle all difficulties, they rarely make such an appeal. Indeed, it is recorded of St. Thomas himself, that the Vulgate was the only text ever used by him, and that he had no accurate acquaintance with either of the original languages of Scripture.

Nor have we reason to suppose that any of these famous theologians possessed this most valuable knowledge. It is true that several of the Pontiffs established professorships in different Universities for the culture and study of the Oriental languages in general. But the object of this arrangement was not to prepare the priesthood to expound the Scriptures more clearly and forcibly to the people; but it was designed to fit the heralds of Romanism to proclaim it more successfully to the Oriental nations. It was intended to fortify them in such a way, that they might meet the onslaughts of the Greek and the Turk with their own weapons, and vanquish them in their own languages.

It was not, indeed, until the rise of Reuchlin, who commenced his labors in 1502, that the study of the original languages of the Bible was introduced to any extent. The services which he rendered to the Old Testament were performed by Erasmus, for the interpretation of the New. He began his career in 1516. By their agency a new era was ushered in upon the Church. Yet the scholastic theologians did not enjoy the benefit of their labors. When this revival of biblical studies began, the glory of Scholasticism had passed away. During the Middle Ages no advances whatever were made in philological investigations, or in the science of interpretation. Accordingly, we may wade through volumes of metaphysical discussions, upon some dogma of the Romish Church, where endless quibblings involve and perplex the reader;

whereas, an appeal to one or two *dicta probantia* of the Bible would immediately have removed every difficulty.

To us at this day, such barrenness of exegetical resources seems unaccountable. A sufficient reason for it, however, may be assigned. The Scholastic Theology was the first daughter of that revival of letters, which succeeded the darkness produced by the fall of the Western Empire. Other departments of knowledge were gradually cultivated, as one giant struggle was made after another, to grapple with the darkness and expel it. The want of the merit in question is one great reason why these writings are so uninteresting and profitless to us at the present day. We neglect the jewels which are hidden there, because they are embedded in oceans of mud. Had the giant minds of the Middle Ages appealed to the Bible, with proper exegetical qualifications, they would have produced a glorious fabric of intellectual beauty which would have challenged the admiration of all succeeding generations.

The Scholastics indulged, to an absurd degree, a spirit of abstract metaphysical speculation. It had been usual for theological writers, previous to this mode of study, to prove their various positions, chiefly by citations from the Fathers, and the usages of the apostolic era. But now another method was employed, the dialectical art, which soon entirely superseded all others. That those who first employed this art, did not intend that it should be improperly perverted, is evident both from the nature of their own writings, as well as their declarations on the subject.

In the middle of the eleventh century, Berengarius labored to disprove the doctrine of transubstantiation, which was gradually gaining ground in the Church. To accomplish this he used no other arguments than such as were perfectly rational. His opponent, Lanfranc, Archbishop of Canterbury, employed in his replies to him, arguments equally moderate and profound. The latter says himself in his tract *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*: "God is my witness, and my own conscience, that in treating sacred subjects I do not wish to bring forward dialectical questions; but if the subject under discussion can be most satisfactorily explained by the rules of this art, as far as I am able, I cover over the art by citations of equivalent import; that I may not rely more upon this art, than on the truth, and on the authority of the Fathers." Peter Lombard declares it to be the aim of his works, *fidem nostram adversus errores carnalium atque animalium hominum munire, vel potius munitam ostendere, ac theologicarum inquisitionum abdita aperire*. John Gerson says of Bonaventura (Doctor Seraphicus), *dum studet illuminationi intellectus, totum refert ad pietatem et religiositatem effectus*.*

But soon this commendable example was forgotten. The usual

* Thus, too, some of the doctrinal expositions of the Scholastics exhibit a similar simplicity and plainness of speech. *St. Thomas*, for instance, answers the ques-

references to the Scriptures and the Fathers were neglected, and nothing but philosophical proofs received. The greatest of these theologians not only descend to the merest trifles, but cultivate expertness in them, and regard such proficiency as highly meritorious. Yet what could be more unworthy of the dignity of the first of sciences, than inquiries like the following: What are the modes of the operations of angels; their means of conversing; the morning and evening states of their understandings; how many spirits can stand on the point of a needle; whether we are bound to love a possible angel more than an actually existing fly? Some of their hair-splitting distinctions are remarkable, as well as unscriptural. For instance: St. Thomas declares, "that if a priest be called upon to testify whether he has received information concerning a certain fact in the confessional, he is justified in answering negatively, though he may have had a full recital of the matter; inasmuch as he received the knowledge of it as God, but being called upon to testify as man, as such, he knows nothing about it." He also distinguishes, in discussing the nature of faith, between a *fides informis* and a *fides formata*. The object of this absurd distinction may not be sufficiently plain; but the absurdity of it is so. For what is a *fides informis*, but *non ulla fides*; and what kind of faith can exist at all, unless it be *formata*? The very idea of a true and proper faith, and any other does not deserve the name, implies that it is a living and confiding one, affecting both the intellect and the heart.

Several causes may be assigned, as producing this trait in the Scholastics. The nature of the subjects discussed by them would lead to it. These naturally tended to call forth the cultivation of the reasoning powers; and when one power is thus prominently exercised, to the neglect of others, it attains supremacy and other modes of thought fall into desuetude. Besides, there was no danger of running against a heresy, by dealing extensively in these minutiae, for there the Church had defined nothing, and there was no peril of incurring the Papal censures. Add to this, that a few men of remarkably acute powers arose to eminence in the Church, whose intellectual tendencies led them to these investigations, and impressed upon the theology of those ages, the peculiarities of

tion, whether we can obtain eternal life without grace, thus: *Non potest homo mereri absque gratia vitam æternam per pura naturalia, quia scilicet meritum hominis dependet ex præordinatione divina.—Vita autem æterna est quoddam bonum excedens proportionem naturæ creatæ; quia etiam excedit cognitionem et desiderium ejus secundum illud, I. ad Corinth. 2: nec oculus vidit, etc. Et inde est, quod nulla natura creata est sufficiens principium actus meritorii vitæ æternæ, nisi superaddatur aliquid supernaturale donum quod gratia dicitur. Si vero loquamur de homine sub peccato existente, additur cum hoc secunda ratio, propter impedimentum peccati.* *Sum. Theol. Ques., 114, Art. II.—III.* He elsewhere defines how a man may know that he possesses this grace. *Hoc modo aliquis cognoscere potest se habere gratiam, in quantum scilicet percipit se delectari in Deo, et contemnere res mundanas, et in quantum homo non est conscius peccati mortalis. Quesæ. 112, Art. 5.*

their own minds. The abilities of these men were also enlisted by the Papal Church, in its interests, and they of necessity labored hard to defend its sophistical dogmas and perversions.

To illustrate the peculiarity now in question, we may adduce the celebrated dispute which divided all the Schools into Realists and Nominalists. The inquiry had been started anew by Roscelin, whether general ideas designated at that time by the name *Universals* were merely *abstractions* of the mind, represented by words; or whether they represented *realities*. He attributed to them only a verbal validity, and was thus the founder of the Nominalists. It is truly amazing that so abstruse a theme should have been discussed amid the darkness of the Middle Ages. The fierceness of the contest which was waged during so protracted a period, is equally astonishing. It was in consequence of his opposition to the Nominalist party, that John Huss was condemned to death at Constance in 1415. It was in consequence of his opposition to Realism, that John de Wesalia was imprisoned in 1479, in which confinement he remained until his death. In both of these cases, it was the influence of the opposing sect which sealed the doom of these excellent men.

We may form some idea of this knotty logomachy from the following statements. The dispute mainly turned upon the point whether *Genus and Species were real things*, existing subjectively and independently of our objective conceptions of them, or not. The doctrine of the Realists was erroneously attributed to Aristotle, says Dr. Whately; for he contradicts it. Aristotle calls *individual*, primary or independent substances (*πρώται ουσίαι*), but genus and species, comprising those individuals, secondary (*δευτερά ουσίαι*), as not denoting an actually existing thing. *Arist. Categor.*, § 3. Upon this apparently worthless inquiry, the fierce disputes of ages rested. Around it they raged with unmitigated intensity; sometimes illuminated by the lurid flames of the martyr's conflagration, sometimes interrupted by his death-shrieks and expiring agonies. That no valuable fruits resulted from these agitations, may well appear to us, in the enlightened and utilitarian age in which we live.

Aquinas gives an exposition of his views on this question as follows. According to him, universals may be considered either in regard to their *matter* or their *form*. The matter of the universal idea of *man*, is the union of the attributes of human nature. Hence, universals are *a parte rei*; their matter exists solely in each individual. Their form is the character of universality applied to this matter, which is obtained by abstracting what is peculiar to each individual, in order to consider what is common to all. In this sense, he says universals are *a parte intellectus*. Apparently, this inquiry was invested with some importance, because if individuals are the only realities, it necessarily follows

that those senses which perceive these individuals are the only sources of human knowledge. It also follows, that there can be no clear conception of anything, because a clear conception and positive affirmation imply a general idea, which it is here affirmed does not exist. This leads us to skepticism. While, on the other hand, if the objects represented by general ideas, are the only realities, of which individuals are merely the forms, we are on the high road to Pantheism. These results, it appears, were anticipated by the scholastics, and were furiously charged in their wranglings upon the respective maintainers of them.

That both systems, when exclusively taken, were erroneous, is sufficiently plain. The generic term *holiness*, for instance, has in its generality, no external, corresponding matter. And yet it cannot be without some object, else it would not exist. In one sense, therefore, the abstract terms, justice, virtue, truth, etc., are nominal, existing without any related objects which they qualify. In another sense, they are real, for they give distinctive character to certain entities, and without them, these entities could not at all exist as such.

A third characteristic of the scholastic doctors was their ignorance of the plain doctrines of the Bible. This results from their want of acquaintance with exegetical learning, already alluded to. This ignorance might naturally be inferred from the fact, that they made the Bible no standard of appeal in their doctrinal investigations. When any sort of reference whatever was made to it, it was so enveloped in paraphrases and glosses, in the language, too, of the Vulgate, that the pure Word of God and mind of the Spirit were rarely reached.

The ignorance of these doctors of the truths of the Bible was singularly illustrated by the conference which Luther held at Augsburg, with Cardinal Cajetan, one of the ablest theologians of his day. As papal legate he was sent to confound and silence the arch-heretic, and then prescribe the terms of his submission to the Holy See. He entertained no doubt whatever, but that he could reduce Luther to intellectual straits, as well as to terms of personal submission. His fame, his learning, his high reputation for talents and experience, must ensure him an easy victory over the abominable heretic. But in bold reply to the distinctions and evasions of the legate, the presumptuous monk arrayed in impene-trable order the declarations of the Word of God. He demanded counter evidences from the same authority. He would not yield until his own proofs had been invalidated. The declarations of the Bible fell with massive weight upon the nice and delicate structures of the legate's logic, demolished them, and left not a trace behind. Had Cajetan been a biblical scholar, the monk's victory would not have been so signal, nor the dignitary's defeat so humiliating. He was learned, but merely in the Schoolmen

and Fathers. He had great abilities, but they had never been trained under the tuition of the Great Teacher, nor enlightened by his Spirit.

Nor was Cajetan's acquaintance with the Bible inferior to that of his brethren. They were all equally ignorant. Scholasticism still flourished while he lived, and if a knowledge of the Bible had been characteristic of those theologians, he would have shared a portion of their wisdom. When we turn to the history of those times, we learn that it confirms the truth taught by the case just cited. Erasmus, de *Ratione Veræ Theologiæ*, says: *Quale spectaculum est theologum octogenarium nihil aliud sapere quam mera sophismata, et ad extremum usque vitæ nihil aliud argutari. Possem tibi producere, qui annum egressi octogesimum tantum ætatis, in scholasticis tricis perdiderint, nec usque contentum evangelicum evolverint.* Id quod a me compertum, ipsi quoque demum confessi sunt. Perkheimer, in his *Epist. apolog. pro Reuchlino*, says: *Hinc est quod vetus Test. a similibus negligitur, novum quasi idiotis scriptum vilipenditur, Apostolorum doctrinæ vix lectione digna putatur.* Robert Stephens, in the preface to his *Responsio ad censuras theologorum Parisiensium*, declares: *Ante paucos annos quidam ex Sorbona sic loquebatur; miror quid isti juvenes nobis semper allegent Novum Testamentum? Per Deum, ego plus habebam quam quinquaginta annos, quod nesciebam quod esset Novum Testamentum?*

Such language needs no comment. Such ignorance of the Scriptures, among the professed teachers of religion, is astonishing as well as mournful. The purity of the doctrines taught by such men may well be imagined. The great principle has yet to be overturned, that *Theologus in Scripturis nascitur*; and if this aphorism be true, the claims of the Scholastic Doctors, to the title of theological instructors, can be with difficulty maintained. When the fountains become impure, and the very channels through which these waters are conveyed are polluted, we will in vain expect anything but a draught of impurity and filth.

The Scholastic Theologians introduced philosophical systems into their doctrines, and were all either Platonists or Aristotelians. This unnatural connection between light and darkness, produced the worst results. The Arabian philosophy had prepared the way for this state of things. The great names of Alkendi, Algazel, and Averroes, adorn the history of that school. The only work of Aristotle, with which Europeans were acquainted, was his *Organon*, of which a Latin translation had been made by Boëthius. The Arabs had translated all his works, and introduced them into the Moorish schools of Spain. To these seats of learning, the youth of Christian Europe resorted. Thus, the fame of these writings was carried abroad, and the Latin translations of them extensively circulated.

The influence which Aristotle exerted in this form, was decidedly injurious. But after a just discrimination was observed between his own writings and the numerous glosses of his Arabian translators, this unfavorable prejudice faded from his name, and he began to exercise unlimited influence.

The mendicant orders of Europe aided powerfully in placing Aristotle upon an undisputed throne. All these orders espoused the cause either of Aristotle or his great teacher and rival, Plato. The doctors of the schools, of course, enlisted in behalf either of one or the other, and thus they were borne forward by the combined influence of conviction and rivalry. While Aquinas flourished he silenced every scruple against Aristotle. Yet the Scholastics did not possess a clear idea of his doctrines, as is apparent from their conflicting interpretations of him. They sometimes united with his system, some of the doctrines of the Neo-Platonic school of Alexandria. Their metaphysics were injurious to their Theology. Accordingly some of them were censured by the Holy See as heretical. This was the fate of Roscelin, Lombard, Abelard and Occam.

By this union of philosophy and theology, these writers may be said to have invested the doctrines of the Scriptures with an impenetrable wrappage of dialectical quibbling, so that the truth could not be discerned amid its interminable folds. Besides, their discussions had assumed the form, in many cases, of theological trifling. They possessed a one-sided subjectivism, without any practical development or tendency, nor proceeding forth in any objective direction. It was time to tear from this theology, the mask which it had so long worn, and stamp upon it its real character of sanctimonious trifling, into which it had hopelessly degenerated. For atheistic and heterodox opinions were beginning to prevail among them. The Nominalists were charged with reducing the persons of the Trinity to modal distinctions. The Realists incurred the accusation of using terms betokening a tritheism. Their erratic adventures were beginning to lead to those extravagances which usually result from a morbid rationalism.

Nevertheless, Papal authority moulded the Scholastic Theology, to a considerable extent, during its whole career. Most of these writers were able champions of the hierarchy, and subservient to its interests. Their acute understandings humbly submitted to the authority of the successors of St. Peter; and as they must needs maintain some system, they selected that one to which interest and ambition allured them. Thus, for instance, in reference to that absurdest of all dogmas, heathen, Mohammedan or Christian, transubstantiation, Scotus himself affirms:—"That which chiefly sways me is, that we must maintain concerning the sacraments as the holy Church of Rome maintains. But she now holds, that the bread becomes the body, and the wine, the blood of

Christ; therefore, we firmly believe it." Whenever the free opinions of enlightened reason are prohibited, erroneous views and dark superstitions will infest religion. It is only necessary that reason should be guided, not fettered, in order to produce the most desirable results. No one who attempts to discuss the doctrines of the Bible under Romish auspices and influence, can expect to escape the contagions of that superstition, which thoroughly infests the whole establishment, and will thus wander afar into the gloomy regions of error and delusion.

Such eventually was the fate of Scholasticism. Whatever services it might have rendered, in developing truth, and urging on the revival of literature throughout Europe, it failed to accomplish such an illustrious task. No fruits of great and permanent value were produced by it. The uplifted arm of papal authority hovered over the heads of learned and able men, constantly threatening to descend with obliterating fury on any adventurous Doctor who should adventure a dogma which the Church had not approved. Thus Scholasticism identified itself with Romanism. It flourished, therefore, while the tiara soared in its supremacy, but has shared the declining fortunes and increasing contempt of its memorable patron.

The characteristic language of Carlyle is appropriate in this connection. Says he :—"Consider the old Schoolmen and their pilgrimage toward truth—the faithfulest endeavor, incessant, unwearied motion, often great natural vigor, only no progress; nothing but antic feats of one limb poised against the other. There they balanced, somersetted, made postures; at best, gyrated swiftly, with some pleasure, like spinning Dervishes, and ended where they began. The Irrefragable Doctor, with his chains of induction, his corollaries, dilemmas, and other cunning logical diagrams and apparatus, will cast you a beautiful horoscope, and speak reasonable things; nevertheless, your stolen jewel, which you wanted him to find, is not forthcoming. Often by some winged word, winged as a thunderbolt, as of a Luther, a Napoleon, a Göthe, shall we see the difficulty split asunder, and its secret laid bare; while the Irrefragable, with all his logical tools, hews at it, and hovers round it, and finds it on all hands too hard for him." The truth is, the Papal court, with all its *indices expurgatorii*, its preventions, its circumvallations, its fearful caveats, its mysterious tribunals, its terrific bulls, and its threats of excommunication and infernal curses, had effectually obstructed the free endeavors of the mind, and successfully baffled its manly struggles after truth.

There were several favorable features connected with the Scholastic Theologians which deserve attention. They excited, to some degree, a literary spirit throughout the dreary waste of the Middle Ages. They fostered a degree of mental activity which would otherwise have not existed to break the universal lethargy. No

change, it would seem, could have been for the worse at that period; for the human intellect had generally sunk into the last abyss of ignorance. Rather than perfect darkness, a few glimmering rays are preferable. Rather than fatal slumbers, it is better to awake, though it be in bewilderment. The rising importance of the Universities must, in a great degree, be attributed to the influence of the Scholastic Theology. It served powerfully to draw out the mental energies of those ages, by the attention which it directed to logic and kindred studies. It prepared the mind of Europe, gradually, by the culture of these sciences, for those investigations which accompanied the great Ecclesiastical Renovation of the sixteenth century. The Universities, thus kept alive, were a necessary nucleus, around which were assembled men of learning; and this state of things was perpetuated until better days had dawned. The revival of the Canon Law was a fortunate event in its influence upon literature. But the impulse produced by it would never have been as extensive as that produced by Scholasticism; for it was not so intimately connected with the Church, whose influence was rapidly extending over Europe; nor was it so closely associated with the present and future spiritual interests of men.

Nor can it be denied that this theology had something directly to do, negatively, with the introduction of the Reformation. If that glorious event was the product of the age in which it occurred—if it was the inevitable result of certain influences then pervading the social and religious atmosphere of Europe, as it undoubtedly was, then Scholasticism had thoroughly moulded these influences, and produced the elements which became thus afterward transformed. It had given tone to the public mind for ages. It had infused into it its predominating characteristics. It had preserved, for ages, the spirit and capacity for literary toil; yet, by its own unprofitableness, it had taught the necessity of something higher and better than itself. It pointed to her glorious Reformation; and imparted strength to the intellectual arm of that age, to stretch forth and grasp something beyond and nobler than itself. Without this training, the system of truth proclaimed in the Reformation would have been of a much slower development. Like a worn-out musical instrument, which has served to complete the skill of the musician, though it be now itself unfit for use, it has yet served a great and important purpose, in preparing the artist to draw forth the most enrapturing harmony from a better instrument.

Hence the Scholastic Theology was not lost in the progress and development of the Church. On the contrary, its influence was indispensable. The language of an esteemed theologian of our own country is appropriate here. "The true Church historian leaves to every age its own peculiar advantages. He does not con-

struct history after the measure of some poor conceptions of his own; he does not correct it by the standard of the times in which he himself lives; but he takes it up and re-produces it, as God has allowed it to occur, in the progressive explication of his plan of redemption. With all his respect for the reformation as a true work of God, he is not rendered insensible by it, to what was excellent and beautiful in earlier times!"* Thus the reasonings of the Scholastics on these points, in reference to which the Romish Church entertained orthodox views, are still important and valuable. Such, for instance, are the articles on God, the trinity, etc., which are treated by them with much ability. Additional illustrations of this point are found in St. Anselm's ontological proof of the existence of God, drawn from *the idea* of the most perfect being; as well as Abelard's argument for the Divine unity, based on the inseparable connection between unity and perfection.

All the scholastic writers are divided into the three following schools. I. The Sententarii, from Peter Lombard, the author of the Book of Sentences (Magister Sententiarum), which was for ages the text-book in the schools. II. Summistæ, from Aquinas, whose chief production was his Summa Theologica. III. Quodlibetarii, or Eclectici, from Scotus, whose most important work was termed Quodlibeta in Libros IV. Sententiarum. These three writers may be said to represent the three great eras in the history of the Scholastic Theology. They were also successively the founders of three great and distinct systems.

IV. THE GRADUAL DECLINE OF SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY.

The glory of the Scholastic doctors has long since passed away. An occasional allusion to their works is found in the writings of the modern Romish theologians, such as Moehler, Ken, Goerves, and Wiseman. But excepting this last faint echo of expiring authority, they are unregarded. They now serve sometimes to assuage the ardor of bibliomaniacs. The introduction of the Reformation tended powerfully to throw these antiquated authorities into the background. Luther, whose energetic words were half battles, hurled his theological vengeance against them, and employed his great talents and influence to bring them into disrepute. In the fearful theological battles which were fought during the sixteenth century, the heroes of Scholasticism were driven from one post to another, compelled to relinquish one fortress after another, which had been held in secure possession for ages, until now they have retreated

* See Dr. Schaf's Prin. of Protes., p.138. This work contains much original matter, new and interesting to American readers. The same may also be affirmed of his later tract, "What is Church History?" Whatever we may think of some of his views, transported hither from the land of speculation, and strongly characterized as they are, by the "German depth" and "German development," we must admit the learning and originality of his productions.

into the obscurities of monastic libraries, and are even there allowed but a precarious peace.

The causes of these reverses may be easily assigned. The contests which had commenced between the Nominalists and Realists, raged with unmitigated intensity for two centuries previous to the Reformation. But soon these strifes subsided from sheer exhaustion. These fires burned less intensely from deficiency of materials. This result might have been inferred from the nature of the case. Such profitless discussions could not for ever impose upon the common sense of nations. It may do for a while to wrangle about the immaculate conception. Learned doctors and august councils may for a time dispute concerning such questions as the unity of form in man; whether one angel illumines another; whether angels know each other's will; whether they speak to each other; whether a lower angel dare speak to a higher one; whether the language of one angel is known to another; whether the secretions of the body will arise in the resurrection; whether the risen bodies will all have the same magnitude; whether the hair and nails of the dead will also arise; *utrum capilli et ungues in homine resurgent*. Thom. Sum. Sup. Pars. Ter. Quæst. LXXX., Art II.) and thousands more, equally frivolous. But the waste of time, the perversion of talents, the neglect of more important pursuits, which were inevitably connected with such despicable discussions, will eventually produce their due impression on the mind. They might serve to occupy the mental activity of the monk Gunzo, who aided in first directing attention to some of these inquiries; but the advance of ages developed other themes of inquiry, of greater consequence to the intellectual and spiritual interests of men, which soon forced themselves upon general attention.

One of the most important of these was the newly awakened zeal for the theological tenets of the Mystics, who endeavored to reach the heart, instead of merely convincing the intellect, as was too much the case with the rival system. Such a change was much needed. Men had forgotten, amid their theological wrangles, to put searching questions to their consciences. Eminent among the mystic writers, were Thomas a Kempis and Jerome Savonarola. Their writings seem to have been but little tainted with those egregious errors which afterward disgraced the Mystics. While this gradual transition was taking place, some theologians were disposed to assume an intermediate position. They proposed that the scholastic subtlety should be tempered with mystic simplicity, that the former should be thoroughly purged of its trifling character, and be thus permitted to enter upon a new and improved career. Of this class were the distinguished Romish theologians, John Gerson and Nicholas Cusanus.

But it was in vain. The want of experimental studies had long

been felt, and now found an avenue for development. Roger Bacon, by uniting practice with theory, ushered in a new era in the intellectual history of Europe. Scholasticism had proven its barrenness after ages of extensive trial. The necessity of innovation and change was acknowledged on all hands. The halls became deserted when once the Angelic, the Irrefragable, the Seraphic, the Subtle, and other intellectual divinities had expounded their respective systems to crowds of admiring and wondering auditors. They were no longer the scenes of acute discussion between minds of the highest order. If still frequented at all, they were occupied by men of inferior capacities, who were utterly unable to sustain the exalted reputation of their predecessors. They were forsaken by the rising intellect of an age which sought advancement, and were not content with the exploded nullities which had diverted the infancy of the European mind. The last doctor of eminence among the Scholastics was Gabriel Biel, professor at Tübingen, who died in 1495. His works are principally a *Collectorium ex Occamo in L. IV. Sententiarum*, the last contribution of any ability ever made to the theology of the schools.

The history of literature, like that of conquest, is marked by constant revolutions. Every series of years has its great, commanding favorite. These, in their turn, arise to exercise a controlling power over the kingdom of truth, and are then dethroned to give place to successors destined to pass through the same inevitable process. Libraries are the cemeteries of departed genius, the tombs of neglected worth. The undisturbed dust of ages accumulates over the productions of those, whose moving thoughts and words directed the mental activities of their age. Many of them now sleep in long, unbroken silence, while other men and other principles play prominent parts in the great drama of human affairs.

Thus Scholasticism has had its brilliant era of supremacy. It now suffers under much neglect and decline. It may never more be reënimated, or regain even a tinge of its former glory. In the Middle Ages, religion showed itself in the erection of vast monasteries and gigantic temples. In the solitary silence of the cloister, the pious few sought to attain to greater holiness. Thus theology, as a science, assumed the scholastic form. Now, the spirit of the age has changed. Men strive to advance in holiness and philanthropy, by engaging in extensive benevolent enterprises, by which the spiritual and social welfare of our race is promoted. The very same spirit of ardent devotion, which four centuries ago induced men to spend their lives in the monotonous exercises of the cloister, now urges them to embark upon the restless sea, and spend their energies in preaching the gospel of a risen Saviour, where the palm-tree waves in the southern breeze, or where the Himalah Mountains cast their mighty shadows.

That the present comparatively neglected state of the Scholastic Theology is not to be regretted is sufficiently plain. John of Salisbury, in his day, bitterly complained that the Parisian dialecticians made no advancement in the pursuit of truth; for after an absence of several years from their lectures, he found them, upon his return, engaged in urging and refuting the same arguments, in making the same attacks, in performing the same exploits, and in achieving the same victories over imaginary foes. The arguments of the Angelic Doctor were exploded by the attacks of the Irrefragable, and he, in turn, was sorely undermined by the intrigues of the Subtle. They at length presented the amusing spectacle, of furious combatants rejoicing over triumphs they knew not what, exulting over prostrate foes they knew not whom.

Hence it is, that in modern theological investigations, few allusions are made to the Scholastics as authorities. If we wish to find these champions now, we must, for the most part, seek them in the dark recesses of European libraries. They will be found still arrayed in their glory, especially in the Romish Universities and faculties of theology. Were they to look out from their obscure habitations now, they would meet few but strangers in the present generation. Nevertheless, that they served an useful purpose during the earliest portion of their career, we firmly believe. Had not this bright but eccentric star arisen, and thrown its rays athwart the gloomy horizon, illuminating the dreadful and chaotic scene with a subdued and glimmering light, the nations would have sunk into irrevocable darkness. That darkness might even now have rested upon us; ruinous to every noble moral, and intellectual activity.

We therefore revere the Scholastic Theology as a relic of former days. It is not devoid of interest as an object of literary research. Whoever desires to test his acuteness by handling the most intricate sophisms, and almost learn "to see what is not to be seen," need but enter into the discussions of these writers. By studying their productions, especially the most celebrated of them, he will have his intellectual optics made amazingly acute. He will be thus initiated into the modes of thought and of theological discussion, which prevailed in the most eminent universities long ages since. He will be able to compare the relative advances which have been made, from that day to this, in the modern modes of treating the theological system. Very various inferences might indeed be drawn from this retrospect.

But the more the teachers of Romish Theology of the present day adhere to these antiquated writers, as defensive authorities for their ecclesiastical absurdities, which some of them tenaciously do; the more they will resist the advancing spirit of the age in which they live. Nor will it answer to unite them *partially* with modern standards and ideas, or the most approved

modes of treating theological science now, as others of them do; for they cannot coalesce. In either case, they will be thrown ignominiously into the rear, in that great and memorable race, which the nations are now running, and which has for its terminus the distant throne of eternal truth. The art of dialectics, when applied to the theological system, during the era of mediæval darkness, when all mind was stagnant, when all free inquiry was crushed beneath the superincumbent mass of ignorance and superstition, was adapted, in the nature of the case, to produce some improvements. After it had worked its natural results in such an atmosphere, and, by its intellectual agitations, driven away the mists of mental gloom which had then brooded over the European mind, all its efficacy was expended. It had fulfilled its destiny. But now the circumstances of the case have altered. Man seems to be aiming at perfectibility. Mind makes gigantic strides, passing at one prodigious bound, the obstacles which the mighty of former generations had cautiously approached, blinked up at, and turned away disheartened. Distant realms of the natural, as well as the intellectual universe, untraveled by the mental sun of other days, whose vast solitude had been unbroken by the most adventurous of by-gone ages, are now subjected to human sway; and the deepest secrets of the past eternity are thrown open to the gaze of every votary of science. Under such circumstances, no such eccentric movements, no such gyratory progress, as Scholasticism by ages of trial had proved itself to be, will content the minds of men. What it was from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, it no longer continued to be until the sixteenth. Now its influence would be far less commendable, than in its last stages of existence. It is far behind the age. From its crumbling throne, once so superior, it must look upward to unexpected heights which now tower far above it. It would stand aghast, were it to come forth and survey modern ideas and developments, and would retreat again into that obscurity, in which it has very wisely ensconced itself, and view the progress of great mental and moral revolutions from a safe distance.



ARTICLE VII.

THE ESSENES, MORALLY AND HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED.

By WM. HALL, JR., New York.

BEFORE the advent of Christianity, the consciences of men in various quarters, and by various modes of activity, gave tokens of wakefulness. Judea, in particular, as the centre of Monotheism, the region of ancient communications from heaven, the depository of the sacred writings held in trust by them for the benefit of mankind, was the scene of peculiar moral manifestations, more or less creditable to human nature, and all attesting its connection with a higher world, as well as its need of spiritual aid. Hence, the wide-spread Messianic feeling, and the number and earnestness of the sects and opinions which characterized the Jewish history at the era of Christ's advent.

In the *tableaux vivans* of that interesting period, Josephus, Philo, and Pliny being authorities, we behold a group of serious, interesting people, known by the name of *Essenes*. They had a real place in that complex of characters which formed the *dramatis personæ* of the important scenes and actions recorded by the Gospel writers. The sacred theatre and age of redemption cannot be seen in its true historical light, if this element of the then intellectual and religious life of Judea be not taken into account. Their proximity to Christ's historical position in time and space, gives them an importance to which neither the skeptic nor the believer can be indifferent.

To say fully what and who the Essenes were, is not our present object; we design to give, in the first place, a condensed view of this peculiar body of men, representing as they did the asceticism, Pythagoreanism, religious romanticism, theophilanthropy, the monkish pietism of the Jewish nation in the age of the Redeemer,—chiefly derived from the writings of Dr. Neander, and then add some further reflections on their moral and historical relations.

There are several inquiries of much interest appertaining to them, which it may be found profitable to bring into view. Among the Jewish theologians in Palestine, at this era, we find the three different leading tendencies which are wont ordinarily to confront each other in the decline of religions: those who confound the inward and the outward of religion, or in the outward quite forget the inward,—who make a multitude of human ordinances, adventitious to religion, the chief point of religion, and who place

the essence of religion in a dead ceremonial, and a dead orthodoxy; then those who resist this false appearance, but who, because the living, inner religious sense, the susceptibility for the Divine, is wanting in them, overstep the just limits of this opposition, and, therefore, because the true spiritual sense does not accompany and guide their critical tendency, while justly attacking human ordinances claiming a Divine authority, at the same time reject, as of human institution, much deeper truth; and finally, those warmer souls, in whom the contemplative habit rules too strongly, who, withdrawing into themselves from the conflict of opinions among the learned, seek in subjective feelings or views, the realization of their religious ideas—*Mystics*, either from a more practical or a more contemplative tendency. These three principal tendencies of religious feeling, which often return under altered forms, we here recognize in the three classes of Pharisees, Sadducees and Essenes.

Out of the struggle of theological and political parties there had come forth a community of pious men, who had passed through manifold experiences, at first, probably (according to Pliny the elder), withdrawn into the quiet region on the west side of the Dead Sea, where they lived together in close union, partly in similar union with the later monks, partly as mystic orders in all times. From this community were afterwards formed other smaller ones, in the towns and in the country of Palestine. They called themselves *Essenes* (*Εσσηνοί* or *Εσσαιοί*). They busied themselves with peaceful professions: husbandry, cattle-raising, handiworks, and especially the healing art, which was an object of peculiar interest and study. Probably, too, they believed themselves to be guided by a higher light in the investigation of nature, and in the application of remedial powers. Their science of nature and the healing art certainly appear to have had a religious, theosophic character, as they also claimed to possess prophetic gifts. The Essenes were, without doubt, distinguished from the great mass of ordinary Jews, by this, that they were acquainted with, and aimed at something higher than merely dead, external ceremonials—that they strove after holiness of disposition and inward communion with God. They were distinguished by their quiet, pious lives, by which, amidst all political revolutions in Palestine, they were esteemed by all parties, even by the heathen, and were able to maintain and propagate themselves, by their industry and charity, their obedience to the government as the ordinance of God, and their fidelity and love of truth. Every Yea and Nay must, in their community, have the value of an oath; for, said they, every oath pre-supposes a reciprocal mistrust which should not find place in a community of honest men. Only in one case was an oath permitted among them, as a sacramental ordinance for those, who, after a three years' novitiate, were received into

the number of the initiated. According to the delineation which Philo has given of them in his remarkable book upon the true freedom of the virtuous man, the Essenes appear to be men of a practical religious tendency, unacquainted with all theosophy and idle speculation, and characterized by a deep, inward devotion, free from superstition. But the report of Philo does not here agree with that of Josephus, whose testimony is entitled to far more confidence.

Josephus had, in particular, better opportunity to learn, accurately, the Jewish sects, than Philo, because Philo lived in Egypt, whither there is no evidence that the Essenes ever extended. Josephus spent the greatest part of his life in Palestine, and had certainly given all pains, accurately, to inform himself of the condition of the different sects, between which, even when a youth of sixteen, he had resolved to choose, although he could not have gone beyond the novitiate in the sect of the Essenes, since he informs us that in the space of from three to four years, he had passed through *all three sects* of the Jews. Josephus manifests also, in this representation in particular, entire impartiality and fairness; Philo, on the contrary, ardently desired to represent the Essenes to the cultivated Greeks as models of practical wisdom, and allowed himself, accordingly, to represent them not so much as they really were, but as his object demanded. That the Essenes busied themselves also with speculation, and professed to make disclosures in respect to the higher spiritual world, is apparent; for the initiated were obliged to swear that they would make known to no one the names of the angels communicated to them. The manner in which they concealed the ancient books of the sect, also attests the same thing. Even Philo himself makes this probable, when he says, that they occupied themselves with a *φιλοσοφία δια συμβολῶν*, a philosophy which was founded on allegorizing exegesis; because every kind of allegorizing presupposes a real speculative system. According to Philo, they rejected the worship of sacrifice, asserting that to dedicate themselves entirely to God, is the only true sacrifice. But, according to Josephus, they certainly held the sacrificial offering to be particularly holy; but they thought that precisely on account of its sacredness, it was desecrated by the profane Jews, in the temple at Jerusalem, and that it could be celebrated in a worthy manner only in their holy community; as such mystic sects are always inclined to let the objective worth of religious actions depend upon the subjective state of those who perform them. In the painfully superstitious observance of Sabbath-rest, according to the letter, not the spirit of the laws, they went still farther than the other Jews; while the casuistry of the Pharisees expounded its decrees more strongly or mildly, according to their interest for the time being. They not only anxiously shrunk from contact with other Jews, but, since they themselves

were divided into four degrees, even the Essenes of a higher grade shrunk from contact with Essenes of a lower grade, as if they could become polluted, and underwent a purification, wherever such a contact occurred. They, too, like other Jews, placed peculiar worth in lustration by bathing in cold water. To their asceticism, the usual custom of anointing with oil, appeared as something unholy; so that every one, whom this had any how befallen, must carefully purify himself. They anxiously shunned other food than that which was preferred by their own sect. They would rather die than receive food from others. Proof enough, that, if the Essenes had a true religious life, and a true practical piety, there was, for all that, mixed with it no little superstition.

In the age of the Gospels, the Jewish nation seems to have been much cut up into sects. Neander speaks of *seven* in all. Among these must have been, of course, the New Testament Pharisees, Sadducees, and Herodians; while the Essenes, Gaulonites, Karaites, and Baithuseans, noticed by other writers, must make up the rest. Possibly the Samaritans are included in the number. Only three of these, the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes, were of any considerable significance. And these, Lightfoot tells us, were only "excrescences from the national religion." "They spoiled by over-doing." The great body of the people kept on in the old Church, and Christ with them, to renew and to fulfil with all wisdom and prudence. The Pharisee was a formalist; the Sadducee, a rationalist; the Essene, an austere pietist. Pharisaism busied itself in "making a hedge to the law," and placed holiness in a precise observance of external and traditive ordinances. Every age finds Pharisaism plying the same work. As to the first of them, Lightfoot, speaking of the ancient Pharisees, says:—"For that the law should lie to the commons, without any fence about it, to keep men off from breaking in upon it by their own interpretations and expositions of it, they could soon persuade the people, was a thing not to be tolerated or endured; and when they had wrought this lesson home upon their hearts, then they had glosses ready of their own invention to put upon it, as to hedge or fence in from private interpretation." Pharisaism was itself hedged up and enslaved by its will-worship, and burdensome ceremonies; and, the worst of it was, there was no life within to prepare the way for something better. The Essenes, however, who carried out into precise and severe practice, the original theory of the Pharisees, were, no doubt, as honest-hearted in seeking righteousness by works of supererogation and voluntary offices over and above the precepts of the law, as men could be under the ordinary moral influences of their day. Between these two movements of Jewish religionists, there was a near relation, and a bond of sympathy, so far as earnestness entered at all into the more showy circle of the Pharisee. But the Sadducee, who

“confessed neither angel or spirit,” and with the denial of *ἀνθρώπου* gave up both immortality and future retribution, stood much farther off from the equally practical and contemplative circle of Essenism. The Sadducean school had started from a true *dictum*, of their reputed master, Sadoc or Tzadoc; or, at least, from a great “half truth torn from its connection,” which, as Neander observes, is usually the origin of fanatical or false religious movements at all times. He had said—“Be not as slaves who obey their masters for reward; but obey without hoping for any fruits of your labors. Let the fear of God be upon you.” So far as the scholars followed this *ipse dixit*, they created a point of connection between themselves and all truth, which is infinitely far from being a mercenary affair. But the cold Sadducee was as deep in the ditch as the blind Pharisee was in the mire. Rejecting the objective in religion, he lost the subjective. He forgot the dependence of imperfect man on those great springs of right action, hope and fear. Being neither religious nor superstitious—being given to no vowing nor fasting, or punctilios of devotion—those “enclosures of holiness”—and chilled by his eternal negations, the ancient Sadducee lost his reverence for the divine, could sympathize with neither the ceremonious Pharisee, nor fervent Essene; and having an eye on the present only, lived the life of a thorough worldling.

A resemblance has been pointed out by a respectable writer between these three ancient Jewish sects, and three Mohammedan sects mentioned by Malcolm in his account of Persia, as existing in that country, viz., the Sheahs, Soonees, and Soofees. The Sheahs maintained the literal meaning of the Koran; the Soonees assert the necessity of a supplement to it by the *sonna*, which is a collection of traditions and commentaries; whilst the Soofees resemble the Essenes in the contemplation of the divine love and their four stages to the attainment of divine beatitude. And doctrinally speaking, as it respects their view of the human will, we may perhaps also say that the Sadducees were Pelagians, the Essenes absolute predestinarians or necessitarians; and the Pharisees semi-pelagians. But however astray in their metaphysics, the Essenes were, no doubt, of the three, truest in their feelings to the natural religious sentiment of entire dependence on a higher power, and nearest in their practice to the self-denying ethics of Jesus Christ.

The origin of this sect is not historically clear. Pliny, who wrote in Vespasian's reign, ascribes to them a great antiquity, and makes them out a great marvel of self-preservation. As the passage is curious and in point, as giving their locality as well as several peculiarities, such as their misogamy, celibacy, &c., we present it entire in the original Latin: “Ab occidentali (Asphaltitis) litore Esseni, quos fugitant usquequaque nocentes, gens sola, et in toto in orbe præter ceteros mira, sine ulla fœmina, omni

venere abdicatâ, sine pecunia, socia palmarum. In diem ex quo convenarum turba renascitur, large frequentatibus quos vita fessos ad mores eorum fortunæ fluctus agitat. Ita per seculorum millia (incredibile dictu) gens eterna est in qua nemo nascitur. Tam fecunda illis aliorum vitæ penitentia est. Infra hos Engadda oppidum fuit.”* The Roman naturalist’s descriptive powers are no doubt more reliable than his chronological accuracy. Jewish sectarism was undoubtedly of late growth among that people. The origin of the oldest of their leading sects has no historical vouchers farther back than about two hundred years before Christ. Essenism, however, may have sprung out of ancient Rechabitism. Light-foot, from the local habitation of the two, thinks they may have so descended by generation or example. The community mentioned by Pliny seem to have occupied the old dwelling spot of the Kenites, designated Judges 1:16. “The wilderness of Judah,” was doubtless the desert on the western side of the Dead sea, and identical with “the wilderness of Engedi.” The locality, called *’Ain Jidy*, by the modern Arabs, is situated, according to Dr. Robinson, nearly at the middle point of the western coast. It abounds, we are told, with caverns and “the rocks of the wild goats;” while “a death-like solitude” reigns over the region. But still there are streams and a fine soil at *’Ain Jidy*. Had it been otherwise, it would not have suited such an association as the Essenes. This place is not far from twenty miles south of Jerusalem.

It is generally believed by the learned, that we have a trace of the original Essenes, and perhaps Pharisees also, in Maccabees 2:42 (168 B. C.), which thus reads: “Then there came unto him a company of *Assideans*, who were mighty men of Israel, even all such as were voluntarily devoted to the law.” Grotius, with many others, finds them in these ancient חסידים *Hassidim*, or *Hassideans*, thus called, according to Philo, from their singular piety, humility, and devotion. Among them, as Gale in his most erudite “Court of the Gentiles” observes, Hebrew philosophy chiefly flourished. Between the Essene and Pythagorean practice, he shows remarkable similarities, which indicate some relationship. Every nation, however, and every religious system, has had its ascetics, its Pythagorean religionists, who mistake austerities for piety, and engage in the contest with evil in too *transcendental* a manner. Among ancient and modern heathen, in the bosom of Judaism, in the centre of Christendom, we find these peculiar developments of the moral and religious sentiment. They imply no imitation or collusion, but spring from a true feeling at bottom, which is, however, indulged disproportionately to knowledge. So far as they embody and promote *truth*, they stand on one and the

* Nat. Hist., Lib. 5, cap. 19.

same basis. So far as they violate its laws, they are only manifestations of a common morbid tendency. From this original Assidean stock, both Pharisees and Essenes, or Essæans, were probably derived, being one in the outset; and hence, by verbal corruption, the *name* of the latter, according to Wolzogenius and others.

When we come to the important question, why the Essenes are not mentioned by the Evangelists, we must not pass by the view of the learned Drusius, that they were in point of fact a branch or order of Pharisees, in the popular estimation, and that the names of the two were sometimes confounded, or interchanged, the more obscure being in common parlance sunk into the more distinguished. His chief authority for this opinion is Gorion, a Jewish author, who mentions only *two* sects, viz. the Sadducees, and the Hassideans or Pharisees, "whom the people followed." Another proof to this effect is, that Meñahem, an Essene, who lived under Herod the Great, was a disciple of Pollio, a chief of the Pharisees. Again, Josephus tells of one Bannus, a great ascetic, whom he fell in with in his sectarian experiments, the said Bannus being clothed with barks of trees, using only food spontaneously grown, and dipping his body night and day in cold water, in order to live a chaste life. But this man was an Essene; yet the author of the book of *Juchasin* calls him a Pharisee. But for more information on this point, we must refer to the works of Drusius, who had a controversy with Scaliger and Serrarius relative to the Assideans. Without pressing this hypothesis, however, the silence of the Gospels as to the Essenes is still very far from authorizing any suspicion of the real historical integrity of these revered records. It must certainly be admitted, that though the latitude of meaning in which the name Pharisee was used, may have excluded the *name* Essene from them, the non-occurrence in the narratives of *persons*, answering to their known ethical and religious peculiarities, calls for additional explanation. Most writers who have adverted to this subject, agree that the small number of this sect—said not to have exceeded about four thousand—their recluse and eremitic life, their anchoretic separation from the people, with whom they did not mingle, and whom they did not teach—they being strangers and unknown at Jerusalem, and systematically shunning all large towns—and, as Prideaux thinks, their harmless and virtuous lives, are the true reasons why the Evangelists have nothing to say of the Essenes. And besides, as Lardner observes, "it was not their design to write the history of Jewish sects, but of our Savior's ministry."—"Is it any wonder that the Evangelists had no particular occasion to mention this private set of men in writing the life of our Savior? John 18:19, 20. This is one of the glories of our Savior's character, as it is our very great happiness, that what he said and did, was public. These men would not come to him, and it would have been a disparagement for him to have gone to them. Certainly, as Dr. Prideaux

observes, 'almost all that is peculiar to this sect, is condemned by Christ and his Apostles.' And this," adds Lardner, "is sufficient for us." He quotes Sir John Marsham to the same purport, who also states that the early Jewish Rabbis do not mention them. Some, however, have supposed them to have been alluded to in our Lord's words, Matt. 19:12. Lightfoot gives some reasons for supposing that when "John was baptizing in Enon near Salim," his position was in the neighborhood of these ascetics as heretofore described. He says, "it might be supposed that the Baptist, as he had been among two sects of the Jews, and had baptized some of them, so now he applied himself to the third sect, the Essenes, and was baptizing some of them."

Indeed, some Christian writers have argued that John was brought up among Essenes, on the ground of his ascetic character, and recorded eremitism, Luke 1:80. But the theory that makes Christianity itself an emanation and modification of Essenism, amended and fitted to his purpose by Jesus of Nazareth, himself a disciple of this theosophic, ascetic school, is one of very painful hostility to the Divine word, and appears to us to disregard all historical probabilities. We do not deny the lawfulness, nay, the naturalness of the inquiry. The earnest mind, in executing its high task imposed on all, of seeking after truth, 'is destined to rebound from one false hypothesis after another, until it is attracted unalterably to the only one which will explain the *facts* that encircle man's moral and intellectual consciousness. No man, however, is at liberty to give out or embrace theories which are irreconcilable with the prominent features of the gospel. And if the Redeemer, as portrayed in the New Testament, was no more like the historical Essene of Josephus, than he was like John the Baptist, or a monkish devotee; if his life was as different from that of those Jewish ascetics, as Clarkson's or Henry Martyn's, from a modern Shaker's; if all that was peculiar in their ethical and religious system, was condemned and discountenanced both doctrinally and practically, by Him whom the Gospels represent as Lord of Jew and Gentile; then are we bound by all that is reasonable, to seek in some other quarter the origin of Christianity. A glance at the history will decide this point. Let us be just in our inquiry. Judged by his own words and deeds, Christ bore a resemblance to the Essene only so far as the Essene lived a true life, and had attained right views of the kingdom of God. On the same principle, and to the same extent, Jesus accorded, both in doctrine and life, with Socrates and Plato, with Confucius in China, and Seneca at Rome, as well as Moses in Judea; with the ancient Indian gymnosophists and Persian Magi. And he must needs have been just so far in sympathy with all systems, and in lineament like all men, or he assuredly could not have been, what the Scriptures claim for him, and what sinful humanity requires in him as its Savior, a personal

exemplification of all that man ought to be, as a being related to God, and capable of moral perfection. Our Lord could not fail to recognize in his character and religion, the *divine* that was already in the world ; nor to sympathize with every element of goodness which under a superincumbent mass of evil was yet kept alive, and every fragment of holy truth which lay in this or that portion of the field of his redeeming mission ; otherwise piety herself must have given way before the tide of doubt let in upon her by her own reason. But now in this very freedom and breadth of his system, in its many points of conjunction and chords of harmony with the philosophies and moralities and religious feelings by which infinite wisdom had been conducting the predestined development of human nature, we read a plain signature of truth, a precious manifestation both of humanity and divinity. Christianity, if of heaven, must of course prefer truth to originality. A divinely commissioned Redeemer inspired with but one purpose, that of eternal love, and seeing at a glance what was, and what was not of the Heavenly Father's planting, would destroy only what was wrong ; would use every sound material found ready at his hands, in re-building the great temple of humanity, and would pull down nothing which already stood on the right foundation. It is not justifiable to regard our Savior as a fallible mortal, a copyist or a mere transcendent religious genius, and his holy religion a patch-work of human origin, because his theology was not entirely *new*,—because his ethics were not entirely unknown to mankind. Now if Christ's likeness to the Essenes opens the door to doubt as to his supernatural claim, his greater *unlikeness* to them ought to close it for ever. It is impossible to deny, that between what is recorded of the Savior, and what is recorded of this sect, there are several important points of resemblance—such as the moral dignity and duty of reciprocal service, the disparagement of riches, hostility to oath-taking, the value of self-denial, the pacific virtues, &c. But in all these particulars, the Essenes, so far as they did not press them extravagantly, only carried out the true *spirit* of the law of Moses, as ever cherished by the most pious under the Theocracy, and clearly expounded by the prophets. And the true Messiah, whom it behooved to “fulfil the law,” and enlarge the bounds of the theocratic kingdom in all its destined spiritual fulness so as to take in the whole family of man, must of course re-produce and re-publish the same eternally perfect principles. But when they cross the bounds of Scripture and nature, and inculcate a round of needless austerities, erecting a standard of artificial *unspiritual* holiness, tying down the soul to a multiplicity of outward observances, exhausting to body and to mind, and derogatory to the wisdom and goodness of God, we find the system of Jesus Christ in direct antagonism to theirs. The parallel ceases precisely where reason parts company with the Essenes ; for we ever find

him the wonder and pattern of all ages, going with his age in all its recorded attainments of good, and rising heaven-high above it, wherein it was yet lying, perhaps unconsciously under the dominion of evil. Take, for instance, Christ's philanthropic and natural interpretation of the sabbatical law. How pointedly, and how beautifully he rebukes the over-strained sanctification of it taught by the Pharisee, and carried out to still greater lengths by the upright, though misguided Essene. Math. 12:1-8; Mark 2:23-28. Luke 6:1-10, 13:10-17. Their scrupulous washings, receive their quietus in Matth. 23:25. Mark 7:1-13. Luke 11:38-9. Their "will-worship," "bodily exercise," and "voluntary humility," are set at naught by one who knew the spirit of the Master better than we do, in Col. 2:21-23; while in 1 Tim. 4:3, their dietetic morality and celibatic tenets fall under the same condemnatory sentence. Christ and his apostles taught no monasticism, no asceticism, no Shakerism, no enslaving literalism. "According to Christ," remarks the learned Prideaux, "whosoever is diligent in his honest calling, how mean soever it be, is by so doing as much serving God, as when at his prayers, provided, that while he doth the one, he doth not leave the other undone." It must also be observed as it respects the relation of the historical Essenes to the historical Messiah, that their silence, as to a resurrection, and a kingdom of God on earth, a regenerating spirit, and a redeeming Messiah, their sensual representations of the eternal world, must for ever stand in the way of those who would refer Christianity to this earthly source.

But other considerations also rebut such a solution of the problem. One is that suggested by Milman, that Jesus draws his imagery and phraseology so much from the marriage relation and the vineyard, not favorite themes, one would suppose, of those zealous sticklers for celibacy and cold water. As the Essenes are said to have been total abstinent from *wine*, the Savior must have placed himself at the outset in opposition to them, by his accredited agency in the production of that article at the marriage scene of Cana. The argument holds as good for us from the bare reputation of his having performed so anti-ascetic a miracle.

Again, Christianity has been from the first, peculiarly an aggressive, actively proselyting movement, attacking every other system, and inspiring its adherents with the most self-denying zeal for its diffusion. This feature renders it still more difficult to identify it with any antecedent religion or moral tendency.

As to the doctrine of a community of goods, which the Essenes practised, distinguishing themselves thereby from all antiquity, it is in vain to seek here a foothold for this theory, since no such precept is to be found in the New Testament, and the notion of its finding place first among Christians at Jerusalem who devoted private property so liberally to their poorer brethren at the interest-

ing and peculiar period recorded Acts 2: is not sustained by the concurrent history. The distinction of rich and poor is everywhere recognized in the Christian Scriptures.

The hypothesis, then, which makes Christianity an outgrowth of Essenism is untenable. It breaks down at every important point of the comparison. It will not bear the test of honest historical and analytical inquiry. Unbelief must search elsewhere for an affiliation of this strange, unique religion, which certainly originated *somewhere*, and must be ascribed to the agency of some intelligent cause, either in or above the world, and that at no very great remove from the time and place which all the converging lines of history and tradition compel us to acknowledge as the chronological and geographical matrix of the Christian faith. It is the conception of the peculiar idea of Christ as a character, and the devotion of so many minds to the glorification of his name, and the setting forth of his merits and the annunciation of his transcendent demands upon the faith of mankind, then and there, as our New Testament and ecclesiastical and heathen records and memorials place beyond the power of doubting, that call for some solution different from what has yet been offered to the world by the patrons of deism, or by Dr. Strauss and his school. And reason as we may, the pure *feelings* of the world will be faithful to Jesus Christ as entitled to divine honors, and the everlasting gratitude of a sinful, dying race, faithful to the Bible as the sacred oracles of Heaven, revealing God, and sanctifying the soul of man, and proving equally true and equally necessary both to the religious and the historical sentiment in human nature.

† That there are some minute items of resemblance between the code of the Essenes and particular sayings of the Redeemer, which we have not adverted to, may be true. Let each lover of truth look and decide for himself. Growing up in the bosom of Judaism as both did, and united by a common bond of language, nationality, and religion, it might easily happen that proverbial expressions, or forms of action and modes of thought, would be adopted from the common stock, and fallen in with as convenient and natural channels of self-development,—as well as on Christ's part, of uniting himself most sympathizingly and effectively with the life of humanity. Let us, however, give the Essene credit for all that he was as a worshiper of the true God, and as a man striving after moral purity in a corrupt age. The Gospel that breathed new life into the higher nature of man, can afford to allow all his virtues. We know that the Spirit of Christ opens the eye to the excellences of others. Truth rejoices in truth, and as all truth is from the same source, the lustre of one development can never be increased by hiding the glory of another. We would not enhance the necessity of our Lord's appearance by depreciating the moral condition of mankind at that period. Those ascetic

Jews deserve well of mankind for the light they gave out in a dark age. We admire the humanity and justice of their principles; their disapproval of war and slavery in the midst of a world lying in wickedness, and the noble example of industry, frugality, and moderation in the things of this life they set before all. We honor their honest endeavors to combine the *vita contemplativa* and the *vita activa*,—to escape the bondage of the senses, to maintain the supremacy of the spirit, and to unite themselves with the Highest. But in all these respects, they are only the true children of monotheism, the legitimate offspring of the Jewish theocracy. They could have sprung up nowhere else.

In the phenomenon of the Essenes let us therefore adore the provident wisdom of Jehovah, and recognize the secret working of his love in carrying forward the great, eternal economy of salvation. They exerted an influence on their age which helped pave the way for the Christ. Conscience spoke, and was spoken to, through them; and the dying sense of virtue was kept alive. Thus were they stars which emitted an humble though useful light before, but grew pale and became invisible after, the coming of the Sun of Righteousness. There is, indeed, a true *asceticism*—a moral and religious self discipline for the subjugation of sense to spirit—which goes before as well as follows after, an earnest reception of Christianity. It is only when bearing the *Cross*, which virtue ever lays on her followers in our present being, that it is possible for man to come into communion with a Savior whose whole existence in time was a voluntary sacrifice of self to the will of God. For a sinful creature striving after holiness, *via crucis, via lucis*, is an axiom never to be forgotten.

Be it ours, then, to make the imperfectly righteous 'though sincere Essene, a guide to his infinite Superior, the sinless One, the world-befriending Jesus. Be it ours, led by heavenly wisdom, to seek and to find in every human system the connecting link which unites it to the Divine in the universe; the higher truth and life which are now revealing themselves on all sides and out of every finite phenomenon, "to awaken the soul from the sleep of superstition, the torpor of atheism, and the death of sin."



ARTICLE VIII.

DATE OF THE BOOK OF JOB.

There appeared in a late number of the German periodical, the *Studien und Kritiken*, the following ingenious and erudite disquisition, from the pen of F. G. Vaihinger, on the vexed but interesting subject of the age of the Book of Job. An excellent version of it soon after appeared in the *London Biblical Review*, which we have preferred substantially to copy, to translating it anew. Though not entirely conclusive, yet it cannot fail to be regarded as an important contribution to the literature of this difficult subject.—Ed.

Of all the Old Testament writings, the book of Job, as to its spirit, its contents, and its language, is the greatest production of the Hebrew people; it is the true *Epopée* of the nation; that in which the theocracy is exhibited in the clearest manner; and in which the deepest thoughts of the human soul, clothed naturally and beautifully in a dress of the most gorgeous poetry, present themselves to our view, and struggle with intense earnestness for the solution of the great enigma of the world's history. In the case of such a book, the date of its composition must be of the greatest value; because, when placed in the light of its own age, it speaks to us a more intelligible language; and its full comprehension becomes so much the more perfect. How difficult it is to determine this point in the case before us, is proved by the simple fact, that the critics of more recent times, from Eichhorn and Bérthold, down to Vatke and Ernst Meier, vary respecting the date no less than *a thousand years*, inasmuch as the former place it in the period before Moses, and the others at some time after the Babylonish captivity, namely, in the fifth century before Christ. As I now propose to make some attempt at fixing the real age of the book of Job, I shall begin by endeavoring to place certain limits on both sides, by means of which the investigation can go forward with security. In this way we shall at length fix upon a given period, which still affords a tolerable latitude. Intelligent critics must not be vexed at this indefinite result, since even Ewald, who seeks to fix the time of its composition very precisely, says, "The age of the book can only be known *by approximation*, even as regards centuries."

I begin, then, by laying down, in the outset, these two propositions:—

1. *That the book of Job cannot have been composed before the time of Solomon. And,*
2. *That the book of Job must have been written before Jeremiah, consequently before the time of King Josiah.*

Before I attempt to narrow this period, which comprehends full three centuries, I will offer some evidence for both propositions.

And, first, the earlier critics, who fix the date of the composition before the time of Moses, or between Moses and Solomon, have almost all started with the common error of not separating the time of Job's life from that of the composition, which treats of him and of his destiny. The necessity of making this distinction, however, must be at once obvious. That Job, whose life most evidently belonged to patriarchal times, himself wrote the document which bears his name, no one will now in good earnest maintain, much less undertake to prove. On this point, therefore, there is no need to insist. But there are *positive* marks, which render the idea of its being written before Solomon altogether impossible. These lie (to pass by the other reasons which have either often been urged before, as those derived from the progress of religious ideas, and from political relations, or which are not very conclusive, as the influence of foreign culture), these lie, we say, in the *language* of the book, both in general, and also in its particular features. I do not now refer to the so-called Aramæisms, of which we shall speak by-and-by, but rather to the whole figurative construction of the poem, and its by no means polished and artistic, yet, at the same time, pure and flowing diction. When we compare with this the well-attested relics of the earlier poetry, such as the fragments in the twenty-first of Numbers, and the song of Deborah, we must feel convinced that the earlier poetical diction was much more rough and unpolished, and that it was first brought into form and pliancy by David and Solomon, or at least during their glorious age; as we find it, for example, in the Psalms and Proverbs. The prose, in like manner, appears to have received at that time a beneficial modification; at any rate, it is not easy to assert anything in opposition to Ewald's remarks on the re-elaboration of the earlier historical books, by some author of that period. (See Ewald's *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, vol. i. p. 72.) But, to come to examples, the expression אֹפִיר (Ophir), occurs twice in the book of Job, namely, 22:24, and 28:16, an expression which it is vain to search for in the Pentateuch, though it often makes mention of gold; as also in the Psalms of David, which, in the same manner as the Pentateuch, only speaks of זָהָב, and כֶּסֶף. It is true that the region itself is mentioned in the register of the peoples of the earth (Gen. 10:29); but Ewald has proved beyond a doubt, in his *Israelitish History*, that this register does not represent the ideas of the Israelites at the time of Moses, but the later geographical ideas of the age of Solomon. At any rate there was no trade to Ophir, and no gold from Ophir, in Israel before the time of Solomon; and on that account we find it first mentioned in the later Psalms, as 45:10. No one, at least, can very well deny that the two passages, 1 Kings 9:28, and 1 Kings 10:11, express the *first* acquaintance of Israel with this distant land. If, then, the book of Job is an Israelitish production,

as is now universally acknowledged, the very circumstance that the gold of Ophir is mentioned in it,—gold which first became known in the time of Solomon,—is a striking proof that the composition of the book of Job cannot fall before the time of Solomon, to say nothing of the many other objections, which stand in the way of an earlier authorship.

But however certain it may be that the book of Job was *not* written before the time of Solomon, it is equally evident that it *was* written before the time of the prophet Jeremiah, and of King Josiah. If we carefully compare the passage in Jer. 20 : 14—18, with Job 3 : 3—10, and Jer. 17 : 1, with Job 19 : 24, we cannot but observe striking relationship. If this relationship indicates the acquaintance of the one author with the writings of the other, there can be no hesitation in asserting, both from the thorough originality of the author of Job, and from the circumstance that Jeremiah, in other places, quotes the earlier writings in his work, that the book of Job was known by Jeremiah, and consequently, was written *previous* to his prophecies.

This becomes so much the clearer when we observe how closely the Lamentations of Jeremiah are related to Job in many points, both of language and subject ; so that, from these circumstances together, we may conclude with tolerable certainty, upon Jeremiah's acquaintance with the book of Job. The relationship in the subject-matter presents itself throughout the whole work ; but as an instance of it in *expression*, any one may compare Lam. 3 : 7, 9, with Job 19 : 8 ; Lam. 2 : 15, with Job 12 : 4, 17 : 6, 30 : 1.

Contemporary with Jeremiah, was the prophet Ezekiel. If this author (see Ezek. 14 : 15) knew Job as a very pious and devotional man, there must certainly have been before his imagination, not a mere traditionary character, but the distinct person whose life is contained in the work before us ; more especially with reference to the passage in Job 42 : 8. These reasons may be sufficient to lead any unprejudiced mind to regard it as morally certain, not only that Job lived before the age of both these prophets, but that his life had also been depicted in the book which we now possess. A similar reference to the book of Job appears also to be contained in Isa. 40 : 2, as compared with Job 7 : 1, also in Zech. 14 : 5, as compared with Job 5 : 1.

We are now in a position to advance somewhat farther, and to narrow our first supposition. In the book of Amos there are two passages which coincide in a very striking manner with the book of Job. In Amos 4 : 13, this expression is used respecting Jehovah, וְיֵרֶךְ עַל-בְּמֹתַי אֲרֶעַ, the very same which we find in Job 9 : 8, only in this case, instead of the expression אֲרֶעַ, we find the term יָם employed. In the same manner, in Amos 5 : 8, we find the names of two constellations, כִּימָה and כַּסֵּל, which we also meet with

in Job 9 : 9, and 38 : 21. These coincidences can hardly be fortuitous ; they seem to indicate either that Amos had known the author of the book of Job, or that that author had known him. At the first view of the case, it may seem difficult to arrive at a decision on this point ; but other points have yet to come before us, which will throw much light upon it. In consideration of the acknowledged originality of the book of Job, we should more safely conclude, at the first blush of the question, that the simple shepherd Amos had yielded his mind to the influence of so profound a writing as that of Job, rather than imagine the contrary. (Compare the expression in Micah 1 : 3, and a similar one, Isa. 58 : 14, and Deut 32 : 13.) For example, the heights of the sea (that is, of the sea of clouds above us), as used by Job, is manifestly a stronger and bolder expression than the heights of the earth, which are familiar to the eyes of every one. Since, however, it is clearly shown in other cases that the weaker term is also the later, it seems more natural to suppose that the weaker term was imitated by Amos, than the stronger by the author of Job.

If, on the one hand, the acknowledged critical canon, *that the stronger expression is the original*, goes to prove that the book of Job was used by the prophet Amos ; the other critical rule, namely, *that that expression is the more original, which has most decidedly the whole connection on its side*, decides for the same conclusion. (Compare Amos 5 : 8, with Job 9 : 9, and 38 : 31.) This is, without question, the case with Job. The subject, in the instance above referred to, is a representation of the power of God in the heavens (verses 7—9) ; how he darkens the sun with clouds ; how in the tempest he lets down the heavens nearer to the earth (compare Psalm 18 : 30), and treads upon the heights of the cloud-sea with his thunder (compare Job 36 : 30) ; but how also, in the serene night, he leads forth the glorious stars, and exhibits in them at once his grandeur and his majesty. The poet, therefore, describes in its entire connection the power of God, first upon earth, and then in the heavens. Exactly the same is the case in Job 38 : 31. Here the poet, from the 22d verse, presents a series of questions on the phenomena of the heavens, and comes in due connection to the planets, naming not only these, but other constellations also. Now, in the case of Amos (5 : 8), this close connection is entirely wanting. In verses 7 and 10, the subject is respecting the sins of the people ; and between these, the description of Jehovah, as seen in verse 8, is interposed, in order to show how rash a thing it is to sin against so powerful a God. Here the expression *עֲלֹה כִּימָה וְכִמָּל* is one, which is by no

means called forth by the construction of the subject, but appears rather as a thought derived from some other source ; and the relation of Amos to Job is the same as that which we have already

acknowledged in the case of Jeremiah. But if we admit, as we reasonably must, that the passages in Jeremiah evidence reminiscences from Job, there is no reason to deny this, nay, there is every reason to admit it in the case of Amos. But, however certain it is that Jeremiah knew the biography of Job, equally so is it that the above-mentioned passages in Amos point to some acquaintance with the same author. If therefore Amos knew and made use of the book of Job, the period we at first supposed is narrowed almost 200 years, and we can now without hesitation place the composition in the time between Solomon and king Amaziah, so that we have now only to hover over a period of about 150 years.

From the time of Joash, in which, according to the best accounts, the prophet Joel flourished, the style of writing became more lively. In this time, a number of poems fall, which have been generally referred to the time of the Maccabees, but which Ewald refers to the latter age of the Persian empire. In this time also, the new recension of the four books of Moses, by what Ewald calls the third historian, was made, as also parts of the larger book of Kings. It was a time in which the better spirit of Israelitism struggled powerfully against the growing corruption. I should not hesitate to fix the composition of the book of Job in this period (about fifty years before Amos) if there were not reasons for assigning to it an earlier date.

The century between Rehoboam and Joash is entirely devoid of all literary productions. There is not a single psalm which can be attributed with any certainty to this period; no prophecy of this age is handed down; neither can any historical book, or any continuation of one, be safely referred to it; nay, it is with great hesitation that even Ewald conceives the probability of the continuation of the book of Kings being composed about this time, that is, in the reign of Asa or Jehoshaphat. We will not of course affirm that there was absolutely no literature in Israel during this age; but assuredly, after the mental activity of the time of David and Solomon, after the lofty tone which the spirit and literature of the age then assumed, it must be regarded as a time of, comparatively speaking, insignificant productions, and of degenerating taste—a state of things to which the disappointment felt at the disruption of their once flourishing kingdom, and the despair occasioned by their losses and humiliation, greatly contributed.

With the reign of Joash and Amaziah on the one side, of Jehu and Jeroboam II. on the other, it is true, both a religious and a political excitement came upon the people; but is it probable that so deep and thoughtful a work as the book of Job can have been composed at the *beginning* of this period? In other nations we always find that great poets have appeared *at the end* of a remarkable era—at the conclusion of an historical age of development;

thus it was with Homer among the Greeks, and Virgil among the Romans; thus also with Dante and the Niebelungen Lied: all these are productions which belong to the conclusion of a glorious period. According to this analogy it would have, *à priori*, more probability were we to fix the composition of the book of Job at the end of the glorious age of David and Solomon, i. e., about the last year of Solomon's reign, or in the time of Rehoboam, than in the beginning of the new era which commences with the writings of Joel in the reign of Joash. For at all events, Job must have been composed considerably earlier than the prophecies of Amos, inasmuch as *he* knew it and borrowed from it. If it is fully admitted (and according to what we have said there can hardly be a doubt on the matter) that Amos made use of the book of Job; then we can no longer have any hesitation in placing the composition of Job previous to the illiterate period which elapsed between Rehoboam and Joash. That such dark and empty periods can exist in the literature of a people, is seen in the age which our own annals present as immediately succeeding the glorious reign of Charles the Great.

From this general conjecture we must now proceed to notice some more positive proofs. It has been long noticed and remarked that several of the Psalms treat upon subjects very nearly related to the book of Job. These are Psalm 6 : 38, 39; Psalm 12 : 13; Psalm 37 : 73; in which the very same struggle appears to exist in the heart of the Psalmist as that which we meet with, more fully explained, in the book of Job. But these Psalms which criticism, since the work of De Wette, has denied to David and his age, according to my deepest conviction belong to this very period, with the single exception, perhaps, of the 37th. My reasons for this opinion I have given fully elsewhere. Now if these thoughts, which might arise at any time (since the history of the world ever remains an enigma to men in the hour of trouble) developed themselves so strongly at the time of David and Solomon, is it to be wondered at, that just at the conclusion of this glorious age in the Israelitish history, after the lyric and gnomic poetry had reached their height, a composition should appear, which, in a dramatic-epic form, should combine together and place in the very boldest light, the opposite views which were then current respecting the mystery of the Divine government? The 39th Psalm (vide verse 14) is so nearly related to Job 9 : 27, and 10 : 20, both in the matter and the expression, that we can hardly avoid viewing them as being the productions of one and the same age, especially since, on the ground of their manifest originality, there is no room for supposing a mutual collusion. Is it not, then, we ask, highly credible that such "*fermenta cognitionis*" as we see in the Psalms of David, would give occasion to some poet of the age to develope these thoughts taken from the instruc-

tive and long-known history of Job still farther, and to disseminate that consolatory solution of the enigma, which refers the whole to the leadings of Divine Providence?

Against the opinion that the above-mentioned Psalms are referable to the time of David, hardly any tenable objections can be brought, since the whole of the language and imagery agree with that period, and with the very history of David himself; and that a period of great poetical activity was well fitted to call forth a larger work, like that of the book of Job, cannot be denied. Should criticism, however, succeed in disproving that these Psalms belong to the time of David and Solomon upon strong and undeniable grounds, and thus pull down our evidence for the earlier authorship of the book of Job, there still remains another witness, namely, the great and manifold relationship which it shows with the book of Proverbs. And here I will not dwell upon its relationship with the first part of the Proverbs (chaps. 1 : to 9 :), because this part may perhaps belong to a later period than that of Solomon, and originated, in all probability, from the diligent perusal of the more ancient portions. But the second part (chaps. 10 : to 24 :) clearly contains proverbs of the time of Solomon; an opinion which no sound critic has ever disproved. This, therefore, being the case, the fact that the language of Job and that of the Proverbs point us to one common period of composition (a fact which is acknowledged even by our opponents), speaks entirely in favor of our present theory.

We shall now quote some examples in order to make the correctness of this view of the case the more evident. The expression *תָּמָה*, which occurs in Job 2 : 3, 9 ; 27 : 5 ; 31 : 6, is found in Proverbs only in chap. 11 : 3. Further *וָיָרַח*, in the meaning *to tarry*, stands only in Proverbs 14 : 18 ; further *קָנָא*, in the meaning of *violence*, is only found in Job 5 : 2, and Prov. 14 : 10. *חֵמָה*, meaning *rage, passion*, occurs Job 19 : 29, 36 : 18, and with the exception of Gen. 27 : 44, only in Proverbs 15 : 1, 18 ; 19 : 19 ; 21 : 14 (27 : 4 ; 29 : 22) ; and consequently is entirely the usage of the Proverbs. On *בָּקַעַ* with *ל* compare Job 10 : 6, and Prov. 18 : 1. The expression *תִּשְׁתָּה*, which we meet with in Job 5 : 12 ; 6 : 13 ; 11 : 6 ; 12 : 16 ; 26 : 3 ; 30 : 22, occurs in Prov. 18 : 1 ; 8 : 14 ; 3 : 21 ; 27 : and later only in Isaiah 28 : 29 ; Mic. 6 : 9. In relation to the *form* of expression I will only point to Job 3 : 25, compared with Proverbs 10 : 24, and Job 4 : 14, in comparison with 27 : 28. With reference to similarity of thought, compare Job 13 : 5, with Proverbs 17 : 28 ; Job 15 : 16 ; 24 : 7, with Proverbs 26 : 6 ; Job 22 : 29, with Proverbs 16 : 18 ; 18 : 12 ; 29 : 23 ; Job 26 : 6, with Proverbs 15 : 11 ; Job 28 : 18, with Prov. 8 : 11.

These examples, which could be easily multiplied, are sufficient to show that a close relationship exists between the Proverbs and the book of Job—a relationship which warrants the conclusion that these two productions belong to one and the same age. We can altogether dispense with the question when the book of Proverbs might have been brought into its present form; enough, that it is an incontestable fact that the second portion of them is distinctly referable to the time of Solomon. If then so close a relationship can be established between the Proverbs and Job, both in reference to the thoughts and the expressions, and that too of such a character, that a more recent borrowing of the one author from the other cannot be at all admitted; if moreover, this similarity points to one particular era in which precisely these words, expressions, and thoughts were current, then but little can be wanting to prove that the book of Job must belong to the age of Solomon, or at least to a period within one generation from it.

For the reasons above adduced, which I trust have not been forced, but will be found really genuine, I consider myself justified in the opinion, that the composition of the book of Job is to be referred to the time of Solomon or Rehoboam,—more probably, indeed, to the latter, inasmuch as that age was so well adapted, in consequence of the misfortunes of the nation, to lead the mind of the poet to such reflections. Still the end of the age of Solomon was also in some measure adapted to produce the same effect.

The knowledge which is manifested in Job of Egyptian affairs and relations is by no means in contradiction with this opinion; for at the time of Solomon, Egypt was just re-opened to the Israelites, and the frequent intercourse between the two people must have had a great charm simply on the score of novelty. The affairs of other nations, moreover, which are developed, and the arts and the sciences that are mentioned in the book of Job, are by no means inconsistent with this age; and I see, in fine, only *two considerations* which can be raised in good earnest against the opinion.

The one is the deep perception it evinces of the other world. Here we are met with a threefold doctrine:—the doctrine of Satan, the doctrine of the interceding angels, and the doctrine of immortality. With reference to the doctrine of Satan, as seen in the first and second chapters, this being is not yet clearly distinguished from the other angels, as he is in Zech. 3 : 1, 2; there is as yet no decided opposition established between the kingdom of the good and the bad angels. An exactly similar view is found in 1 Kings 22 : 19—22, perhaps about fifty years after Rehoboam, and I do not profess myself able to find any very essential difference between this representation and that in the book of Job; only that *the Spirit* in the vision of the prophet Micaiah comes before us as though by chance, while in Job he appears rather to be the

designed accuser. As, however, the ideas respecting Satan were very fluctuating during all this age, even up to the 'Babylonish captivity, the difference here visible is not to be much regarded. The expression *Satan* occurs first in Numbers 22 : 22, 32, and in this case, indeed, as a verb. *There*, the angel appears in order to withstand Balaam in the commission of an act disapproved of by God. But in 1 Kings 22 : 19—22, a Spirit comes forward in order to *mislead* Ahab *into* a resolution disapproved of by God ; while the Satan in the book of Job exercises an influence simply upon the *outward relations* of the patriarch, not upon his mind and character. We see, then, that the representation in Job, in this respect at least, lies midway between the other two, and consequently indicates an *earlier* date than the representation in 1 Kings 22 : 19—22. But that the angels were considered in the time of David as partly protecting and partly deceiving spirits, appears evident from Psalm 91 : 11, 12, and Psalm 35 : 5, 6, two psalms which have been attributed, without any evidence whatever, to a later period.

On the contrary, when we consider the angels as beings which intercede for the interests of men before God, we find this view first presented with clearness in Zech. 1 : 11, and 3 : 1 ; but as servants and instruments of God for the welfare of men, they are *everywhere* regarded, and consequently from this particular modification of their office, where the whole conception of them is so fluctuating, no safe conclusion can be arrived at with reference to the date of the book.

Far greater stress, however, has been laid upon the belief in immortality which Job so fervently manifests (ch. 19 : 25), inasmuch as it has been erroneously imagined, that this lofty idea of a future state had not grown up upon the soil of Judea, but had been borrowed from some other source. This is certainly incorrect. For the 16th and 17th Psalms, which were unquestionably composed by David, fully express this belief. And what, moreover, could the common expression "*to be gathered to his fathers*" signify, unless a dim idea of continued existence in the world of shadows were couched under it ? Besides, can we suppose that heathen religions were more adapted to give birth to this belief than Judaism, which was without controversy distinguished far above them all in clearness and in light ? The view, then, which is taken of the future world in the book of Job, as I regard it, is no satisfactory ground for showing our opinion respecting its date to be erroneous.

But, it is said, *the language* is by far the most weighty consideration which necessitates us to suppose a later date of composition. There are found (it is urged) in the book of Job partly grammatical, partly verbal forms, which remind us forcibly of the Aramaic, words which have evidently been introduced at a late

period. I shall attempt, then, to collect all these together, so far at least as they have suggested themselves to me, or been quoted elsewhere.

There are found peculiarities of this kind :—

1. Job 8 : 8, רִשְׁוֹן. For this, however, we find, Job 15 : 7, רִאשֹׁן. The same difference in orthography is found also in Prov. 13 : 18, רִישׁ; 28 : 19, רִישׁ; and 30 : 8, רִאשׁ.

2. Job 6 : 27, רִיעַ for the usual form רִיעַ; on which we may remark that in this passage many manuscripts leave out the *yod*.

3. Job 22 : 29, and 33 : 17, נִמָּה contracted, instead of נִמְאָה, which latter occurs, however, Job 41 : 6.

4. Job 31 : 7, מִמָּאֵם. The usual form, however, occurs

namely, מִמָּם, Job 11 : 15.

5. נִמָּא, 30 : 8, conjugated like the verbs in אִלָּא, as in תִּלָּאֵם, 2 Sam. 22 : 12.

6. Job 39 : 9, רִיט. In the same manner we have it, Psalm 22 : 22; in other places it is רִאט, Deut. 33 : 17.

7. Job 41 : 4, רִתִּין, for the usual form רִתִּין. This word does not occur elsewhere in Job. In codex 168 of Kennicott the accustomed form is elsewhere used.

8. Job 22 : 2, סִכֵּן, with עַל. On the contrary, in Job 35 : 3, it is used with ל, and sometimes without a preposition. The interchange of אֵל, with עַל, occurs also in Isaiah.

9. Job 24 : 9, רֶשֶׁת, as also Isaiah 60 : 16, in the sense of *breast*. Elsewhere the usual meaning could perhaps be retained, as it is done in the Vulgate.

10. Job 19 : 29, שׁ for אֶשׁ, which, however, in other places is contested by Ewald.

As partly grammatical and partly verbal peculiarities, the following are mentioned.

11. Job 2 : 10, קָבַל, which elsewhere occurs only once in Ezra, three times in Esther, and four times in Chronicles; yet, still it is found Prov. 19 : 20, in the same signification, *to receive in return*. Also the passage in Job is a poetical passage.

12. Job 5 : 2, and 21 : 22, ל as a sign of the accusative case, as in Psalm 135 : 11, and Lam. 4 : 5. The very same thing we find in 1 Sam. 22 : 7; 2 Sam. 3 : 30; Isaiah 11 : 9; and this is the less striking, as the object stands first.

13. קִלְהָ, which also occurs elsewhere 2 Sam. 23 : 2; Psa. 19 : 5; in the Davidic Psalms, and in Prov. 23 : 9. It can therefore

only be alleged, that, *in addition* to the ordinary plural מְלִיכִים, the Aramaic form מְלִיךָ occurs some twelve or thirteen times. But this plural is found in a yet older poem, viz., Judges 5 : 10 ; also in prose, 1 Kings 11 : 13 ; therefore it is not to be wondered at that we find it in two other places in Job ; viz., 24 : 22, and 31 : 10.

14. Job 21 : 28, גִּירָב, in a bad sense, meaning a tyrant. So, however, it occurs in Isa. 13 : 2. From this nothing can be concluded with reference to a later authorship.

15. Job 5 : 1, and 15 : 15, קְרָשִׁים, in the sense of *angels*, a word which, among the writings previous to the captivity, we only find employed in this sense in Zech. 14 : 5, but which proves nothing respecting the age of the book, because it does not occur in the later Hebrew. In Zechariah, however, the word appears clearly borrowed from Job.

16. Job 16 : 19, שָׁהָר, which hardly ever occurs except in this place, and, as an Aramaic word, can warrant no conclusion, since it is a peculiarity of the poets to use uncommon words ; and Job retains also the accustomed word עָר, vide 10 : 17 ; 8 : 19.

17. Job 14 : 20, and 15 : 24, תִּקְרָה. This expression, it is true, only occurs elsewhere in Ecclesiastes, Esther, and Daniel ; but it is very questionable whether this proves anything more than the rare and poetical use of the word.

18. Job 21 : 2, and 22 : 3, חָפֶז, in the meaning of *desire*, then also *care*, *business*, as in Isa. 44 : 28, is a somewhat striking case. Still the usual meaning also occurs Job 31 : 16.

19. Job 7 : 3, מָנָה, *to determine*, occurs poetically in addition to the later writings in Deuteronomy and in the Psalms. We can only conclude that, in common with many other words, it acquired a more frequent use in later times.

20. Job 22 : 28, גִּזַּר. In the meaning *to decide* or *conclude*. This use of the word occurs only in Daniel and in Chaldee, but it may have been used as a poetical rarity in the earlier language of Judea.

21. Job 26 : 9, אָמַן, in the meaning *to close*. But Ewald shows the more proper meaning here to be, *to draw together*, as we find it in 1 Kings 6 : 10.

22. Job 32 : 6, יָרָא, in the meaning *to fear*, as also in the Syriac and Chaldee יִרְאָה. But this meaning is not necessary ; and the Hebrew meaning, *to creep away*, fully satisfies the passage.

23. Job 15 : 17, חָהָה. This occurs also poetically in the time of David, vide Psa. 19 : 3.

24. Job 36 : 22, ^{לֹרֵן}. This Ewald understands in the Aramaic sense, *lord*; but the Hebrew meaning, *teacher*, is perfectly satisfactory, and is still better adapted to the connection.

25. Job 6 : 2, we have ^{נָפַל} in the sense of *to fall*. But this is not Aramaic, it is only the verbal root from ^{נָפַל}. This rare meaning is here simply used *poetically*.

26. Job 36 : 2, ^{נָפַל}, is used instead of the usual form, ^{נָפַל}. This reminds us, it is true, of the Aramaic; but still we find the same thing in Isa. 28 : 10, 13, and also its derivative, ^{נָפַל}, in Isa. 10 : 25. From this, therefore, no safe conclusion can be drawn.

Out of all this number of cases, the first seven, and the eighteenth can alone be considered as striking. The whole of the other cases can be referred to poetical usage. When we meet often with several of such peculiarities in the little space of a single psalm, as, for example, in Psalm 68, in which alone we find no less than thirteen *ἀπαξ λεγόμενα*, or peculiar forms, it cannot certainly be anything strange to meet with a still greater number of unusual forms and significations in so considerable a poem as that upon Job. With reference, however, to the eight cases above mentioned, the first four are by no means uniformly carried out in the book of Job; from which circumstance the suspicion arises, that some early copyist has allowed himself to follow this method of writing the words. The fifth and sixth cases have analogies in the earlier writings; the seventh occurs only once; and the eighteenth can be just as easily explained by supposing it a dialectic peculiarity as it can by referring it to a later date. That there was some variation of dialect in North Palestine from the language of Jerusalem, has been shown from the song of Deborah, from the Canticles, and from the prophecies of Hosea. In the same manner the dialect of the South might also have shown variations from the ordinary forms, as indeed the book of Amos proves. (See Amos 5 : 11, and 6 : 8.) If, therefore, we suppose that the sage who wrote the poem on Job lived somewhere in the south of Palestine, perhaps on the caravan route near the lower end of the Dead Sea (a supposition which is rendered probable by his reference to Egyptian affairs, his knowledge of the gold mines in Arabia and Idumæa, his exact description of the caravans which cross there, his graphic allusions to the Troglodytes and to the sudden invasions of the Beduins, his precise descriptions of the wilderness, and other things of a similar nature), then the peculiarities of language, which, in comparison with the extent of the poem, are by no means considerable, cannot hold good as secure witnesses of a later composition, but lead us rather to refer them

to a dialectical peculiarity. From the distance of the author's residence from Jerusalem, we may likewise account for the circumstance, that the book, which has come down to us with great purity, was for a long time unread, and was probably first introduced to notice by the prophet Amos, who at any rate was the first to make any use of it in his writings. We should not omit to mention, either, that the regions south of Palestine and bordering upon Egypt, were very celebrated for the sages who resided there (1 Kings 5 : 10), and that even the Temanites in Idumæa were distinguished in this respect. (Jer. 49 : 7; Obad. 8.) The whole spirit of refinement, in fact, proceeded from the south. Accordingly, we see that Joab, when in the time of David he wanted a wise woman, went to the south, namely, to Tekoah (2 Sam. 14 : 2); and that the celebrated sages in the time of Solomon, Ethan, Heman, Calcol, and Dara, were, according to 1 Chron. 2 : 6, all of the tribe of Judah, and consequently dwelt in the south of the Holy Land. Is it not, then, conceivable that one of these very men, or a pupil of them, may have written the book of Job? or does it lie without the bounds of probability that at that very period in which the productive spirit of the Israelites was in its highest bloom, a work should have been composed by one of these men, which, on account of the stormy times that followed, was at first little known, but which was drawn from obscurity by Amos, and by virtue of its high excellence was afterwards received into the canon of the sacred writings? Moreover, however great a distinction might afterwards have been fixed between the sage on the one side, and the prophet and the priest on the other (vide Jer. 18 : 18; Ezek. 7 : 26), yet all the traces of this book indicate, that it was composed neither by a prophet nor a priest, but by a sage, such an one as we find in Solomon and his celebrated contemporaries.

Still although we might decide to fix the date of the book of Job in the time of Solomon or Rehoboam, yet we should feel inclined at first sight to exclude from this the speeches of Elihu, because we find in them a considerable difference, both with regard to the language and the style; also the Aramaic is here introduced in far greater abundance. In this case, indeed, it is not to be denied, that the introductory speech (from Job 32 : 6, to Job 33 : 7) is characterized by a kind of circumstantial diffuseness, which is very striking in comparison with the concentration otherwise observable. Also it must be granted that in this part, namely, in the beginning of the dialogue, far more of the Aramaic forms occur. The first of these objections might be explained by the consideration, that the feeling of respect due from youth to age (as it was enjoined in the east; vide Lev. 19 : 32) gave occasion to the younger of these sages to render a full account of the reasons why he should venture to speak; especially as, in the dialogue

itself, such a diffuseness no longer occurs. In reference to the second point, Ewald himself, the strongest opponent of the contemporaneousness of this portion, has remarked in his Commentary (p. 214) that the poet assigns to every speaker certain *favorite words and phrases*. Should it then be regarded as anything very remarkable, if the author—evidently a very expert and finished writer—makes Elihu use more of the Aramaic style in his speeches, a man whom he clearly introduces, if not precisely as an Aramæan, yet at any rate as a sage dwelling in the neighborhood of the Syrians, properly so called? (Compare חַי, Gen. 22 : 21, and מַי, 2 Chron. 22 : 5, with 2 Kings 8 : 28.) That the Syrians

also were perfectly well known in the age of David and Solomon, and consequently their peculiarity of language understood, can be sufficiently explained from the frequent commotions of both people, and from the extension of the Israelitish frontier at this time. Moreover, the unquestionably genuine portions present two constructions (Job 22 : 28, and 27 : 8), which strongly remind us of the Aramaic; in comparison with which the above-mentioned cases are by no means very striking and peculiar. In addition to this, it has been shown by Stickel, in the 258th page of his work, that in many passages, the words, phrases, significations, and conjunctives, occurring in Elihu's speeches, show a close connection with those portions of the book of Job, in which the expressions are quite peculiar. The strongest proof, however, for the contemporaneousness of the whole composition lies in the complete agreement which the speeches of Elihu exhibit, in common with the professedly genuine portions of the book of Job, with the Proverbs of Solomon. I take the liberty of indicating here the most important coincidences which the speeches of Elihu present with the second or earlier portion of the Proverbs, in order that our readers may satisfy themselves of the correctness of our assertion. The peculiar use of הֵנָּה, *there is* (Job 37 : 10, and Prov. 13 : 10), is common to both. The use of the word הִנֵּנִי in reference to the

fall of the wicked, is found in both Job 34 : 25, and Prov. 12 : 17. We have חֲמוּלָה, Job 37 : 12, with the same meaning as in Prov. 11 : 14, &c. Again, compare בְּהִשָּׁבִיל, Job 34 : 35, with Prov. 21 : 11; שֵׁר, *duty*, Job 33 : 23, with Prov. 14 : 2, מַעֲכָה; Job 32 : 3, with Prov. 15 : 1; and אֶכֶף, Job 33 : 7, with אֶכֶף, Prov. 16 : 26, &c.

Striking, however, as these coincidences are, yet they cannot be derived, in the case of either of the authors, from *imitation*; we should much rather say, that the traces of a common age are here betrayed, under the influence of whose spirit both of these writings

were dictated. Since, then, the Proverbs, in their essential part (which is unquestionably contained in the second portion, namely, from chap. 10 to chap. 22: 16), must be referred, both in language and matter, to Solomon, and since there is absolutely no ground why we should depart from this unalterable tradition (1 Kings 5: 11, Prov. 10: 1, Eccl. 12: 9), we are necessitated to assign the speeches of Elihu, as also the rest of the book of Job, to the same age; that is, to refer them to the age of Solomon himself, or to the age immediately succeeding him. With regard to the Aramaic forms, of which not a trace occurs in the prologue or the epilogue,—these we must attribute to the intention of the author, not to allow his characters entirely to belie their native place; just as also the poet himself, by peculiarities similar to those of Amos, shows his own native home to have been in the southern part of the country. For in like manner as Amos writes מִסְרָיִם, for מִצְרָיִם, so also does the author of Job write סִבָּא, 34: 36, for שִׁבָּא, Isa. 2: 6.

Thus, then, I trust that I have come in an unprejudiced manner to the result, that we must fix the composition of Job in the time before Jeremiah and Amos, and *about* the time of Solomon. For even should any one at length succeed in proving, upon unquestionable evidence, that the Proverbs were first collected together in the age of Hezekiah, yet it would not be possible to deny their first authorship to Solomon; so that we should still be driven back again to the age of Solomon, as that to which the book of Job must be referred

ARTICLE IX.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *A Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature.* Edited by JOHN KITTO, D.D., F.S.A. Editor of "*The Pictorial Bible.*" Author of "*The History and Physical Geography of Palestine,*" etc., etc. Illustrated by numerous engravings. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 894, 996. New York, M. H. Newman & Co. 1846.

THE limits of a notice like the present forbid such a description of this learned work as its merits deserve, or sufficient to give the reader a just idea of its plan. We regard it a most important and practically useful contribution to the cause of sound Biblical learning, and have no doubt that it will soon take the place, in the estimate of scholars, of every compilation of the kind. The work of Calmet, especially as revised by Dr. Robinson, and the more miscellaneous volume, the *Encyclopædia of Religious Knowledge*, though they have served a useful purpose, are so strikingly defective in many of the most important departments of archæology, and contain so little of the results of modern research, as to be painfully inadequate to the wants of the student. The present work not only supplies this long and deeply-felt deficiency, but enters into the discussion and explanation of important questions of philology and archæology, which no mere Biblical or Theological Dictionary ever before attempted. We can in no way put the reader in possession of the originality, comprehensiveness, and real utility of the work, so well as by simply sketching its plan, and indicating its general contents.

Besides the brief notices of every important thing relating to the Bible, the work presents a large number of independent treatises on different subjects in Biblical Literature, from a great variety of writers, over forty in number, and among whom are some of the most eminent and learned men in England, Germany, and the United States, each in that department of study to which his chief investigations have been directed. Among the German contributors, we notice the well known names of Dr. Credner of Giessen, Dr. Ewald, of Tübingen, Prof. Hävernich, of Königsberg, Drs. Hengstenberg and Jacobi, of Berlin, Drs. Tholuck and Neander, of Halle. The department of Biblical introduction and criticism is rich with learning. Introductions to the Pentateuch, and its several books, are given by Prof. Hävernich; to Job by Prof. Hengstenberg; to the Apocalypse, by Dr. Davidson, of Manchester; to the New Testament, by Prof. Tholuck—all of which are at once lucid, comprehensive, and profound. On Natural History, a great variety of exceedingly valuable and interesting matter appears from some of the most eminent living naturalists. A number of articles on medical subjects, also, are very valuable. On the great subject of Geography, the contributions of Dr. Kitto, the Editor, are of rare interest, and the result of long years of study, which have given him unquestionable eminence in that department. He is assisted by several other scholars of note. The subject of Archæology is particularly full, minute and very valuable. The articles are plentifully illustrated with drawings and wood cuts, which much enhance their usefulness. A large number of very learned articles not embraced in either of these general divisions, appear, from pens that will be sure to command the respect of the learned world. Among these we mention "Angels" and "Heaven," by the Editor; "Canaan," by Dr. Alexander; "Creation," by Prof. Powell; "Gnosticism," "Greek Philosophy," and "Logos," by Mr. Potter, Oxford; "Inspiration," and "Miracles," by Dr. Woods; "Interpretation and Hermeneutics," by Dr. Credner; "Manuscripts" and "Talmud," by Dr. Davidson. "Dispersion of Nations and Confusion of Tongues," by Dr. Pye Smith. The work is no less rich in articles of biography and history; some of which are conceived with high artistic skill, and embodied in eloquent language.

The enlistment of so many scholars in the production of a single work; each one presenting in a brief compass, the results of a life-time of research, in precisely the matters where he is most at home; could not fail of enriching it with an amount of learning and scholarship to which, of course, the work of no single mind, however great, could pretend. And if it be thought to lack unity, and to exhibit unquestionable inequali-

ties of excellence and style, yet the advantages of combining the strength of so great a number of scholars, must more than counterbalance any inconvenience of that kind. And when it is considered that the work strictly excludes all subjects of Theology and Church Government, it will be seen that the chances of any essential disagreement in opinion are very slight; and the reader can be assured that they are too slight to be generally noticed, much less to interfere with the utility of the work.

We have preferred to devote the little space we have to a brief sketch of the contents of the work, to enlarging upon its merits, or expressing the real satisfaction we feel with it. That it will be found incalculably superior, in point of scholarship, accuracy, and comprehensive learning, to any other similar work, we do not doubt at all. And that it supplies a very great want, in the present posture of Biblical study in this country, we are equally confident. In some important respects, there will be felt some deficiencies; but taken together, it is a monument of labor and learning, in the possession of which the Biblical student, the clergyman, and the Church at large, may be sincerely and cordially congratulated. Its very neat and accurate typography, and its low price, combine to enhance its worth; and its general circulation is a matter in which we are willing to confess our decided interest.

2. *Sufferings of Christ.* By a LAYMAN. Second edition, Revised and Enlarged. Harper & Brothers.

This work was reviewed at some length in the July number of the *Biblical Repository*. Since that time the present enlarged edition has been published. Besides additions in many parts, there have been inserted two whole chapters in corroboration of the main argument. The book has already attracted a good degree of notice, both for its doctrine and its style. A second edition, in so short a period, shows that it has taken a deep hold upon the public mind, and bids fair to rank hereafter among our standard theological works. To our own mind, although we cannot subscribe to every sentiment, it combines some of the closest specimens of logical reasoning, with an eloquence of style seldom found as its associate. We are glad, however, to see that the writer has softened and modified some expressions of the first edition, which, although they might seem natural and appropriate to one whose whole soul was filled with the solemnity and importance of the doctrine, might, to others, whom the author would wish to convince, appear extravagant and hyperbolic.

It is, of course, impossible, in such a brief notice, to present an adequate synopsis of the work to those who have never read it. We would simply state that it maintains the doctrine, that Christ suffered in his entire personality, or in the totality of his character as human and divine—that there was that about his death which could not have been predicated only of his humanity; something, in short, which must be regarded as superhuman and awfully mysterious, in consequence of the presence and participation of the divine. In this, too, the author finds the great mystery of the atonement, that dread peculiarity of this doctrine which places an impassable gulf between those who hold it truly, and all the varieties of those who would so pervert language as to bring widely differing dogmas under one common name. The actual sufferings of the divinity make a distinction, never to be erased or obscured, between the Orthodox and all Unitarian, Pelagian, and some Orthodox uses of the word atonement.

It may be stated, generally, that the author employs two principal methods of argumentation. One is directly from the simplicity of Scripture, which uses no qualification when it speaks of the sufferings of Christ, neither referring them to his divinity nor his humanity, but to the indivisible personality in which they are both for ever embraced. It was Christ that suffered, and Christ was HE, who, being before all worlds the Eternal Son of God, assumed humanity in the womb of the virgin. HE suffered. Whatever the pronoun, or the name Christ embraced, that being or personality suffered, and bore the wrath of God for the sins of his redeemed people. In carrying out this argument from the Scriptural language, the writer shows his chief force. Exceptions may be taken to some explanations of particular texts, but the general argument itself seems to us to be one to which it must be difficult to make a satisfactory reply.

The next most common method of reasoning has reference to those states or relations, which, it is admitted, must be predicated of the divinity, or the whole scheme of redemption fails of support. The Eternal Son did in some way empty himself of his Glory. God did become incarnate. If, then, as the author maintains

with great power, these states, or assumptions, or this becoming, does not imply imperfection, and is not inconsistent with the divine immutability, neither does the fact of that voluntary submission to suffering which is necessarily implied in them. In connection with this, attention is given to the general doctrines of the divine immutability; in treating of which the strength of the argument consists in adhering to the simplicity of Scripture, in opposition to that reasoning which claims to be more in accordance with an abstract or philosophical view of this awful subject.

In the preceding edition, the writer had too freely admitted, as we think, that the general voice of the church was against him. In the present, he has inserted an able historical view of the doctrine, and the controversies in relation to it, proving, as we think, to those who attach value to such considerations, that it is far from having been altogether out of the line even of decretal church authority. In connection with this idea, there is presented an appendix, containing extracts from the hymns of the church at various periods, and under its most varying phases. These do certainly show, that whatever place the doctrine may have had in symbols and works of speculative theology, the sufferings of the Redeeming God have ever been deemed an idea essentially requisite to impart vividness and power of emotion to the sacred feeling, either of the public or domestic altar. Every reader must be struck with this most interesting collection from the sacred lyrics of the Roman Catholic, Episcopal, Presbyterian, German, Baptist, and Methodist churches, all testifying with one voice, that however the doctrine may have been absent from the pulpit or from didactic works, it has been ever present to what may be truly styled the heart of the church, as shown in the unreprieved and unqualified language of her spiritual songs. The author thinks, and we agree with him, that hyperbole here is not a mere harmless poetical license. If not grounded on a most solemn verity, it approaches, to say the least, to blasphemy. With equal truth and eloquence does he say:—"Sacred poetry must not dare transplant into consecrated soil flowers gathered in fairy land. The hymns of praise breathed forth in God's earthly house must be truthful as the sister chants of the upper sanctuary."

3. *The Hebrew Grammar of Gesenius, as edited by Rödiger. Translated, with additions, and also a Hebrew Chrestomathy.* By M. STUART. M. H. Newman & Co. *Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar. Fourteenth Edition, as revised by Dr. E. Rödiger. Translated by T. J. CONANT, D.D.* D. Appleton & Co.

Prof. Stuart, who was about preparing a new edition of his well known Hebrew Grammar, chose to substitute for it, Rödiger's splendid edition of Gesenius' Grammar, which lately appeared in Germany. Prof. Conant, who had translated the previous edition of Gesenius' work, has also furnished a translation of this edition—so that two versions of the same work appear simultaneously, and have an appearance of rivalry which does not exist. Prof. Stuart's modifications conform the work substantially to his previous editions, including of course the valuable additions of Rödiger. It may therefore be regarded as a new issue of his own Grammar, and will probably be adopted by the large class of scholars with whom his Grammar is a favorite. Those who have been accustomed to Gesenius' Grammar unaltered, will of course prefer Prof. Conant's copy. They are in the main quite alike, as indeed they must be; but yet differ enough to give each a character of its own.

Rödiger's improvements to the original work of Gesenius possess great value. The whole work is methodized, and much new matter, the result of learning second to that of no other living scholar, introduced. Of Gesenius' Grammar itself, the basis of all, it is impossible to speak too highly. The simple fact of its being simultaneously adopted by two such eminent Hebraists as Profs. Stuart and Conant, shows at once their high estimate of it; and the greater fact that in all Christendom it has well nigh supplanted every other grammar of the language, attests more strongly than any commendation of ours could do, its unquestionable worth. Both editions noticed above are neatly printed.

4. *Pictorial History of England.* Harper and Brothers.

A reprint, in successive numbers, of a voluminous History of England, is in progress by this enterprising house, which we beg especially to commend. Aside from the value of its numerous and well-executed illustrative engravings, which in many instances help out the impression aimed at by the text, in a striking manner, and as an object of art, are highly creditable, the work strikes us as singularly impartial, erudite,

and comprehensive. It has taken scope enough to allow a minute representation of many matters of interest, usually overlooked in historical compositions; and is particularly full in its delineations of the progress of society, the arts and manufactures, and of the moral, religious, and economical condition of the people, at each stage of history, and of the bearing of political measures, and public events upon them—a feature quite too rare in the popular works of the kind. It is written in a lucid and pleasing style, though with hardly the grace of Hume, or eloquence of Gibbon; and exhibits research and painstaking accuracy. As a whole, we are confident that it will convey a much more correct impression of the deeds and the men of England, and leave a far more wholesome impression, than any other work extant.

5. *A Treatise on Algebra, containing the latest improvements.* By CHARLES W. HACKLEY, D.D. Harper & Brothers.

We particularly admire the plan which Prof. Hackley proposed to himself—that of popularizing the results of recent research and discovery in the higher departments of this science. The treatises mostly in use, constructed years ago, are far behind the times; and, however excellent for beginners, are unfit for the more advanced stages of study. But whether the plan has not been carried too far, and some processes and expositions introduced which are too abstruse and complicated to be successfully treated in an elementary work, however comprehensive, some will be disposed to question. It may safely be pronounced in advance of any American compilation in respect to comprehensiveness and extent; and though claiming but little originality, it preserves a good degree of unity, and is very accurately and neatly printed.

6. *Harpers' New Miscellany of Sterling Literature.*

To this valuable series of reprints, there has been lately added Schiller's splendid work, the History of the Thirty Years' War, which is a model of its kind. Concise, accurate, and spirited, it takes the reader through the tragic story with unfaltering interest, and leaves a definite and vivid impression of the men and the events of that memorable period. The fine enthusiasm felt for the truly great men that figured in the war, which is the genial offspring of the author's poetic feeling and generous character, also lends its charm.

The Use of the Body in relation to the Mind, is another valuable little volume, by George Moore, M.D., demonstrating the mutual influences of body and spirit. The relation of the two is treated rather as a matter of science than in its moral aspects, but suggests materials for deep and profitable reflection. It was preceded in England by another similar work, on the power of the mind over the body, which we should suppose, ought to accompany it.

7. *The Useful Arts, considered in connection with the applications of Science.* By JACOB BIGELOW, M.D. Harper & Brothers. 2 vols. 12 mo.

The substance of this work has before appeared, under the more distinctive title of Elements of Technology, which very accurately describes its character. It is a very comprehensive description of the theory and scientific principles of the whole range of the useful arts, with definitions of the terms, technics, tools, and the like, used in connection with them. It is the work of a scholar of extensive practical knowledge, and may be relied on. For utility of reference and general information in these matters of universal interest, there is probably no manual that is at once so concise and satisfactory as this.

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APRIL, 1847.

ARTICLE I.

THE LAW OF PROGRESS IN ITS APPLICATION TO CHRISTIANITY.

By REV. WILLIAM ADAMS, D. D., New York.

AMONG the many theories which have been advocated concerning the condition and prospects of society, that which affirms its gradual and certain advancement has now, at length, obtained a very general, if not universal prevalence. During the last two hundred and fifty years, the human intellect has developed an unprecedented activity. Discoveries have been pushed into the secrets of the sea, the air, and the earth; inventions have been multiplied to subserve the convenience of civilized man; the boundaries of knowledge have been greatly enlarged; and the general condition of the world has assumed a new and brighter promise. That the "golden age" is past already, is a dream of pagan mythology. Ours is the day of hope and expectation; and as the face of the whole earth revives under the breath of Spring, so do all departments of science, physical and intellectual, partake of that progressive impulse which is abroad in the earth.

In these circumstances, it was not to be expected that the province of religion would long remain uninvaded by the universal spirit of motion and innovation. At length, we have heard it affirmed, and this no longer by an avowed infidelity, but by professed religious teachers, that the Christian religion is capable of many essential improvements; and that it must, and will, indeed, undergo many important modifications, or prove itself altogether unequal to an age of brightening light and progress.

Let us not, therefore, be judged as one that beateth the air, when we announce for our theme, the *Law of progress in its ap-*

plication to Revealed Christianity. Is there a place in the Christian system for the operation of this law? If so, what is its province, and what its limits?

The extremes of opinion which are entertained in many circles upon this subject, must deliver any attempt at its discussion from the imputation of being untimely and impertinent.

It is asserted, on the one hand, that a religious system, introduced centuries ago for the advantage of comparatively rude and ignorant tribes, cannot, in the nature of things, be suited to an erudite and philosophic people in their highest civilization. Moses, it is said, had his day and his mission; well did he fulfil them. His religious system accomplished its end, and then passed away as visionary and obsolete. In like manner, it is added, Jesus of Nazareth, in progress of time, established a new and more simple religious faith. He accomplished his mission. But it would be altogether contrary to every analogy, to suppose that Christianity, in its original form, would prove itself equal to the later necessities of the world; and so an exception to that general law by which all that is old is ready to vanish away. There will be other Christs, and other and advancing Christianities.¹ The human mind is no more stationary or retrograde; and, therefore, revelations which were made for its benefit in the twilight of time, partaking as they do of a fixed quality, must be superseded by other and higher disclosures, which, in their turn, becoming effete, must be surpassed and forgotten in the still farther progress of philosophy and religion.

Such are the sentiments incorporated with a certain description of philosophy, which, in spite of its insufferable mannerism, has attained to no inconsiderable notoriety in Germany, and in some parts of the United States.

In the opposite extreme are those, who, failing to distinguish between Christianity itself, and Christian theology, which is but its outward form and expression, look with distrust, and suspicion, and jealousy upon the bare mention of improvement and progress in the latter, as though it were nothing else than an insult to the former. No equivocal displacency do they manifest towards any form of expression which is new—believing that the “old is better.” They have no faith in progress at all. Their category of wisdom is briefly summed—“*Be still.*” Verily, they cannot comprehend the suggestion, that it may be possible, without derogating from the perfection of Christianity, for them to acquire some new ideas, concerning Christian doctrine; and believing that their theological system, like the subject to which it relates, is incapable of change and improvement, they regard those who would attempt any modification, as presumptuous and profane.

Between these remote extremes is there an intermediate space capable of exact definition, which it is wisdom for us to compre-

¹ Theodore Parker and Ralph W. Emerson.

hend, and necessary for us to defend? Believing that there is, our present article will humbly undertake to set forth the limits within which this principle of progress has and may develop itself in connexion with a revealed Christianity. Many delude themselves by false analogies, on this whole subject. We have no faith in any pretended or expected amendment of Christianity. There has been, as we shall show, a progress in the development of Christianity itself, in former ages, such as we are not to expect for time to come.

The Progress of Science, is an expression sufficiently familiar to our ear. In strictness of speech, what does it denote? Simply the rectification of human opinions concerning those objects to which science relates; and never such changes in these objects themselves, as imply on their part defect and falsity.

The planetary system, for example, as a system, was a perfect thing, in all its laws and attractions, and motions, when, at the close of the fourth demiurgical day, its Maker said of it, "It is good." The same sun, in the same relative position, with the same attractions, shone on the first pair in Eden, as shines to-day on us. The same stars which look so thoughtfully on us, shone on the tents of the Idumean Emirs, when Job, and Eliphaz, and Zophar discoursed concerning Orion and the sweet influences of Pleiades. But what a slow, yet certain, advancement there has been in the history of astronomy as a science! What a vast interval between the fancies of the Chaldean shepherd, the notions of the Phœnician mariner, and the demonstrations of celestial mechanics by Newton and Laplace! Centuries elapsed, during which men gazed on the evening sky, recorded observations, calculated eclipses, measured time, steered ships, before the motion of the earth was at all suspected. The system of astronomy, elaborated by Ptolemy, with all its error, was an advance, containing much which is of value to the present day. Twelve hundred years more elapsed, when Copernicus appeared, saying, in the words of Joshua, which words are now sculptured on his monument in the Church of Cracow—"Stare Sol, ne moveare!" Nor was the system yet completed. The laws of Kepler afterwards explained seeming irregularities which confounded Copernicus and Galileo; and the splendid hypothesis of Sir Isaac Newton, verified by subsequent experiments, revealed the unity, the harmony, the perfection of the vast planetarium of the heavens, which had been hid for ages and for generations. Yet Newton died in ignorance of the *Georgium Sidus*; and there yet remain unexplained phenomena in the evening sky, to provoke and reward the thoughtful observation of those who shall follow us.

Progress in the history of this interesting science, is perfectly intelligible; distinguishing as we must between the changeless, faultless laws of nature, and the gradual advancement and rectification of human speculations concerning them.

What else do we mean by progress in all those sciences, discoveries, and inventions, by which the general improvement of the human race has been so essentially promoted? Progress here, has not been an improvement of nature, mending her defects, altering her course, and gradually becoming more perfect and propitious; but it has been the result of a closer observation, and a more copious induction, and a more accurate analysis, and a more patient experiment, and a bolder enterprise on the part of those who have believed in nature's truth and faithfulness.

The structure of the human body was after the same model at the first as now, but great has been the progress in physiology and pharmacy. The heart, the brain, the nerves, the viscera, the irritable fibre, each and all performed the same functions in the days of Hippocrates and Galen, as of Harvey and Stahl and Haller. The continent of America was not created in the 15th century, and all at once made to emerge from the waves like the fabled Delos, at the stroke of the trident, to answer a great purpose. Had the Grecian argosies passed the pillars of Hercules, and ploughed the main three thousand miles towards the setting sun, they would as certainly have reached the Western Hemisphere as did the more adventurous galleys of Ferdinand and Isabella, centuries later. The little pilot which now maintains its post on the deck of every ship that floats, unblinded by darkness, undaunted by danger, unexhausted by fatigue, has, from the beginning of the world, pointed as faithfully to the pole, as when recently discovered by the eye of thoughtful observation. The expansive power of steam was just as capable of application to safe and rapid locomotion on land and sea, to all ponderous and delicate enginery, in the days of Thales and Archimedes as of Watt and Fulton. Carbon, nitre, and sulphur, mixed in certain proportions, would just as certainly have resulted in the formation of that explosive grain which has changed the whole aspect of modern warfare, in the days of Hannibal or Julius Cæsar, as in the laboratory of Roger Bacon. It was just as certain that a few bars of wood, and pounds of metal, and ounces of ink were capable of imprinting the signs of thought on parchment and papyrus, in the days of the Phœnician Cadmus, as centuries later, in the hands of the German Gutenburgh. The lightning which gleamed from the cloud, when the old Grecian and Roman augurs appealed to its glare in aid of superstition, was identically the same form of natural agency which greeted with a responsive spark the knuckle of Franklin, 'applied to the kite string of his son, and which by a simple process, is now conducted innocuously to the earth.

Most obvious, therefore, is the distinction between the facts and forces of nature which have a fixed and changeless quality, and the opinions which men may entertain concerning them. Of these facts men may remain entirely ignorant, or partially informed, may in-

dulge in the most false and fanciful speculations concerning them, to be corrected by a more careful and copious induction. Progress, therefore, in the inductive sciences, in the inventions of art, in great discoveries, has not been the result of any advance in natural laws, but an improvement in the education of man. Nature has maintained her own calm and truthful and changeless quality, without freaks or falsities or deflections; and man, her pupil, has gradually opened his eye and observed her regularities, and compared and reasoned and discovered; and the more he has interrogated, the more unreserved has been the response, the more studious he, the more has he been rewarded, the more inquisitive, the more observant, the more patient, the more rapid and certain has been his advancement.

The same is true as to the progress of intellectual and ethical philosophy. If there has been any advance in mental philosophy, it surely is not owing to the production of any new faculty, but the better analysis and classification of mental phenomena. The simple object of intellectual philosophy is to explain what is; but the same faculties of perception, of memory, of imagination, of reason, existed in the days of Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, as of Locke, and Kant, and Stewart. What has the progress of time to do with the question in dispute from the beginning—whether ideas are the images of objects without, or interior and original types, imparting life and form and power to objects of sense? The laws of mind being the same in all times, what can be meant by the progress of intellectual science, but a more accurate analysis of mental processes?

Progress there has been in ethical philosophy: but of what sort? Have new obligations been discovered in our interior mechanism? Revelation being, for the present, altogether left out of the question, what advantages had Clarke, and Leibnitz, and Butler, and Edwards, above Socrates, and Epicurus, and Zeno, and Cicero, in demonstrating the nature of virtue, and the laws of voluntary action? The same laws of sensibility, of emotion, of desire and aversion, of pleasure and pain, of happiness and misery, were in operation within every human breast, when the Grecian philosopher discoursed in the grove, and the sage of Northampton, and the Dean of Carlisle elaborated their theories concerning virtue. If there has been progress in ethical philosophy, it has been owing, not to the production of new facts, but the rectification of human opinions concerning things which have remained the same from the beginning.

Turning now to the system of revealed Christianity, we discern, at a glance, *one peculiarity by which it is distinguished from all the sciences to which we have alluded.* The planetary system, we are authorized to believe, as a system, was complete when the morning stars first sang together; but the system of Christianity,

as a system, was not complete at its first introduction. There has been a progress of facts and events, constituting that system, from the beginning. All which is known to us, was not, and could not be known once. Facts which exist now had no existence formerly. The time was when the whole of Christianity was folded, as in a germ, in that one obscure promise of a Redeemer, which cheered the apostate pair in Eden. All of Scripture, and all of history, are but the gradual developement of that original intimation. There is a dramatic unity in the construction of the inspired volume. Genesis and the Apocalypse, dissimilar though they be in form and style, relate to one and the same subject. The silver crescent, turning towards us its delicate rim of light, and the harvest moon, full and bright, are precisely the same objects, though in different phases. It is the first grand error, preparatory to all others, to suppose that patriarchal worship and the Mosaic code were opposite and incongruous to the Christian system. Readily will he be led to expect that Christianity itself will at a later day be superseded by some other religious system, who begins by misunderstanding the mission of Moses, as one of mistake and falsity, wholly at variance with the Christian system. Christianity, we believe, was the alpha, and will be the omega of this world's history—the one drama occupying the whole of time;

"The one eternal scheme involving all."

We open the sacred volume, and Genesis, the programme of the mighty Act, acquaints us with the unity of our race, in a common origin, and involved in a common apostacy. Immediately, the promise of a future redemption is announced. The Levitical worship, with its sacrifices and ablutions, its types and shadows, was language, speaking to the eye concerning Him who was to come to atone for human guilt. The book of Job, one of the earliest books that ever was written, represents, as such a book should, the cravings of the human mind and heart, amid sorrow and sin, after a Redeemer. The writings of Solomon present the utmost of human folly and wisdom, in contrast with that divine Wisdom, who was with God when the worlds were made. The book of Ruth, which, on any other principle of interpretation would seem to be without relevancy or profit, derives all its meaning from its historic account of the families from which the Christ was to come. The testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy. Whether with Isaiah, the vision of Christ's spiritual kingdom lights up the gloom of the Jewish captivity with ineffable splendors; or with Ezekiel, we behold all forms of ritual worship superseded by the glorious priesthood of Jesus Christ; or with Daniel, we anticipate the termination of all human kingdoms in the everlasting dominion of the Prince of Peace; or with Zechariah or Haggai, rejoice in the Son of God, as the true glory of the second temple—in one and all, we behold the solemn progress of the same Christianity which was

announced at the beginning. Malachi closes the ancient canon, with the declaration that the morning star would soon appear to herald the approach of the sun. The New Testament begins, but with no change of subject. There is progress, but the progress of the same system. The dawn breaks in the darkened east; 'tis twilight—'tis day. The Sun of Righteousness has appeared:—"Behold," say the Evangelists, "behold the Lamb of God." In the book of the Acts, we see Christianity in motion, in action, in experiment, and in success. The Epistles of the Apostles present didactic expositions and defences of this well developed system; and the Apocalypse made to John consoles and stimulates a ransomed Church with the vision of an ultimate extension, and triumph, and reward.

Here is a progress of *things*, and not of *speculative opinions*. The facts—the events which make up the system of Christianity, were themselves cumulative and progressive. One's position in time made an essential difference as to his obtaining a correct estimate of Christianity. As to natural religion, it was otherwise. Socrates made as skilful use of the statues of Polycletus and the pictures of Zeuxis in silencing the atheist Aristodemus, as Dr. Paley has of the watch, and of comparative anatomy. But as to the great system of justification by faith in the atoning blood of Jesus Christ, the apostles were surely in a better condition to comprehend it, than were Moses and Isaiah. Indeed, there was a rapid progress of things during the brief life-time of the Eleven. The mediation of Christ was better understood by them, after his ascension, than before. The resurrection of the Crucified One was the crowning fact of Christianity. It was the key to all that was obscure and enigmatical before. The whole system was now complete; and in their preaching was actually fulfilled what their Lord had predicted, "Greater things than I do, shall ye do:" because they could tell the world of a Savior, slain, ascended, glorified. Thus far it is very easy to comprehend the application of the law of progress to the development of the Christian system; and we have dwelt the longer upon it than would otherwise have been necessary, because, reasoning from the analogy of the past, many have believed in a *similar* advance for the future.

There came a time, then, as we suppose, when the system of Christianity was complete. When did this occur? Obviously, with the crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ. Great words were those which were uttered by the Sufferer, when his head drooped in death—*It is finished*. There was to be no farther progress of events to complete the Christian system. The disappearance of the Lamb of God, when, ascending from Mount Olivet, he mingled with his native sky, was the grand close and climacteric of Christianity as a system of truth and salvation. Ever after there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin. There cannot be a second Christianity, without falsifying the first. The

differential calculus of the ancients and of Descartes, was not falsified because a better analysis was subsequently discovered by Leibnitz and Newton. But the doctrine of Christ would surely be impugned, if any other system of salvation were to supersede it. There is but one religion now for the whole of time ; and this system, according to all Protestant churches, is contained within the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. It is then, in a real sense, a fixed and changeless object. We expect no new revelation to supersede it. We do not look for the discovery of any better faith. "Lo ! here," and "Lo ! there," have been familiar sounds from the beginning ; but we do not believe at all in discoveries in religion, such as have been made in chemistry, in pharmacy, and in navigation. Amidst all which is new and visionary, all hypotheses and all imaginations, all philosophies and all reforms, one thing, we know there is, even this revealed Christianity, which, like the polar star, never wanders, and never changes ; which, immutable itself, is suited to all changes of time and place and events ; and, perfect itself, will, like its Divine author, continue the same to-day and for ever, modified by no speculation, superseded by no discovery, capable of no improvement.

If Christianity be a complete and perfect religious system, the question now arises, can there be a place, in connexion with it, for improvement, and for progress ? Certainly there can, certainly there is : and this in several ways. In the rectification of our own opinions and speculations concerning Christianity ; and in the growth of our own faculties, to discern more and more of its innumerable relations and unfolding glories.

Though Christianity itself is perfect, and incapable of improvement, yet, in the mode of viewing, and comprehending, and stating, and applying Christianity, there has been already, and will be for time to come, a great improvement. It is of this part of our subject, that we wish particularly to speak ; for here it is that the abstract is transmuted into the practical.

And here we shall be led to observe, that although Christianity, as a revelation from God, is a perfect system ; although the knowledge of it is contained within certain books, few in number, to which a word must never be added, and from which a word is never to be subtracted ; yet, so it was that in the very beginning, by processes to which we shall advert, accretions of error, false philosophies, vain and foolish speculations, became attached to the Christian system, and incorporated with it ; and some of these, transmitted from generation to generation, under the pressure of authority, have continued to alloy the pure gold of Christianity, to weaken its strength, and obscure its light. It seems to be a part of that moral discipline to which the author of Christianity has subjected us, in our earthly education ; that by thought and prayer, by the Word and the Spirit of God, we should work ourselves free

from all this beggarly bondage, towards a more simple and perfect appreciation of the few simple facts which compose the Christian system. Our progress in the science of theology in this respect is analogous to that of astronomy. The bodies which compose the planetary system, and the facts which constitute Christianity, are altogether superior to human speculations; and they roll on in their own orbits undisturbed by the ignorance and errors of man. But the opinions which men entertain of these facts; the speculations which they indulge concerning them; the forms of statement which they may choose for the expression of their opinions; these may admit of great variety; receding remotely from, or approximating more nearly to the simple truth. Egregious and long-lived errors early became incorporated with Christianity; but they must at length be disengaged from it, and leave her heavenly form free from every foreign substance, pure, bright and independent in its own element of truth and goodness. The sun, immediately upon its rising, was veiled by mists and vapors, which followed it far in its course, and threatened to shut it in; now and then it would struggle forth, and the clouds would again gather, thicker and blacker than before; but the heavenly orb has kept on its way, and the time is coming, ere it sets, when every obstruction will disappear, and the sun, unchecked, undimmed, shall pour its golden radiance upon a calm and cloudless world. Progress, improvement indeed, there must and will be, before the world is released from all those ancient errors which have impeded the power of a perfect Christianity.

The history of Christianity! What ominous words are these! That history is yet unwritten. We do not mean the record of names, and events, and dates, inclining much to the notion of Lord Plunkett, that these are little better than old almanacs; but the origin, the influence, the transmission and reproduction of opinions.

Considering the divine origin and perfect truth of Christianity, we should have been led to anticipate for it a fair and smooth career. Yet we cannot open the New Testament without perceiving that Christianity, when beginning its progress in the world, gradually contracted influences from existing institutions and opinions, as rivers are tinged and impregnated by the soils through which they flow; while the apostolic epistles abound with predictions of apostacies and corruptions which were to appear within the Christian Church. The messages to the Seven Churches show at what an early day pernicious heresies had obtained.

First of all was Judaism, which from being, in its origin, a preparatory part and portion of Christianity, had been perverted into an antagonistic system. The epistles to the Hebrews and the Galatians show conclusively with what difficulty the infant Christianity broke from the bondage of the old Jewish faith; like Milton's lion struggling to disengage itself from the reluctant sod.

Next came the struggle of Christianity with the Gnostic Philosophy; at that time the mistress of the oriental world. Opposing her own universal truths to the popular speculations of this Asiatic rival, [Christianity triumphed; but it was then, as we shall see it has been since, that in triumphing it was itself wounded and weakened; and while vigorously repelling the distinct forms of Gnostic delusion, at a very early period it yielded itself to the more insidious seduction of Gnostic principles. It will not, of course, be possible, within our present limits, to verify this remark by copious citations from patristic authorities. Yet we distinctly affirm that the first three or four centuries of the Christian period comprise a sample of every form and variety of intellectual and religious error of which human nature is susceptible. We need not pause to qualify this statement by an attempt to do justice to the more distinguished men of that remarkable era. No sympathy have we with those who denounce the Fathers, with indiscriminate contempt, as puerile and ignorant. The accomplished Eusebius, the great and good Athanasius, a man, who, in the judgment of Gibbon, was in every quality of mind and person fitted for a throne, the excellent Basil, his eloquent friend Gregory Nazianzen, the erudite Jerome, the illustrious Augustin, he of "the flaming heart," and his renowned contemporary Chrysostom; men like these unsurpassed in brilliancy of genius, in power of eloquence, extent of erudition; men, who, in the deepening shades of barbarism, trimmed and watched the lights of knowledge; these surely need not our feeble defence against the contemptuous imputations of imbecility and ignorance. For all this, so thoroughly imbued was the theology of these great and good men with the influence of Gnosticism, that in their writings are found the seeds of those disastrous errors which brought eclipse and midnight upon the Church for a thousand years. It is not enough to say that the truth was with them; and that we may appeal to their testimony in proof that the voice of the Church has been one concerning Christianity; for the truth itself is often found in wrong positions and relations. Their theology was of a mixed quality, and became the parent of a heterogenous progeny. It was like the centaurs and satyrs, which, according to the narrative of Jerome, the famous St. Antony met on his way to the wilderness cave of Paul the Eremite; human faces gibbering and staring on the bodies of goats and horses. In their writings it is easy to find the substance of Christianity; and in the same connexion, fancies and follies, and falsities, which sealed the fate of Christianity for many centuries. Jansenism claimed to be identical with Augustinism, as we believe it was; and yet the Papal decree in denouncing Jansenism, refers to the writings of Augustin for its own justification. Both were consistent; for the simple fact is, that in the writings of the bishop of Hippo, and his illustrious

contemporaries, there is to be found all of truth, and all of error. The same fountain sent forth both sweet water and bitter. The same writer is authority with Pascal, and Calvin, and Turretin, on the one hand, and Hildebrand and Bellarmin, popes, asectics, and formalists on the other. We wonder not that the Tractarians of Oxford appeal so frequently to the sentiments and practices of the Fathers; since errors, which have overshadowed the Church for ages, are to be traced directly to those superstitions which oriental philosophy entailed upon a victorious Christianity.

Precisely the same was the issue of the struggle between Christianity and Pagan Mythology. It conquered, but alas! it fell in its victory. Gibbon has most accurately expressed it: "The religion of Constantine achieved the final conquest of the Roman Empire, but the victors themselves were insensibly subdued by the arts of their vanquished rivals." The Empire was brought over to the faith, but the Church was also infected with the pomp of the Empire. The Pagans were converted to Christianity, but the worship of Christians also depraved to the fashion of Paganism.¹ Tertullian, in the second century, wrote in condemnation of the distinguishing rites and Mythologies of Paganism. Had Tertullian been raised from the dead three centuries later, to assist at the festival of some popular saint or martyr, he would have been filled with astonishment and indignation, to find that the simple worship of Christianity had taken into its alliance the pomp and glitter and faith of the old Pagan temple. The testimony of every man who visits the Eternal City accords exactly with that of the classical biographer of Cicero, Dr. Middleton, whose celebrated letter has so ably demonstrated the identity between Papacy and Paganism. You go to the seven-hilled city promising yourself the pleasure of inspecting the authentic monuments of antiquity; of demonstrating the certainty of those histories which have been the entertainment as well as instruction of our younger years; and so resolve to lose but little time in observing the fopperies of the prevalent religion; but you are surprised to find that the very reason which you thought would have hindered you from noticing it at all, is the chief reason which engages you to pay it great attention; for nothing so much aids your imagination to fancy yourself wandering about in old Rome, as to observe the religious worship of modern Rome;—all whose ceremonies appear to have been copied from the rituals of primitive mythology.² Idolatry has not been uprooted from its ancient site. It has changed its name, its objects of worship; but its forms, its spirit, are the same. Saints and martyrs have taken the place of divinities; but it matters not by what name the sculptured marble is designated, whether Jove or

¹ Turretin.

² Letter from Rome showing an exact conformity between Popery and Paganism, by Conyers Middleton, D. D., London. 1812. pp., 171—2.

Jesus, Apollo or Apostle, Minerva or Madonna, the worship of it is one and the same act.

We can advert to only one other of the more remarkable perversions of Christianity, the hereditary effects of which, still visible, are yet to be rectified by a simpler theology.

When the lost writings of Aristotle were discovered, and the science of dialectics appeared in the West, the Church, alarmed at its progress, vigorously opposed the system and subtleties of the old Philosopher. But discovering ere long that it was a power good to be employed against heresy, Christianity compounded with the adversary and took her into alliance. Scholastic theology, to employ the illustration of Baumgarten, might be likened to some of those ludicrous oddities prohibited in the Levitical code, such as the ploughing with an ox and an ass together—the union of honest industry and preposterous folly. In the writings of Thomas Aquinas, the eagle of the schools, we find the doctrines of grace, as held by Augustin, in opposition to the speculations of his renowned rival, Duns Scotus; but the best account that can be given of most matters discussed with such profound skill by the schoolmen, is this: one-half were above, and the other half below the human faculties—abstractions which no *eagle's* eye could discover; follies which no *dunce* could tolerate. For all this, scholastic theology had its use, as the security of truth in times of barbarism and cruelty. Had Christianity then been abroad as a pure and living form, it would certainly have been murdered by the Pharaohs and Herods of Rome: so the dialecticians, those ingenious artisans of thought, wove their ark of bulrushes and hid it out of sight; and there beneath the subtleties of the schools, the life of Christianity was securely preserved, as the chrysalis in its temporary grave, till the appointed time should come, when its cerements should be broken, and Christianity should once more appear on a freer wing, with brighter colors, and a stronger life.

This brief allusion to some of the more palpable corruptions of Christianity will suffice to show the need which existed of a vast rectification of opinion concerning the Christian faith, and the room which there was for great improvements in Christian theology, by reason of those falsities in which Christianity was encrusted.

We come down to the Protestant Reformation, and signs of resuscitation, and life, and progress are everywhere visible. There was a man whom God had prepared for the emergency, whose opportune labors in the sixteenth century have exerted a wider influence upon the intellect and liberties and advancement of the Church, than any uninspired man that ever lived. Visiting the city of Geneva the Christian traveller early inquires for the grave of John Calvin. With surprise he learns that the spot cannot be designated. Not a monument of any description marks the place in the cemetery where repose the ashes of the great theologian of

the Reformation. Though no sculptured stone bears his eulogy, such has been and such is the influence of his life, that we may take our stand in the centre of the civilized world, and say of him, as it is written of Sir Christopher Wren, in the cathedral of St. Paul, in London: "*Si monumentum requiris circumspice.*"

The name of Calvin has been eulogized and defamed by many who have no just conception of his mission. He was the *theologian* of the Protestant Reformation. That appellation belongs to no other. The wonderful life of Martin Luther, the Reformer, was like an epic poem—a magnificent drama in which kings and armies, cabinets and councils, marches and revolutions make up the shifting scenes of the splendid pageant. Too much cannot be said in praise of some of his theological theses; but it is no derogation from his just and lofty fame to affirm that his theology was not distinguished by completeness, by system. Finding in the Word of God the great doctrine of *justification by faith*, it was to him like the discovery of a new continent, or the mariner's compass. Enamored with the life and glory of this one truth, he believes in nothing else. He did not learn how to frame all of Scripture into one compact and symmetrical system. The epistle of James upon good works he never could speak of with any patience.¹

When the basis of the old Jewish economy was to be broken up by the introduction of a better hope, the bold and impetuous Peter, and the other fishermen and tax-gatherers in his company, were sufficient to arouse attention to the new opinions; but when the storm was raised, and inquiry was active, and the new faith was to be carried into schools and councils; when it was to be vindicated before the Areopagites of Athens, and the philosophy of Rome, then did God appoint that young man who had been educated at the feet of Gamaliel, an adept in canon-law, a proficient in tongues, and skilled in logic and rhetoric. Analagous to this, in many respects, was the mission of the French Reformer. Luther and Zwingli had gone before, and the whole mass of European mind was in a state of perilous agitation. Possessed of a strong and healthy intellect, acute in discrimination, patient of research, addicted to study as the great pleasure of his life; his attenuated frame and pallid face betraying a life purely intellectual and spiritual; pronounced by cautious men as the greatest scholar of his age; John Calvin exhibited, in admirable combination, those mental and moral qualities which marked him as one destined to guide the opinions of inquiring and agitated empires. In that perilous crisis when the intellect of the world was roused, without instruction, and without a guide, save the Spirit and the Word of God, did this great Reformer arise to separate the chaff from the wheat, disengaging the truth from the follies, superstitions and impieties of the

¹ Le Luthéranisme et la Réforme ou leur Diversité essentielle et leur unité. Par M. Merle D'Aubigné.

dark ages, to demonstrate its harmonies and relations ; giving form, stability, unity and consistency to opinions then floating about in atomic confusion ; forming a Christian theology worthy of the name, which, as a system, was destined to stand and develope its power in all future time, on the intellect and heart of the world.

The influence of Calvin in the reformation and progress of Christian theology, it is impossible to estimate. What a vast interval between the speculations of Jerome—the “*Summa Theologia*” of Aquinas, and the “*Christian institutes*” and Biblical expositions of the Genevan professor ! Great progress is visible here in the comprehension and statement of Christianity. Did that progress find a limit when the pen of Calvin had done its work ? Was there no room for subsequent improvements in Christian theology ? Were the truths of the Christian system ever after to be confined to that form of expression which were given to them by this distinguished theologian ? Is it heresy to affirm that there are many things in the system of Calvin which we do not believe, and cannot believe at all ?

The Reformers of the sixteenth century brought to light the essential and vital doctrines of Christianity. Earnestly will we contend for their faith, holding fast to their religious system as embodying the substantial teachings of the gospel of Christ. At the same time, we believe that many theories, and speculations, and philosophies were then attached to the Christian system, which are altogether distinct from it. Some of them have already been discarded. Others yet remain, which are destined to pass away, leaving the system itself more simple, more powerful, because unmixed with foreign or contrary qualities. We claim that there has been, within a century past, a great improvement in the mode of stating, and explaining the doctrines of Christianity, and we are sure that this improvement is to proceed yet farther, with no other effect than to develope the life and increase the efficacy of these eternal verities. The doctrine of justification by faith through the atonement of Jesus Christ, affords an illustration of our meaning. Can any one deny that there has been a palpable improvement in the mode of explaining and stating this fundamental doctrine ; not such a change however as endangers the doctrine itself, as though we could modify it into something else which denies a real atonement through the blood of an expiatory sacrifice. Among those who believe in such an atonement, there have been various opinions as to the mode in which we are made to participate in its benefits. We need only to allude to the extreme opinions of some writers on the subject of *imputation* ; the transfer of our sins to Christ. Many there are who believe, as really as did the Reformers, in justification through faith in the atonement of Christ, who would neither use nor tolerate the language which they employed in explanation of the mode. Is there a man now living—we doubt if there is—who

would dare to use, in a Christian pulpit, the language which Luther was wont to employ to describe the transfer of our sins to Jesus Christ? It gives us pain to repeat or reprint many of the expressions which were employed by this noble and godly man upon this subject; but as they were published after mature and deliberate reflection by the Reformer himself, in his favorite work, which he was wont to designate by the pet name of his own wife (his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians), we copy a few sentences in this connexion as a good illustration of the distinction at which we aim between Christianity and Christian Theology.

“And this, no doubt, all the prophets did foresee in spirit, that Christ should become the greatest transgressor, murderer, adulterer, thief, rebel, and blasphemer *that ever was or could be in the world*. For he being made a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world is not now an innocent person and without sins—is not now the Son of God born of the Virgin Mary; but a sinner, which hath and carrieth the sin of Paul, who was a blasphemer, an oppressor, and a persecutor; of Peter, which denied Christ; of David, which was an adulterer, a murderer, and caused the Gentiles to blaspheme the name of the Lord; and briefly, which hath and beareth all the sins of all men in his body; not that he himself committed them, but for that he received them, being committed or done of us, and laid them upon his own body that he might make satisfaction for them with his own blood. Therefore, this general sentence of Moses comprehendeth him also (albeit, in his own person he was innocent), because it found him amongst sinners and transgressors; like as the magistrate taketh him for a thief, and punisheth whom he findeth among other thieves and transgressors, though he never committed anything worthy of death. Now Christ was not only found amongst sinners, but of his own accord, and by the will of his Father he would also be a companion of sinners, taking upon him the flesh and blood of those which were sinners, thieves, and plunged into all kinds of sin. When the law, therefore, found him among thieves, it condemned and killed him as a thief. If it be not absurd to confess and believe that Christ was crucified between two thieves, then it was not absurd to say that he was accursed, *and of all sinners the greatest.*”¹

Men of all theories would agree, in this day, to reject language like this with horror. Progress, improvement surely, there has been in the explanation of the great doctrine of Christianity, since the day that the above extracts were penned by Martin Luther. Bishop Butler did not hold to the private interpretations of the Reformers concerning imputation; but the Scriptural doctrine of vicarious atonement he most ably demonstrated alike from the analogies of nature, and the teachings of inspiration.

¹ Luther on the Galatians.—Chap. ii., iii.—pp. 213, 214: Lond. ed., 1838.

Irreconcilable is the difference between those who believe in such an atonement, and those who reject it ; nor let any anticipate such modifications of our opinions on this subject, as will result in a denial of this essential truth of the Bible—a vicarious atonement for sin. Whatever accretions of philosophy some may attach to this doctrine ; however, they may wrap it about and about with traditions of men, and to whatever degree of simplicity others may denude it ; in all changes of dress we detect the body, the life of the same doctrine. Between the rejection of the atonement, and the belief of the atonement, the difference is as great as between Lazarus dead, and buried in the grave, and Lazarus brought forth alive ; but when the bands and constraints of traditional theories and appendages are fallen off, it will be like the second direction of our Lord—“ *Loose him and let him go.*”

The great improvement which we anticipate in Christian theology, is in a more complete separation between the simple facts of Christianity, and the private interpretations and theories of men. Now for a long time men have been striving to amend Christianity by means of philosophy ; the time is coming when philosophy will itself be instructed and amended by means of Christianity. Reflecting men must and will pursue their favorite philosophies, and it is right that they should ; but contrary to the prevalent practice of the past, we hold that the doctrines of revealed religion, and the speculations of human philosophy, belong to entirely different spheres ; and that it is possible that it is right, and that it is necessary to separate them entirely. The pure gold of Christianity admits of no mixture with iron and clay. Its statements are sufficiently distinct and practical without the aid of that forward philosophy which is for ever obtruding itself beyond its sphere, to modify that, which should be the source of its own faith.

In a word, we are anticipating at length the entire liberation of Revealed Christianity from those dominant systems of philosophy which have been its bondage and its burden ; and the use of common sense, associated with rectified affections, and all illuminated with the Spirit of the Most High in the interpretation of Revealed Christianity. Very much remains to be done before this is accomplished. It is astonishing to what an extent at this late day, the simple facts of Christianity are obscured and blunted by the theories and traditions of men. No book has been so much abused as the Word of God, because men have wished to detect some authority in its divine teachings for their private dogmas. They come to the study of the Bible with their *a priori* reasonings, their pre-conceived opinions, hoping to find therein some authoritative announcement to justify and fortify them. The time we believe is coming, when the simple inquiry of the Biblical Interpreter will be, *what is written* ; and every thing besides will be carefully confined within its own proper limits. For these

ages past, men have been prone to attach their own theories to the pure letter of Scripture, and exalt them to a sort of coordinate authority with the Word of God. Our great hope of improvement in Christian Theology lies in a better interpretation of, and a more faithful adherence to the pure scriptures of inspiration ; neither adding to nor subtracting therefrom. That all mankind both sin and suffer in consequence of the apostasy of the original pair, is a fact which lies on the surface of Scripture, and of the world, too. But the little preposition "*By*," in the 5th of Romans—"by one man's disobedience many were made sinners," is surely of too slender proportions to sustain ALL the ponderous theories which theologians of different schools have suspended upon it.

Observe how the analogies of religion have been perverted and falsely applied to the serious detriment of theology. Were Bishop Butler living now, he would write on the abuse, rather than the use of analogy, precisely that part of his subject which, as his preface informs us, he left unfinished, because the circumstances of his times did not demand the discussion ; while the errors of our day make it so imperative. Mr. Macaulay, in his splendid critique on the life and writings of Lord Bacon, has exposed a strange error into which that distinguished man, and many others of less note, have frequently fallen in the misuse of analogies for purposes of argumentation. When Sir William Temple, strangely confounding rational and fanciful analogies,—analogies which are arguments and analogies which are mere illustrations,—deduces his theory of government,—a defence of monarchy, from the properties of the pyramid ; when Mr. Southey in like manner elaborates his whole system of finance from the phenomena of evaporation and rain, the mistake, however amusing, is perfectly innocent. But when theologians carry the same want of discrimination into the vital concerns of Religion ; when strong and subtle intellects lay hold of those many analogies employed in Scripture to *illustrate* particular parts of theology, and confounding them with direct resemblances, press them beyond their sphere and convert them into *proofs and arguments* ; when Toplady, arguing against free will, quotes the text, "Ye also as lively stones are built up a spiritual house," and then triumphantly exclaims, "this is giving free will a stab under the fifth rib, for how can stones hew themselves and build themselves into a regular house ;" when Charnock argues the entire passivity of man in regeneration, from a scriptural expression like this, "If any man be in Christ, he is a new *creature*," for what creature, adds he, "can give itself a being ; what matter can infuse a soul into itself," when learned doctors will soberly describe the healing of the withered hand as a correct and philosophical explanation of the union of divine and human power in the process of conversion ; when, on the one hand, the atonement is alto-

gether rejected, because not implied in the analogy of parental love, as set forth in the parable of the prodigal son, and on the other hand the glorious fullness and freeness of the atonement as a moral expedient, are straitened down to an exact resemblance to the payment of a debt, a precise commercial equivalent; when whole systems of divinity embracing the fall of man, the nature of depravity, the nature of the atonement and the mode of the Spirit's operations, are constructed upon those many analogies which are employed only to illustrate particular points (for analogies often exist where there is no resemblance), when theories so framed are published and defended from the pulpit and the press, as the standards of religious faith, which it is presumption to question, and heresy to deny; then must we believe there is yet a place for the exercise of common sense in Religion, and a fair opportunity for improvement in the science of Christian Theology. St. Jerome, in his old age, greatly lamented that in his more youthful fervors he had so spiritualized and perverted the analogies of Scripture, especially the prophet Obadiah, without understanding the meaning of the author at all.

That there has been improvement already, all agree; otherwise, the Reformation was a movement in the wrong direction, and gnosticism, paganism and scholasticism, which became incorporated with Christianity, were its aids and ornaments, rather than excrescences and defects. But if the Reformers had their faces in the right direction, if through their efforts the progress of theology was greatly promoted, the practical question arises, at what time, precisely at what point, did that progress cease? Who was the man; who were the men who are to be recognised to the end of time as the authorized exponents of Christianity, upon whose modes of statement no improvement can possibly occur? Was it Calvin himself? Was it, *par excellence*, Henry the Eighth, *the* Defender of the Faith? Was it the councils of Augsburg or Dort, or the assembly of Westminster? Alas! in the writings of the noblest of the Reformers, there are opinions which oppose our faith and our reason—flies in the most costly ointment. While we can never forget that the most prominent creeds and confessions which have been constructed by councils from those of Nice down to those of Dort, all have been framed in reference to existing controversies, and so have been shaped and modified, more or less, by temporary and local influences.

When the Spanish soldiers overran the Floridas, under Ponce de Leon, a century before the settlement of Plymouth Colony, they had heard and soberly believed the tale of a fountain on these shores which possessed virtues to renovate the life of those who should bathe in its stream, and give a perpetuity of youth to the happy man who should drink of its ever flowing waters. Nature was to discern the secrets for which Alchemy toiled in vain, and the elixir of life was

to flow from a perpetual fountain in the New World in the midst of a country glittering with gems and gold.¹ Is this fabulous tradition to receive its fulfilment in the actual events of our political and religious history? So it has been in all past history, that civilization, cradled in the East, and advancing towards the West, has, in all its progress towards the setting sun, gathered to itself new elements of life and vigor, by which that which was old and ready to vanish away has been either vivified, invigorated and improved, or entirely abolished and superseded.

It is not national vanity—with which we have no sympathy—which leads us to believe that our own country has contributed much in modern times to the improvement of Christian theology, and that in no part of the world, at this present time, are the doctrines of theology more unexceptionably stated. Among the Protestants of France, so far as any evangelical theology is organized, the extreme notions of hyper-Calvinism prevail, unimproved and unmodified. In Germany, Protestantism has depraved in good part, on the one hand, into rationalistic philosophy, and ecclesiasticism on the other—with an intermediate body of mysticism and pietism, having no doctrinal basis. The same is true of Sweden, and other Protestant communities in the North, where Lutheranism prevails. In England, so rich in the theology of her Puritan age—there is no unity of theological opinion—little which deserves the name of theological system. The theology of the Established Church is a bundle of religious systems without number or order—comprising the religious system of a Paley and a Simeon—of Bishop Tomline and John Newton—of Dr. Arnold and Mr. Froude—of Dr. Pusey and Archbishop Whately. Visiting her venerable institutions, rich in those historic associations which no endowments can purchase, unsurpassed in libraries and literary leisure, you feel that those large and quiet halls, and shady walks, and inviting parks, ought to be not merely the haunts of the Muses, but the home and head of theological science. But facts disappoint our expectation, and in a defective theological education, you find the cause of a defective theology. Scotland is distinguished for its national tenacity in adhering to all precedents of antiquity. John Knox is the incumbent of the Scotch pulpit; Scottish preaching to this day being, with very little modification, a reproduction of the old Reformer.

Our fathers sprang from the highest point of civilization, learning, and piety, which had been reached by the human race. They were not merely Protestants, but reformers of Protestants. Their aim was to advance the Protestant interest, not merely in simplicity of form, but purity of faith and power of life. The noble sentiment of John Robinson in his address to the Pilgrims when about to embark for

¹ Vide Bancroft's History and Peter Martyr.

ARTICLE II.

HUMAN JUSTICE, OR GOVERNMENT A MORAL POWER.¹

By PROFESSOR TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D., New York University.

THE present article, as continued from the January number of the Biblical Repository, is occupied with the argument from Scripture, and with answers to objections.

It has been shown that the moral or retributive power of human law is affirmed *a priori* by the moral sense, and that it is also demanded by a true expediency. The previous considerations have fully prepared us for the third position, namely, that it is a doctrine which also finds a most direct support in the written Word of God. It might be proper here to insist, in the first place, upon arguments drawn from the Jewish code. The fact that it was given by God, does not, on that account, make it any the less a human government in its practical application to human affairs. It prescribes laws for men, to be executed by men, designed for the ordinary good of men, and to punish the ordinary crimes of men. As the laws of a human government, they differ from those of other nations only in their superior wisdom and adaptedness because the direct offspring of the Divine mind; but in their essential elements they are the same with any other system for the regulation of human conduct on earth. It may be that they are not to be followed, at all times, in respect to modes and degrees of penalties; but certainly, no reason can be given why, as far as regards the ground, and nature, and reason of punishment, the Jewish thief or murderer was to be dealt with on any other principle than would be applicable to the same class of offenders in any other country. We speak now especially of the national criminal jurisprudence, aside from the purely religious precepts and prohibitions; or, in other words, of its application to those offences that might have been committed in any other nation as well as in the land of Judea.

Now, in the Jewish criminal law, the doctrine of moral guilt being primarily the ground of punishment—whatever subordinate considerations might have had place—stands out too prominently to be mistaken by any honest inquirer. Views of expediency may doubtless come in as lower aims, yet there is not merely a total absence of that favorite style of speech which marks the modern economical theory; there is also, throughout, a spirit, a *usus loquendi*, altogether alien to that philosophy which would find in it the

¹ Continued from page 95.

great or sole end of government. Desert is everywhere presented as the first ground of punishment. The murderer, for example, was to be put to death, not primarily for the peace and good order of society, but because, if he was not punished, the land remained "polluted with blood;" a crime unvisited by penalty, and one, too, which human laws could reach, was insulting high Heaven; satisfaction had not been rendered to the law. On this account they were not allowed to spare the murderer, nor to take any satisfaction for him. If guilty of wilfully taking his neighbor's life, he was to be put to death, because his crime deserved it,¹ and the State, by sparing him, became a partner in his guilt. "Thou shalt consume the evil from thy midst," is the constant declaration attached to judicial commands and executions; and this, too, as the context shows, was the evil in its moral, rather than its physical aspects. "That it may be well with thee," it is said; but this well-being is most clearly held forth, not on any grounds of what would now be termed expediency, but solely with reference to the divine favor, as following the strict execution of the law in its moral aspect. Nothing can be clearer than that the Jewish magistrate was to punish crimes as crimes, or, to use the language of Dr. Arnold, "*because they were wicked.*"

But we would not so much rely upon proof drawn from the whole current of the Old Testament, as upon the express declarations of the New. Before proceeding, however, to direct citation, it may be best to make use of a little preliminary reasoning. One of the most trite arguments on the other side of this question, is derived from the oft quoted and oft perverted words—"Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord." Along with this there is a very common confounding of vengeance and revenge, as though the terms were synonymous. The Reviewer, to whom we have before alluded, has fallen into this very vulgar error. If the term vengeance denotes a wrong principle, it certainly cannot be declared to be a prerogative of God; if a right one, there is no reason, *primâ facie*, why it may not pertain to human governments; unless there are grounds for believing that it has been expressly withheld from them, or exclusively reserved to the divine administration. Now, this is the very position which is often so complacently assumed by writers on the other side. They might just as well take everything else, and dispense at once with all argument. Vengeance belongs to God, they say; and then they proceed to talk very piously, and to profess a holy horror at the thought of "human hands grasping the awful power of retributive justice, and dragging it down from the high and holy sphere to which it belongs, into the lower region of human polity." This strain of argument, too, is sometimes, on account of temporary convenience, adopted by some who show by other reasonings, equally valid and equally

¹ Vide among many other places, Numbers 35, 33.

sincere, that they have really no belief at all in this *high* and *holy* principle of retribution as belonging to the divine government any more than to the human.

All this, we say, is a pitiful begging of the question. We do not maintain that man, as man, by virtue of anything inherent in human nature simply, has a right to punish retributively ; because we would most strenuously contend, that in himself, and without respect to any divine sanction, he has no right to punish at all, on any ground whatever. This, however, we maintain, has been most expressly given to him with all the inherent and inseparable ideas that pertain to it ; only in a lower degree, and with applications limited by the circumstances in which he is placed. Man is permitted to have not merely a shadowy or counterfeit, but a real government, with real, that is, divine sanctions. He is not only permitted, but he is also required to punish crimes, as crimes ; and is even held guilty by the Almighty, if he suffers any expediency to interfere with the duty, when there are no disabilities (such as are afterwards specified) in the way of performance. "Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord ;" but if it can be shown that the true human magistrate really bears the sword of God, and not of the people, or of any earthly expediency merely, then the vengeance, or retribution, or visitation of crime which pertains to him, is really the Lord's vengeance. This presents the great, and on this branch of our subject, the only question.

Is legitimate government among men a divine institution, or is it self-originated or self-constituted, not only in its forms, but in its sanctions, ultimate principles, and grounds ? This, we repeat it, is above all others the great political question for the age.

We often meet with the distinction between the rights and duties of the individual or individuals, and those of the State. The individual or individuals, it is said, have no right to punish, even on the ground of expediency. But if the State is only an aggregation of individual parts, if it has no sanctions and no authority which it does not derive from its members, how will it ever be able to get to itself that which is denied to belong to the source of its power ?

Nothing can be clearer than that, in the New Testament, not only an individual, but any number of individuals, are expressly forbidden to exercise any kind or degree of violence in the resistance of evil. They have no right, as individuals more or less numerous, even to inflict a blow ; much less to put to death any one on the ground of any previous injury, or because the conduct of any one may have been an inconvenience to them, or because they may have reason to fear any future inconvenience from others if he is not made to suffer. The words of Christ on this point are too plain to be mistaken, and numbers can make no difference—"I say unto you resist not evil," or "the evil man"—"Avenge

not yourselves." As an individual, therefore, a man has no right, under the plea of promoting his own convenience, to imprison another, or to inflict upon him any loss, or to put him to any pain whatever. So strong is the language, that we wonder not at those who regard it as forbidding all private or national defence of every kind; but whatever admission may be made in respect to the repelling of instant and sudden aggression, certainly the right of individuals to inflict pain *prospectively*, for the sake of reforming, or on the *in terrorem* principle—for the sake of the effect on the future conduct of others—receives no sanction from the words of Christ. To this extent, at least, must their interpretation be carried, or they mean nothing. This much is plain beyond all controversy. Now for the next step.

If an individual man is forbidden to do this on any grounds of expediency or convenience, he certainly cannot suppose this solemn injunction dissolved, because in these objects he associates with him one of his neighbors. Will the mere aggregation, then, of three, or four, or ten, or a hundred, have any more effect in taking the case out of the direct words of the prohibition? Will mere numbers make right for an aggregated many what is wrong for the individual or the few—unless to the former, when rightly constituted, there comes from some source, out of and above itself, an idea or a principle which transforms it into something of a higher nature; thus making a difference of essence instead of mere modification or degree?

Unless above himself he can
Erect himself—how vain a thing is man !

Nowhere is this sentiment more true than in this very matter of government. Here, if anywhere, humanity wants something out of its own sphere.

Now, how shall this power, so expressly denied to individuals, be acquired by those bodies, or rather masses (as some are fond of styling them) which claim to have no higher authority than that which comes only from such aggregation? In other words, how do those combinations, or rather, organisms, called states and governments, get the right to punish at all; either for desert, or for prevention, or for reformation? We defy any rational man, who believes the declaration of Christ, to give, consistently, any other than one of two answers. He must admit that human government, when truly such, and when it truly employs the term punishment, and uses the thing signified by it, has a divine sanction, a divine authority, and a divine institution that does not belong to men as individuals or mere aggregations of individuals; in other words, that the lawful magistrate bears the sword of God, and thus, by exercising a true retribution, is not liable to the charge of revenge, or of violating the commands of Christ;—he must ad-

mit this, we say, or take the only other ground, that whenever that thing commonly called human government, uses violence of any kind to wrong doers, it is a forcible resistance of evil by evil, exerted by some individuals against others ; or, in other words, an extension or acting out on a larger scale of the condemned principle of individual revenge.

Thus reasons the no-government man. Assuming as his premises that the State has no such divine sanction, his conclusion is absolutely unanswerable. With all that outcry, then, about revenge, which is made by the defenders of the merely economical scheme, there is no other way in which they can escape from this latter class of antagonists, or save punishment of every kind from the charge of being revengeful, than by resorting to the doctrine of desert, and of law as a moral power instituted and sanctioned by God.

Retribution, then, instead of being revenge, is the very ground upon which the infliction of pain upon wrong does escape the charge. In other words, to punish crime because it deserves to be punished,—a power which the State can only have from God,—is a holy and righteous principle which when placed first conserves every subordinate good or expediency, and is the ground on which individuals are required not to avenge themselves ; to visit it with pain, or painful constraint, on no higher ground than that it is inconvenient, especially when there is a denial of any divine sanction for so doing, is vindictive in the lowest sense of the word. It is regulated Lynch law, only carried out by masses (instead of individuals acting severally in visiting all aggression on themselves), yet truly differing from the individual exercise in no essential element of its character.

We think we can understand the position of the no-government man ; but it does seem amazing that any one should assert the right of the state to punish at all, much more that he should maintain that it may exercise so high a power as that of taking life, merely as a matter of convenience or expediency—at the same time rejecting all that can give it efficacy, even as an expedient—denying, too, that it acts at all “ on the ground of moral guilt,” or that it has any divine institution, either as respects the particular penalty, or the general moral authority of government. There is no difficulty in understanding why the thorough-going and consistent opponent of the death penalty should be so hostile to the doctrine of retribution. He sees that if it is allowed to be made a question of desert or intrinsic demerit, the moral sense decides at once the whole controversy by a direct appeal to the fitness of things, without any long and utilitarian calculation of effects and consequences. It affirms *à priori*, and without hesitation, the solemn declaration of the patriarchal law, that for wilfully shedding the blood of a human being, the most fit and righteous retribution is the death of the

man who hath done this most wicked deed. It utters the same voice of God which proclaimed, Numbers, 35 : 33, "There can be no cleansing made for blood that is shed, but by the blood of him that shed it." How absurd to treat this and similar declarations as merely local and temporary statutes, and to talk of their being repealed! It is the declaration of a *reason*, a *principle*, which, if language can convey the impression, bears on its very face a universality and a permanence as wide and as immutable as the justice of God. There is nothing in the New Testament presenting more of these characteristics. The only question for any serious mind is—Was it really uttered by God.

But to return to the divine authority of the State and the magistrate;—the argument under this head is direct and short. It consists in the plainest exegesis of one of the most significant passages of the New Testament, "Dearly beloved," says the Apostle (Rom. 12 : 19) "Dearly beloved, avenge not *yourselves* (μη εαυτους εκδικουντες) for it is written, vengeance is mine :"—εμοι εκδικησις. Nothing can be more conclusive, say some, against your doctrine of retribution. How often, too, is this text quoted to show "the error of those, who," in the language of the writer in the Democratic Review, "would grasp the awful power of retributive justice, and drag it down from the high and holy sphere to which it belongs, into the lower regions of human polity—thereby giving to earthly rulers, under the notion of a divine right, not only to protect society, but also to *punish* what they may view as moral guilt." Truly it might seem so, even had the Apostle gone no farther; but how little is it generally adverted to, that closely following this, and in close and necessary connexion with it, is the very passage which most conclusively proves this very thing—namely, the divine and retributive authority of the magistrate as the minister of God. "Vengeance is the Lord's," says the Apostle; but then, after a brief exhortation to abstinence from individual righting of wrongs, and as a reason for it, he immediately proceeds exegetically to show how, and through what means, this vengeance of the Lord is exercised upon actual outward crimes upon the earth; as a part, though a far lower part, of that great administration of justice which embraces both worlds. "Let every soul," he immediately proceeds (Ch. 13), be subject to the powers that are over us—(εξουσιας υπερχουσας). For the authority is not, except from God; and even the present existing authorities (αι ουσαι εξουσιαι) are appointed of God. So that he that resisteth the authority, resisteth¹ the ordinance of God. For magistrates are not a terror to the good, but to the

¹ The reference is not here to what may perhaps be rightful resistance (even though revolutionary) to an illegitimate *law-lacking* despotism, but to resistance to the lawful magistrate in the regular exercise of his power, under, and according to law. Neither is there reference here to the tyrannical Roman emperor, but to the magistrate generally, or to the *magistracy*, as an office then existing, and which, by God's appointment, always would exist in the world.

wicked. Wouldst thou then not be afraid of the authority, do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For HE IS GOD'S MINISTER TO THEE. But if thou doest evil, be afraid, for he beareth not the sword in vain; for he is GOD'S MINISTER, an AVENGER (*ἐκδικος*) upon him that doeth evil."

Can there possibly be a doubt as to the true meaning and spirit of this passage? Would not the opposing school have said at once, that it preached the retributive doctrine, and would they not have unsparingly condemned it therefor as harsh and unevangelical, if, instead of being the language of the Apostle, it had been found in some modern production advocating the divine right of government? It is quite common, on questions of this kind, to set off the New Testament against the Old, but here both breathe the same spirit. In both, the divine authority of the lawful magistrate, as a minister of God, is not so much taught in the way of a new truth, as it is assumed as one long established and acknowledged. Among all nations, Gentile as well as Jewish, the judgeship has ever been esteemed a sacred office, and he who held it, as even ranking among the ministers of religion. *Diis immortalibus proximi sunt magistratus*, says Cicero. "And Jehoshaphat said unto the judges, Take heed what ye do; for ye judge not for man simply, but for THE LORD. And now let the FEAR OF GOD be upon you, for with the Lord your God there is no injustice."—2d Chron., 19 : 6, 7. The same idea is presented in the general directions given to magistrates, Deuteronomy, 1 : 17. "Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; the cause of the small and the great alike shall ye hear; ye shall not be afraid of the face of man, for the judgment is God's."

It is not extravagant to suppose, that the Apostle had these and similar places of the Old Testament in view when he made the declaration on which we are commenting. This remarkable passage in Romans is introduced by him, both as a motive and as a reason for individual forbearance. It most certainly assumes to set forth the true power of the magistrate, the sanctions of his authority, and the grounds on which he is to be obeyed. He is the minister of God; and so, some would say, is everything in the natural world; but can we suppose that Paul made these solemn declarations, in the connexion in which they stand, with no higher sense than might be true of the wave that cast him on the shores of Melita? Can it be possible, that he would thus have trifled with his readers, by meaning no more than a physical power, when he calls it a "fear to the wicked, and a praise to those who do good?" The moral aspect pervades every part. The ideas of desert, and of moral guilt as the ground of punishment, meet us in almost every word. How little, on the other hand, does it savor of, or rather how utterly alien is the whole spirit of the passage to those ideas of expediency, of convenience, of the mere-

ly economical authority of the magistrate as the majority's servant, to which some would give the chief place in criminal jurisprudence. "For he is the *avenger*" (ἐκδικος), the same radical, which, in the verse introducing the whole passage (Rom. 12 : 19), is applied to God—(ἐμοὶ ἐκδίκησις) "Vengeance is mine." It is, therefore, the *same vengeance*, the same in kind, though lower in degree, and in application. It contains the same essential idea; an idea which is not in nature, nor in physical laws, nor in expediency. It is an idea which must belong to a true morality, and in whatever system it is not acknowledged, there this word has no real application. Such a system is merely physical, under whatever disguises it may seek to present the appearance of belonging to a higher department. The most rude and imperfect administration into which the idea of desert truly enters, is better entitled to the name, moral, than any scheme, however apparently refined and civilized that rejects it.

It is, in short, a power which is not in man, except as delegated to him from above. Is any one startled at this; he should rather feel that the authority of the true magistrate is a fearful thing, because connected with the fear of God; and therefore to be revered, not simply on the ground of expediency, but "for conscience sake"—διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν (Rom. 13 : 5). He should feel that law and the State are not those popular playthings which many are accustomed to regard them; that they are something more than the popular breath. He should examine carefully whether, through the prevalence of a false philosophy, his own ideas may not have fallen far below the real standard. It may not, after all, be the meek spirit of humility, but something of a very different nature, which prompts us to sever the connexion between divine and human justice, to talk about "erring mortals," and "usurping the high and holy prerogatives of Heaven." We are so made, and such is our moral nature, and such are our fearful relations to things above us, that, though unholy and imperfect we may be, we must exercise, and be affected by, high and holy responsibilities.

The then existing authorities spoken of in Romans 13, are doubtless those of the Roman Empire in its various departments. This fact is sometimes adduced in argument from two opposite motives. One class of writers would urge it in support of the higher sense; for the purpose of showing *à fortiori*, that the divine sanction was essential to the idea of present governments, because it had been declared to belong even to one of the worst of past times. If the Roman authorities were ordained of God, much more, would they say, should we regard in this light the magistracy of modern Christian countries. Others would contend, that the very fact of this being thus spoken of the wicked and corrupt Roman Powers, as they are pleased to style them, shows that

it was never intended to be taken in that higher sense which is maintained by the former class. Both we conceive, in certain respects, to be wrong. We do not think that the Apostle had in his mind the *à fortiori* view; and much less, that he meant to reason so absurdly, as by the particular instance to abate the force of his own general proposition. There is, besides, upon the minds of many, a popular delusion in reference to the civil condition of the world at that time. The imagination is filled with the thoughts of Tiberius, and Caligula, and Nero; whereas, it was not so much Cæsar, as the Roman State and its collective authorities, to which allusion is made. This State and these authorities, imperfect as they might be, were the grand conservatories of the justice and order of the world. The city Rome, or the immediate contiguity of the palace, was the chief seat of those tyrannies and cruelties which stand out so prominently on the page of history. The great mass of the people, in the different departments of the Empire, were as well governed under a Nero as under a Vespasian, or a Trajan, or even an Antonine with all his stoical philosophy. The general and ordinary administration of justice was little affected by the personal wickedness of the Emperor. In the age in which St. Paul wrote, the Roman Empire was, in general, under a system of law administered on as pure principles as even now prevail in most parts of the civilized world. When the immediate passions and jealousies of the great were not concerned (which they, in general, gratified within the circle of their own aristocratic class), crime was, for the most part, impartially punished, and innocence protected in its rights. Indeed, *in the abstract*, the laws of the worst men, and even their abstract administration of justice, may be safely trusted, as being mainly founded on the sound principles of the moral sense, in all cases where individual feeling or interest does not control. If this had not been the case in the Roman Empire, the Apostle would never have thus spoken of the then magistracy, as “a terror to evil-doers, and a praise to them that do well.” And so in almost all civilized communities, the criminal jurisprudence has been grounded and exercised on abstract principles far better than the personal character, either of the magistrates or of the people. In the abstract, all men love right and justice. There has been more good government in the world, and more righteous applications of the principles of justice to crime, than is generally allowed. The exceptions, in monarchical governments, have been of instances near the throne, and in democratic States, they have arisen in the midst of popular excitement;—the reason in both cases being substantially the same, namely, that they have been brought, by peculiar circumstances, within the sphere of the personal and animal desire overpowering the abstract and rational will. Such examples, too,

it should be remembered, stand out prominently, because they have formed the special subjects of history.

Besides—the Roman Empire was a collection of States, each of which retained, in a great measure, its own laws and its own system of jurisprudence, which had come down from the ancestral times. It is evident, then, that the Apostle had reference, not to Cæsar, but to something far higher, which no Cæsar and no people had ever created or could ever destroy—which lived on, and was destined to live on, amid all the convulsions of Roman despotism or of that Gothic turbulence by which it was to be succeeded.

We have here to do simply with the general position—the State as a Power ordained of God, without pretending to decide some difficult questions which grow out of it. We believe that there are extremes, which, although they may be called States and governments, are really not entitled to the name. The essential idea may be lost in two ways, namely, by substituting in place of true law, the unchecked will of a single despot, or the unrestrained passions of a mass or mob. But where the State practically ends, and what may be justly styled a mere aggregated mass begins, it does not belong to our present argument to decide; although we think there are certain principles on which this matter admits of a tolerably accurate determination. Neither would we meddle with the question of the right to revolutionize, or violently modify the forms of government. Even through all such changes, the State ever survives. The political life, which now flows in our own civil institutions, apparently so young in respect to their outward forms, may be shown to be older than the Norman conquest, and in some respects to have been derived even from the old Roman State. However this may be, it does not affect the position, that in all established governments based upon law, and carrying on a regular administration of justice under acknowledged religious sanctions, there is a branch,—it may be a very inferior and imperfect one, yet still a branch of the great law system of the Universe—exercising a moral power, not given generally, like the laws of nature, but specially bestowed, as upon a divine institution; and that thus the magistrate is truly a minister of God, wielding a retributive power—*ἐκδικὸς τῷ τὸ κακὸν πράσσοντι*—“*an AVENGER upon him that doeth evil.*” In other words, he punishes crimes *because they are wicked and wrong.*

Does any one say that this is extreme doctrine; it may be well worth inquiring, whether it may not be safer than that other extreme, into which our own age, and especially our own country, is so inclined to run. An affected reverence, and an undisguised irreligion, are both striving to carry to the widest extent the separation between the human and divine, the moral and the economical, the political and the religious. The danger is increased by

the fact, that along with this, a spurious philosophy, assuming to be transcendental, is producing the same mischief by a seemingly contrary process, namely, by confounding them all indiscriminately together. This latter class profess to have an extraordinary faith in morality, in the Eternal, the religious, the absolute, the ideal. They adore the "holiness of nature;" they reverence the human as the divine, or rather "the divine in the human;" they are very fond of all "high and holy principles." But study their system, as far as it can be studied or understood, and it comes out that morality and nature, physical laws and moral laws, religion and science, grace and philosophy, spirit and matter, gravitation and holiness, Heaven and Earth, God and man, are all one, and all is nature, and the fear of God is the adoration of the universe.

Our strong feeling in regard to the immense importance of the view we have labored to set forth, may blind us to certain aspects of this question, but we cannot help regarding it as, beyond almost everything else, the great question of the day. The fact that human government has these ultimate grounds and sanctions, may seem, theoretically, to be unaffected by men's refusing to acknowledge it, or by their adopting a philosophy which is alien to the principle; but we may well fear lest, when this idea is wholly lost, not only from the objective intellect, but from the inner conscience (where it may still reign even after speculation has rejected it), no mere human aggregation would long be entitled to the name, or be allowed to have any of the true sanctions or authority of government. This is a problem to which the course of events may give a most fearful solution; presenting an issue which shall drive us back to a despised truth, if not through reverence for the Word of God, at least by the bitter experience arising from a rejection of its teaching. This truth, however, we would hope, may perhaps be yet conserved in a way less dangerous and dear. Many, we have reason to believe, are already led by the course of events, to look back for the clear old landmarks of revelation; but with what contempt do others regard any reference to the Bible as any guide to right views on the nature of crime and justice, or the kind, degree, or ground of punishment; or, in fact, on any question whatever, relating to criminal jurisprudence! No age has been more distinguished than the present for zeal in circulating the letter of God's Word; no one, we think, has been less inclined to go directly to the Scriptures, as "profitable for instruction in all righteousness," political, moral, and religious.

There has lately appeared among us a new and strange phenomenon. It is generally styled Lynch law. We may thus speak of it, because in our age and in our country it has assumed an aspect not belonging to those acts of violence in former times, which, at first view, might seem to be of a kindred nature. Violation of established law has ever heretofore been regarded as *lawless*, and that

too by the perpetrators themselves as well as by others. It has honestly called itself revolution, and alleged in its justification various motives and reasons; some good, some bad, sometimes righteous, and sometimes presented on the most unsubstantial pretences. Certain movements have been styled revolutions, that should perhaps have taken to themselves a better name; because they were in fact for the support and restoration of violated law, rather than for its subversion. But in general, what has heretofore been thus called, has never itself assumed the name of law; at least in its incipient stages, and before time and the course of God's providence had completely changed its historical character. Here, then, is the peculiarity of this modern phenomenon, the lynch code, that it professes itself to be law, and in fact the pure quintessence of law extracted directly, and in all its freshness, from the primary fountain in which all law originates. Those who carry it into effect, profess to get it right from the people, and to exercise it directly on that true and ultimate ground, as well as object, of all law and punishment, namely the people's convenience, estimated directly by a majority of themselves, and without reference to any authority or sanction out of themselves. It very often, too, is quite punctilious about forms, and even at times affects great solemnity. It has its judges, its jurors, its witnesses, its oaths, its adjudications, its formal executions; yea, its chaplains likewise; not unfrequently has it been known, in its great self-complacency, to invite even religion to mingle in its proceedings. Its fondness for arraying itself in the external robes of the old justice, is in proportion to a deep, though objectively ill-defined and obscurely apprehended sense of the lack of some eternal principle pertaining to true law, and which its imitator can never hope to possess.

Now it may be well worth our while to inquire here wherein this essential difference consists; and whether it is not in this divine sanction, which, notwithstanding all the influence of an opposing philosophy, is generally felt, if not acknowledged, to belong to the one, whilst it is totally absent from the other.

Without going into any direct affirmative proof of this, we would prefer taking another and more negative course. We would ask those who adopt the popular theory as it is generally presented, and who reject the idea of any divine sanction and divine authority, except in that general physical meaning for or against which no one contends—we would most seriously ask such, how they think of making this essential difference between lynch law and the action of true government; in other words, a distinction not in forms, nor in external circumstances, nor in *objects* simply, but in the *ground, reason, and essence*, of the two procedures? It cannot be in the degree of order; for it is a fact that the counterfeit, in some of our western and south-western states,

has had a method and a regularity beyond what even true law has sometimes exhibited in simpler ages and nations. Doubtless, in this respect, some of the lynching districts in Illinois have far excelled the ruder proceedings of the common law in the days of Alfred. True government, it may be said by way of distinction, is the true popular will; but then lynch law professes to be the same, and, as far as this constitutes law, to have come more freshly and purely from the fountain head. It may moreover be urged, that the difference consists in lynch law being in opposition to a previous expression of the popular will. But it is maintained, we say, and it results directly from that theory of government which admits of no superhuman element, that the people cannot so bind themselves, as to deprive themselves of the power to unbind what they themselves have bound—and bound, too, only for what they regarded as their good. They may therefore dissolve it when and where they please, or whenever they may think their own better apprehended good may require such a proceeding. This very doctrine has been loudly proclaimed in our own state capitol, by men of the highest standing in both political parties.

True, it may be again replied, the people may change the law, even the fundamental law; or, in more correct language, may give another and a new expression of the popular will. It must be done, however, they would say, in consistency with established forms, and according to methods previously declared to be legal. But what, asks perhaps another more advanced and philosophical reformer, what are these forms and legal methods, but this same popular will? A breath may unmake them as a breath has made. They may present delays and restrictions which the *public good* may require to be disregarded. They may have been made, too, by ancestors, or people who had no right to bind the present generation either as to forms or substance. Moreover, even if we live in the same generation in which they were made, and have even given our individual consent, it was only for the *public good*: this must be ever implied; and if the same public good requires that these forms be disregarded as causing an injurious delay, or a hindrance to the adoption of better methods, we have no right to make our former mistakes an impediment in the way of what is plainly counselled by a higher light and a more advanced progress. If these previous forms and methods require more than a majority before any modification either in form or substance can take place; or if they pretend to specify of what persons such majority shall consist, this, of itself, may be termed, and has been termed, a violation of the fundamental principle of what is called free government; it is placing something back of the *present* popular will, regarded as now deciding on the *present* popular good. If this is allowed to a majority, it may be contended that it is only granting what belongs to them by nature. Any restrictions, therefore, as to *time, place,*

or *manner*, in which this popular will is to be expressed, may be treated as an unnatural impediment, and may be adjudged to interfere with the public good as much as a restriction of majorities, or any limitation in regard to numbers. If the majority represents this popular will, then no power back of it, or aside from it, can prescribe (any longer than such majority may choose to permit such prescription) of what kinds of persons it shall consist, or how, or when (with or without the sanction of any legislative body) it shall commence or proceed in its work of reform, whenever such reform shall be deemed to be necessary.

In this direction, let it be followed ever so far, we shall fail in finding that of which we are in search—namely, the essential distinction between lynch, or false law, and true government. There is no ground on which one may be claimed to be the popular will acting for the popular good, that may not also be claimed for the other. But is it possible, an objector may say, that you cannot see the egregious fallacy of this reasoning? Is it not most evident that this radical difference between lynch law and true law consists in the fact, that those who assume to execute the former are only a *part* of the state, acting without the concurrence of the rest, and in defiance of the common law. This *part*, however, may be a majority; and if, as it would be no extravagance to suppose, a number sufficient to be styled in ordinary language the mass of the community, should thus be found acting, or sanctioning actions, in violation of previous forms—what then? Why, in that case it is justifiable lynch law, or it becomes, *ipso facto*, from this very circumstance, the *true* law of the land. To pursue the matter, however, a little further, let us take the common case of a county, or a district of a state, resolving, *for the public good*, to dispense with pre-existent forms and statutes, on the ground that they furnish too slow a remedy, or, it may be, in their opinion, no remedy at all against a great and pressing evil. The popular will for this county or district (which is law for the time being) resolves to drive out Mormons, or to punish horse-thieves and gamblers. It may, however, be said that they have no right to do so, and that *their* popular will cannot be law, because they are but a part of a whole, acting without the concurrence of the whole, or a majority of the whole, and, it may be, in opposition to the wishes of the whole. But, on the mere aggregation theory, what makes a *whole*, unless it be the several popular will of each and all the *parts* determining not only the power of a majority, but also what that whole or body is of which it is to be a majority? And again, what makes a part, but the popular will of that part determining not only to be a part, but also declaring of what whole it is to be a part? Surely, these are as much matters for the decision of the masses as anything else in the constitution of the state. The whole, therefore, can only be a whole of accumulation or aggregation, and its unity

can never transcend such totality—a totality resting ever on the consent of the people severally and collectively to remain such a whole, only for such times, and for such purposes, be they temporary or permanent, as their several or collective judgment of their several or collective good may decide.

On any theory it must be true that the State is what it is by the law of the State, or, in other words, by the law of its being. It is by virtue of this, that New York is New York, and not Massachusetts,—or parts of New York, Vermont, and New Hampshire. On that scheme, then, which views the State as an aggregate without any transcending unity, this primary law of its being must be nothing else than the several popular will or wills of the parts composing the aggregation and constituting it a whole; and on the same ground, the cohesive principle of each and every part can be nothing more than its own several popular will, consenting to become or remain a part only until it may be led to regard the public good, either of itself, or of its former whole, as being best promoted by separate action. If this unity is styled a contract, still it is a contract made by the several parts for their own good respectively, and there being no higher arbiter, and no acknowledgment of a divine sanction, such consideration of the joint or several public good, combined with the physical strength of each part, can alone decide how long such contract shall continue; since, as must ever be implied, those who entered into it, or at any time consented to remain under it, did so only for their benefit, and for as long time as it should promote the benefit of themselves and their posterity. Its having become a part, too, may have been the act of ancestors, who, according to the most modern doctrine, had no right to bind their posterity to anything which said posterity could not at any time unbind. In short, its becoming, or even its remaining a part, is only a suspension, by its own active or passive will, of its own fundamental law; which fundamental law is nothing else than the exercise of that will, and which it may therefore resume, whenever either its own or any larger public good (it being in respect to its own action the only judge thereof) may require. In other words, it may at any time amend its separate natural constitution, by virtue of which alone it is linked to what it may choose to regard as a foreign whole; and this may be done permanently or temporarily; it may be for all purposes, or it may be for special and transient expediencies. Should any one say that this doctrine must be as true of the subdivisions as of the divisions,—that it may be carried out, not only to counties, but to towns, and families, and individuals; and that thus the consequence would be a complete disorganization,—we cannot help it, we reply; it is a direct result of a very popular political theory which denies to government any higher sanction, any higher authority, any stronger cohesion, and any higher unity, than the

popular will. Not a few, too, have thus carried it out to its widest extent.

In this way, reasoning solely from the doctrine so much in vogue, one might maintain that a county of Illinois, in instituting what are styled lynch law proceedings against certain offenders, was acting according to its innate, inalienable sovereignty, and carrying out its popular will on the principle supposed to be at the foundation of all law, namely, the popular good, according to the best understanding that could be formed thereof by the present masses by whom such proceedings are supposed to be instituted. At all events, if the actors in such scenes should be regarded as guilty of any wrong at all, it might be treated as belonging to that palliated class, now beginning to be recognised in our jurisprudence under the name of "*political offences*."

If now it should be urged, as it sometimes is, that this is all dealing in abstractions,—that the public good is not a mere matter of temporary convenience to be judged of by any part or any body of men, great or small, wise or ignorant, that chooses to undertake it,—that the preservation of *great general principles* is of far more importance, in respect to the true public good, than the immediate punishment of any number of counterfeiters, thieves, and gamblers, without the usual forms of law,—that the violation of these great general principles will, in the end, be productive of more evil than can possibly arise from any amount of temporary inconvenience,—that it is of the utmost importance that there should be stability in political institutions,—that "human government is a *practical affair*, not built out of abstractions, but of such materials as are best adapted to subserve the purposes of wisdom and goodness," &c., &c.,—to all this we would most cordially say amen. This is all very good, but the man who is pressed to talk in this strain, is fast sliding off the ground of the modern popular theory of the State. He is bringing in higher expediencies, and these must carry him back to higher, and still higher, until he approaches the region of the absolute, or that ground which, by transcending, upholds and conserves all true expediency. In other words, if he goes on in this way, he must soon arrive at what we call the *moral power* of government, as conservative of all lower interests. He will find, too, that he cannot rest in the moral severed from the religious; in short, that he has no stopping place whatever, until he recognises true government, or law among men, as a special ordinance of Almighty God,—thus expressly declared to be by his inspired Apostle; and that the true magistrate is God's minister, "*an avenger upon those who do evil, and a praise to those who do well.*"

Here, then, is that great deficiency in lynch law to which we before alluded, and which is doubtless felt by the very actors who conduct its proceedings. It is the want of this very retributive or

moral power of law and punishment for which we contend. The one treats offences solely as inconveniences, the other regards them primarily as crimes or sins, or *as inconveniences mainly because they are crimes*. The defect of lynch law is, in short, not the mere want of regularity; it is not simply that it is a false expression of the popular will; it is not that it does not aim at the popular good; it is not that it is the act only of a part—for parts and wholes and all territorial divisions are but creations of law. It is, we repeat it, the want of that moral power which has always been felt to belong to true, as distinguished from false government. This feeling may not, in many cases, be so distinct as to have become the subject of objective contemplation; still, almost all men do yet possess it. We may not know exactly whence it comes; we may not be able to determine historically, or philosophically, how these elements enter into the State; we may not be able to answer all the objections that may be presented; yet still, there it is in the human soul. It is felt by the child, and it is felt by the man, that in true law there is something above us, something which comes down from heaven instead of coming up from the masses to be governed; something, in short, commanding not only our respect, but our *reverence*. However feeble, at times, may be its influence, yet to every sound mind there is a moral sentiment, even in witnessing a criminal proceeding in some inferior justice's court, which is never called out by the exciting spectacle of a whole district carrying into formal execution some lynch law sentence for what may be deemed a most important popular expediency.

It cannot be denied that the spirit of disorder to which this name is given is extensively prevalent in our land. Against it, we firmly believe, all the common arguments will be found unavailing. In vain shall we attempt to stay it by appeals to national character, or national credit, or to the public security, or to the public convenience, or to an "enlightened self-interest." Its only true cure will be found in the general diffusion of a moral and religious feeling in relation to law. Only let these moral ideas of justice and retribution be retained in all their strength, together with the accompanying doctrine that human government, by the very fact of embracing them, is a part of the great moral administration of the universe, and men will not dare to trifle with it as they have done.

But how shall we determine what the *State* is which has these elements, in distinction from the *mob* or *mass meeting* which has them not? This question can be answered, but it would take us too far from our present subject, and would require by itself a separate, and a prolonged discussion. It would lead to an examination historically, as well as philosophically, of the ground, reason, idea, and origin of the State,—a question of too great magnitude to be treated as merely incidental to another topic. It is sufficient for our present argument to have presented the insuperable diffi-

culties in the way of those who hold that not only the forms, but the very right of government is founded alone upon an expediency to be judged of by the governed ; that law is only the popular will, and the magistrate nothing more than the representative of the people.

We need not dwell long upon the objection, that such a view as we have taken confounds together the human and divine. This might be met at once by simply presenting the plain declaration of Scripture, that the human magistrate is truly God's minister, and leaving the objector to solve his own difficulties ; for, even in this 19th century, we are ever resolved to quote the Bible as decisive authority on all moral and political subjects of which it professes in any place to speak. The answer, however, is close at hand. Human government, when rightly viewed, is, in fact, a department of the divine ; they are truly the same, in two separate administrations. In the one, there is exercised an immediate, and in the other a mediate authority. The lower department, or delegated administration, may be regarded as imperfect, because carried on by imperfect agents ; it may often be abused and perverted to the execution of wrong purposes. Thus, too, has it been with the church, and thus has it also been with that power of the parent which all ages have regarded as possessed of a sacred or religious character. Human government may in this way, at times, do much evil instead of the good for which it was designed ; and the guilty actors, legislators, magistrates, and people, may be held responsible and punished for such abuse of an institution of God. This, however, does not at all affect our main position, that it is God's appointed agent for the punishment and prevention of crimes and wicked acts upon our earth (primarily as crimes and wicked acts), and in necessary dependence upon this, for the purpose of promoting the comfort and happiness of men in the enjoyment of order, peace, and security. The lower, or human department, is of course necessarily limited in its objects, its subjects, its modes of proceeding, and the punishment it inflicts. It has, indeed, to do with thoughts, intents, and moral dispositions ; but only as manifested in their ultimates, or as actions. The higher not only takes cognisance of these directly in itself, and mediately through the lower, but also of moral or spiritual states as existing *per se*. It is the duty of human government to punish, and thus remove and prevent, all the wickedness it can reach. The proper limitations of its power, in this respect, arising from physical weakness, ignorance, defect of evidence, peculiar condition of society, state of public sentiment, and even those imperfections or disabilities of its own for which it is responsible, will be best considered in treating of the objection as it sometimes rises in another form.

But if a man is punished by the higher law of God, what would prevent his suffering twice for the same offence ? That may be,

we answer, and no eternal principle, either of truth or equity, violated by such a fact. The offender may be regarded as visited with retribution in two aspects, corresponding to the spiritual and temporal aspects of his crime; but, independent of this, both may be necessary to fill up the full measure of his desert. Besides, the objection, if it has any force at all, lies equally against human punishment on the sole ground of expediency. If an offence, in its whole extent under the universal government of God, deserves a certain amount of suffering and no more, then, on either scheme, what the criminal suffered *in relation to the crime*, let the motive of the human infliction be what it may, should be reckoned in the total amount. The fact, if it were so, that the human judge did not intend it for desert, would not make it the less—*suffering for the act*. If the objection is presented in another shape, namely, that he who has been punished for a crime on earth, will, on the whole, suffer more than another, who, having committed the same offence or offences, has shunned the retributions of human law,—we can only say, that those who make this objection affirm that of which they know nothing; nay more, that the moral sense and the Scriptures both warrant the rational belief, that he who has thus escaped all vengeance in this world, will on that very account experience a heavier doom in the next. We certainly would not wish to weaken any impressions of the awful retributions of the spiritual state, by such arithmetical comparisons, or by thus carrying forward balances of accounts from the present to the future; yet still, whatever may be our estimates as to *degree*, it is enough if it can be maintained that justice and punishment are everywhere the same in essence, be the scale on which they are exhibited higher or lower, greater or less, human or divine.

“The murderer deserves to die,” says a late writer; “but,” he continues, “all men deserve to die, not only a natural but an eternal death. Hence if human governments punish men because they deserve it, why should not all men be put to death?” We think that we have met with this foolish argument before in the writings of Mr. Burleigh. The only punishment we would wish to have inflicted on its ingenious authors is, that they should be compelled to put it in the syllogistic form, in order that its folly might stare them in the face. It has only one small defect, namely, a double or ambiguous middle term. It is only quietly assumed, that a natural death, that is, one brought about in the ordinary course of nature or God’s providence,—although itself a penalty in respect to the higher administration,—is the same thing with the violent death inflicted by the hands of man on him who has super-added to his natural guilt the shedding of the blood of man. When this middle term can rightly embrace things so very different, and when the writer can make true what ought be his second premise, namely—“all men deserve to die a violent death by the

hands of men,"—then the argument may be worth something. The reference to the second or spiritual death must be regarded as thrown in as a blind, for surely it can have no proper weight whatever in coming to any right determination of the question. It certainly would not follow, on any scheme, whether of desert or expediency, that because human governments are unable to inflict the higher penalties, therefore they can inflict none.

It would seem to be enough for our argument, that the Scriptures do most expressly recognise human government, viewed irrespective of all particular forms, as an ordinance of God, and the magistrate as the minister of a moral justice. We may, however, without irreverence, inquire into the reason of such a constitution of things, and in so doing, may perhaps find it in a proper consideration of man's true nature, of his relation to higher states of being, and of that moral training to which all his lower relations are intended to contribute. Here also will be found the grand difference between the two doctrines that are taught in relation to this matter. The one regards human law as intended only for the security of property, and what it styles personal rights. It views the natural condition of man as a state of war, and government as a scheme to defend himself against himself. With this end in view, and with nothing but this end in view, it can be shown, and we think it has been shown, that it will never attain even the lower object at which it aims; it will not secure property, or maintain peace, or defend man against himself. Without, however, again entering upon ground that has been partially occupied before, we proceed to set forth another and a higher aim of the State; one which has been acknowledged by the profoundest thinkers of ancient or modern times. It may be well, in this respect, to compare our Godwins, and Paines, and Combes, and Sampsons, with the master mind of antiquity. "Before we can determine," he says, "the best *Politeia*, we must ascertain what is the most excellent life"—*ἡ ἀρίστη ζωὴ*¹. In doing this, he next tells us, we must estimate the relative value of the three classes of interests pertaining to humanity, namely, *τὰ ἔκτος, καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*—"those without, those of the body, and those of the soul"—or, to use the more modern style and order—*soul, body and goods*. "If the soul," he proceeds, "is more precious than property and the body—*ἐπεὶ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος τιμώτερον*—then the best life is that which preserves the same analogy." In this way, he maintains, the best state, or *Πολιτεία*, is ascertained. For the soul's sake, then—*τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν*—must the law have regard to person and goods, instead of viewing the former, as the modern doctrine does, only in its relations as a means to the latter, and not in reference to its own spiritual

¹ Aristotle, *Politica*, Lib. vii., ch. 1.

well-being as an end. The same high ground is more distinctly taken by Plato. *Οὐ τὸ σῶζεσθαι μόνον ἀνθρώπους κ. τ. λ. τὸ δὲ ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν ᾧσιν*—"The state is not for security simply, but that men may become morally best or most excellent (as *βελτίστους* most clearly signifies) during the whole period of their existence."¹ How refreshing to turn from some modern productions to the writings of these noble old heathen! They may not have intended, by some of the expressions we have quoted from them, the same elevated sense which their own terms would suggest to a Christian statesman; yet limit them as we may, they are the language of a very different theory from that which denies that human law "has anything to do with moral considerations," or that it has any legitimate objects of its care besides the security of body and goods. To this effect the Stagyrite maintains, in the same chapter, that the great end of the State is the absolute instead of the relative perfection of humanity. "Since then," says he, "to each man there is blessedness in proportion to his virtue and moral wisdom (*φρονήσεως*), and actions corresponding thereto, let the above principle, namely, that the attainment of such blessedness is the end of every good Polity, be regarded as established by us; in which also we refer to God as a witness, who is blessed and happy, not by reason of external goods (*τὰ ἑκτὸς*) but in himself, and because he is what he is."² According to this theory, then, the State is designed, not so much for defence against the animal nature, as for the cultivation of the moral and spiritual,—to train the soul to obedience to law, as law, instead of the mere following of what may be called an enlightened sense of convenience. Its great design,—and every true political organism, however rude, in some measure fulfils it,—is to call men away from the personal, the individual, the animal, to that higher, abstract, and rational life of humanity, which each man lives as a member of a whole or organism—itsself subordinate to, and connected with, that great whole of which God is the head and the Divine-reason the everlasting law. "Propose to any man," says a late popular writer on crime and punishment, "that which is for his own interest, and convince him by argument that it is so, and try whether he will refuse it."³ This he calls "ruling men through the medium of the understanding." Now, without adverting to the difficulty of convincing a man as to his true or highest interests, we would say that the purpose of all law and government, as instituted by God, is to get him out of the animal method of regulating his conduct by calculations of interests, or by balancings of accounts between himself and the mere aggregation of individuals with which he may be locally connected.

¹ Legg. Leip., p. 116.² Arist., *Politica*, vii., 1.³ Roscoe, on Penal Jurisprudence, Part III., p. 115.

It is to habituate him to the contemplation of living by a rule of acknowledged right, instead of the estimates of self interest, be it dark or enlightened; in other words, to regulate his conduct, not by the "*understanding*," in the above sense of the term (and which varies with each man's view of his own circumstances), but by *conscience*, and that abstract reason of the race of which law, even human law, with all its imperfections, is the truest and most unchanging earthly exponent. In this sense, government is not a "necessary evil" of which the less we have the better, but an appointed means to our highest well-being.

Without, however, entering here upon a more extended discussion of the direct question at issue between these two theories,—namely, of living by the understanding and of living by conscience,—we would at present simply insist upon the *matter of fact*, that, by reason of the constitution and actual circumstances of men, our first ideas of law, of punishment, of justice, and desert, do necessarily receive their first objective suggestions and illustrations from earthly laws and earthly tribunals. *The latter are the necessary chronological antecedents through which the former are developed.* In this respect, there is attached to them an importance for good or evil, immensely beyond any utilities they may possess for the conservation of property and order; and in this fact, too, we see the reason why God has not left such vital influences to themselves without the regulation of his own sanction and appointment. The lower, from the very nature of things, become types of the higher. The lower law and the lower justice are the first media through which the higher are necessarily read and contemplated. First is that which is earthly, and then that which is heavenly; first that which is temporal, and then that which is eternal. If there is a true and eternal justice, a true retribution, or, in other words, a divine justice and a divine retribution, then is it of infinite moment that our first mental impressions in the use of these and kindred words, should have no associations that are not in harmony with these high and unchangeable verities. Neither the child nor the man, when unsophisticated, has any thought of two sets of ideas, essentially distinct, corresponding to these two sets of terms when severally used in their divine and human relations; although it may be evident to the most untaught intellect, that there is an immense difference in degree and in the nature of their applications. If the ideas are essentially distinct, the employment of the same terms for both must necessarily be a source of error. It will inevitably bring down, in our conception, the divine to our assumed standard of the human, or falsely raise the human to meet a depressed standard of the divine. Although substantially the same in their results, yet the first is the more common and natural method as we see it exemplified in

those who wholly deny any such thing as retribution to the divine government.

If our first impressions, then, are necessarily connected with the proceedings of human tribunals, the idea of the human justice must precede that of the divine. If the former is held to have no reference to desert or retribution as the ground of punishment, such will necessarily be the first, and, because the first, the most lasting impression connected with the term as used of the government of God. If our earliest conceptions of human law should lead us habitually to regard it as having strictly no moral character, the soul is just in a proper condition to receive the doctrine (now such a favorite with some), that what is called the divine government is merely a scheme of physical laws for physical ends; punishing, as it is commonly said, by necessary physical consequences, and with nothing strictly of a penal, retributive, or avenging character, as these terms have been ever used in human language. In short, if the one has no other and no higher aim than what is usually styled expediency, the conceptions of the other will partake of the same character; and thus, in place of a true morality, the epicurean doctrine, that happiness instead of right, or happiness as synonymous with right, is the end of being, becomes the law of the universe. There is, in other words, nowhere any *right* except success in the attainment of the greatest amount of "*pleasing sensations*;" there is no *wrong* except an intellectual mistake as to the method by which this attainment can be secured; there is no other punishment than the physical ill consequences of such mistake, producing a reform consisting in the rectification of such error. In short, there are not only no acts, but also no *states of soul*, which, in themselves, and irrespective of consequences, have an eternal right or wrong; there is strictly no morality, no desert, no retribution, and of course no genuine conviction of sin in the universe. All terms implying such ideas must either be accommodated to the physical scheme, or they have absolutely no meaning as they have, since the time of Adam, been invariably used among mankind. This, to use the before quoted declaration of Mr. Roscoe, is the theory of "*regulating human conduct through the medium of the understanding*," or enlightened sense of convenience, without any appeal to the conscience as a distinct and higher department of the soul. It uses language which would have shocked some of the best and wisest among the heathen. It affirms, what Cicero would have abhorred, that virtue is only a *means*—a means to happiness—and that happiness, "or pleasing sensations," is the *end* instead of the appointed reward of virtue.

If, then, human law is thus the schoolmaster to lead us to the divine, with what solicitude should we see to it that a false philosophy does not dictate to it a lesson, which, when carried out, will

turn what would otherwise be the highest truths into the most deadly poison for the soul. In view of this, too, we may see why the author of the Scriptures has taken so much pains to declare that human government, instead of being a self-created and self-grounded system of expediency, is an ordinance of God, and that the lawful magistrate is truly his minister—"an avenger upon him that doth evil."

We need no stronger proof of the truth and importance of the above positions, in a practical point of view, than the fact that almost all who faithfully carry out the opposing views in regard to human law, do proceed onward to their legitimate consequences. Those of this class who mingle a philosophy with their speculations, or who have no established church to keep them sound in their theology in spite of their heresies on other subjects, or who have no vulgar fear lest it should not be thought respectable to maintain the same opinions with Paine and Godwin—those of this class, we say, who deny the doctrine of retribution and desert as an element of human justice, seldom stop short of the same denial in regard to the divine government. All who travel this road most faithfully do come out at a certain place, and such being the fact, it is vain and absurd to deny that the road naturally leads there. The most consistent reasoners against capital punishment do now, almost all of them, belong to this ultra school. Some, on this account, have, as we have seen, expressly repudiated the words penal and punishment as conveying false ideas. The pressure of the argument has also brought them to see such an intimate connexion between the retributive principle and the warning or preventive effect upon others, that they have come, at last, openly and boldly to avow the safe keeping of the criminal, and his reformation, to be the only grounds on which society can employ towards him any violence or constraint. With them crime is disease, and punishment is cure, not only on earth, but throughout the universe.

For the establishment of these views, they labor most assiduously to break down those institutions, which, in reference both to the ordinance and providence of God, have ever been regarded as the nurseries of opposing sentiments. Among these, the family and the school rank next to the State. In the former, the child's first idea of law should be the authority of the parent, as bestowed by God, and his first thought of punishment should embrace the idea of desert or moral guilt. He should be told that a violation of the one is in reality a breach of a divine commandment, and that its penalty, though infinitely less in degree, involves the same primary idea that belongs to the retributions of eternity. The other theory assumes to be more refined and humane; it claims, as a peculiar excellence, to proceed on a benevolent expediency, and to have in view the good of the child, whilst the former, it

declares, inculcates a stern and odious vengeance. It pretends to govern by the higher mode of addressing the understanding, and to produce a love of right and justice by a discovery of their utilities. So also in the school, it assumes to appeal to the higher sentiments as something distinct from the conscience, and represents submission to authority without an explanation, at every step, of the expediencies thereof, as a lesson addressed to the lower faculties of the soul. It of course declaims loudly against all corporeal punishment as contrary to the spirit of the age, and deriving all its support from the precepts of an antiquated book.

The other, or Scriptural system, holds all authority acknowledged to be lawful (such as beyond all question is that of a parent over a child, and of the teacher over the pupil committed to his care), to be the authority of God, and that submission to it under this view, and without reference to its utilities as the ground thereof, is not only the highest lesson reason ever taught to a human being, but the one which, above all others, this age needs to learn in respect to the school, the family, and the State; a lesson, too, which, when received with docility into the soul, will be the surest guarantee of a consequent enlightenment of the understanding, and of the truest mental independence. The opposite is that wretched counterfeit, calling itself independence and freedom of thought, but which, in fact, is a servile fear of anything like first truths or settled opinions—a base subjection to the individual will led captive by everything choosing to style itself a reform, or a new idea, or the spirit of the age.

All true authority is from God, who throughout the Bible assigns no other reason as the ground of his laws than the oft repeated *ANI JEHOVAH*, and who, in striking contrast with favorite theories of obligation, self-love, utility, benevolence, &c., ever challenges obedience on the ground of his *own proper Deity*, as Creator, self-existent, eternal, and possessing a righteousness not to be questioned even in the conception—a righteousness upholding all true expediency; therefore upholding, because having a position immensely above it; therefore conserving, because unmeasured by it; and therefore securing all happiness, for the reason, that it maintains its own high position as an *end*, instead of destroying all good by suffering itself to take the subordinate station of a *means*. Every violation of true authority is, therefore, an offence against God; all punishment of it, consequently, is primarily because it is wicked and on the ground of moral desert. These are the lessons which the spirit of law should constantly teach the child, the pupil, and the citizen. When and where they are deeply implanted in the inmost soul, and, by *living in the conscience*, become a part of our moral and political being, then and there (although not their highest aim, and because they are not their highest aim) will there be a security for person and for property, which no philosophy of expe-

diency will ever effectually conserve, although it may profess the benevolence of an angel, and a wisdom wiser than that which dictated the Scriptures for our instruction in all righteousness. When these views are clearly maintained, it is perceived that all true government is one, and that every lower grade, such as the State and the family, are departments of this one government of the universe, interpenetrated according to their degree of perfection with the same spirit, having, essentially, one nature of law, one nature of justice, one nature of punishment, one retribution in kind if not in degree, and basing its judgments primarily on the ground of moral demerit,—in short, all presenting, according to their several powers and jurisdictions, the one and the same immutable moral idea.

In connexion with such views we may estimate the value of that vulgar rhetoric which blends, in such illogical and unphilosophical confusion, vengeance, and retribution, and revengeful spirit; and talks about “the passionless nature of law;” as though this was not the very reason why the law is passionless, because, instead of a popular expediency that might be swayed by every irrational impulse, and which so easily runs down to personal individual or aggregate revenge, it keeps in mind that holy principle of retribution, which, far from having anything akin to the narrowness of individual feeling, takes a range beyond the earth, and claims alliance with all that is eternal, immutable, calm, and absolute, in the universe of God. If law is “passionless” only in proportion as it lacks the retributive principle, then what must be thought of Heaven’s justice by those who admit that this is an element of it? “The law,” says one, “which condemns a human being to death, should be perfectly free from the least appearance of revenge.” It never will be wholly so, we reply, as long as it assumes so solemn a prerogative on no higher ground than a selfish expediency. It never will keep its hold on the consciences of men, or long retain its place in the statute-book, unless it is regarded as punishing the crime because it *deserves* the punishment,—because God has therefore commanded it, and because a moral reason higher than any temporal expediency most imperatively demands it likewise.

The writer, to whom we have frequently alluded, is fond of delivering eulogies on the “majesty of human law.” “It is passionless,” he says, “calm, inflexible;” “it is an awful power”—“it is the severity of goodness itself,” &c., &c. Now to this, we would most cordially say amen; but for what purpose is it intended? If arguments in which such rhetoric enters have any drift or meaning, it must be that human law has all these excellencies, because it has not the odious principle of retribution, or (to deprive such writers of the *ad captandum* benefit of what to some is a very ugly word) does not punish crime on the ground of moral

desert. Its peculiar excellency, then, is placed in the very circumstance in which it is said to differ from the divine law; which is acknowledged by many of this class to contain the principle of retribution, and to punish sin because it deserves to be punished. But is not the divine law "passionless, calm, majestic?" Is it not "an awful power?" Is it not "the severity of goodness?" But is it not also retributive, and does it not possess all these excellencies?—is it not calm, majestic, severe in goodness, just because it is retributive?—in other words, because it is a true *moral* power,—because it inhabits a region where all expediency is subordinate to that holy principle which looks to moral desert as the absolute ground of all penal law; and in so doing (as we have said before, but cannot repeat too often), effectually secures all lower aims?

There is no consistency in such declamation. If retributive justice is no part of human law, because it would in that case be revengeful, it can form no part of the divine. So decides the moral sense and also the speculative reason; and we have a good proof of this in the fact, that all those who are the most consistent on this question do thus carry out their conclusion to its legitimate results. We cannot help regarding it as indeed a most blessed provision of God's economy, that error is thus ever forced onwards to develope itself. It cannot rest in midway positions, but must go on until it stands before us in all its deformity, to show at what an immense sacrifice of first truths its dreadful consistency is to be maintained. There will always be ultra reformers, who will thus push out their doctrine, and whose very extravagance will be made of service to the cause of truth, by bringing boldly to the light, what might long have concealed its poison under the guise of a moderate and respectable orthodoxy.

It remains now for us to consider some of the more common objections that are presented to the doctrine of desert as a ground of punishment and an element of human law.

It is urged, that the moral sense of man is not competent to decide upon the intrinsic demerit of offences, or their relative proportions in a proper gradation of punishments to be prescribed by human law.

The objection is of the same nature with that, which, in the philosophy of a former age, denied the existence of any moral sense at all. This latter opinion was supported by arguments drawn from the varying decisions of different times and people. What had been held to be a crime in one age, and one nation, had not been so regarded in another. Theft, it was said—and this was a standing illustration—was not regarded as criminal in Sparta, but rather praiseworthy, if it was so practised as to exercise that *useful* faculty, cunning, or skill in deception and concealment. Now we need no better proof than this trite example, if founded on fact, to

show that whenever the conscience has not been true to its office, and has permitted gross error, it has been because a vile system of political economy, or political expediency, had been suffered to take its place and supersede its decisions. We would much rather trust the decisions even of a Spartan conscience—unprincipled and deceptive as that people were, beyond any nation of antiquity—than any view of right derived solely from a scheme of national expediency. Had the moral sense alone been suffered to decide, no doubt theft would have been punished in Sparta with as much rigor and ignominy as under the Jewish law.

Commercial England presents another illustration of the same truth. It is often asked—If the moral sense is competent to decide on the proper gradations of punishment, how comes it that in one of the most enlightened nations of the globe, murder and forgery are visited with the same penalty? We answer again—this has not been caused by an erroneous decision of the moral sense of the nation, but by a low doctrine of expediency, in which a regard to property was suffered to take the place of the *holier*, and because the *holier*, therefore the *wiser* principle. The *τὸ ἐξ ὁρίων*, according to Aristotle's classification, took precedence in this respect of *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς*. The common law has ever had more respect to property, and less to purely moral considerations, than the Roman or civil, which was adopted in other nations of Europe.¹ It is this very doctrine of utility or public convenience as the highest ground of law, which, as far as it goes, has committed the error that its advocates would now charge upon the moral incompetency. Had the whole matter been left to the decision of the moral nature, or had property and expediency been forced to keep silence, and not to interfere with those more ultimate grounds on which the law's more clear and righteous judgments would have been based, England would have had a far better code of criminal jurisprudence,—one that would not have shocked and deranged the moral sense by its anomalies,—thus, for this very cause, becoming a fearful source of depravity;—a code, too, which doubtless, in the end, would have done more to conserve the interests of property than any scheme of penalties seeming to be more especially grounded upon them.

There is an affected humility in this objection for which we have no respect. It has much to say about “usurping the prerogatives of the Almighty,” and of “frail humanity presuming to sit in judgment on human sins;” but, when viewed in connexion with all this, how strange the fact, that after God has enlightened human darkness as to the proper penalty due to certain crimes,—when, in other words, he has most expressly revealed to us that the murderer ought to be put to death by the hands of men, none are more

¹ This is said comparatively, for the jurisprudence of England, with all its anomalies, is, like that of all other nations, *mainly* based on moral grounds.

ready to despise such authority, than the very class who are always so fond of presenting this objection of man's incompetency.

Besides, who cannot see that the objection, if it have any relevancy at all, applies with even greater force to that scheme which grounds punishment *solely* on expediency? How easy would it be, and how much more in accordance with truth, to enlarge upon man's incapacity to determine what is truly expedient, and upon the mistakes, which, ever since the fall—when he first tried the experiment of “living by the *understanding*” instead of the *conscience*—he has been making in respect to his highest good! We may more safely trust the moral sense in these matters, than this self-blinded, calculating doctrine of economical expediency. There is no blinder guide in regard to the highest good than what is called an enlightened self-interest. The principle, when taken out of its subordinate place and made supreme, becomes, in consequence of this false position, essential darkness, and cannot either give light or be enlightened. That individual certainly acts the wisest, who, in the regulation of his own conduct, trusts the moral sense, and by the very act of trusting gives growing clearness and strength to its decisions.

It is doubtless most certain that man is incompetent to decide the intrinsic demerit of crime, regarded in its whole extent as embracing all its spiritual and subjective as well as outward aspects; but this is very different from the proposition, that in reference to the latter he may not institute a proper gradation; especially when divine wisdom, by revealing the proper human penalty for the highest crime in the scale, has given him a starting measure for all the rest. There is, moreover, no inconsistency in maintaining that human government is a divine institution, and yet admitting that it is imperfect. We say the same of the Church, of the family, of the creation,—of his own heavens, even, “which are not pure in His sight”—yea, of all things aside from the perfect God himself.

A second objection we have seen thus expressed: “If punishment is inflicted by man, on the ground that crime deserves it, then it must always be inflicted, and there is no room for pardon.”

The answer presents itself at once. It arises out of what has just been said of the human administration of justice being imperfect because intrusted to imperfect agents, although this does not derogate from the doctrine of its divine institution. There may be the highest wisdom in employing imperfect beings in divine and elevated employments, associated, as all true law and justice must be, with the eternal and the absolute,—and this, too, as a divine means for elevating their moral nature. However this may be, the necessity of a pardoning department springs out of this imperfection of human tribunals, and cannot affect the ultimate grounds on which they should ever proceed. In the immediate government

of God, there can be no such thing as pardon except on the ground of full and perfect satisfaction. The mercy is in the voluntary substitute and the agents in his voluntary substitution; but this would lead us to discuss a subject beyond, although not irrelevant to, our argument. In human law, however, pardon is simply an expedient to remedy the necessary imperfections of human justice. The executive, or whoever exercises the power, is, in this respect, simply a higher judicial officer to correct the supposed mistakes of courts; especially when made known by subsequently discovered testimony. But how this interferes with the doctrine, that the law punishes the criminal because he deserves to suffer, we cannot understand; or how the objection does not apply with as much force, if it have any, to the economical scheme as to any other.

Whoever places this power of pardon in human law on the ground of clemency, irrespective of the considerations above named, forms a totally false conception of its nature; and those executive officers who have regarded it as a power to be exercised at their pleasure, have abused one of the most sacred duties of the judicial department. It must be placed, either on the ground of such clear discovery of error as would have warranted an acquittal, or of such probability of mistake, as, (although not sufficient for the former purpose) would justify a remission of the penalty as the safer course, under all the circumstances of the case. So that pardon implies still the idea of guilt or suspicion of guilt. When the subsequently discovered evidence is such as to remove all doubt in respect to innocence, then the reversion of the sentence, notwithstanding it has begun to be carried into effect, should be called by some other name. In fact, it is a strong support of our view, that the very terms, pardon and clemency, imply the existence of intrinsic moral distinctions, recognised by law as lying at the foundation of certain proceedings, whilst they have no place in others. Who would not revolt at the utter absurdity of pardoning a man from a pest-house or a lunatic asylum?

A third objection is—that “if crime is punished for its intrinsic demerit, it would be right to punish all violations of law, civil, physical, or religious—those which determine our relations to God, and those which involve our relations to society.” All this would come, it is said, if human law punishes men “because they deserve to suffer.” But suppose government punishes on the other ground, which is such a favorite with many philanthropists, namely, reformation. Then why, we ask, must not the same consequences follow in the one case as in the other? Then, to accommodate to our purpose the same language—“it would be right to punish (if we may use the term) for the sake of *reforming* men from all wilful violations of law, civil, physical, and religious—those which determine man’s relation to God and those which involve his relations to society.” The argument in the one case would be just as

good as in the other. In neither is it good for anything. Whatever may be the end of government, it is bound to carry out that end to its fullest possible extent, by all the means (and we shall afterwards limit and define what we mean by available means) which lie within its power. In neither case, however, whether government punishes retributively, or for the sake of reformation, or of prevention, would it be bound to visit with retribution everything which might deserve retribution, any more than it would be bound to attempt the reformation of every person or thing that might need reformation, or to prevent everything which might justly be regarded as an evil or inconvenience. And this for the simple and obvious reason, that there would be many things beyond its power in all these cases. On neither scheme would it follow that the State was bound to punish *always*, and to punish everything, and to punish irrespective of all considerations of its moral or physical capacity for so doing. There are certain very bad crimes, and vices, and states of soul, which it could neither reach to reform, remove as nuisances and inconveniences (although such they doubtless are in the very highest degree), nor punish retributively, because they are entirely beyond the satisfactory cognition of human evidence, or because the State has not enough of moral vigor in consequence of a powerful adverse and yet uncorrected public sentiment.

Let us try the economical theory by the same test. Why does it not remove certain acknowledged evils which are known to have the most injurious effects upon the temporal welfare of society? The answer, it may be said, is most plain. In a given state of things they cannot be removed without danger of producing a greater *inconvenience*. And so we say, and the reply is equally obvious and conclusive—there are some sins which, as society is constituted, you cannot visit with their justly deserved retribution without danger of committing a greater *injustice*.

In regard to this objection we would not at all hesitate to take the widest theoretical ground. Human government, we maintain, and we think have proved, to be instituted and designed by God, as, in the most real sense, a moral power,—economical and truly useful just in proportion as it possesses this primary character. It was intended to have to do with the conscience. It is something which we have no right to dispense with, even although it might be fancied, that in respect to body and goods we might get along tolerably well without it. It is a great moral means of God's appointment, in the use of which men are to be trained, or to train themselves, to live soberly and *righteously* in the present world, whilst preparing for the higher retributions of another state of being having relation to another law of concurrent and supervisory jurisdiction; which latter law, although higher and more spiritual, has yet the same ultimate ideas of desert and justice. It

is, with all its imperfection, a type through which we read the administration of the higher justice. It is our schoolmaster, our first teacher, in connexion with whose lessons are called out our first ideas of right and desert in their objective presentations as connected with positive law, and which we afterwards transfer to the divine government. It contains, too, a power that does not belong to individuals, or to any aggregations of individuals, but comes to it as positive institution of God, invested on this very account with a moral character.

For these reasons we hesitate not to take the position, that it is the office of human government to punish and remove *all moral evils* within its earthly jurisdiction, which it *can* punish. Its prerogatives and duties are only limited by its inability. This may be of various kinds. It may be physical weakness. In respect to some crimes, it may be an impossibility of applying correct evidence. It may be an ignorance on the part of the governed which cannot easily be remedied in our present imperfect state. It may be a false public sentiment on the part of the people, which, although not the law, nor the ground of the law, may yet be a conceded and excusing impediment in the way of its action. It may be, in short, any imperfection in the nature of human things, or in the state of society (to be judged of by those who have the sovereignty and responsibility, and on their responsibility), which renders it morally or physically impossible to do justice to certain offences, without danger of greater injustice in some other quarter. Some crimes *cannot* be punished (and therefore the law in that state of things *ought* not to punish them), because a large part of the population is not yet sufficiently advanced to regard them as crimes;—serious differences of opinion, whether moral, religious, political, or even economical, thus becoming real impediments. We do not say that in such cases the *people* are absolved from all responsibility, but only assign it as a reason, why under certain circumstances, to which the State or government must have respect, it *cannot* exercise the moral or even economical action which in other cases it rightfully may and ought. Other offenders may escape, because, where there cannot be absolute certainty, mistakes in relation to them would endanger most important institutions with which such offences are naturally connected. Thus covetousness, and want of charity, cannot be punished, until society is so advanced in moral wisdom as to be capable of making distinctions which are now but dimly perceived. To compel the rich, for example, by law or threats of punishment (except by way of general tax), to give charity to the poor, would be, in fact, giving others a property, or community of property, in their possessions. It would, of course, defeat the very important ends for which separate property, with all its acknowledged evils, is allowed in the State and sanctioned by God. It would annihilate the very virtue

it would aim to enforce, by taking away the grounds on which alone it can be exercised, and which were doubtless intended as furnishing the means and field of its disciplinary culture. In other words, it is better for a temporal jurisdiction to leave unpunished the odious offence of covetousness, than to give rise to a state of things in which there could be no exercise of the heavenly grace of charity. Hence, we say, it is one of those sins which lie without the range of the State's ability, and which must, therefore, be remitted solely to the ultimate and divine justice.

All such we style disabilities, or imperfections, if the latter term is preferred; but these, we also believe, will become less and less in proportion as human government, under all the circumstances in which it may be placed, acts for the moral end for which it was instituted, and faithfully keeps in view its own high and sacred character. As the individual man improves in virtue by the exercise of virtue, daily removing personal, moral and physical impediments, and acquiring higher capacities, so the State that most faithfully uses the moral power with which God has intrusted it, according to its measure, will constantly acquire moral strength, moral wisdom, and, in short, capacities of every kind for the just and safe performance of all its functions as a minister, on earth, of God's eternal righteousness.

Certainly it would be a most highly desirable state of society, when such procedures could safely take place, sanctioned by the pure moral feeling of the nation, and freed from those impediments, and perplexing connexions with other interests, which now prevent human justice from deciding with satisfactory certainty in the premises. Doubtless it would be desirable on the ground merely of a wise expediency, to say nothing of any higher ends. If this be so, we need not stop to prove the converse proposition, that that State, or rather aggregation, which seeks to divest itself of its moral character, will go on corrupting and corrupted, educating the people into false principles, and itself constantly feeling the effects of a natural reaction, until it shall so lose all moral vigor, that it will finally fail to secure the lower objects at which alone it professed to aim.

But would you punish men for lying, and offences of a similar description? Yes; by all means. We should rejoice in belonging to a commonwealth that had so pure a code, and could enforce it without the fear of any vulgar ridicule or shallow blue-law witticisms. We would have the magistrate punish the odious sin of lying *per se*, whether "it broke any man's leg or picked any man's pocket," or not; and so also drunkenness *per se*, and fornication, and adultery, and all unchaste behavior. If this is so, it may be said to follow that the State should punish the expression of wicked and blasphemous opinions. Most certainly, we reply; but always with the safe limitations which have here-

tofore been set forth ; namely—when public sentiment, or serious differences of opinion, or anything else constituting a real impediment to rightly defining or proving the offence, is no longer in the way. When it is well understood and commonly acknowledged to be a crime by a moral and religious people, anxious to preserve their children and posterity from that greatest of all evils, irreligion,—then blasphemy, for example, or a profane reviling of God, and Christ, and holy things, should be punished as blasphemy, and profanity as profanity,—as an openly wicked and abominable act in the sight of God, and which therefore the magistrate, as God's minister for vengeance, should take cognisance of for the purpose of *putting away* the offensive thing from a righteous State. Where the open expression of blasphemous sentiments (no one would contend that the mere mental holding of blasphemous opinions could be punished) cannot be reached, by reason of any of the disabilities above mentioned, then of course there is an end of the discussion under this head.

But would not also a wise expediency itself require, that the law should take cognisance of the expression of opinions attended with *mischievous* consequences to the *interests* of society. Certainly, it must be replied, if society has a right to protect itself ; or else the system is false, both to its name and assumed fundamental principle. If the general prevalence of blasphemy and irreligion will, as matter of fact capable of proof, produce in the end insecurity to person and goods, or cause "pockets to be picked and legs to be broken," then the economical theory must punish blasphemy, and the teaching of atheism, as severely, at least, as the offence of selling bad provisions. What then becomes of the bug-bear which, in regard to this matter, is held forth against the moral power of government ? If the profanity is proceeded against even on the economical ground, it must be viewed remotely and ultimately as a *sin*, even if treated immediately and directly as a *mischief* ; because if not a sin, or an offence against God, it could not be *contra bonos mores*, or an offence injurious to society. It is the first character which creates the second. *Practically*, then, both theories lead, either in a greater or less degree, to the same course of action. Both meet with the same difficulty ; only the one is based on a holier principle, and therefore, whilst no more liable to abuse, would have far more efficacy even in securing the ends of a wise expediency ; we might say *less* liable to abuse, because on neither theory could the act be punished unless generally condemned by public sentiment ; and in that case we would much rather trust the *enlightened moral sense*, than the "*enlightened self-interest*."

Sometimes these objections take another form. Their authors affect to mourn over human depravity and human ignorance.

They are occasionally fond of indulging in such language and such rhetorical ejaculations and interrogations as these—"How is guilt to be ascertained, and who is competent to estimate its amount? Who can look into the ten thousand times ten thousand circumstances, both external and internal, which have conduced to mould the character for good or evil? Who can calculate the force of temptation which has tended to corrupt, and the good influences which have improved, and tell us how much guilt each and every victim has incurred, &c., &c."¹ The true answer to all this impassioned rhetoric is this—It is a sheer assumption of a position which not only requires a great deal of proof, but which, in truth, is disproved by considerations arising from the contemplation of almost every human duty. It implies the absurd proposition, that man ought not to do anything, unless he can do it perfectly, and without the least risk of mistake; in other words, as unerringly as God himself. It is a miserable effusion of sentimentalism opposed both to reason and to facts. Could not those who indulge in it see that it has just as much application to what is called society, or our more social and domestic intercourse, as to the action of the State. The amount of it is—we must form no judgment of moral character; we must esteem the good and the bad, the righteous and the wicked, the obedient and the lawless, all alike, as long as there is any possibility of mistake in our estimate of moral desert. And yet the Scriptures do most directly condemn those who make no difference between the righteous and the unrighteous, as also commend those "in whose eyes a vile person" is held in his proper estimation.

There are, however, two decisive answers which meet at once the whole ground and spirit of these objections. The first is, that, notwithstanding this affectation of humility, human tribunals, in *practically* carrying out prerogatives which even many of these writers admit to belong to them, are compelled to make, and do actually make these very inquiries which are thus spoken of as usurpations of the prerogatives of the Almighty. They must sometimes inquire into desert, even if the proceeding is to be viewed in no higher light than as incidental to the right discharge of their economical functions. They are compelled every day to examine most searchingly into intentions, although it would be at once admitted that in this they might commit even great mistakes. "For who," to adopt the same strain, "can look into the ten thousand times ten thousand circumstances, both external and internal, that determine" the true nature of that complex thing styled purpose or intention? In deciding the great question of guilt, and especially in fixing the amount of the penalty, they do

¹ Democratic Review, August, 1846, p. 96.

and must most keenly interrogate very many, if not ten thousand, circumstances internal and external. They do calculate the force of "temptations that have tended to corrupt." They inquire into previous character, and previous moral influences, and endeavor, by every possible means, to get as near as they can to that moral state in which the crime was committed, in order to ascertain the proper mitigation or enhancement of the penalty,—when its magnitude or duration is wholly or partially in the discretion of the magistrate. All governments and all courts have done so in all ages, and the common sense and the moral sense of mankind have ever sanctioned the proceeding as not only necessary but just. If, however, the objections with which we are dealing have any force, all such proceedings have been "usurpations of the prerogative of Omniscience." This principle is carried so far in the common law and other systems of jurisprudence, and is so sanctioned by the moral sense, that it influences even what is styled the civil, in distinction from the criminal, jurisdiction of courts. We refer to those proceedings in civil suits involving actions *ex delicto*, in which the law has sanctioned the giving what is commonly termed *smart money*, or *vindictive damages*, beyond the mere measure of actual pecuniary loss suffered by the injured party. In such cases the moral sense demands it, and the law acknowledges its higher authority.

Again, as we have said in reference to another aspect of the objection, can any one fail to see that it lies with all its power, if it have any, against the economical theory, or in fact any scheme except that which repudiates all human government whatever? How aptly and consistently might the ultra no-government men adopt this same style against all who would give to mere human aggregations, that "prerogative which can only be safely used by Almighty wisdom and goodness"—violent resistance to evil. This high power of employing force by man against man, says our utilitarian, belongs to the State to promote the public good,—a position in which, as far as it goes, we most cordially agree with him; but here comes our and his more ultra antagonist, with the same or a similar series of passionate interrogations, and with equal justice—"How is that good to be estimated, or who is competent to ascertain its nature? Who can look into the ten thousand times ten thousand circumstances which must be known before we can distinguish what is truly good from what is evil? Who can tell whether the ultimate results of any act will be evil; or, if evil, who can estimate the amount of mischievous consequences which must be known before the magistrate, under the economical scheme, can determine what infliction of pain (not to call it penalty) or exercise of force may be exactly proportioned to the circumstances of the mischief to be prevented?" Certainly, we think, it requires less of the prerogative of Omniscience to decide that the horse

thief *deserves* to be punished, and even (by the aid of the Scriptures if we cannot trust ourselves) to fix the relative degree of his deserved penalty, than to determine, under all circumstances, the injurious effects to society from the permission of theft; or the amount of inconvenience to the offender which would be just enough to prevent horses from being stolen.

We have dwelt the longer on this subject of the moral power of government, because of a deep conviction of its immense importance in our own age and land. A contrary doctrine is urged with all the sophistry of irreligion, assuming the guise of an extra philanthropy and even a hyper-christianity. Depraved as men are, we might, perhaps, trust the moral sense of the race to bring us back, in the long run, from any temporary prevalence of error, to the old and right views of law, of justice, of desert, and of punishment, as ever possessing an intrinsic and inseparable moral character. But a remedy is wanted which can present an immediate and effectual check to an evil so specious, so wide-spreading, so utterly disorganizing; and this effectual remedy can only be found in that divine interposition, in the reality of which every Christian believes, and for which he is bound ever to pray. In other words, there is wanted a deep and powerful revival of those religious ideas of justice and desert in reference to divine law, which can alone give power and pungency to the corresponding conceptions in their relation to human government.

The opposite doctrine, we have said, is most specious. Its first effects may, perhaps, be made to assume the appearance of a benign practical success. As the new philosophy is now applied in some of our state prisons, there may be deceptive signs of temporary reform, which will be pointed to as triumphant evidence of its truth. The doctrine of "self respect," now so assiduously taught, is doubtless calculated to produce, for a time, a very pleasant feeling on the part of the criminal—a bland emotion of satisfied complacency towards those who so kindly aid him, by their instructions, to still the voice of conscience, and to keep in the background the stern ideas of justice and desert. But the man is left in all his depravity—a depravity which, when the pleasing self deception has passed away, will yet show itself in some still more hideous form of outbursting crime, gathering renewed strength from the feeble temporary check interposed by this false and sentimental reformation. The Bible, in a manner too explicit for denial, teaches a painful¹ repentance together with an humbling

¹The Romanists have doubtless perverted this idea in their unscriptural doctrine of a meritorious penance. To this they were perhaps led by the peculiar nature of the Vulgate Latin phrases—*penitentia* and *agere penitentiam*, which are more objective, and more connected with the idea of actual suffering, than the Greek *μετάνοια*. This latter term, being more subjective in its nature, expresses the result rather than the process or *actual* exercise of repentance. By looking at the word simply, without taking into consideration the connexions in which it is found, there is reason to fear

confession of ill desert, as the only foundation of any true moral change. It keeps ever in front the ideas "of sin (that little word so odious and painful to the mere sentimentalist), of righteousness, and of judgment to come."

"*Respect thyself*," says the new philosophy; "*Abhor thyself, and repent in dust and ashes*," is the language which the Scriptures represent the soul as using, when brought to view itself in its true relations to the Eternal Righteousness. How infinitely asunder are the two methods in their starting principles! How infinitely different must be their results! although the first may boast of its apparent success in checking one form of depravity, by the temporary substitution of another of more pleasing aspect. The same parallel may be carried out in every comparison of the two systems. Doubtless the reading of *Oliver Twist*, or of *Combe's Constitution of Man*, or of any other book that lays the guilt of a man's sins upon society, or upon his cerebral organization, will produce far more pleasing emotions than the study of the Bible, or of *Doddridge's Rise and Progress*. The poetical appeal of the "poor victims of false institutions," or "the unfortunate prisoner's lament," as sung by the mellow voices of the Hutchinsons, may occasion far more luxury of feeling than the fifty-first Psalm, or the contemplation of satisfaction to divine justice through a Redeemer's blood. There is of course no natural delight in a medicine so painful; yet, in the end, so healthsome, to the soul. Where in the whole Bible, would we ask, is to be found this famous modern doctrine of self-respect; or rather, what part of it does not teach a lesson which humbles to the very dust every aspiration having its origin in a reform without humiliation, and built upon a spurious affection so at war with all right views of the criminal's true moral condition?

We admit that such a sentimental luxury of emotion, whilst it lasts, or as long as it is not worn out by repetition (which it must be sooner or later, seeing that it has no higher vitality than what is derived from the naked soil in which it is planted), may produce a temporary ease in government. To those who resort to this exhilarating stimulant or quackish opiate of self-complacency, it may seem to work admirably for a while. But what utter ignorance of all the deeper departments of human nature, to suppose, that such reformation alone, unconnected with anything of a more serious kind, can ever be genuine, or do more than produce the most unsubstantial of all moral changes, with, perhaps, a most fatal injury to the soul's true and lasting health!

"There can be no possible cure of sin without pain."¹ So said

that the extreme modern Protestant view does also contain a most pernicious error, though of the opposite kind. In this way many have come to regard repentance as almost wholly severed from the idea of pain—in fact, as something purely *abstract*, intellectual, or, according to a popular jargon—a mere "change of governing purpose."

¹ Οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἄλλως ἢ δι' ἀληθείαν καὶ πόνον—Plat. Gorg. 525 c.

the wisest and nearest to inspiration of the heathen philosophers. In this he is in exact accordance with the Holy Scriptures. Those who imagine that the transition from the false elevation of sin to the eternal heights of virtue can ever be made without passing through the intervening valley of painful humiliation, not only condemn the Bible and the true philosophy of the human affections, but also all the deeper and more serious moral experiences which have ever been furnished by the history of the human soul.

The same or similar remarks, had we time to dwell on kindred topics, might be made in reference to the family and the school. The system of government which boasts of appealing alone to what it styles the reason and the *higher* sentiments of the pupil, or, in other words, and to adopt the language of Mr. Rosce, which would rule through the calculating understanding alone instead of the conscience, may produce temporary ease of discipline, but often at the serious cost of lasting moral principle. We have seen enough in our own experience to convince us, that the teacher who resorts to artificial praise, or to the stimulating flattery of a selfish "self-respect," or "enlightened self-interest,"—or who relies in any way upon the production of emotion having no real ground in the conscience, may consult his own comfort, and, in some places, his own reputation; but it is only done by sowing the seeds of deadly moral disease in those souls that are the victims of a system so deceptive, and, in the truest sense, so cruel.

Says the chief reformer in one of our state prisons—"Where *prescribed rules* formerly restrained offences, there are now felt the influences of *self-respect*, and those other restraints which all the good must rejoice to see supplanting *mere external law*." Now the very offences for which these persons were confined, consisted in the breaking of prescribed rules; and yet they are daily taught a doctrine which leads them to despise all such "restraints," upon the "higher nature," as it is called. The authority and even sanctity of legitimate "*external law*," is the very lesson which, of all others, they most need to learn. We believe most firmly, and we think with more consistency than any of the sentimental school, in the reign of subjective law as the final health of the soul: but when will this sect understand what is so plainly revealed in the Scriptures and testified to by conscience—namely, that to the soul which is destitute of it, or to the fallen nature, there is no other entrance or ground for subjective law than through the previous presentation of the objective and the external? This is certainly God's method in his own eternal government; for "by the law (the *prescribed rule*, the *external precept*) is the knowledge of sin." What an impious conceit, then, to regard the principle as obsolete or unnecessary in the administration of human justice!

One settled principle of obedience to law as law, and because

it is law, is of more value in after life, than all the seeming results that have been produced by the opposite course; even to say nothing of the ultimate mischief which the latter is so adapted to produce. Such a principle is also in the highest sense more rational. Every outward exercise of it not only gives subjective strength to the conscience, but commanding clearness to the intellect. The animal nature may have some glimpse of an "enlightened *self-interest*;" it may rise to a complacent pride akin to what is so often styled *self-respect*; but it never ascends to the contemplation of that sublime reason which makes submission to true authority the absolute ground, in itself, of all subordinate interests.

It is not enough, however, to say that the apparent good effects of the false doctrine against which we are contending, are unreal and temporary. Experience is beginning to show its positive evils. More than one offender has already been known publicly to charge his crimes upon society; thereby seeking relief to his own conscience. The reading of *Oliver Twist* has not been without its fruits. The lesson so assiduously taught in newspapers and books is being rapidly learned, and the results are already beginning to manifest themselves in crimes with new features, and bearing most unequivocal marks of parentage from the sentimental or transcendental school. It not only furnishes apologies for crimes committed, but motives for those that are yet future. It tells every criminal in the land that he is more sinned against than sinning. Let us suppose for example, a man debating with himself the commission of murder, and balancing between his "*understanding*" (that is, his views of his own *self-interest*) and his conscience, the motives for and against the awful crime. How easily, in such a case, might the nicely poised scale of wicked purpose or desire be turned by the lesson now so constantly taught—that he is only imitating a barbarous law, or retaliating upon a wrong state of society that sets up its selfish convenience against his own!

What then, it may be briefly asked in conclusion, is the true and effectual remedy for the evil against which we have been contending? We venture to answer—a sound theology. This must underlie all moral and political science, and all political institutions, or the whole fabric is ever in peril. There is really no sound theology, without the pervading element of a deep experimental conviction of sin, and of our relations to the eternal justice. With this, there need be no fear for the speculative theological soundness of individuals or communities. There need be no fear that the man who has it will not be orthodox in respect to the person and offices of Christ, or the church, or the way of salvation. Without it, the most rigid profession of orthodoxy, and the highest churchism, are absolutely good for nothing—the merest

shells, in whose emptiness the most subtle infidelity may be engendered, and that, too, amid the loudest professions of a high and extraordinary faith.

We need then,—with all reverence and diffidence would we say it,—a revival of religious feeling, in which there shall be prominent the ideas of law, of justice, of sin, of deep demerit, of punishment for intrinsic desert, of expiation, of redemption, of God as a sovereign lawgiver, of a divine government grounded on his own proper and eternal deity, and administered for his own eternal glory;—instead of those theories of obligation, and benevolence, and happiness, and greatest amount of pleasing sensations, and utility, and enlightened self-interest, and physical consequences, &c., which are now so rife in the moral and religious world; and which might almost be supposed to retain whatever sanctions they possess, under any system of natural religion, as well as in connexion with the Gospel of Christ. We would make the charge with great diffidence, and yet it does seem to us that a chief characteristic of some former periods of religious interest in our land, has been the almost entire absence of these views of justice, and punishment, and intrinsic desert. There seemed to be little deep conviction of sin, and, of course, but little recognition of the awful doctrine of expiation with its inseparable ideas; there was an absence of Christ and the cross; there was far more of self-dedication, and self-submission, and self-resolving, than of self-abasement; there was more talk of duty and less of demerit, than would have been under a truer view of our relations to the Deity. God was regarded rather as a being to be obliged by ill-defined service, or resolutions of service, instead of an offended judge, to whom nothing was acceptable without faith in the atoning work of Christ. Hence has come much of that restless religion, which has issued, and is yet issuing, in so many forms of radicalism—in some cases hardly to be distinguished from avowed infidelity. In the periods to which we refer, there was doubtless much good accomplished, but they have also left behind them their evil dregs, from which, in part at least, have been engendered many of these false theories of law, and ground of punishment, and physical consequence, and greatest happiness, and justice as only a modification of benevolence. Of all this kind of morals and theology, it may be said, that it makes little or no account of the “*fear of God*”—that principle which the Bible so solemnly declares to be “*the beginning of all wisdom*,” and without which, therefore, every moral, or political, or religious theory, must be but as “*sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal*.”

Nulla religio absque formidine. Take away this element, and the very term implies a solecism. Without it there may be a philosophy, a psychology, a theology even, as the term is understood by some; but the Scriptures, and the universal conscience

of the race, and all rites, and all modes of worship which have ever existed among mankind, most loudly testify that aside from the ideas of retributive justice, and wrath against sin, and a consequent expiation, there can be no *religion*. Equally important for us is the truth, that without religion there cannot be law. Both terms spring from the same radical and the same ultimate idea. *Religio haeret in republica*—says Cicero—*It is inherent in the very idea of the State. Absque religione nulla est lex.*

ARTICLE III.

SOLOMON'S SONG.

By REV. C. E. STOWE, D.D., Prof. Bib. Lit., Lane Seminary, Cincinnati.

THERE is a Hebrew poem of singular structure, containing passages of great and unrivalled beauty, which neither distance of time, difference of manners, nor the awkwardness of incompetent and blundering translation, has been able, so far, to obscure, that they will not affect, and that very sensibly, even the dullest readers; while a poetic imagination will dwell upon them with intense delight. Most students of Hebrew literature date the origin of the poem as far back as the year 1000 B. C.—that is, several centuries anterior to Hesiod or Homer; and none pretend to make it later than 500 B. C., a century earlier than Herodotus, the father of profane history. It is the united voice of antiquity, the concurrent testimony of all generations, that the poem was written by Solomon, the wisest of oriental kings, whose reign extended from the year 1014 to 980 B. C.

Of this poem, I now propose to give a popular, but at the same time a strictly philological review; and all I ask as the basis of the examination is, that you admit, what I presume none will be disposed to deny, that it is a Hebrew poem, written in Palestine or some of the neighboring countries, some time between the years 1000 and 500 B. C.

On reading the poem, we find in it two characters, who speak and act throughout the whole; the one a king named SHELOMOH (the Peaceful, or Prince of Peace), the other a female, who from a rustic shepherdess becomes his queen. This female bears the name SHULAMITH, which is simply the feminine of the name Shelomoh, the two having to each other the same relation as the Latin names *Julius* and *Julia*. Compare 1: 6. 3: 11. 6: 13. 8: 12.

There is also throughout the whole, as in the Greek dramas, a

chorus of virgins, called daughters of Jerusalem. Compare 2 : 7. 3 : 5. 5 : 8, 9, etc.

Towards the close, two brothers of Shulamith appear and speak each once. See 8 : 8, 9, compared with 1 : 6.

There are other characters occasionally introduced or alluded to, as shepherds, watchmen, gardeners, etc., but they are mutes and do not speak.

Like all other ancient poems, there are no breaks, no initial letters, no marks whatever, to indicate change of scene or speakers. In detecting these changes, we must be guided altogether by the sense. There is one facility, however, in the structure of the poem, and in the peculiar character of the Hebrew language, which renders the changes as plain to the attentive reader as they could have been made by the divisions and the initial letters of the modern drama. Throughout the entire poem the speakers are one man and one woman, with only occasional remarks by the chorus of virgins. Now the Hebrew language always distinguishes the gender of the pronouns in the second person as well as the third; and it also distinguishes the gender of the verbs both in the second and third persons singular and plural. By attending to the gender of the second person of the pronouns and the verbs, we can always determine whether it is Shelomoh or Shulamith who is addressed; and the number of the first person, together with the context, will always show when the chorus of virgins is speaking.

With these observations for our guide, we will enter on the poem itself, and make a few extracts to indicate its general tone and spirit.

I. Shulamith is first introduced, expressing her ardent admiration of Shelomoh (1 : 2—4.) She then turns to the daughters of Jerusalem, and deprecates their contempt for her rustic character and appearance in the following terms :

I am black yet comely,
Ye daughters of Jerusalem,
As the tents of Kedar,
As the pavilions of Shelomoh.
Eye me not because I am dark—
Because the sun hath looked upon me.
My mother's sons envied me—
They set me to keep the vineyards;
But my vineyard,¹ that which is my own,
I have not kept it.—(1 : 5, 6.)

II. After this there is a dialogue between Shelomoh and Shulamith, in which the character and position of each are described.

Shul.—Tell me,
Thou whom my soul loveth,
Where feedest thou thy flock ?

¹ Her beauty. See also 8 : 8, 9, 12.

Where retest thou at noon ?
 Why should I be as one veiled¹
 Among the flocks of thy companions ?

Shel.—If thou knowest not,
 Thou fairest of women,
 Follow the footsteps of the flock.
 Feed thy twin kids²
 By the shepherds' tents :
 To my Pharaoh's chariot horse,
 Do I compare thee, my love ;
 Lovely are thy cheeks with rings,
 Thy neck, with chains.
 Golden chains will I provide for thee,
 With points of silver.

Shul.—Where the prince is on his divan,
 Thither doth my perfume send its fragrance.³
 A cluster of myrrh is my beloved to me,
 A bouquet in my bosom ;
 A palm cluster for the garden of Engeddi
 Is my beloved to me.

Shel.—Behold, thou art fair, my love,
 Behold thou art lovely ;
 Thine eyes are doves.⁴

Shul.—Beautiful art thou, my beloved,
 Sacred art thou ;
 This green turf is our couch,⁵
 These cedars the columns of our palace ;
 These cypresses its rafters ;
 And I the rose of Sharon,
 The anemone of the vale.⁶

Shel.—As the anemone among thorns,⁷
 So is my love among the daughters.

Shul.—As the fruit tree among forest trees,⁸
 So is my beloved among the sons.—(1 : 7—2 : 3)

III. During this interview, Shulamith, overcome by the strength of her emotions, falls asleep and has an ecstatic dream. Shelomoh, both at the commencement and at the close of the dream, charges the daughters of Jerusalem not to awaken her.

Shel.—I charge you, ye daughters of Jerusalem,
 By the gazelles and fawns of the field,
 That ye disturb her not,
 That ye wake her not,
 Till she⁹ please.

Shul.—(*asleep and dreaming*) The voice of my beloved,
 Lo ! he comes,

¹ Regarded as a prostitute. See Gen. 38 : 14, 15.

² All the flock she has

³ He attracts her very perfume.

⁴ Not *dove's eyes*, but *doves*—the soft, gentle, loving movement of the eyes.

⁵ They are in the field, on the green grass, among the tall cedars and spreading cypresses.

⁶ She compares herself to the small and lowly flowers.

⁷ He turns her modest self-estimation to compliment.

⁸ She returns it.

⁹ The verb here is feminine.

Leaping over the mountains,
 Bounding over the hills.¹
 As a gazelle is my beloved,
 As a fleeting fawn.
 Lo ! there he stands
 Beyond the wall.
 He looks through the lattice work ;
 He glances at the window ;
 My beloved speaks,
 He speaks to me :
 " Arise, my love,
 Arise, my fair one,
 Come !—
 For see the winter is past,
 The rain is over and gone ;
 The flowers are seen in the ground,
 The time of song is come,
 The voice of the turtle dove
 Is heard in our land ;
 The fig tree is sweetening
 Her green figs ;
 The blossoming vine
 Sends forth its fragrance ;
 Arise, my love,
 Arise, my fair one,
 Come !
 My dove is in the clefts of the rock,²
 In the hiding place of the precipice.
 Let me see thy form ;
 Let me hear thy voice ;
 For thy voice is sweet,
 For thy form is beautiful."
 Catch for me the foxes,³
 The little foxes
 Which destroy the vines,
 While the vineyard is in blossom.
 My beloved is mine, and I am his,
 He is feeding his flock among the wild flowers ;⁴
 When the day breathes cool,
 And the shadows grow long,
 Return, O my beloved ;
 Bound like the gazelle, like the fleeting fawn,
 Over the mountains which separate us.
 By night upon my couch,⁵
 I seek him whom my soul loveth ;
 I seek him and find him not.
 I will arise, now,
 I will go around the city,
 In the streets, and in the squares,
 And seek him whom my soul loveth,
 I seek him and find him not ;
 The watchmen met me,

¹ Just as we see things in dreams. ² He complains that she is inaccessible to him.

³ She seeing him in the garden thus addresses him.

⁴ Again she sees him feeding his flocks beyond the mountains. ⁵ All so perfectly dream-like.

⁵ The dream takes another shape.

Who patrol the city ;
 Saw ye him whom my soul loveth ?
 Scarcely had I passed them—
 I found him whom my soul loveth :
 I took hold of him,
 I would not let him go,
 Till I brought him
 To the house of my mother,
 To the chamber of her that bare me.¹

Shel.—I charge you, ye daughters of Jerusalem,
 By the gazelles and the fawns of the field,
 That ye disturb her not,
 That ye awaken her not
 Till she please.¹—(2 : 7—3 : 5.)

IV. The daughters of Jerusalem see a nuptial procession approaching the city from the country, and they describe it in the following terms :

Who is this approaching from the country,
 Like a pillar of smoke—
 The vapor of myrrh and frankincense,
 Bringing the most costly perfumes ?
 Behold the palanquin, the palanquin of Shelomoh !
 Sixty heroes surround it,
 Of the heroes of Israel ;
 All, with sword in hand,
 Skilful in war,
 Every one girt with a sword,
 On account of the dangers of the night.
 A royal palanquin
 Did King Shelomoh make for himself ;
 Its poles of silver,
 Its columns of gold,
 Its hangings of purple,
 Its couch worked with love,
 By the daughters of Jerusalem.
 Go out and see him,
 Ye daughters of Zion,
 Behold King Shelomoh,
 In the crown with which his mother crowned him,
 On the day of his nuptials,
 In the day of the joy of his heart.—(3 : 6—11.)

V. Dialogue between Shelomoh and Shulamith :

Shel.—A garden enclosed
 Is my sister bride ;
 A spring enclosed,
 A fountain sealed :²
 Thy plants a fruit-paradise,
 With most exquisite fruits ;
 Cyprus and nard,
 Crocus and cinnamon,
 Every odoriferous tree,

¹ Feminine verb again.

² Chaste, inaccessible.

Myrrh and aloes,
 The most delicious aromatic spices :
 A garden fount—
 A spring of living waters,
 Rivulets of Lebanon.¹
 Blow, O north wind !
 Breathe in my garden,
 That its fragrance may flow.

Shul.—Let my beloved enter his garden,
 And eat its costly fruits.²

Shel.—I am come into my garden,³
 My sister bride,
 I pluck my myrrh and spices ;
 I eat my honey and honeycomb ;
 I drink my wine and milk ;
 Now eat, my friends,⁴
 Drink and be satisfied, my loved ones.—(4 : 12—5 : 1.)

VI. A night scene ; Shulamith addresseth the daughters of Jerusalem, whom she meets in her search for Shelomoh, tells them what had happened to her, and why she was in search of him ; and then follows a dialogue between herself and the daughters of Jerusalem.

I was sleeping, but my heart was awake.
 The voice of my beloved, he knocked ;
 " Open to me, my sister, my friend,⁵
 My dove, my pure one,
 Open to me,
 For my head is wet with dew,
 My locks with the damps of the night."
 " I have taken off my dress, how shall I put it on ?
 I have washed my feet, how shall I soil them ?"
 My beloved put in his hand at the hole of the door ;⁷
 My inmost affections were moved towards him ;
 I arose to open to my friend ;
 My hands dropped with myrrh
 On the handles of the bar ;⁸
 I opened to my beloved ;
 But my beloved had turned away, he was gone ;
 My heart went out after his voice ;
 I sought him, but found him not ;
 I called to him, but he answered me not.
 The watchmen who patrol the city, met me ;
 They beat me ; they wounded me ;
 They took off my veil from me,⁹
 The keepers of the walls !
 I adjure you, ye daughters of Jerusalem !
 If ye meet my beloved,

¹ All a figurative description of the charms of the bride.

² She affects to understand him literally.

³ He tells her he is already there.

⁴ What lover would say this in respect to his beloved, in a literal love-song ?

⁵ He speaks to her.

⁶ She replies.

⁷ Narrative resumed.

⁸ Perfumed by him.

⁹ Oriental manners force upon us the allegorical interpretation of such a poem.

What shall ye tell him ?
That I am fainting with love.

Daughters of Jerus.—What is thy beloved above another beloved,
Thou fairest of women ?
What is thy beloved above another beloved,
That thou dost thus adjure us ?

Shulamith.—My beloved is fair and ruddy ;
Distinguished among a myriad ;
His head is pure gold ;
His locks curly, and black as the raven ;
His eyes are as doves by fountains of water,
Bathing in milk, flowing in fullness ;¹
His cheeks garden beds of spices,
Aromatic mounds ;
His lips roses, distilling flowing myrrh ;
His hands golden cylinders, set with topaz ;
His body pure ivory, spangled with sapphires ;
His legs columns of marble
Fixed in pedestals of gold ;
His form as Lebanon,
Elegant as the cedars ;
His speech most delightful ;—
He is altogether most lovely.
Such is my beloved,
Such is my friend,
O daughters of Jerusalem !

Daughters of Jerus.—Whither hath thy beloved gone,
Thou fairest of women,
Whither hath thy beloved gone ?
We would seek him with thee.

Shulamith.—My beloved hath descended to his garden,
To the garden bed of spices,
To feast in the gardens,
To pluck the lilies ;
I am my beloved's and my beloved is mine,²
He feeds his flock among the lilies.—(5 : 2—6 : 3.)

VII. A morning scene in the garden. Shelomoh goes into his garden early in the morning, and there unexpectedly sees Shulamith, and exclaims :

Shel.—Who is this,
That looks forth like the morning dawn,
Fair as the moon,
Pure as the sun,
Terrible as a host in battle array ?

Shul.—To my nut garden I came,³
To see to the fruits in the vale ;
To see whether the vines are budding,
Whether the apples are in bloom.
Ere I was aware,

¹ The soft, full, rich, moving, loving expression of the eyes.

² Asserts her peculiar interest in him—all but jealous.

³ She apologizes for being there.

My soul was as the war chariot¹
Of my noble people.

Shel.—Return,² return, O Shulamith !
Return, return,
I would look upon thee.

Shul.—Why wouldst thou look upon Shulamith
As upon a chorus of dancers?³ (6 : 10—12.)

VIII. The brothers of Shulamith are introduced, consulting together as to what they shall do with their sister, now that she is addressed by Shelomoh, pretending that she is too young to receive such addresses. She replies to them indignantly; then follows the concluding dialogue between herself and Shelomoh.

First Brother.—Our sister is yet young;
Her bosom is not full.⁴
What shall we do with our sister,
Now that she is addressed?

Second Brother.—If she be a wall, we will build upon it a silver palace;
If she be a gate, we will shut it up with boards of cedar.⁵

Shul.—I am a wall,⁶
My bosoms are towers;
Thus was I in his sight,
As one that found favor.
A vineyard had king Shelomoh in Baal-hamon,
He gave it out to keepers,
Each man got for its fruits a thousand pieces of silver.
My vineyard I keep myself;
The thousand pieces of silver shall be for thee, Shelomoh,
The keepers shall have two hundred.⁷

Shel.—Thou dweller in gardens!
Thine associates await thy voice,
Let me hear it.

Shul.—Fly, O my beloved!
Like the gazelle, like the fleeting fawn,
On the spicy mountains.⁸ (8 : 8—12.)

The above specimens may suffice to give an idea of the general tone and spirit of this interesting relic of antiquity. The translations are free, but I believe they are in strict fidelity to the mean-

¹ Excitement occasioned by even the unseen and unknown approach of her beloved.

² She has turned to go away.

³ Would you gaze upon me as men gaze upon dancing girls?

⁴ Not yet marriageable.

⁵ If she is chaste (like a wall) we will ornament her; if she is open (like a gate) we will shut her up.

⁶ She replies indignantly in their own style.

⁷ The keepers had cheated him, but she will do him justice. Herself is the vineyard, which she keeps, and keeps it for him.

⁸ They escape from the envious brothers; their union is perfected, and the poem closes.

ing and form of the original. The subject is the more important on account of the misunderstandings which are so general with reference to this book. These misunderstandings have prevailed to such an extent, that many even now are disposed to deny the book a place among the canonical Scriptures. Objections to its place in the canon, however, are wholly arbitrary; they have not a shadow of testimony to give them plausibility. The attempt, I think, has never been made to displace it from the canon on philological grounds; and I presume, never will be made by any one acquainted with the subject. It is true there is no express quotation from it in the New Testament, and it is true also that it is not expressly quoted by Philo; but its existence as a part of the canon is recognised by Josephus, and all the early Christian writers, and it has always made a part of the Septuagint translation, which was completed probably some 200 years before Christ. On this topic the statements and reasonings of Eichhorn in his *Einleitung ins Alt. Test.*, Th. I., 109–179, wholly exhaust the subject, and are perfectly unanswerable.

1. The testimony of Josephus, in his work against Apion, I., 8, compared with *Antiq.* viii., 2 : 5, is entirely explicit with reference to this book.

2. Melito, Bishop of Sardis, in the second century of the Christian era, went to Palestine on purpose to ascertain the Scriptural books of the Jewish canon, and found the Canticles among the number.—*Euseb. Eccl. Hist.* iv., 26.

3. Origen, of Alexandria, the best biblical scholar of his time (born A.D. 185, died 253), after the most patient and accurate investigation, came to the same result.—*Euseb. Eccl. Hist.* vi., 25.

4. Jerome, in the fifth century, the most learned critic of the Latin church, in his *Prologus galeatus* to the Vulgate, gives the same testimony.

5. The Jewish Talmud, written between the second and fourth centuries, witnesses the same.

6. So also Theodoret, the learned bishop of Cyprus, A.D. 450, testifies in the same way. Indeed, the testimony is uniform; it is all on one side. Compare Eichhorn as above, and Rosenmüller, *Scholia in Vet. Test.*, P. ix., vol. 2, p. 269–272.

If a fact can be established by testimony, it is established by testimony that the Song of Solomon was a part of the Hebrew canon in the time of Christ. Nor is there any internal evidence against it; but as far as that goes, it is all in its favor, for there are other portions of the Old Testament acknowledged to be canonical, which are exceedingly like it both in sentiment and imagery. Let the reader carefully consult passages like the following: Ps. 45: Jer. 3: Ezek. 16:; 10:; 13: Hos. 1:; 2:; 3: and compare Lowth's *Lectures on Hebrew Poetry*, Lect. xxx. and xxxi., and the notes on these lectures in the Andover edition, 1829.

But the book is objected to as being indelicate in its expressions. To this we reply :

1. That much of this indelicacy is the fault of the translators, and not of the original poem. No one quality of the poem will more forcibly strike a reader of the original, who is capable of entering into the spirit of the age in which it was written, than the delicacy, the purity, and the propriety of its language. Our English translators were theologians and not poets ; they had not sufficient confidence in their knowledge of Hebrew, or did not feel their position sufficiently secure, to preserve them from a too implicit reliance on preceding translators, who had not only been as unpoetical as themselves, but most of them were monks and recluses, whose minds too often are but a cage for every unclean and hateful bird. Of the fact here stated, every reader will be convinced who will compare our English translation with the Hebrew original, or with any good modern translation, like that of Herder, De Wette, or Rosenmüller.

2. Some of the alleged indelicacy arises from mistaking descriptions of the dress for descriptions of the naked person. Chap. 5 : 10—16, is often supposed to be a description of the naked person, than which nothing can be more absurd or less in accordance with the language itself. Those parts of the person which custom exposes to view are indeed described ; but as to those parts which custom conceals, it is the dress and not the skin which is described ; for example : *His head is as the most fine gold, and his hair is curled and as black as the raven.* What is this but the turban, gold-colored or ornamented with gold, and the raven black ringlets appearing below it ? How else could his head be yellow and his hair black ? unless, indeed, he were a bald-headed mulatto, and that surely would be a curious subject for amorous eulogy, besides being directly contrary to the context ; for his complexion is just before described as white and ruddy, v. 10.

Again, v. 14 : *His body is as white ivory girded with sapphires.* How admirably this corresponds with the snow-white robe and the girdle set full of jewels, as we see it in Sir Robert Kerr Porter's portrait of the late King of Persia ! But what is there, I pray you, on the naked body that looks like a girdle of sapphires ? Do you suppose the loved one is eulogized for having the disease called the shingles ?

Again, chap. 7 : 2, is a beautiful description of the front clasp of the female dress, which was usually of gold, and set with rubies and other brilliants. Nothing is more common among the Oriental poets than the comparing rubies with wine and wine with rubies ; but how utterly absurd if the naked body is supposed to be described ! So also the fawn-colored robe and the

snow-white girdle are represented by the next figure ; but what is there on the naked body to correspond to it ?

3. Some of the supposed indelicacy arises from a change of manners ; see 5 : 5, 7 : 3. There is certainly no indelicacy in describing those parts of the person which are always exposed to view, as the face and hands. All the monuments and pictures of ancient Egypt show us that the ancient Oriental ladies dressed so as fully to expose the bosom, and of course there could have been no indelicacy in alluding to, or describing it.

In regard to the use of certain words, every generation changes in its views of delicacy and propriety. The English language of the time of Elizabeth and of the present age is a sufficient illustration of this. In a poem nearly three thousand years old we may well expect some deviation from our present views of propriety in respect to the use of words, though there are not more in the Song of Solomon, properly translated, than in Hesiod or Homer, or even in Spenser and Shakspeare. The fact, too, that men and women live separately in the Oriental world, makes a great difference in respect to the use of words.

Some object to the poem as a part of the Scriptural canon because, as they allege, it is a description of physical love, and as such, unworthy a place among the sacred books.

Allowing it to be a description of physical love, I presume no one acquainted with the original will deny that it is wedded love ; a chaste and legitimate affection. Why should a passion so strong, so universal, so essential to the happiness—to the very existence of the human race, be denied a place in a revelation from God to man ? As a matter of fact, has it not a place in every part of the Bible, from Genesis to Revelation ? God is the author of the human constitution as well as of the Bible ; and He has in all respects adapted his revelation to the nature of the beings for whom it was designed. It would be strange indeed, if one of the most important and never absent phenomena in the moral and physical constitution of man should never be noticed in a revelation to him from his Creator. If the viciousness and licentiousness of men have loaded this subject with vile and filthy associations in vile and filthy minds, this is not the fault of God or of his Revelation. The vine will not be destroyed, nor the grapes annihilated, because wicked men make themselves beasts with wine.

But this is an Oriental book, written in an Oriental land, by an Oriental author, and intended in the first instance for the use of an Oriental people ; and it is to be interpreted by their manners and their rules of composition, and not by ours. Now it is the universal custom in the Oriental world, and always has been from time immemorial, to represent spiritual subjects under this peculiar figure. The figure is appropriated to such subjects. In the

Bible itself, where the words of this class are used once in the literal sense, they are used ten times in the metaphorical sense; so that in fact, the metaphorical instead of the literal becomes the most obvious sense, not only in the Bible, but in all Oriental literature. In respect to the Bible, any one can satisfy himself of this fact, by taking a Concordance, and tracing the use of the words *love, marriage, adultery, fornication, whoredom*, and the like. The figure is appropriated equally both in the Old Testament and the New. In addition to the chapters already referred to, and which in the places where they occur are plainly declared to be allegorical, examine also the following—Isa. 54 : 5. 62 : 5. Jerem. 2 : 2. Ezek. 16 : 8. Matt. 9 : 15. John 3 : 29. 2 Cor. 11 : 2. Eph. 5 : 23, 31. Rev. 19 : 7. 21 : 2. Compare also the very elaborate and satisfactory investigation by Rosenmüller in the volume above quoted, p. 265-68.

But we are not shut up to the Bible for the appropriation of this figure. Sir William Jones, in his *Commentaries on Asiatic Poetry*, P. III., c. 9, in the *Asiatic Researches*, vol. III., p. 353 (5th edition, p. 165), and in the quarto edition of his collected works, vol. I., p. 445, has given numberless examples from all the most celebrated Asiatic poets. There is a remarkable example of an Oriental poem of this kind, with an Oriental commentary, in my notes to Lowth's *Lectures on Hebrew Poetry*, p. 439-40, Andover edition. Adam Clarke, in his *Commentary on Solomon's Song*, has given two very striking instances of the same kind, namely—the Chaldee Targum on Canticles, and the Gitagorinda, a sacred poem of the Hindoos. Professor Stuart has given other examples, more recently brought to light, in his late work on the Old Testament, p. 391-93.

It is certainly proper to estimate the literary character of a work by the habits of judging on such subjects, which prevailed at the time, and among the people with whom the work originated. Judging by this rule, we should at once decide that the Song of Solomon is an allegory; and this has been the uniform judgment of the most skilful Oriental scholars, both of those who have admitted its inspiration, as Lowth, and those who have considered it merely a human composition, as Rosenmüller. The discussion of this subject by Rosenmüller, in his *Scholia* already referred to, is one of the most candid, thorough-going, and perfectly convincing that I have ever read. A mere sense of literary justice, without any regard to the book as an inspired writing, compels this learned but rationalizing critic to decide in favor of the allegorical interpretation as the only possible one.

In this sense the Jewish writers, from the earliest times, have always understood it, and they surely ought to be allowed to know something of their own literature. Without this interpretation, it is hardly possible that, with their views, they would have received

it into the sacred canon. Let the reader examine the Chaldee Targum, or paraphrase, already referred to, translated by Adam Clarke, and inserted in his commentary. This paraphrase was made some centuries before the time of Christ, and probably before the traditional interpretation from the author himself could have been entirely lost. In the same sense it is understood by Aben Ezra, Jarchi, and other distinguished Jewish writers, as well as by almost every one of the earlier Christian writers. Here Jewish tradition, and Christian tradition, and, we have reason to believe, the tradition from the author himself, are perfectly coincident.

Finding, therefore, this oriental poem in an oriental collection of religious books, and attended with so unbroken a tradition in respect to its meaning, all the presumption is wholly in favor of the allegorical interpretation.

Let us now examine the work itself, and see whether its phenomena correspond to this presumption.

1. The names of the two principal characters, namely, Shelomoh and Shulamith, are in the original quite as significant as John Bunyan's Christian and Christiana, Obstinate and Pliable, Faithful and Hopeful, &c.

2. The sudden changes from the singular to the plural number in the part of the dialogue sustained by Shulamith, indicate that her name is to be taken in a collective sense. *Draw ME, WE will run after thee. The king hath brought ME into his chambers; WE will be glad, etc., 1: 4, and many other places.*

3. Shulamith is put in situations and made to utter expressions, which, if literally understood, are so entirely abhorrent to Oriental manners, that no sane writer, certainly no writer so skilful as the author of this poem shows himself to be, would ever put into a literal love song; though they are all very beautiful and appropriate when understood allegorically. Such are 3: 1—4. 5: 7. 8: 1, 2. Such scenes and expressions are not uncommon in the allegorical poetry of the East, but in their literal amatory songs they can never occur. Literally understood, they would doom their heroines to everlasting infamy, and certainly no poet ever thus treats his favorites.

4. The entire absence of everything like jealousy, in situations where that passion must appear in a literal love song, is proof of the allegorical character of the piece. See 1: 4, 5: 1, 6: 8, 9.

5. The dreamy and fanciful, and even impossible character of many of the scenes, shows that they cannot be understood literally.

2: 14—16. Shulamith is in the cleft of the rocks, in the concealments of the precipices, and Shelomoh wishes to see her and hear her speak. He is in the garden at night, and she tells him to catch the jackalls that are destroying the vines. She sees him feeding his flocks in a distant field of anemones. She sees him

beyond the mountains which separate them ; and calls upon him to leap over them like the gazelle and the fleeting fawn, to rejoin her at evening. All these things occur together at the same time and place.

4 : 8, Shelomoh calls upon Shulamith to go with him to the snowy peaks of Lebanon and Hermon, among the lions' dens and the leopards' lairs, and enjoy the fine prospect over the plains of Damascus.

Numerous impossibilities of this kind will occur to every intelligent reader of the poem.

There are people who take up Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, and read it all through as a delightful story, without once suspecting that it is an allegory, who scarcely allow themselves to suspect that it is not all literally true, and who would think rather meanly of so extensive a traveller as Mr. Buckingham, if he had never seen the Hill Difficulty, or the Delectable Mountains,—had never visited the Palace Beautiful, or Vanity Fair. The indications of allegory in that beautiful story of the Pilgrim, considering the lapse of time, and the comparative length of the two pieces, are scarcely more conspicuous than in this exquisite song of Israel's wisest king. How do we know the *Pilgrim's Progress* to be an allegory, any more than *Robinson Crusoe*? Because we have the tradition from the author, the names of the characters, the circumstances, and the aptness of the application. The same evidence we have in respect to the *Canticles*; only, as the work is shorter, more ancient, and more remote, the evidence is less obvious at first sight.

We will now examine some of the objections which are usually urged against the allegorical interpretation :

1. The difficulty and variety of the allegorical interpretation. This objection applies with much greater force to the literal than to the allegorical method. Almost all the allegorical interpretations, following the analogy of the Bible and Oriental usage, proceed on one and the same idea, namely, the mutual love between God and his chosen people ; while the literal expositions, having neither guide nor limit, neither way-mark nor boundary, are almost infinitely diversified, and scarcely any two alike. The literal interpretations differ essentially, the allegorical only circumstantially. The Jews applied the poem to themselves as being the chosen people of God, and the Christians to themselves as being the chosen people of God. They in fact agree in their interpretation, they differ only as to the question who are the chosen people of God.

2. The supposed uselessness of the allegory. To the Orientals, who are accustomed to writings of this kind, whose taste and habits demand them, the allegory is not useless, but in the highest degree both pleasurable and profitable. Seven-eighths of the human race who have lived on the earth, have been Orientals ;

more than half of those who are living now, are Orientals; the Bible is an Oriental book, originally given to Orientals and written by them; and considering all these circumstances, are not the Orientals entitled, out of the 800 pages of which the Bible is composed, to have at least three pages adapted to their peculiar taste? Considering all these circumstances, I should think this quite a reasonable allowance to make them out of their own Bible. We Occidentals assume a great deal, when we assume that this Bible, which belongs to the whole human race, and which was prepared by Oriental men, should all be exactly suited to our tastes and our habits of thought. The wonder is, that so large a portion of the Bible is adapted to the tastes and habits of thought of a people so remote in every respect, in time, in place, in mind, in manners, from its original source. Had it not been dictated by Him who knew what was in man universally, had it not developed itself from the very nucleus of human nature, its adaptations could never have been so wonderfully diversified as the fact has proved them to be.

But the objection assumes altogether too much on another ground. The allegory is not useless even to the Occidentals. There are persons and there are states of mind, even among ourselves, to which it is peculiarly fitted, and to which it affords the richest devotional excitement, and a devotional excitement of the purest character. The devotional poetry of Dr. Watts is a sufficient illustration of this point. But we have a better illustration in our own country, in the metaphysician Jonathan Edwards, who, though the driest and most astute of scholastic theologians, had a heart and imagination of Oriental richness and fervor. Read the following extracts from his account of his own religious experience.

“I remember the thoughts I used then to have of holiness, and said sometimes to myself, ‘I do certainly love holiness such as the gospel prescribes.’ It appeared to me that there was nothing in it but what was ravishingly lovely; the highest beauty and amiableness—a *divine* beauty; far purer than anything here on earth; and that everything was like mire and defilement in comparison with it.

“Holiness, as I then wrote down some of my contemplations on it, appeared to me to be of a sweet, pleasant, charming, serene, calm nature; which brought an inexpressible purity, brightness, peacefulness, and ravishment to the soul. In other words, that it made the soul like a field or garden of God, with all manner of pleasant flowers, all pleasant, delightful, and undisturbed; enjoying a sweet calm, and the gentle, vivifying beams of the sun. The soul of a true Christian, as I then wrote my meditations, appeared like such a little white flower as we see in the spring of the year; low and humble in the ground, opening its bosom to receive the pleasant beams of the sun’s glory; rejoicing, as it were, in a calm

rapture ; diffusing around a sweet fragrancy ; standing peacefully and lovingly in the midst of other flowers round about, all in like manner opening their bosoms to drink in the light of the sun. There was no part of creature holiness of which I had so great a sense of its loveliness as humility, brokenness of heart, and poverty of spirit ; and there was nothing that I so earnestly longed for : My heart panted after this : to lie low before God, as in the dust ! that I might be nothing, and that God might be ALL ; that I might become as a little child.

* * * * *

“ And as I was walking there (in his father's field), and looking up on the sky and clouds, there came into my mind a sweet sense of the glorious *majesty* and *grace* of God, that I know not how to express. I seemed to see them both in sweet conjunction ; majesty and meekness joined together ! It was a sweet, and gentle, and holy majesty, and also a majestic meekness ; a high, great, and holy gentleness.”

“ After this, my sense of divine things gradually increased, and became more and more lively, and had more of that inward sweetness. The appearance of everything was altered ; there seemed to be, as it were, a calm, beautiful appearance of divine glory in almost everything ; in the sun, moon, and stars, in the clouds and blue sky ; in the grass, flowers, and trees ; in the water, and all nature ; which used greatly to fix my mind. I often used to sit and view the moon for a long time ; and in the day spend much time in viewing the clouds and the sky, to behold the glory of God in these things ; in the meantime singing forth with a low voice my contemplations of Creator and Redeemer.”

After reading these extracts, you will not be surprised to find him saying in the same connexion :

“ The whole book of Canticles used to be pleasant to me, and I used to be much in reading it about that time, and found from time to time an inward sweetness that would carry me away in my contemplations. This I know not how to express otherwise than by a calm delightful abstraction of the soul from all the concerns of the world ; and sometimes a kind of vision or fixed ideas and imaginations of being alone in the mountains or some solitary wilderness, far from all mankind, sweetly conversing with Christ, and rapt, and swallowed up in God. The sense I had of divine things would often of a sudden kindle up an ardor in my soul that I know not how to express. * * * * *

“ While thus engaged, it always seemed natural for me to sing or chant forth my meditations ; or to speak my thoughts in soliloquies with a singing voice.”

The soft, rich, glowing, all-absorbing devotional feeling of Jonathan Edwards, would soon cure people of all their scruples in respect to the SONG OF SONGS WHICH IS SOLOMON'S.

3. The luscious if not lascivious character of the devotional feeling excited and nourished by the book, is urged as an objection against its sacred character.

Nothing of this kind is seen in the devotional feeling of Edwards ; very little, if any, in Watts ; not to allude to many others of equal purity. I acknowledge, however, that such a kind of devotional feeling has sometimes existed ; but it has arisen from neglecting a principle which the Bible always observes. The love of God or Christ for the individual is not expressed in the Bible by this figure, but only the divine love for the whole community of the godly. In this very poem, the plural pronoun and the plural verb are often used in respect to Shulamith, as if on purpose to prevent the possibility of this individualizing interpretation, and it is only this kind of interpretation that becomes voluptuous or fanatical.

We will close with a few hints respecting the interpretation of the allegory.

The literal costume is that of a marriage song. The imagery is evidently derived from the marriage of Solomon with the daughter of Pharaoh. Compare 1 Kings 3 : 1. 7 : 8. 9 : 24, with Song 1 : 9. 6 : 12, etc. The general idea is, the mutual love of God and his people ; the vicissitudes, the trials, the backslidings, the repentings, and finally the perfect and eternal union of the Church with its Lord and Savior.

If so disposed, we may make of it a very pretty allegory of the development of the Christian church out of the Jewish. In this case Shelomoh, the Prince of Peace, would be Christ. Shulamith, the rustic shepherdess, who suffers so much, the Christian community, both Jewish and Gentile, in its incipency ; the daughters of Jerusalem, the inquiring and Christianly disposed portions of the Jewish community, such as Nicodemus, Joseph of Arimathea, etc., and the envious brothers of Shulamith, the scornful and persecuting Sadducees and Pharisees.

To illustrate the extent to which the Orientals carry their allegorical application of language, we will subjoin a few extracts from the poet Hafiz. (See Sir William Jones's Works, vol. ii., p. 469.)

"He is drunk, but only with the love of the eternal covenant,
He who in the manner of Hafiz drinks pure wine."

"Do not suppose that we are drunk with the juice of the grape ;
We visit the taverns where we become drunk with the wine of the divine covenant."

"The ebriety of love is not on thy head ;
Depart, for thou art drunk with the juice of the grape."

"Thy whole form is delicately made,
Every place where thou art is sweet,
My heart by thy sweetness, by thy honeyed joy,
Is delighted."

The following is Hafiz's method of calling for a cup of wine :—

“ Bring me the sun in the midst of the moon.”

The moon is the cup, the sun is the wine. The Sufi sect have a large and regularly constructed lexicon, the very purpose of which is to give the allegorical meaning of the words most frequently used in poetry of this kind. The following are specimens :

Wine—Devotion.
 Sleep—Meditation.
 Perfume—Religious hope.
 Kiss—Pious rapture.
 Beauty—Perfections of God.
 Tresses—Glory of God.
 Lips—Mysteries of God.
 Ebriety—Religious ardor.

Surely no one acquainted with Oriental literature will think it strange or far-fetched to give to the Canticles an allegorical interpretation ; on the contrary, the literal interpretation, to the Oriental eye, is the one which is, beyond example, strange and far-fetched.

ARTICLE IV.

REMARKS ON STUART'S COMMENTARY ON THE APOCALYPSE.

By REV. EDWARD BRECHER, D.D., Boston.

EVERY development of the providence of God seems to be giving new interest to the Romish controversy. The great idea of the age is the conversion of the world. The great practical question is, To what shall the world be converted ? The claims of the papacy are universal and exclusive. The Romish corporation, in its essential nature, is the universal and all-pervading antagonist of every other effort to convert the world. Hence, soon after the commencement of the era of Protestant missions, we see a universal revival of the papal power, manifestly as the antecedent and cause of the final and decisive struggle.

Of this struggle, too, we have been accustomed to hear our fathers speak, as the battle of the great day of God Almighty. They also firmly believed that in the Apocalyptic visions of the seer of Patmos, they had received from the Spirit of God an inspired prophetic outline of the combatants in that war, and of its origin, progress, and final results. President Edwards, in his

history of the Work of Redemption, in the seventh part of the third period, vividly represents the view generally taken by our fathers of this greatest of all earthly moral revolutions. Substantially the same views may be found in most of the English commentators, under whose influence the anticipations of the main body of evangelical English and American Christians, as it regards the future destinies of the world, have been formed. In consequence of these views, they have felt themselves strengthened in view of the coming conflict, by a cheering consciousness of the closest sympathy of God with his people in their arduous conflicts with the gigantic and malignant power of Rome. In the eighteenth chapter of the Apocalypse they heard the utterance of the omnipotent emotions of long outraged divine justice towards her deeds of pollution and blood, mounting up to heaven, and calling aloud for divine vengeance. In the nineteenth chapter, they heard the hallelujahs of heaven, over her terrific judgments and fiery doom. Then followed in rapid succession the subjugation of all the remaining enemies of God on earth, the binding of Satan and the millennial reign.

But now, just as this great battle is coming to a crisis, and the united energies and wiles of the papal world are concentrated against Great Britain and the United States, the great strongholds of spiritual Protestant Christianity and missionary enterprise, a new system of prophetic interpretation arises to strip the people of God of their arms. It denies any specific reference to the papal power in the Apocalypse; carries back more than fifteen hundred years, passages that have been supposed to refer to the present time, and leaves us only the general assurance that all the enemies of God shall finally fall beneath the dead weight of his retributive vengeance.

This view is by no means a novelty to us. At least twenty years ago, we met it in the work of Eichhorn on the Apocalypse, and examined the principles on which it rests with all the care and thoroughness in our power. The conclusion to which we came was that whatever might be true of Germany, that view would never meet an advocate in our land, at least among the leaders of our evangelical Protestant churches. In this it seems we were mistaken. Professor Stuart has adopted the view, and devoted his great powers and learning to its defence. His introduction and commentary are the result of the patient and protracted study of years; and whatever extended and varied learning, and eminent natural abilities can do to defend the view which he has adopted, has been done. Well then and truly may we say,

“ Si Pergama dextra
Defendi possent, etiam hoc defensa fuissent.”

Although the subject, as already intimated, was not new to us,

but had been repeatedly examined and re-examined, with the aid both of German and English light, yet we felt ourselves called upon by these facts to give to the work of Professor Stuart a careful and oft repeated perusal. We think that among all competent judges, there can be but one opinion as it regards the great and permanent value of large portions of Prof. Stuart's work. In it the reader will find copious stores of valuable verbal interpretation and criticism. He will be interested and instructed by the presentation of the Apocalyptic literature of the centuries preceding and following the Apostle John. He will feel grateful for the thorough and conclusive discussion of the question of the authorship of the Apocalypse.

— But when we come to consider the fundamental principles of prophetic interpretation, and raise the inquiry, has the interpretation of our fathers been radically and thoroughly overthrown, and ought the German interpretation to supersede it, then we must beg leave to demur. We do not believe that the fundamental idea in the interpretation of our fathers has been overthrown, or that it can be. And this last and greatest effort of Professor Stuart has the more confirmed us in that belief. — The reasons of this conviction we proceed to assign.

We do not rely on the mere fact that the language of ch. 13–19 of the Apocalypse can be applied with striking power to the papacy and to the civil system in league with it; for there is a general similarity in the principles and aspects of Satan's kingdom in all ages: and what was first meant for Egypt, or Nineveh, or Tyre, or Babylon, or any other power of his kingdom, may often with striking appropriateness be applied to subsequent principalities and powers, through which he has ruled the darkness of this world. Nor do we rely on the mere fact that the common English interpretation of the Apocalypse has been much used and would still be of great use in the warfare with Rome. If the Holy Spirit did not give the Apocalypse for such a use, then God forbid that it should be longer so used. We advocate no system of pious frauds. In fighting the battles of truth we ask for no armor but the armor of truth.

The reasons of our conviction are these :

1. The English system of interpretation, in its essential elements, has nowhere been stated and answered with clearness and discrimination in the work of Professor Stuart.

2. It is so inwrought into the fundamental structure of the Apocalypse that it is impossible to remove it without doing violence to the book.

3. The German theory, after all that Prof. Stuart has done to give it consistency and strength, is exposed to numerous, and, in our judgment, fatal objections.

What then is the English theory, in its fundamental elements ?

Is it that the Apocalypse is a syllabus of the civil and ecclesiastical history of the world since the days of Christ in minute detail? So one would think from reading the work of Prof. Stuart. In varied forms, he repeats and assails this idea from the beginning to the end of his work.

Now that it is possible, in applying the Apocalypse to the papacy and to the civil power, to descend to an improper degree of minuteness of detail, we freely admit; and that this has often been done, we have not the slightest disposition to deny. But we confidently affirm that such minuteness of detail is not a fundamental or necessary part of the system. Nay, the system may be presented in much greater perfection without it, than with it. Still further; it is much less liable to objection on the ground of a necessary undue minuteness of historical detail than the system that Prof. Stuart advocates.

Its fundamental idea is one of the grandest and most sublime historical generalizations of which the mind of man is capable. It is beyond all doubt true, that out of the city of Rome has grown an ecclesiastical power that stretches back, with dread continuity of history, nearly to the age of the Apostles. It is a no less notorious fact that from a very early age this ecclesiastical power has acted in adulterous connexion with the civil power—first with that of imperial Rome, till by the sword of the barbarians that power was slain, and afterwards with the revived Roman imperial power under Charlemagne, and with the European civil system to which that power gave rise. A dread unity of fundamental malignant principles has run through this vast system from the beginning to the present day. None in the history of this world has ever wielded power so vast, for so many ages, and for ends so malignant. Nowhere on earth can be found such a true and perfect embodiment of the principles of hell. By no power have such inconceivable and unutterable corruptions of human society ever been effected. No other power has ever been so drunken with the blood of the saints. Without a figure, we assert that Rome has been for long ages the centre of deeds worse than could be done in hell itself. In hell there is no want of malignity against God, but nowhere except in a world of mercy, and by men professing to stand as God's exclusive vicegerents on earth, could such enormous deeds of mingled lust, licentiousness, sodomy, fraud, treachery, assassination, gluttony, intemperance, blasphemy, and sanctimonious hypocrisy, be perpetrated, as may be found clustering around the dark history of that apostate power whose centre is at Rome. There is a dread sublimity in the idea of carrying out moral evil, on a great scale, for long ages to its highest degree of perfection, in order to show to the moral universe to what results the principles of sin, when fully evolved, legitimately conduct. For, studying this fearful science, there is no point of vision in the

universe for a moment to be compared with Rome. Like the summits of the Himmaleh Mountains, this system of evil that centres there, towers in solitary and dread magnificence above all other systems of evil that ever cursed this world,—yea, it pierces the clouds, it mounts up to heaven, it reaches to the very throne of God, and calls aloud for the fiercest displays of omnipotent wrath.

If now the inspired writer had said in few words, and in simple prose, that such an ecclesiastical power should arise, whose centre should be at Rome, and which, in guilty league with the civil power, should from age to age corrupt and debase society, and oppress and murder the saints of God, would it have been in any sense, a minute syllabus of the civil and religious history of Europe? If then he had added, God shall at length judge and destroy this guilty system in the fierceness of his omnipotent wrath, and in so doing convulse and terrify the world; that he shall thus prepare for himself a pure church, arrayed in fine linen, clean and white, through whom he will subdue the world to himself and reign, would this involve an undue minuteness of historical detail? And yet this and nothing else is the essential and fundamental idea of the system of our fathers, which Prof. Stuart rejects and condemns as involving a minute syllabus of the history of the world.

Now, in order to radically overthrow this system, it is essential that it be stated, not in its weakest and most defective, but in its strongest and most unexceptionable form, and in that form be shown to be untenable. For any such statement and proof we look in vain in the work of Prof. Stuart. He seems to assume that if chapters 13—19 are applied to papal Rome, and the civil system in league with her, a detailed epitome of the civil and religious history of the world since the days of Christ is of necessity involved. In his preface he traces the disagreement of original and independent expositors to the fact that the Apocalypse is “regarded principally as an epitome of civil and ecclesiastical history.” He affirms that confidence in such expositions is generally withheld, and must continue to be withheld so long as this mode of interpretation is pursued.

Again in § 12, Vol. i., p. 208—after stating his views of the end to be gained by the book, and the mode of effecting it, he thus proceeds :

“How can we, then, when such a design and such a method of accomplishing it stand out with marked prominence in this picture—how can we attribute to John a mere syllabus of the civil and ecclesiastical history of remote ages, a history of civil commotions and tumults, or the mere description of literal famines and pestilences, of earthquakes and of tempests? In the name of all that is pertinent and congruous in prophecy, I ask, what have these to do with the object which John had

before him? Or are we, as some have silyly hinted, to regard him as in a state of hallucination when he wrote the Apocalypse? Or if any one alleges that some notice of the *great apostasy* in the church was surely to be expected, then may I ask again: In what way could it *console* or *encourage* John's readers, to be told that at some future day a great part of the church would become heretical, or act the part of apostates, and persecute and destroy true Christians as badly as the heathen were then doing? And is this *consolatory* to poor fainting spirits, filled with dread lest the light of divine truth might be quenched in the blood of its friends, and anxious for one ray of hope that the church would yet rise and triumph over all its enemies? It would in fact seem not unlike some degree of hallucination, to engage in making such disclosures, with the expectation of reviving the drooping spirits of suffering Christians by them. It is out of reasonable question, then, that we should take, and be able to support, such a view of this subject as the popular exegesis demands. In truth, it requires us virtually to set aside the idea, that John had in view any present, important, and appropriate object in the writing of his book; or if he had such an object in view as appears to lie upon the face of that book, then, according to the exegesis which we are controverting, he took the strangest course imaginable in order to accomplish it, i. e., he wrote a syllabus of the civil and ecclesiastical history of distant ages, the highest end of which, in respect to those whom he addressed, could be only to gratify their prurient historical curiosity.

"Such a view of the book will not bear a sober examination. It is too improbable, incongruous, and inapposite to the necessities of the times. A church bleeding at every pore, and ready to faint or to apostatize—such a church addressed by a grave writer who has a superintendence over its concerns—and merely or principally told what things will happen in distant future ages, things civil, ecclesiastical, and even appertaining to the natural world, most of which were to be developed a thousand years or more after all the members of that church were dead! Nothing short of the most express testimony of John himself, that he meant to address them in such a strain, ought to satisfy us that he has done it."

Here then we are told that the popular exegesis of this book demands such a view of the subject. That is, if we understand it, if we apply the latter portions of the book to papal Rome, and not to pagan Rome, it involves all this, and is totally at war with all that is pertinent and congruous in prophecy. It implies that John had no present, important, and appropriate object in writing his book, or else that he took the strangest course imaginable, in order to accomplish it, i. e., he wrote a syllabus of civil and ecclesiastical history of distant ages, the highest end of which in respect to those whom he addressed, could be only to gratify their prurient historical curiosity. The same ideas are repeated again in § 28; and indeed in every variety of form in both volumes they occur again and again. Not unfrequently, too, reference is made to the

popular exegesis of the book in a manner adapted to render it ridiculous. He speaks of it as involving "merely imaginative and ever floating exegeses." He speaks of "volumes without number, of prophetic or theological romances, that have already been poured forth under the excitement and guidance of such views as I have now been characterizing." He says, "it is high time for all men to call to mind that the apostles did not occupy themselves with writing conundrums and charades."

Any intelligent person who is accustomed to apply the Apocalypse to papal Rome, is not likely to be much shaken by such a mode, either of argument or of ridicule. He will reflect that the general view he adopts does not, by any necessity, involve any absurd or ridiculous minuteness of detail. He will reflect that it is just as possible to interpret symbols generally, when applied to papal Rome, as when applied to pagan Rome. He will remember, too, that Professor Stuart does not dismiss with ridicule the fundamental ideas of Eichhorn, and others, concerning the book; although they are, undeniably, connected with most ridiculous errors of detail. He retains their ground-work, and rejects what he deems their errors. And does not even-handed justice demand that the same measure shall be meted to the other view? Ought it not to be stated with discrimination and precision, and separated from all non-essential adjuncts? And if it can be done, ought it not to be shown that, in no form, does its fundamental idea admit of defence?

But when it is nowhere stated with that discrimination and precision which the subject demands; when it is assailed by scattered assertions, here and there, from the beginning to the end of the work, its advocates may feel themselves harassed and disquieted, but they will not be convinced. Especially will it seem to them in bad taste, to say no more, to assail with ridicule the system which cheered the minds and sustained the hopes of such men as Edwards, Bellamy, Hopkins, Newton, Fuller and Scott, at least until it has been thoroughly and effectually subverted by fair argument.

But the intelligent advocates of the view thus assailed, though they will not, as easily they might, return ridicule for ridicule, will not rest here. Not only do they see that the deep foundations of their belief have not been shaken, but as before intimated, they see that their view is so inwrought into the fundamental structure of the Apocalypse, that it is impossible to remove it without doing violence to the book. The proof of this is simple, brief, and direct.

None of those against whom we now reason, deny that the events of the twentieth chapter are future. Satan is not yet bound. The millennial reign is yet to come. No less plain is it that the closing conflict of the nineteenth chapter is the immediate antecedent and cause of the binding of Satan and the millennial reign.

As the defeat of Bonaparte in the battle of Waterloo was the immediate antecedent and cause of his capture and confinement in St. Helena, so the defeat of Satan and the destruction of his forces in the last great conflict, is the immediate cause of his capture and confinement in the abyss.

Again, it is no less plain, that the main organs of his antecedent power have been two, the beast and the false prophet. To the beast the dragon gave his power, and his throne, and great authority (13 : 2). And the second beast, *i. e.* the false prophet, exercises all the power of the first beast (13 : 12). Moreover they are powers of long duration. For these identical agents of Satan are the leading combatants in the final battle, that precedes and introduces the millennium. Then, and then for the first time, are they taken and radically destroyed. Let any one who doubts, read and see. The inference is irresistible. They are both alive now. And if they are, then as Rome is definitely declared to be the centre of the system, the Romish Hierarchy under the Pope is the false prophet, and the civil system in league from age to age with this hierarchy, is the beast, and the general view which we have given of the scope of chap. 13—19 is undeniably true.

This argument, we have said, is simple, brief, and direct. It lies upon the very face of the book. True, it is but one; but one such argument is enough. At mid-day there is but one sun in the heavens; but let him who can eclipse it. The Pacific is but one ocean, but let him who can, stride across its limitless expanse. The Andes are but one chain of mountains, but let him who can leap their sky-piercing summits. So this one argument, simple, magnificent, and sublime, is enough for ever to settle the question.

If any should suggest that the beast and the false prophet in ch. 19 : 19, 20, are merely generic symbols, and not the identical beast and second beast spoken of in ch. 13, we reply that this assertion is in direct conflict with the express words of the Apostle. He declares as plainly as language can declare, that they are the same; yea, he takes special pains to identify them. What are the most striking acts and characteristics of these two great conspirators against God and man in ch. 13? The second beast makes an image; both conspire to compel men to worship it. The beast has a mark; both conspire to compel men to receive it. The second beast deceives those who dwell on the face of the earth by lying wonders, wrought before the first beast. Had it been the purpose of God to identify these conspirators, what more could he do than to say, they are those by whom these very guilty deeds were done? But this is the very thing he has said—

“The beast was taken, and with him the false prophet, that WROUGHT PRODIGIES before him, with which he DECEIVED them that had received the MARK of the beast and them that worshipped his IMAGE” (19 : 19, 20).

That this is so, is plain from the fact that although that remarkable symbolical agent, known in this book by way of eminence as *το θηριον*, is manifestly spoken of as one and the same agent, yet when the common interpretation is rejected, it becomes necessary to use the expression *το θηριον* in four different senses.

1. It is used specifically to denote an individual Roman Emperor, i. e. Nero.

2. It is used generically to denote the Emperors of Rome collectively.

3. It is used in a still more generic and indefinite sense, to denote the abstract idea of hostile civil power, as existing just before the millennium.

4. It denotes the devil, without any particular reference to civil power at all, or else it is uncertain what it does denote.

Of the first sense Prof. Stuart thus speaks, vol. ii., p. 351.—“That Nero is mainly characterized in XIII., XVI., XVII., we cannot well doubt.”

Of the second sense, he says, “the beast generically considered, represents many kings, not merely one.” “Insensibly almost, at least so it is to the reader, this specific meaning appears to be dropped, and the more generic one to be employed again in chap. XVIII., seq.”

Concerning the still more generic sense which refers to a time far beyond the era of the pagan Roman Emperors, even on the verge of the millennial day, he thus speaks, “As soon as the writer dismisses the case of Nero from his consideration, he deals no longer with anything but energetic representations. Persecutions will revive. The war will still be waged. At last, the great Captain of Salvation will come forth in all his power, and make an end of the long protracted war. *Then, and not till then, will the millennial glory dawn on the Church.*”

And yet during all of the book from chap. 13 to 20, it lies upon the very face of the language, that John is speaking of one and the self-same beast. Even Prof. Stuart is compelled to admit this; for he says, “*Insensibly, almost, at least so it is to the reader, this specific meaning appears to be dropped,*” &c. As the language in question was no doubt intended *for the reader*, so if it gives him no proper indication of a change in the sense of the words *το θηριον*, then we have every reason to believe that there is no such change. Most of all are we compelled to believe, that in chap. 19: 19, 20, the beast and the false prophet, who are so carefully identified with those of chap. 13, by a reference to the delusions practised by them, the image, the worship of which was exacted by them, and the sign which they demanded men to receive, are not mere generic representations, totally disconnected from the beasts of chap. 13; but are identically the same with them: so that if the beast of chap. 13, is Nero, then it follows that just before the millennium,

Nero is to encounter Christ, and be taken and cast into the lake of fire.

Concerning the fourth sense of τὸ θηρίον, i. e. the devil, Prof. Stuart thus speaks, commenting on chap. 11: 7—"The beast that ascendeth out of the bottomless pit, shall make war against them," i. e. the two witnesses. "Here τὸ θηρίον is said to ascend from the abyss; and who is it that dwells in the abyss, and is an enemy to Christians, and can come forth from that place to oppose them? Who but Satan or the dragon?"

Yet he is forced to admit that the beast of chap. 17: 8 is represented as coming from the abyss. Thus are they clearly identified. Rev. 17: 8, the language is θηρίον δὲ εἶδες ἣν καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ μέλλει ἀναβαίνειν ἐκ τῆς ἀβύσσου. Rev. 11: 7, the words are, τὸ θηρίον τὸ ἀναβαῖνον ἐκ τῆς ἀβύσσου.

But the general theory of Prof. Stuart as to the slaying of the witnesses, forbids him to admit the identity of the beasts of these two chapters.

Now consider how great, how prominent the part assigned to the beast in this book—consider how he is referred to κατ' ἐξοχήν as τὸ θηρίον—consider the distinct individuality of his character and deeds, and can that be a true theory which demands such a fluctuation and confusion of senses, in which one sense is dropped, and another taken *imperceptibly* to the reader, whilst he clearly does perceive that one and the same agent is spoken of? That is, now specific, meaning Nero; now more generic, meaning the Roman Emperors collectively; now indefinitely generic, meaning certain unknown deceivers to be encountered just before the millennium; and now specific again, meaning neither Nero nor the Roman Emperors, but the devil? Can this be true, especially when the last time the beast appears on the stage, in the closing ante-millennial battle, he is minutely and carefully identified with the beast, who came upon the stage in chap. 13?

Indeed so strong is the evidence that the beast is still alive, that Prof. Stuart is obliged expressly to say, vol. ii., p. 309.—"It is only in the course of time (which is not limited), when the Redeemer himself shall come at the head of his victorious army, that the *final* extinction of the power of *the beast* takes place." And yet such is the confusion of idea, of necessity produced by the system, that on the same page, he says, "The death of Nero was indeed the destruction of the beast for the time being, and it made a temporary end of persecution. But the beast still came up again from the pit; the contest was renewed, and, with many remissions, continued down to the time of Constantine. Rome, as heathen, then finally ceased to persecute. THE BEAST WAS FINALLY SLAIN." And yet, after all, it seems that the *final* extinction of the power of the beast was not to take place till more than fifteen

hundred years after, when the Redeemer himself shall come at the head of his victorious army.

Truly this is more obscure than the double sense. We have a quadruple sense of one and the same expression, and without rule or law, nay, against all rule and law; the mind is made to flit from one to the other, and in the confusion of the transitions can retain no definite idea what THE BEAST is, though it is the most prominent figure in the whole composition.

All this confusion of necessity results from the vain effort to make a crisis and a catastrophe in the days of Nero, where there is manifestly none.

There is plainly but one catastrophe of the Beast, and the false prophet, and that occurs in Chap. 19, at the close. That this is the *final* catastrophe even Prof. Stuart is compelled to admit. And it is no less plain that this is future. Prof. Stuart is also obliged to concede this. Of course, the beast and the false prophet are yet alive. Their final defeat is yet to come. The splendor and the terror of the battle of the great day of God Almighty are yet to be revealed. If now, we try to split up into parts a catastrophe that is manifestly simple and one; if one part lies in the yet distant future, and another part is placed nearly eighteen hundred years in the past, in the days of Nero, and another part in the days of Constantine, how can anything but constant mental confusion be the result? But most manifestly, in the days of Nero there was nothing like a grand catastrophe in history. Much less was the conversion of Constantine anything like a terrific catastrophe, *a catastrophe of wrath*. And yet the catastrophe of the beast, whenever it takes place, is such a catastrophe.

But apply the passage to the papal power, and to the civil system in league with it, and all is definite and simple. It presents a sublime view of the past, and a glorious victory of God in the future, when the beast and the false prophet shall finally be consumed, in the fierceness of his wrath. From what has been said then, it is plain that this view is so inwrought into the fundamental structure of the Apocalypse, that it is impossible to remove it without doing violence to the book.

Of this we shall adduce further evidence as we proceed directly to examine the German theory as propounded and defended by Prof. Stuart.

This theory is based chiefly on certain undeniable principles of interpretation, *i. e.* That we must regard the circumstances of the writer and his readers, and his end in writing. These, it is alleged, forbid the application of the book to the papacy, as involving a syllabus of civil and ecclesiastical history. The tendency of these principles thus used, is to crowd everything back, as far as possible, into the days of John, and the Christians among whom

he wrote, on the ground that he must have written for their consolation and support, and that what he wrote must have been intelligible to them. But a syllabus of history could have served no end but to gratify a prurient historical curiosity. Therefore he did not write such a syllabus—but was mainly intent on consoling Christians during the Neronian persecutions. This is the substance of the principles and their application. They are indeed presented over and over again in every variety of form, until the mind becomes weary of the repetition. But the essence is what we have stated. Now that the Holy Spirit would, to a great extent, regard the wants of the generation for whom John wrote, cannot be denied; and this he plainly did in the introductory chapters, and in the letters to the seven churches. In these are abundant warning, consolation, and reproof, enough undeniably to meet all present emergencies. But let us remember, that John was the last of the inspired writers, and that by him the canon was to be closed. Of course, the necessities of the coming two thousand or more years before the millennial day, were also to be regarded, as well as those of the generation among whom he wrote. Would they be agonized by no persecutions? Would they never bleed at every pore under cruel tyrants? Would they never need consolation and support? Shall God's communications be expended to a wasteful extent, in view of a persecution under Nero, which even if it did spread beyond Rome, of which there is no certainty, and little probability, was yet so near to its end, that John's book could scarcely reach the sufferers before it was over, whilst the transcendently bloody persecutions of the Church of Rome for long and gloomy centuries, are overlooked?

But it is alleged that it is the law of prophetic writing to expand what is near, and to give but brief glimpses of the future. Why then is there such a minute and vivid expansion in chaps. 21, and 22, of the most distant future in the book? Is it said that the future glories of God and the church in Heaven would console the church in the days of Nero? And would not the vision of a future glorious triumph of God over the most terrific enemies that Satan could raise up on earth, also console them? Prof. Stuart, we are aware, asks how could it console Christians to be assured that there would be a great apostasy, and that the nominal church would become a bloody persecuting power? No one was ever simple enough to suppose that there was any consolation in this. But this is not the whole. It is no less clearly revealed that God will destroy, in a manner equally glorious and terrific, this great conspiracy, against his cause. And is there no consolation in this? Neither is there any consolation in knowing that there will be a great apostasy after the millennium; but is there none in knowing that God will most signally defeat and destroy its power?

The truth is, we are not competent to say *a priori*, how much, in revealing the closing historical book of the New Testament God ought to regard the then present generation, and how much the future. If John were a mere uninspired man, as most of the German commentators suppose, we should not expect that he would see much beyond the horizon of present events. But the foresight of the future, and the judgment what to present, belonged not to John as a man, but to John as an inspired man. He did not call up the splendid panorama of symbols on which he gazed, but the Spirit of God caused it to pass before his mind, and it came and disappeared not as John, but as God, judged and chose.

It is also alleged that John must have written to be understood by the generation among whom he wrote. No doubt he did to a certain extent. But we know well, that even uninspired men often are conscious of thinking far in advance of the generation in the midst of which they live and write; and we know that they often write far more with a reference to posterity than to those by whom they are surrounded. They expect indeed to be understood in part by the present generation, but not to be fully understood except by future generations. For this reason the illustrious Lord Bacon committed his reputation to the care of future ages—nor did he do it in vain. And shall the thoughts of God, and the vast interests of his eternal kingdom, be cramped down till they can enter the contracted minds of the generation that happens to live when they are disclosed?

Some things indeed may be very intelligible, but if God speaks like himself, many will not be so; and he may well commit the judgment on them to future ages. And if Prof. Stuart's view of the Apocalypse is true, so he did; for there is not the least evidence, or even probability, that the book was ever understood as he now understands it, till since the Reformation.

True, he assumes that the Christians under the persecutions of Nero must so have understood it, and been consoled by it. But of this there is not a particle of proof. Prof. Stuart says, "We cannot, indeed, make out the history of Apocalyptic exegesis, in the apostolic age, *i. e.* during the first century, from any written documents, for such we do not possess." But if the book was once understood as Prof. Stuart now expounds it, would all traces of this view, written or traditional, have utterly disappeared? Yet they have. The earliest traces of any kind of interpretation of the book are visionary and erroneous to such a degree as to injure the authority of the book. Prof. Stuart says, "We only know that soon after this age (the apostolic), readers of the Apocalypse began to explain some parts of it in such a literal manner as to throw in the way very great obstacles to the reception of the book as canonical."—(*i.*, 451.) He refers chiefly to the millenarian views of Papius and others. But in the third century he

says, "Hitherto all in the exegesis of the Apocalypse is fluctuating, arbitrary, and of course uncertain. No idea of any regular plan and connexion throughout this book, seems to have suggested itself to the minds of the writers of that day."—(Vol. i., p. 453.)

Of the work of Victorinus, the earliest commentary on the book, Stuart says, "No plan of the whole work is sought after, or even conceived of; no effort to get at the circumstances and relation of the writer of the Apocalypse and his times, and bring them to bear on the explanation of the book."—(i., 455.) At the close of the eighth century, he informs us, "no real and solid advances were made."—(i., 458.) From this period to the Reformation, he says there was "nothing important in the way of exegesis." The Reformers, also, in applying it to the papacy, according to Prof. Stuart, erred, and no clear and definite light dawned till the Jesuit Ludovicus ab Alcassar wrote in 1614. He introduced substantially the view that Prof. Stuart now advocates, to the great gratification of the Romanists of his day. Grotius and others followed him, till at last Eichhorn presented this view in its most brilliant form. Of the main features of his exegesis, Prof. Stuart says, "they substantially agree with the general tenor of the book."—(i., 472.) Such, according to Prof. Stuart, are the facts of the case. And in view of them we ask, is it at all likely that the true interpretation of the work was at first plain and actually understood, and yet that all traces of it were so soon and so utterly lost? We have not the slightest belief that the book was ever understood as Prof. Stuart now interprets it in the apostolic age, nor indeed ever until the days of the Jesuit Alcassar.

But mere general principles can never settle the interpretation of the book. In order to do this, it is necessary to examine their application in detail. Although a minute examination of all of Prof. Stuart's exposition is impossible in our limits, yet enough can be considered to aid us in forming a judgment of his fundamental view. This we shall next attempt.

Meantime we will remark, that although it would be a great error, to misinterpret the Apocalypse for the sake of assailing Rome, it would be no less an error, on the eve of the coming and greatest conflict with that power, to throw away weapons of heavenly temper expressly provided for the conflict by God. If God has specifically spoken of the Romish hierarchy in words of consuming fire, then no indefinite human theory of a general certainty of the destruction of all God's enemies, can make good the loss of God's own words. We all know that God's enemies will fall, but who are they? The mother of harlots will of course be destroyed, but who is she? Is it nothing to have in God's own words a description of the very powers with whom we are to contend? No words have an edge and a power like those of God. If the Spirit has given us a sword against the greatest enemy of

God and man now on earth, well may the Christian soldier say in the words of David, "there is none like that; give it me." The interpretation of the Apocalypse, then, is not a question of mere abstract theory. It is vitally connected with the greatest moral conflict of this or any other age.

Professor Stuart has followed the fundamental principles of the Jesuit Alcassar, as the basis of his exposition, *i. e.* he regards the Apocalypse as "a *continuous* and *connected* work, making regular advancement from beginning to end, as parts of one general plan in the mind of the writer. Ch. 5—11, he thinks, applies to the Jewish enemies of the Christian Church; ch. 11—19 to heathen Rome and carnal and worldly powers; ch. 20—22 to the final conquests to be made by the Church and also to its rest, and its ultimate glorification." (i. 463, 464.)

Of course he regards the fall of Jerusalem as the great catastrophe of the first part, and the development of this catastrophe he finds in ch. 11: 15—19, and all that precedes from ch. 6, is designed to prepare the way for this result. A prominent part of this preparation is to be found in the slaying of the witnesses, which occupies the greater part of ch. 11. Now, it is our conviction that this part of the theory cannot be carried out, without doing greater violence to all true laws of prophetic interpretation than is to be found in all the works of Bishop Newton, Scott, Fuller, Edwards, or any of the defenders of the common English theory.

In the first place the language in ch. 11: 15—19, has no fitness to describe such a catastrophe as the fall of Jerusalem. It is upon the face of it, a song of triumph for the conversion of the world to God, after a divine inquisition and judgment, and a retribution to good and to bad, and a glorious victory over hostile nations; and if it were not a case of life and death to the theory, no man, we are assured, would ever conjecture that there was the slightest reference to the fall of Jerusalem or to Jewish affairs in the whole passage. To make it so apply, requires the utmost violence in forcing the words to say what they obviously do not say, and not to say what they obviously do say, as we shall soon show.

Again, this view disagrees with the declaration of the angel in ch. 10: 5—7, that in the days of the sounding of the seventh angel *the mystery of God should be finished*, as he has declared to his servants the prophets. Now it is plain that the existence of the papal anti-christian power and her civil allies ruling the world in the name of Christ, corrupting society, and preventing the conversion of the world to God, is the great mystery spoken of by Paul, in 2 Thess. 2: 1—12; and the destruction of these powers by the glorious advent of Christ is the finishing of that mystery. Moreover, the general scope of prophecy in both dispensations, is to hold up the universal prevalence of the kingdom of Christ over manifold opposition, as the finishing of the mystery of God. The solemnity of

the whole scene, the oath of the angel that there should be no longer any delay, but that when the seventh angel should sound the mystery should be finished, all imply a long protracted series of antecedent events, on a great scale, followed by the full development of God's system, the triumph of his principles, and the cessation of that mysterious and long continued triumph of Satan, that had so severely tried the people of God. All the expectation thus excited, the language of ch. 11 : 15—19 in its obvious sense, perfectly gratifies. It implies that the exercise of the great power of God has been for ages withheld, and therefore Satan had come in great power, and organized vast systems to desolate and destroy the earth ; but that at length God had taken to himself his great power and reigned. The nations indeed rage and oppose ; but the time of divine judgment and recompense has come. Saints and martyrs are to be rewarded, and those who have destroyed the earth are to be destroyed. Hence the all-comprehending idea of the whole is to be found in the anthem that bursts from the lips of the angelic host, "the kingdoms of this world have become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ, and he shall reign for ever and ever." The fundamental ideas of this passage are precisely those of ch. 19, 20 ; so much so, that those may be regarded as a mere expansion of these.

And now, how are these things to be changed into a mere catastrophe of wrath, like the fall of Jerusalem ? The nature of that catastrophe can be easily gathered from the ample and undoubted predictions of Christ with reference to it. It is a day of judgment and of wrath ; but not of the conversion of the world to God. Christ anticipates no such result. Jerusalem is rather to be trodden down of the gentiles for a long period, even until the times of the gentiles shall be fulfilled. Moreover, as it regards the catastrophe itself, our Savior is full and precise. Is there even a hint of this catastrophe in this passage ? Not one. Even Prof. Stuart virtually admits this, for he endeavors to account for it thus : "the writer is a Jew, and how can he dwell on the destruction of his beloved city and people with a minuteness of representation ? He turned from the scene with weeping as a sympathizing Jew," &c., ii. : 145. Again, "The shouts of victory in heaven, fill the ears and occupy the mind of the seer, and turn away his attention from the sad spectacle of the overthrow of his beloved city and people." We confess that this account of the matter, in view of all the circumstances of the case, is little less than ludicrous. The fall of Jerusalem is assumed to be the great catastrophe for which, during six whole chapters, John has been preparing the way. He had heard the words of Christ describing that catastrophe. Six seals have been opened full of omens of wrath. Six trumpets have sounded their blasts of vengeance ; every form of terror has been accumulated ; but just when the final catastrophe comes, and the

highest development of wrath is demanded, alas! the heart of John is too tender to present it. He omits it entirely, and his ears are filled and his mind is occupied by the shouts of victory in heaven; and those shouts have no reference to the fall of Jerusalem, but solely to the conversion of the world!

It is so plain that the fall of Jerusalem is not here represented that Bleek, Ewald and others deny that there is here any catastrophe at all. Prof. Stuart regards this as unaccountable; to us it is not. It is far more rational to deny any catastrophe at all, than to find the fall of Jerusalem in such a passage as this.

Moreover, there is other internal evidence against this view. The enemies over whom God triumphs are indicated in a way that clearly shows that Jews are not meant. They are called *τα ἔθνη* (11:18.) the nations, or the gentiles. They, and not the Jews, are angry, and resist God. This is perfectly decisive, for never are the Jews called *τα ἔθνη*, in the general and unlimited sense. This is the common and universal antithesis of the Jews. In opposition to this, Prof. Stuart quotes some passages in which the Jews are called *a nation*, in the singular, *i. e.*, Gen. 12:2. Ps. 33:12. Is. 1:4. 9:2. 26:2. 49:7. But how manifest is it that to call the Jews *a nation*, is not the same as to call them *τα ἔθνη*, *the nations*. *A nation* they were; *the nations* they never were. Nor were they ever so called. Neither does the passage in Gen. 35:11, to which he appeals, sustain Prof. Stuart. Here God says to Abraham, "a nation and a company of nations, shall be of thee." Now the Jews were not in the strict sense a company of nations, but of tribes. Therefore, Rosenmüller says, "Propagatio e patribus undecim tribuum am natis, et Benjamine mox nascituro indicatur;" and he quotes Le Clerc to the same effect. *עַמּוֹת* is here used in a peculiar and unusual manner; and the use is decided by the context. But never are the Jews called absolutely and independently *τα ἔθνη*. Prof. Stuart also appeals to Ps. 2:1. "Why do the nations *ἔθνη* *עַמּוֹת* and the people *λαοί* *עַמְּךָ* imagine a vain thing?" The raging of the nations here, he says, "applies principally to rebellious Jews." (ii., 242.) Yet the inspired apostles in Acts 4:27, do not take this view. After quoting the passage from Ps. 2, they say, in explanation of its fulfilment, "for of a truth, against thy holy child Jesus, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the gentiles and the people of Israel were gathered together, &c." So then inspiration has decided that by the gentiles, the Jews are not here meant, for they are distinguished from the people of Israel. There is then, as we have before stated, no case in which the Jews are called *τα ἔθνη*, and of course the enemies here referred to, are not the Jews, but the hostile nations of the world at large, as the whole scope of the passage plainly shows. Nothing therefore, but the utmost violence can force this passage into a

description of the fall of Jerusalem ; and yet to the theory of Alcasar, Eichhorn and Stuart, such an application is essential. That theory therefore must be false.

Still further, the same theory renders necessary either an obscure or an imaginary interpretation of the slaying of the two witnesses. It compels the interpreter to find the fulfilment of this prophecy in events preceding the fall of Jerusalem. But it lies on the very face of the prediction that the witnesses were of such power and influence as to torment those that dwelt on the earth, and that their death would arrest the attention of the people and kindreds, and tongues, and nations, and fill them with joy—that their resurrection would fill them with terror, and be attended with great convulsions.

Let us now call to mind that our Savior took especial pains to point out to his disciples the signs by which they might foreknow that the fall of Jerusalem was at hand, and enjoined it on them to escape. Moreover, the general belief of the Christian world, ever since, has been, that they did escape, and that no Christians were in Jerusalem when it was compassed about by the Romans.

And yet this theory compels us to find these two illustrious witnesses of God in Jerusalem at this very time, and to discover events corresponding to their death and resurrection, and the great convulsions attending it.

Now by a stern necessity, either an absurd or an imaginary exposition must be adopted. If it is admitted that there were no Christians in Jerusalem, then the interpretation is absurd, for it finds God's two illustrious witnesses either among the abandoned Jews or the heathen. Herder and Eichhorn look for them among the Jews, and select the Jewish High Priests Ananus and Jesus, whom the zealots slew. That is, the guilty leaders of God's abandoned enemies on whom his vengeance was soon to fall, are God's two witnesses, whom the beast from the bottomless pit will slay, and whom God will raise to glory ! Where in Mede, Newton, Scott, Fuller, or Edwards, can anything be found comparable to this for intense absurdity ? Prof. Stuart has taken good heed to avoid this Scylla, but in doing it, he is obliged to fall into the Charybdis of purely imaginary interpretation.

There is not a solitary scrap of history by which it can be made to appear probable that there were any Christians in Jerusalem—much less, that there were two or more teachers deserving of a description so magnificent—much less that they were put to death,—much less that it excited the attention of people, and kindreds, and tongues, and nations—still less that they rose, and great fear and convulsions attended their resurrection.

What then is Prof. Stuart's ground ? He admits, that “ according to the testimony of the ancients, the great body of Christians fled beyond the Jordan to Pella, when Palestine was invaded by

the Romans. That Judea could successfully resist the Roman power, no considerate person would believe. Hence the flight of Christians in accordance with the warnings of the Savior. But still the case can hardly be imagined, where all would be able to make good their escape. The sick, the aged, paupers, persons of a hesitating or doubting turn of mind, must, or at least would, delay, or give up an effort to fly. Then, among the faithful and zealous teachers of Christianity in Palestine, there must have been those who chose to remain and preach repentance and faith to their perishing countrymen. These I regard as symbolized by the two witnesses in 11 : 3." (ii : 227.)

But is there any historical proof that such illustrious preachers did stay, contrary to the express directions of Christ? None at all. Is there any proof that they tormented those who dwelt on the earth; that nations and peoples and tongues rejoiced in their death, and were terrified by their resurrection in any sense? Not a particle. If there were any teachers, or death, or resurrection of any sort, it excited so little attention and made so little impression, that the general and constant impression of the ancients was, that there were no Christians there at all. But Prof. Stuart finds it hard to imagine that all could escape, and thinks that some teachers must have chosen to stay and preach, and that the zealots would probably kill them; and that the Christian religion would prevail notwithstanding, and this is the death and resurrection of the witnesses!

And now we ask any man to sit down and read ch. 11 : 1—14, and compare with it an interpretation so purely imaginary and conjectural, an interpretation that cannot call in one historical fact to its support, and then to say whether it can be the true interpretation of a passage so striking and sublime? Ought we not rather to find the interpretation of such a passage in a series of events that deeply affected and agitated the world, and not in a series that made so little impression that no record of them ever was made, and even the memory of them has entirely faded away? It is of no avail to say that we must not interpret too minutely and specifically, the drapery and costume of prophecy. We admit it. But it is a still greater offence utterly to evaporate the vital energy of such a passage, by applying the most moving and striking symbols of the book to purely imaginary and utterly improbable events.

But Prof. Stuart says, that Christ has plainly foretold the persecution of Christians at the time in question, and refers to Matt. 24 : 9—13. Mark 13 : 9—13. Luke 21 : 12—16. No doubt he foretold persecutions in these words, but they were plainly to precede, not to follow, the flight of Christians from Jerusalem. For the persecutions were included among the preceding signs; and after them, he says, when ye shall see certain other signs then

flee from Jerusalem to the mountains. See Luke 21 : 20, 21. Mark 13 : 14, 15. Matt. 24 : 15, 16. His words, therefore, indicate no persecution of Christians in Jerusalem after the flight to the mountains, but clearly imply the reverse. Plainly then, that theory must be wrong which compels us to look for the two witnesses in Jerusalem, just before its fall.

Nor is this the end of the violence which this theory compels us to do to the laws of prophetic interpretation. It compels us to find in Jerusalem some organized civil power to slay the witnesses, that can be called the beast that ascendeth from the bottomless pit. Prof. Stuart (ii : 232) has well set forth the perplexity of interpreters on this point. Eichhorn says that *θηριον* is generic, and is put for *θηρια*, and that *θηρια* means the locusts, in ch. 9 : 2. That is, THE beast means beasts in general, and beasts in general, means locusts in particular. Grotius and Hammond say that it means the famous impostor Barochchab, &c.; but enough of such theories. According to Prof. Stuart, it should mean the Zealots; for he thinks it extremely probable that they killed the Christian teachers, who probably remained at Jerusalem. But as it would be hard to show in what sense the Zealots were the beast that ascendeth from the bottomless pit, he finally, as a last resort, fixes on Satan—though he is nowhere else in the whole Bible thus designated, and though the word plainly denotes a civil organization and not an individual person. All this violence results of necessity, from endeavoring to convert a song of triumph over the conversion of the world, into an account of the fall of Jerusalem. Let the language of ch. 11 : 15—19 be taken in its plain and obvious sense, and there will be no difficulty in knowing who the beast is; for, as we have seen, he lives till just before the conversion of the world, and the slaying of the witnesses also takes place so near to that great event, that we are not obliged to hunt up some new and strange meaning of the word beast, or to consider it as denoting the devil. The one great beast fulfils all the conditions of the case.

But Prof. Stuart relies on what is said as it regards the slaying of the witnesses in the city in which our Lord was crucified, as proof that the literal Jerusalem is meant. Yet he is utterly unable to carry out the literal interpretation, through the passage. Speaking of ch. 11 : 1, 2, he says, "How can we consider the representation before us as anything more than *mere symbol*?" Is it to be once actually imagined, that John actually expected the Gentiles who would tread down the holy city, and the exterior part of the temple (*την ἀυλὴν τὴν ἔξωθεν*) to spare the interior part of the temple and the worshippers there? This would be to suppose him wholly ignorant of the manner in which war was conducted at the time when he lived. Moreover, as to matter of fact, the reverse of what is implied by such a supposition actually

took place. The temple—the very *sanctum* itself—was the great slaughter house at the time of the Roman invasion, and all the sacred building was destroyed together, at one and the same period.” He resorts of necessity, therefore, to a spiritual interpretation of the temple, and of measuring its parts and worshippers, and preserving a part, and giving up a part to the Gentiles. But we have the same right to interpret the city spiritually, that he has so to interpret the temple. Moreover, consistency requires it, for mixed interpretation is worse than mixed metaphor. Indeed, Prof. Stuart, in reply to Ewald and Bleek, says, “Why should we adopt an exegesis which is half literal and half figurative?” (ii : 215.) So say we; and yet see how this very thing is done in this passage (i : 184): “The city where our Lord was crucified, was about to be destroyed.” This he takes as a literal fact, and thus proceeds: “There was the temple of God, and there in former days he had dwelt. The most holy place is therefore measured off, for exemption from destruction, *i. e. the spiritual part of the ancient dispensation is still to be preserved.*” Is not this exegesis half literal and half figurative? So too, he refers the sealing in ch. 7, to the literal Jewish nation (ii : 139), although the transaction manifestly indicates merely the salvation of a portion of God’s elect, *i. e.*, the true spiritual Israel, from impending perils, just as the names of the twelve tribes of the children of Israel on the gates of the heavenly city (21 : 12), denote that all the elect of God have finally reached their eternal home in that city. We regard, therefore, all arguments derived from a reference to “the city called Sodom and Egypt, where our Lord was crucified,” in favor of the idea that ch. 11 : 15—19 refers to the fall of Jerusalem as utterly baseless. A figurative interpretation is in part indispensable, as Prof. Stuart has clearly shown (though we do not regard his particular one as correct), and both consistency and the exigency of the case demand a spiritual interpretation throughout. In short, it is not possible to introduce the fall of the literal Jerusalem here, as we have abundantly shown, without the utmost violence of every kind. But a spiritual interpretation will render all symmetrical and consistent.

Thus have we examined the general outlines of what is regarded by Prof. Stuart as the first catastrophe, and shown that they do not present to us the harmonious parts of a consistent system, but warring elements that refuse to combine in harmony either with each other, or with the providence of God. It would be easy still further to illustrate and prove this by descending to minuter details, but this general view of the so called first catastrophe, is all that our limits will admit.

We will now proceed to consider what is called the second catastrophe.

We have already indicated that upon the face of it, as presented

by Prof. Stuart, it is a most singular and unexampled catastrophe, beginning as it does nearly 1800 years ago, and stretching over the middle ages, and about to be completed at some indefinite future time. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of more incongruities and inconsistencies than are involved in the endeavor, to blend Nero, the Roman Emperors collectively, and the future enemies of the Church, together with all intervening enemies, in one and the same catastrophe. It sets at defiance all laws, poetical, historical, exegetical, or prophetic.

The centre of this theory, as presented by Prof. Stuart, lies in the assumption that Nero is the beast described in chap. 17. This view exerts in this theory a wide-reaching influence through the Apocalypse. It is made extensively to control its interpretation, and to reverse, on grounds of internal evidence, the prevailing opinion of the ancients, that it was written in the time of Domitian, and to fix it before the fall of Jerusalem. How then is this theory established? It is by assuming that John has in chap. 17, in direct terms, asserted the truth of certain rumors concerning the death of Nero, and his return to life, and to the imperial authority, which heathen soothsayers had circulated in the Roman empire, not because he believed them, but to point out Nero as the beast spoken of in chap. 13, 16, 17.

Now this, we do not hesitate to say, is at war with every sound principle of interpretation. The words of John are—"The beast which thou sawest was and is not, and shall ascend from the abyss, and go into perdition, and all who dwell upon the earth, whose names were not written from the foundation of the world, in the Lamb's book of life, shall wonder when they behold the beast, that was and is not, and yet is." (17 : 8.)

These are as absolute and solemn affirmations as it is in the power of language to make, and they occur in a series, the rest of which is admitted to consist of absolute affirmations; *e. g.* The seven heads are seven mountains, on which the woman sitteth (v. 9); and there are seven kings, five have fallen, one is, the other not yet come, &c. (v. 10). The ten horns are ten kings (v. 12). They shall fight with the Lamb, and he shall overcome them (v. 14). God hath put it in their heart to give their kingdom to the beast (v. 17). The woman is the great city, &c. (v. 18). All these are not rumors, but direct assertions of facts. But verses 8 and 11 are in the same style of affirmation, and are closely interwoven into the series. Who, then, has a right to break out these links from the chain of assertions, and to declare that their design is not what it seems to be, and what the words imply—to assert real facts, but something quite different, *i. e.*, to retail unfounded rumors of heathen soothsayers concerning Nero, in such a way as to point him out as the beast? We protest most earnestly against such a violation of every sound law of interpreta-

tion. When the editors of the improved version of the New Testament came to John 1:10, "He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not," they merely inserted *πεφωτισμένος* after *εγενετο*, and then all became "facile and congruous." "He was in the world, and the world was *enlightened* by him," &c. But with what indignation was the question asked, what right have you to insert *πεφωτισμένος*? John says nothing about it. But this is a small affair, compared with the insertions needed to bring out the new sense of Rev. 17:8. Let us listen to Prof. Stuart. We have enclosed his additions in brackets, in order that the reader may see at a glance what John actually does say, and what additions are needed to bring out the new sense.

"What the angel says, *seems to be* (?) equivalent to this. 'The *beast* [means the Roman emperors, specifically Nero, of whom the report spread through the empire is, that he] will revive, after being [apparently] slain, and will come [as it were] from the abyss or Hades; but he will still perish, and that speedily. [The beast symbolizes him, of whom it is said that] all the world will wonder at [and worship] him when they see him thus returned [as they suppose] from the under world, [that is, all] whose names have not been inscribed in the book of life, before the world was made.'" (ii: 323.)

Now, it will be seen that the effect of the additions is not merely to modify, but directly to contradict, what John actually says. John *affirms*, that the beast will revive after being slain, and that this fact shall excite universal wonder. The additions imply that nothing at all of this kind will take place, but that it is a mere unfounded rumor.

But there is one part of this verse that no violence can pervert or silence. It is the exception of those whose names were written in the Lamb's book of life. Was this a part of the heathen rumor? Did the soothsayers declare that all should wonder at the return of Nero from the abyss, except those whose names were written in the Lamb's book of life from the foundation of the world? The supposition is absurd. What did they know or believe concerning the Lamb's book of life and election from eternity? This exception, then, can be no part of the heathen rumor—of course the universal wonder to which it is an exception, is no part of that rumor, but a reality; for would the inspired apostle John gravely make so solemn and emphatic an exception, to an unfounded heathen rumor about a universal wonder, which he well knew never would take place? But if the universal wonder is a reality, the cause of it is also a reality; that is the coming up of the beast from the abyss is a reality, and not a heathen rumor about Nero. Therefore, the whole statement is a reality and not a rumor. Thus, not only the whole scope of the

passage, but also a most irresistible *exigentia loci*, refute and explode the theory that would force the language of John into a reference to heathen rumors concerning Nero.

We do not know, in the whole history of interpretation, of a case of such violence done to the plainest laws of language as is found in this effort to turn aside and neutralize the pointed assertion of John. With such laws of interpretation, it is possible to make *aliquid ex aliquo*.

True, Prof. Stuart asserts that the object of John is *dilucidation*, and not *prediction*, in this passage. But how are we to know that? Out of a given series of similar assertions, who can select some, and say these are meant for *dilucidation*, but the rest are meant for prophecy? And if once such a principle is introduced, who is to limit its use? It is easy to raise the devil, but not so easy to lay him when once raised. And so Prof. Stuart has found it. For in v. 16, Ewald interprets the assertion that the ten horns and the beast should hate the whore, as having reference to the rumored return of Nero from the East, and his union with certain kings to destroy Rome. But Prof. Stuart tells us, "*here there is not so much of explanation on the part of John, as of prediction;*" and then gives a lame account of what seems to be the sense. But finally he says, "after all, there would not perhaps be much to object to Ewald's exegesis here, provided it should be regarded merely in the light of a *dilucidation*." Thus does one false principle, or precedent, like the dry rot in timber, corrupt and destroy the whole framework of interpretation. For if Prof. Stuart has a right to say that in one case John is not predicting, though he seems to predict, why has not Ewald or any one else, as good a right to make the same assertion anywhere else? Indeed the thing does not stop here. In chap. 16 : 12, Ewald and others refer the pouring out the vial on the river Euphrates, and preparing the way for the kings of the East, "to the hariolation which predicted, that Nero should flee to the East, and there rouse up and unite many kingdoms, and then come and invade Italy and burn Rome." Prof. Stuart admits the existence of such rumors concerning Nero in the East, but still he assures us definitely, that "John is *here predicting a reality, something which will take place*, not merely, as in some other cases, saying something concerning Nero, which might serve to make him known to his readers." It is easy to make such assertions, but we should be gratified to know on what principle they are made. Who is to tell us when John is prophesying, and when not? We have a great respect for Prof. Stuart's assertion; but we infinitely prefer one definite principle to his or any other man's assertion. But he has destroyed the principle that is essential to our defence, and in place of it, seeks to erect a mere barrier of assertions.

But he informs us ii : 442, that some circumstances, which he

has not seen distinctly noticed by any of the commentators, tend to confirm his view. "These are the *somewhat veiled*, but still sufficiently plain, intelligible, and oft-repeated cautions of the writer of the Apocalypse, that the reader should weigh his words, and not give them an interpretation such as a superficial reading might suggest." We do not wonder that none of the commentators have noticed these cautions. One is, 13 : 9, "if any man have an ear, let him hear." A caution often repeated by our Savior, and found in all the letters to the churches. Does this intimate that these letters are "not to be interpreted by the letter or according to the first appearance of the words?" That they are not to be "interpreted in the ordinary way?" If they do not, why give the same words that force here?

Again, the assertion, ver. 10, "he that leadeth into captivity, shall go into captivity, he that killeth by the sword must be killed by the sword," is said to point out Nero. But these words have no more a natural reference to Nero, than the assertion of Christ, "they that take the sword shall perish by the sword."

Again, in 13 : 18, and in 17 : 9, it is intimated that peculiar wisdom is needed in order to get at the meaning of John ; and from this he infers that the passages were not intended to be "interpreted in the ordinary way." He says, "Interpreted in the ordinary way, we might make out from our text the meaning that Nero had been already wounded," &c. Of course, according to Prof. Stuart, the text is not to be interpreted in the ordinary way. And are we then, in order to manifest peculiar wisdom, to abandon the ordinary laws of interpretation, and to attach a meaning to the Word of God by a reference to unfounded rumors and heathen hariations? For our part, we cannot see that this is any more consistent with the true dignity of prophecy than the practice, so soundly reprobated by Prof. Stuart, of interpreting it as if it were a series of "riddles and conundrums." We confess that this whole effort to force Nero into ch. 17, as the wounded beast, and the beast that ascends from the bottomless pit, savors too much of that German infidelity that regards John as little better than a soothsayer himself, and does not hesitate to affirm that he believes the rumors concerning Nero. They are at least consistent, for they teach that John really thought that Nero would come to life, and they are not obliged to neutralize his assertion by saying that he did not mean what he actually says. But Prof. Stuart of course, abandons this ground. He says emphatically, "*I do not say, that John meant to convey the impression that Nero would actually revive and re-appear on the stage of action ; for this I do not believe.*" (ii : 441.) And yet he asserts that he spoke as if he believed it, and that in order to get at his true meaning, we are not to interpret his words in the ordinary way. For ourselves, we decidedly reject not only the root of this German

infidelity, but all that has ever grown from it. This theory as to Nero has decided infidel associations. It is perfectly consistent in the hands of one who denies the inspiration of John; but it cannot be so grafted on the tree of true Christian interpretation, as to appear like one of its true and genuine branches. In short, we are deeply convinced that it is no part of a true interpretation of the word of God.

Still further, we object to this theory that it converts prophecy into an undignified syllabus of minute contemporaneous events, and does not give to its symbols that sublime magnitude and far-reaching scope, which accord with the magnitude and vast extent of the system of God. To a finite mind, near events assume a disproportional magnitude and importance. But an infinite mind can see all events in their true magnitude and relations, and sketch the bold outlines, and omit the minute details.

Now let us look at a few facts as given by Prof. Stuart: "The persecution of Nero began in the middle of Nov. A. D., 64" (ii : 279). It ended with the death of Nero, A. D., 68, June 9; for Galba was proclaimed Emperor on the 9th of June in the same year, and Nero was assassinated on the same day. It is not improbable that Galba was on his march from Spain when the Apocalypse was written, so that the time of deliverance for the church was *very* near when the book was written (ii : 280). Again, the evidence that the persecution spread from Rome into the provinces is so feeble, that the ablest modern historians deny that it did, *e. g.* Neander, Lücke, Giesler and others. Stuart, indeed, labors to controvert their views; but this state of facts shows of itself, that the persecution was not great and prominent, except at Rome, else it would have made a deeper impression and left stronger evidences of its existence. Not only is this true, but it was also just at its close. The Apocalypse, we are told, was written during the year in which Nero died; and yet its main end was to console and sustain the church under his persecutions. Is not this too much like crying fire, after the fire is put out? Before the book could be finished, copied and circulated, Nero would be dead and the persecution over. Now, does it comport with any just sense of the elevated and expanded views of God, to suppose that he would devote so much space, in such circumstances, to a minute syllabus of events, and even rumors about Nero? After presenting the beast in ch. 13, the development of omens of wrath goes on, till at the end of ch. 16, the seven vials are all poured out, all aimed at the beast. Then comes up the question who is this beast? And in ch. 17, in a most mysterious way, John intimates that it is Nero, by a minute detail of pagan rumors about him; and then the final catastrophe comes on, and somewhere at last, though Prof. Stuart does not indicate where, Nero is slain. Now after all that has been said about the æsthetical merits of this theory, it seems to us a de-

gradation of prophecy, thus to exhaust all its emblems of magnificence and terror on an occasion so little calling for it. Even a heathen could say, *nec deus interit nisi dignus vindice nodus*. How much less such a waste of divine displays on such an occasion! No less unworthy of the splendid prophetic symbols employed, is the interpretation of the flight of the church into the wilderness, which is a part of this theory. A portion of the church fled from Jerusalem to Pella, before the capture of Jerusalem. But neither the apostles nor the main body of the church were there. The few at Pella were in no sense *the* church. And yet the splendid and sublime symbol of the church, in ch. 12: 1, 6, 14, is applied to them; and the time of their stay there is minutely limited to three years and a half. Such a contracted idea of the church in the wilderness, and such minuteness of detail concerning a few Christians at Pella, are unworthy of the words **THE CHURCH**, and of the dignity of prophecy. And the true tendency of the whole theory is to expose the book itself to contempt, as unworthy of such a being as God.

Another effect of excluding the Romish Church from this book, and referring chap. 18 to Pagan Rome, is to produce of necessity a false interpretation of the marriage supper of the Lamb in chap. 19. The great and obvious idea that lies upon the face of chap. 18 and 19, is this: God will judge and terribly destroy the false and harlot church which has so long corrupted the world, and shed the blood of his saints. In her place will follow, as the natural result of this judgment, a pure and holy church, whom God will publicly own and espouse, and through whom he will speedily destroy all remaining enemies, and reign. Hence the hallelujahs of Heaven over the judgment of the harlot, and their anticipation of the speedy reign of God as the natural result of this judgment and of the consequent marriage supper of the Lamb.

Now it is notorious that no such marriage supper of the Lamb took place after the judgment and fall of pagan Rome. The dark ages and the Romish apostasy followed them. Of course, Prof. Stuart's theory finds no place for the marriage supper of the Lamb on earth. He is obliged, therefore, to call it an episode, and to transfer it to Heaven (ii: 340): "But before the final consummation, the episode (so usual in this book) of praise, thanksgiving and anticipated completion of victory, comes in, with a delay (grateful in itself to the reader) *of the main action*." So, then, the marriage supper of the Lamb is no part of the main action; it is but a grateful delay of it. But what is it? In it, "the glorious prospect for suffering martyrs is disclosed. They will be guests at the marriage supper of the Lamb." So in his commentary on v. 8, he says, "All that is here said, is said for the sake of pointing out the reward, which awaits Christians in the world to come." These are mere assertions. Of their truth he offers no proof.

The reason is plain. There is no proof to be offered. They are in direct conflict with the imperious demands of the passage. They destroy the real ground of the angelic and heavenly joy, expressed in the passage. That joy is not so much called forth by the judgment of the harlot, as by the succession of a pure church in her place. "Let us be glad and rejoice, for the marriage of the Lamb is come, and his wife has made herself ready." It is as plainly spoken of as a present event, and a cause of heavenly joy, as is the judgment and doom of the harlot. It is one part of a grand antithesis. "Let us rejoice, for the harlot church is destroyed—the true church takes her place. The earth shall no more be corrupted as it has been. Hallelujah, for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth." To say that this is merely disclosing the glorious prospect for suffering martyrs, is merely to contradict both the letter and the spirit of the passage. It has nothing to do with the future prospects of suffering martyrs. It is on its very face, an expression of heavenly joy in view of the most glorious result which the mind of a created being can conceive, in the history of this world,—the removal of that corrupt power, which has degraded Christianity, corrupted civil governments, debased human society, and deluged the world with the blood of saints, and the presentation in her stead of the true bride of Christ, royally arrayed in robes of heavenly righteousness. And well might the angel say, happy is he who lives to behold, and is permitted to enjoy so glorious a consummation. It will indeed, be life from the dead to this miserable world. What, then, shall we say of a theory which compels its advocate to throw aside the very essence of the result at which the whole system of God aims, as *an episode, and a delay of the main action*! The final consummation of the great work of purifying the church on earth, and perfecting her glorious union to Christ, a delay, an episode! Surely this one result is enough to condemn the whole theory; for it is not Prof. Stuart's fault—he does the best that the theory will allow. It is the necessary result of the theory, and is therefore, a demonstration of its absurdity.

But take the other view, and it is easy to account for the fact that at this point the joy of heaven reaches its highest degree of intensity. Christianity is restored to its purity; the Church appears in her true holiness, unity and glory. No more an adulteress, no more ruled and debased by the civil powers of the world, and a corrupt hierarchy; but free from all bondage, and relying solely on her own glorious Lord and Savior, she shines forth, fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners. The anticipation of such a day is not an idle dream, for these "are the true sayings of God."

To what has been said as it regards Nero, the Church in the wilderness, and the Marriage supper of the Lamb, let that be added, which at the outset we proved, concerning the main beast, and it

will be seen that the second part of the theory of Alcasar, after all that Prof. Stuart has done to support it, is totally at war with any just interpretation of ch. 13-20. By the same course of reasoning as we applied to the first beast, it can be shown that the effort to interpret the second beast, called generally the false prophet, as the priestly hierarchy of pagan Rome, is at war with the radical structure of this part of the book. The pagan hierarchy has been long extinct. The false prophet is yet alive, and with the beast, is yet to be taken and slain. Of course, he represents the papal hierarchy of false teachers, and not the pagan hierarchy of old Rome.

Thus far we have regarded only the bold outlines of the German theory. We have looked at the framework of the building which they have tried to erect. If now we were to descend to more minute details, it would be easy to accumulate evidence of the falsehood of the theory to any extent, but it would be wearisome, and our limits forbid. There are also, some other topics which deserve discussion, such as Prof. Stuart's views of the modes of designating time in the Apocalypse, and on the question of a literal resurrection of the dead before the millennium. But either of these points would require an independent essay for its full discussion, and we omit them here.

We will only notice one striking fact: Prof. Stuart is a decided opposer of the millennarian theory; and yet more arguments can be derived from his commentary for its support, than from any other book we know of, not written by a millennarian. Now it is of little avail to ridicule the millennarians, as Prof. Stuart once did, and yet concede to them their interpretation of their leading proof texts.

It is well known to the readers of their works, how much they rely on Rev. 20 : 4-6. Phil. 3 : 8-11. Luke 14 : 14. Isa. 26 : 19. 1 Cor. 15 : 23, 24. 1 Thes. 4 : 16, to prove their theory of a literal first resurrection, before the general resurrection. And yet Prof. Stuart not only concedes, but insists that these passages do teach or intimate that doctrine. True, he denies that those who partake of the first resurrection, will remain, and reign on earth. He insists that they will ascend and reign with Christ in heaven (ii : 485) : "May we not conclude, then, that John did not mean to designate a resurrection apparent to all the dwellers on earth, or apparent to the fleshly eye, but one which, although not outwardly seen by men, and unattended by any proofs, or outward and visible tokens, will in reality take place, in order that martyrs and faithful saints may, as it were, *anticipate their final state of glory*, and enjoy the triumphs of the church, in the splendor and excellence with which redeeming love will invest them."

Doubtless the millennarians are willing that Prof. Stuart should have his own opinions on this point. They will also give them just as much weight in regulating their own opinions as they see fit.

But one other thing they will surely do. They will exult in the fact that the power of truth has at last compelled the great father of philology in America, to admit the fundamental correctness of their interpretation of these passages. And they will feel that the barriers that prevent a transition from such a concession to the rest of their doctrine, are shadowy and imperceptible.

We say not this by way of reproach. If their views are correct, let them prevail. But we do not regard them as correct. In our judgment they introduce a false theory as to the conversion of the world, and tend to paralyse the present efforts to effect a purely spiritual regeneration of the human race. We therefore regret to see them gain strength by what we regard as unauthorized concessions. We will only say that the interests of the Church require a radical re-investigation of this subject, in a very different spirit from what has often been manifested in the discussion of millenarian views.

In our review of Prof. Stuart, we have spoken with earnestness and freedom. We could not in any other way have done justice to our feelings and convictions on a subject of such moment. The most careless observer must see that a great crisis in the history of this world hastens on. The free church movement in Scotland, and recent events in Switzerland, are raising the question of the entire dissolution of the union of church and state throughout Europe. The efforts of the Romish hierarchy to regain their lost ascendancy are redoubled. We are the special objects of their wiles. All things tend to a re-investigation of the whole history of the Romish church, and to such a judgment as she has never yet undergone. The great want of the world is a pure, a united church. Never did the people of God more need guidance and strength. They need to see among them a pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night. They need to see that pillar standing between themselves and their foes, shedding light on one side and darkness on the other. In the Apocalypse we see such a pillar of cloud and of fire. In it we hear God's exposition of the present crisis, and of coming events. **THE APOCALYPSE IS THE TRACT FOR THE TIMES.** In it there is no spurious charity, no pantheistic philosophy of history, no transcendental liberalism. It is a clear, pure, omnipotent utterance of the heart and mind of God. It is the sharp, two-edged sword, that proceeds out of the mouth of Christ. It is the iron rod, with which he will break his foes.

The interpretation of such a book stands high above all personal considerations. In it not only the whole world, but the whole universe, are vitally interested. At this very hour an intense interest fills all heaven—yea, it fills God himself, in view of the events transpiring and soon to transpire on earth. And what we solemnly believe and deeply feel to be acceptable to God, and for the highest good of man, that we must speak—that we have spoken.

To unfold the details of what we regard as the true interpretation of this book, is inconsistent with our limits. That we regard the papacy, and the unholy union of church and state, which have been the main corrupters of the church, and of human society as included in it, is plain from what we have said. Still, we would not make it a syllabus of history. We would sketch only a grand outline of the great mystery of God, and pay a due regard to the great laws of poetry and of symbolical prophecy. Nor would we neglect even trichotomy. But we would insist on it that the crises of the book, and those of history, shall correspond. The nature of history is such that we know what its crises are, without a revelation. They reveal themselves. And we would not by force, apply the most splendid crisis of the Apocalypse, where in the book of history, we find no crisis at all. Prophecy and history are counterparts; and their similitude to each other on the great scale, is natural and obvious. That similitude we would never disregard. Nor would we ever contract the mind of God to the narrow dimensions of the generation when John wrote. We do not believe that the generation then living either did or could understand all of the Apocalypse. Much they could understand. The letters to the churches were plain. The grand idea, **GOD WILL FINALLY TRIUMPH OVER SATAN AND ALL HIS HOSTS**, lies on the face of the book. Its moral influence is always elevating and bracing, even if not understood in detail. But it was designed as a book for ages; providence was to aid in its interpretation, and it should become most clear when most needed. Such a book we believe God can make, such a book we believe he has made—and as such with all gratitude and reverence, we receive it.

If Kepler was willing to wait centuries for an intelligent reader of his exposition of God's works, because God had waited thousands of years for an exposition, uttering the memorable words: "*Jacio en aleam, librumque scribo, seu presentibus, seu posteris legendum, nihil interest; expectet ille suum lectorem per annos centum; si Deus ipse per annorum sena millia contemplatorem præstolatus est;*"¹ shall we think an inspired apostle incapable of such sublime waiting? Nor does it move us that, at the opening of his book he says, "the time is at hand." He was then judging from God's point of vision, with whom a thousand years are as one day—he was judging on the scale of eternity—he was, in fine, surveying the scene from the same point of vision as Christ, when at the close he said, in view of the completion of the whole system, Surely I come quickly, to whom the apostle responds, Amen, even so, come Lord Jesus. Who will not join with the beloved disciple in a response so heavenly?

But there is not time fully to discuss the principles of prophetic

¹ See Bacon's Sermon at the Ordination of President Woolsey, p. 22.

interpretation, or of interpretation in general. We will only say that if any have ever gone to the extreme of overlooking the circumstances of the writer, and the thoughts and feelings of his age, and his peculiarities as a man, the prevailing danger is not now of that kind. All things now tend to break up the Bible into a series of writings to be looked at exclusively on the human side, and interpreted as the results of human minds.

The idea of one great centralizing, inspiring mind, who saw each book as the part of one great system, as its human author could not see it, and who saw the reference of his words to future results, as he could not see it, is in multitudes fast fading away.

For our own part, we believe the present tendency to be far the most dangerous. Edwards may have erred in too minute an interpretation of types and symbols; but standing as he did at the point of vision of the great eternal mind, breathing the air, and seeing the light of Heaven, he correctly grasped the great system of the Word of God. And when the trial of the fiery day shall come, and the wood, hay, straw and stubble of human error shall be consumed, we fully believe that the German theory of interpreting the Apocalypse on which we have commented, will be utterly reduced to ashes, while the main features of that of Edwards, as disclosed in his history of the work of redemption, will for ever shine as pure gold in the bright splendors of eternal day.

We will also add, since so much has been said of late of the progress of interpretation in general, and especially since Mr. Barnes has called in question the antecedent probability that any of the Scriptural quotations of Edwards are apposite, that we regard such things as adapted unduly to degrade our holy predecessors in the great battle of God, and to inflate the men of the present age with an extravagant idea of the attainments of the age. We are sorry to see so much that tends to this result in Prof. Stuart's work. We freely admit that much progress has been made in interpretation in some respects. But it is long before the vast mass of German interpreters will reach the heights where Calvin stood three centuries ago. Noble exceptions, we freely admit, there are. But it cannot be denied that the predominating tendency of German interpretation has been to relax the nerves of faith in a full inspiration of the Word of God, and to reduce its interpretation to the same dead level with the interpretation of merely human books. We would avail ourselves to the utmost, of every advantage furnished by German industry and investigation. But after all, nothing can make good the loss of that eminent power of spiritual interpretation which is the peculiar gift of the Spirit of God, and which Edwards possessed to a degree rarely, if ever, equaled on earth.

A man thus guided, and so eminent in logical power, could not miss the main scope of the Word of God, as it regards the great

system of doctrines—or, as a general fact, misapply the Word of God; and in truth few writers interpret Scripture on all great doctrinal points with such precision and correctness as President Edwards.

May God give the same spiritual insight into his Word to all our young men, and especially may he guide them into the true interpretation of that glorious book of prophecy which was the last message of Christ to his own church, to guide her on to victory!

ARTICLE V.

MIRACLES.

By REV. ENOCH POWD, D.D., Prof. of Theology, Bangor Theological Seminary.

IN the following article, I propose, first, to define or describe miracles; secondly, to show, that the Bible contains veritable accounts of real miracles; thirdly, to consider the leading object of miracles, and their bearing on the divine authority of the Bible; and then to consider the question of their continuance.

By a miracle, I understand an event or work, not only out of the common course of nature, but contrary to it; transcending, obviously, the capacities of creatures; and implying, in every case, a direct intervention of the divine knowledge or power. A clear and proper miracle is always, and may be known to be, *a work of God*.

Miracles may be divided into two classes, viz: those of *knowledge*, and of *power*. In miracles of the first class, there is a display of knowledge—there are disclosures, which are possible to no being but God. In those of the second class there is a display of power, which no being can exercise, except the Creator.

Intelligent creatures in this world may arrive at various kinds and degrees of knowledge; and they may make displays of their knowledge which shall astonish and confound the uninitiated; but they never work miracles. Intelligent creatures in other worlds may have knowledge vastly superior to our own; and were they permitted to have communication with us, might make disclosures far exceeding all our present conceptions. But there are some things which even they cannot do. They cannot perform a proper miracle.

I can conceive that some ministering spirit, if he were allowed to make the communication, might inform me what had been doing in the city of London to-day, or yesterday. But could he tell me, of

his own unaided wisdom, what will be doing there a hundred years hence? I trow not. To do this would be to perform a *miracle of knowledge*, which is the prerogative of God alone. Soothsayers, fortune-tellers, in order to convince those who consult them of their ability to look into the future, will sometimes undertake to disclose the past. "If we can tell you what is past in your history, you will be convinced of our ability to foretell what is to come." I decide nothing here as to the ability of the fortune-teller to disclose in any case (except where he has had the ordinary means of information) what is past. Allowing him to possess such ability, will it follow that he can disclose the future? By no means. His demon (if he have one) may inform him as to the past of an individual's history; but no demon or angel can, of his own knowledge or wisdom, lay open the future. This is locked up in the infinite mind of God; and, except so far as he is pleased to reveal it, is a secret alike to angels and to men.

When I say that God alone can look into the future, I mean, of course, what is commonly called the contingent future, including the remote and voluntary actions of men. Such events as depend on known, established physical causes, may, indeed, be calculated and ascertained. The astronomer can predict eclipses, and the times of the rising and setting of the sun, for long ages beforehand. But can he foretell what individuals shall be born a hundred years hence, and where they shall live, what they shall say and do, and when, where, and how they shall die?

Moral causes are in some instances so uniform, that we feel little hazard in predicting, within a narrow compass, how individuals, or even communities, with which we are acquainted, will be likely to act. I have no doubt that a great majority of my readers will go to their pillows to-night, and to their breakfasts in the morning. I have no doubt that the mails to and from this city will come and go, on the morrow, at the usual times. I have no doubt that the farmers of this country will plough their ground and sow their seed, at the opening of the spring. The skilful politician is able to calculate, with some degree of probability, as to the measures of cabinets, and the public acts of nations; and creatures of higher intelligence and longer experience than ourselves may be able to carry such calculations to greater lengths, and to draw them out with more precision. But then all such calculations are necessarily limited—the most of them within a very narrow circle; and they are all attended with more or less of uncertainty. A thousand unforeseen casualties may arise to disappoint our best settled and most confident anticipations. They fall immeasurably short, therefore, of *proper predictions*—those which reach out into the distant future, and declare, with infallible certainty, who shall live, and what things shall be done, in coming ages.

It will follow, from what has been said, that every proper pre-

diction, in the sense explained, is a miracle of knowledge. It is a disclosure which none but God can make; involving a kind and degree of knowledge possessed alone by the Infinite Mind. And so the case is represented in the Scriptures, "I am God, and there is none like me; declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done." To "declare the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done," in other words, to *predict* the distant and contingent future, is here represented as the prerogative of God alone. In another passage of the prophets, God challenges the idols of the heathen to vindicate their claim to divinity, by predicting future events. "Show the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are gods;" implying that if they could show the things that were to be hereafter, their claim to divinity would be satisfactorily vindicated.

In the first part of the Apocalypse, a vast map of the future is exhibited, under the symbol of a sealed roll or book; and "no creature in heaven, nor in earth, neither under the earth, was able to open the book, neither to look thereon."¹ We are here taught the same lesson as before. To all created minds, the whole contingent future is a sealed book; and a sealed book it must remain, except so far as God is pleased to unseal and open it.

We conclude, therefore, that every proper prediction is a miracle of knowledge; and in every case, it is a revelation from God. Creatures may presume, may conjecture, may make calculations; but God alone can predict. The presumptions of creatures often disappoint them; but God's predictions never. These are sure to go into effect, and in precisely the way and manner which he has indicated.

We turn now to the second class of miracles, viz: those of power. In these, as I said, there is an exercise and display of power, such as is possible to no being but the Creator.

Creatures in this world, in some instances, possess great power, the exercise of which is surprising and unaccountable to their fellow men. But they never perform miracles of power; and if they are honest, they make no such pretensions. And created beings in other worlds may possess power, as well as knowledge, far superior to all that is merely human; and were they permitted to make a full display of their power, we might be astounded and overwhelmed. But neither angels nor devils can perform proper miracles, more than we can. They may do things superhuman, and to our apprehension supernatural; that is, above our natures, and above what we know of the powers and laws of nature; but strict and proper miracles they never perform. These belong only to the Almighty.

¹ In the ability of the Lord Jesus Christ to open this book we have one of the most convincing proofs which the Scriptures afford us of his proper Divinity. See Rev. 5: 6.

But it will be asked, How are we to distinguish between the superhuman, and to us supernatural, and that which is strictly and properly miraculous? We are unacquainted with the powers of angels. We know not the extent of created power, as it exists in other worlds. We see a thing done, which is not only out of the common course of nature, but entirely above all that we know of the regular powers and operations of nature. Now, in what way are we to distinguish between such an event, and one strictly and properly miraculous?

This is a fair question, and one which deserves an explicit answer. The event, in the case supposed, is *above* nature—above all that we know of its powers and laws. Is it also *contrary* to nature? Does it obviously contradict any of its powers or laws? Does it involve a suspension or contravention of them? If so, it is a proper miracle. But if not, it is no miracle. And if it be doubtful whether it be so or not, then its claims to be regarded as miraculous are of a doubtful character.

Limited as our powers and capacities are, we do know something as to the powers and laws of nature. We may not know as much as the angels; still, we know something, consequently we may know, at least within certain limits, when these powers are suspended, and these laws contravened. And whenever we witness an obvious suspension or contravention of them, we witness what we may know to be a proper miracle, and we may know that the hand of the Lord is there.

The great laws of nature are all of them of Divine appointment. They are spoken of in the Scriptures as “the ordinances of heaven.” They are rules which the great God hath prescribed to himself, in carrying forward the vast movements of his providence. They are regular and established modes of Divine operation. Now, as God himself established these laws, God alone has power to suspend them. He only can cause an event to take place in palpable contradiction to them. In other words, God only can perform a proper miracle.

But it may be further inquired, whether what seems to us in contravention of some known law of nature may not be in accordance with some unknown and higher law; or in other words, whether what seems to us a miracle, is so in reality? May not its apparently miraculous character be the result entirely of our ignorance and short-sightedness? And if we were in a situation to know more about the powers and laws of nature, might we not discover that it was no miracle at all?

In replying to these questions, I come back to the position before assumed, that, limited as our capacities are, we do know something in regard to the powers and laws of nature. I repeat, we have, or may have, not presumption and conjecture, but knowledge here. Else all philosophy is delusive, and every attempt at phi-

losophical inquiry must be fruitless. But if we may know to some extent what the laws of nature are, then we may know when they are suspended or contravened. In other words, we may know and distinguish a palpable miracle from every other kind of event. And to escape this conclusion by saying, that what we see to be in contradiction to some known law of nature, may be in accordance with some unknown and higher law, is only to say that these laws may be in opposition to each other; in which case the great wheels of providence must be moving in opposition, and will be likely, ere long, to come in collision, with tremendous crash.

We come then to the conclusion, that a clear and proper miracle is not merely a strange thing, or an unaccountable thing, or a thing to our apprehension supernatural; but it is an event involving a manifest suspension or contravention of some one or more of nature's laws—those laws which God has established, and which God alone has power to suspend. Were ourselves, or any one else, whether in this age of the world or in any other, to see an event like this taking place; were we to see, for example, the sun standing still in the heavens for hours together, or apparently moving from west to east, instead of from east to west; were we to see living men cast into a burning fiery furnace and coming out unharmed; were we to see the raging waves of the ocean calmed to rest, or the mouldering dead called out of their graves, or a great river of water turned into blood, or the dust of a whole country turned into lice at the simple word of a prophet; were we actually to see such things done, we might certainly know that we saw miracles, miracles of power, works to the performance of which no hand was adequate but that of the Almighty. And it would be vain to say, in such case, that what seemed to contradict one law of nature might be in accordance with some other law. Here is a palpable contravention of known laws of nature, to which no other laws can be set in opposition, unless we will suppose the providence of God to contravene and oppose itself.

It will be objected, perhaps, to one of our positions, that in Scripture, miracles are sometimes ascribed to wicked men or to wicked beings, to other beings besides God. This is the case, it has been said, in regard to both the kinds of miracles here described, viz. those of knowledge and of power. "If there arise among you," says Moses, "a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and he giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or the wonder *come to pass* whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods and serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God proveth you," &c. It is here represented, it is thought, that the seducing prophet or dreamer may give a sign or a wonder that shall come to pass; or, in other words, that he may utter a real prediction. But is it certain that the representation implies as

much as this? The greatest bungler at soothsaying may guess right in some instances. An adept in the business may do so frequently. But if he should guess right, and the thing which he predicted should come to pass, the Israelites were not to go after him, more especially if his object was to draw them into idolatry; but they were to regard the event as a necessary part of their trial, and persevere in the service of the Lord their God. There is nothing in this passage which implies that the pretended prophet need be any other than a lying soothsayer, or that his alleged predictions were anything more than shrewd conjectures.

But the magicians in Egypt wrought miracles with their enchantments. Their rods became serpents; they turned water into blood, and brought up frogs upon the land of Egypt. All these things they did with their enchantments. And this, as I think, is equivalent to saying, that they did not in reality do them at all. That they seemed to do them I have no doubt. That they were capable of practising a sleight of hand, and imposing upon the eyes of spectators (as many do at this day), is altogether probable. And this, in my opinion, is the sum total of what they actually performed. Indeed, as much as this is clearly indicated in the representation that they performed their seeming wonders by enchantments. What are enchantments? And what could these magicians accomplish by means of enchantments, except to impose upon the eyes and ears of their fellow-men? They could no more turn a literal rod into a serpent, or water into blood, than I can, or than any other person. Nor is it at all likely that God would interpose and perform miracles by their means. The probability, therefore, is, amounting almost to an absolute certainty, that what they did with their enchantments was in reality no miracle at all, but merely an imposition on the eyes of the spectators.

It was predicted by our Savior of the false Christs which should arise after his death, that they would "show great signs and wonders, so that they should deceive (if it were possible) the very elect." Now we know what signs and wonders these false pretenders to the Messiahship wrought; for Josephus and others have informed us. They were the merest cheats and impositions in the world, by which multitudes of the infatuated Jews were deluded to their destruction.

So it is predicted of the enemies of God's church, in the latter days, that they too shall show signs and wonders. One of the beasts of the Apocalypse is to deceive "them that dwell on the earth, by means of the miracles which he has power to perform." Rev. 13 : 14. The frogs which proceed "out of the mouth of the dragon are the spirits of devils, working miracles." 16 : 14. The false prophet is also represented as working miracles before the beast, and deceiving them that have his mark, and that worship his image, 19 : 20. The kind of miracles here spoken of is indicated

by the fact, that those before whom they are wrought are said to be deceived by them. But how deceived? Why, by supposing them miracles, when they are not. How else should they be deceived by them? These same miracles are spoken of in one of the predictions of Paul, as "lying wonders" (2 Thess. 2 : 9) ; a clear indication that, whatever else they may be, they will be no other than gross impositions, and no proper miracles at all.

We come back, then, to the definition or rather description, of a miracle with which we commenced. It is an event, not only out of the common course of nature, but contrary to it; transcending, obviously, the capacities of creatures, and implying in all cases, a direct intervention of the Divine knowledge or power. A proper miracle is always, and may be known to be, a work of God. Such is the conclusion to which our reasonings have brought us; and such is the current representation of Scripture on the subject. "Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you, by miracles and wonders and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you." "The Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works." "God wrought special miracles by the hands of Paul." "God also bearing them (the apostles) witness, with signs and wonders and with divers miracles." Whatever may be the instrumentality employed, God is the author of the miracle. From the nature of the case it must be so; and the teachings of reason on the subject are abundantly established by the representations of the Book of God.

But it is time that I proceed to my next proposition, in which I am to show that our Scriptures contain veritable accounts of real miracles, such as have been described. In doing this, I must assume for the present, the truth of the Scripture history. I assume this point here, though a very important one, because the proof of it would consume too much time, and would lead us too far away from the subject in hand.

But certainly the Bible contains accounts, minute and circumstantial accounts, of numerous miracles; not the tricks of jugglers, not sleights of hand, not merely strange and unaccountable things, but *miracles*, in the strictest and most proper sense of the term—miracles both of knowledge and of power.

There are *predictions* in the Bible, reaching away into the distant future, and detailing with great particularity, the circumstances of things, and the free actions of men; the most of which have been already accomplished. I need only refer to the predictions in the Old Testament of our Savior's advent and sufferings; to his own prediction of the destruction of Jerusalem; to Isaiah's prediction of the capture of Babylon; and to the prophetic visions of Daniel. So remarkably have these last been fulfilled, that Porphyry, an ancient Pagan philosopher, vainly and desperately undertook to show, that the book of Daniel was history, and not pro-

phesy, and must have been written subsequent to the events of which it speaks.

And that the Scriptures record miracles of *power*, as well as of knowledge—miracles extending through a long succession of ages, from the time of Moses to that of the apostles, no one who looks into them can doubt. I need not refer to particular instances, as these are familiar to every reader of the Bible. The miracles of Scripture were performed, not secretly, but openly. They were performed in the presence, not merely of partial friends, but of bitter enemies, who were constrained, much against their prejudices and their inclinations, to confess their reality. The results of them, too, were not momentary, but abiding. The plagues of Egypt continued till their reality was painfully and universally felt, and till Moses was entreated to pray for their removal. Those who were healed by our Savior and the apostles, continued healed; and those who were raised from the dead actually lived for a considerable time. These events, therefore, were not tricks, sleights of hand, impositions practised upon the eyes and ears of spectators, but sober realities; acknowledged to be such, at the time, both by friends and foes. They were not merely strange and unaccountable things, above what we know of the powers of nature; but the most of them were palpably *contrary* to nature, involving a contravention or suspension of some one or more of nature's laws. Those who regard the Bible as true, must believe that these events actually took place, as there described; and if they took place, they certainly were miracles, and the hand of God was in them.

Some, I know, have rejected the miracles of Scripture, on the ground that a miracle cannot be established by any amount of testimony. Such was the opinion of Mr. Hume. His reasoning in support of it was to this effect: That since the ground of our reliance on testimony is experience and observation; and since we have more frequently found the testimony of others to be false, than we have seen miracles performed; therefore it is more likely that the inspired writers relate falsehoods, when they speak of miracles, than it is that these occurrences actually took place. I have no occasion to go into a full consideration of this plausible but oft-refuted objection here. It manifestly contravenes the truth of Scripture—a point assumed in our present argument. It is further manifest, that the main premise on which the objection is made to rest, is without foundation. The ground of our reliance on the testimony of others is not experience and observation. This we know, from the most undeniable facts. So far from becoming credulous by experience, we become incredulous. Our experience of the deceit and falsehood of the world leads us to doubt, often, when we ought to believe. Children, and those who have had but little experience, are in the habit of believing almost everything. Facts such as these, so common and obvious, go to assure

us, as I said, that the ground of our reliance on testimony is not experience and observation; and of course, that the grand assumption in Mr. Hume's argument is without foundation. The fact of miracles may be proved by testimony, just as well as any other fact; and where the testimony in support of them is conclusive (as it is in the case before us), we are bound to believe that they actually took place.

I might add to what has been said on this point, that the most ancient opposers of the Christian Scriptures—Celsus, Porphyry, Julian, and others, who lived nearest the times of the apostles, and had the best opportunities of forming a judgment, did not pretend to deny the occurrence of the Christian miracles. They admitted that they took place; but supposed that they were performed by magic, and that as great or greater miracles had been wrought among the pagans.

But if the miracles of Scripture actually occurred, as there related, why did they occur? What was the leading object or end of them? If God has actually interposed to arrest the regular movements of nature, and cause events to transpire in contradiction to them, it must have been for some great purpose. What was this purpose?

We inquire here (and this, it will be remembered, is our third inquiry), for the grand, the leading object of miraculous interpositions. The more immediate and subordinate ends to be answered by them may have been various. Thus, not a few of the miracles recorded in Scripture were performed out of compassion for the sick, the afflicted, and distressed. Others seem to have been prompted by a holy hatred of sin, and were intended for the punishment of the incorrigibly rebellious. Others still, may have been intended for the trial of those immediately concerned, and were resorted to as a means of forming and developing character. But all these were obviously but subordinate purposes, and not the grand, leading object in view. This must have been something higher, and of more general interest to the world.

The great end of miracles seems to have been, to attest the Divine mission of those who performed them, and the Divine authority of the messages which they were instructed to deliver. In frequent instances, this object is brought out prominently in the record; and in others, it evidently lies at the foundation, and constitutes the leading, prompting motive to the exertion of miraculous power. Thus, when Moses was commissioned to carry a message from the God of Israel to the proud monarch of Egypt, Pharaoh demanded (as it might have been presumed he would), "Who is the Lord, that I should obey his voice? I know not the Lord, neither will I let Israel go." And now God proceeds, by a series of stupendous and crushing miracles, to show Pharaoh who he is, and to convince him that, in the presence of the God of Israel, he

is himself but a worm. By these repeated miracles, God attested the divine commission of Moses and Aaron, sanctioned their messages as coming from himself, and at length constrained the unwilling monarch to yield to the demands which, at first, he had so proudly resisted. So when the murmuring Israelites in the desert, called in question (as they frequently did) the Divine commission of the appointed leaders, and the Divine authority of their communications, miracles were almost instantly wrought, to attest and sanction both. The dry rock is smitten, and water gushes forth. Aaron's rod flourisheth, while the others are dried up. The earth opens under the feet of the rebels, and they go down alive into the pit.

In the days of Elijah, the people were halting between two opinions, not knowing whom to recognise as true prophets, or whether to worship God or Baal. And to satisfy them again, a notable miracle was wrought. Fire comes down visibly from heaven, consumes the sacrifice and the wood, and licks up the very water in the surrounding trenches.

And not to multiply instances from the Old Testament, our Savior continually appealed to his miracles, in proof of his Messiahship, and in attestation of the Divine authority of his words. Thus, when John Baptist sent messengers to him, saying, "Art thou he that should come, or do we look for another?" our Savior returned answer, by appealing to his works. "Go, show John again those things which ye do see and hear. The blind receive their sight, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised up," &c., as though he had said, "My miracles attest the verity of my pretensions, and show conclusively who I am."

Upon the Jews, also, our Savior urged the same kind of evidence. "I have greater witness than that of John. The works which my Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me that the Father hath sent me." Again: "The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me." "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not; but if I do, though you believe not me, believe the works; that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in him." Still again: "Believe me, that I am in the Father and the Father in me; or else believe me for the very works' sake."

The declared object for which our Savior raised Lazarus from the dead was to establish the Divine authority of his mission, and faith of his followers. "Because of the people that stand by, I said it, that they may believe that thou hast sent me." With the same view, our Savior refers, not only to his miracles of power, but to those of knowledge; or, in other words, to his *predictions*: "I have told you before it come to pass, that when it is come to pass, ye might believe."

The grand object of the apostles' miracles was precisely the same: "They went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with signs following." While Paul and Barnabas were at Iconium, they "spake boldly in the name of the Lord, who gave testimony unto the word of his grace, and granted signs and wonders to be wrought by their hands." When the apostleship of Paul was called in question, he appealed at once to his miracles, in vindication of it. "Truly, the signs of an apostle were wrought among you in all patience, in signs, and wonders, and mighty deeds."

It may further satisfy us as to the leading object of miracles, to take into consideration their frequent effect on those who witnessed them. This was to compel an assent, and often an unwilling assent, to the Divine mission and authority of those who performed them. Thus, the miracles of Moses convinced not only Pharaoh, but the magicians themselves. When they saw what was done, they were constrained to acknowledge, "This is the finger of God." The miracle of Elijah, in raising the widow's son, drew from her the following noble confession: "By this I know that thou art a man of God, and that the word of the Lord in thy mouth is truth." A similar effect was produced on the mind of Naaman, when he had been miraculously cured of his leprosy. "He returned to the prophet, he and all his company, and stood before him and said, Behold, now I know that there is no God in all the earth, but in Israel."

Of our Savior's first miracle, it is said, that "it manifested forth his glory, and his disciples believed on him." In Jerusalem, at one of the Passovers, "many believed on his name, when they saw the miracles which he did." It was his miracles which convinced Nicodemus of his Divine mission: "We know that thou art a teacher come from God; for no man can do the miracles that thou doest, except God be with him."

At Paphos, Paul encountered a malicious Jew, a sorcerer, who greatly withstood his words, and endeavored to prevent others from hearing him. And what follows? In an instant, at the word of Paul, the sorcerer is smitten with blindness, and gropes about, seeking some one to lead him by the hand. "And those who saw what was done believed, being astonished at the doctrine of the Lord." So the miracles of Philip at Samaria compelled the assent, not only of the people generally, but of Simon, another miserable Jewish sorcerer. He "continued with Philip and wondered, beholding the miracles and signs which were done."

The above instances of miracles, selected from different parts of the Bible (and they are but a selection), are conclusive as to the leading design and object of these remarkable interpositions. It was, as I said, to attest the Divine mission of the inspired teachers, and the Divine authority of their communications; and thus to

establish the faith, not only of those who heard them, but of all who should become acquainted with their words and works.

But if such were the leading and professed object of the miracles recorded in Scripture, the question arises—and it is one of great importance; Were they of a nature to accomplish this object? In other words, is the argument from miracles for the Divine authority of Scripture valid and conclusive?

I do not say, for I do not believe, that the miracles of the Scriptures constitute the *only* argument for their Divine authority. I am not insensible of the weight and importance of other arguments, more especially those which are drawn from the truths and precepts of Scripture, or from the nature of its contents. But these, it is no part of my present purpose to consider. We inquire now as to the validity and conclusiveness of the argument from miracles.

And I remark, in the first place, that we cannot call in question the soundness of this argument, without impeaching the character of the Savior. That he frequently employed this argument, and urged it home upon the consciences of the Jews, is evident from the passages already quoted. “The works that I do bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me.” “Though ye believe not me,” i. e. my simple testimony, “believe the works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him.” The only possible question here is, Did our Savior reason wisely and well? Was the argument which he employed to vindicate his Divine authority, and that of his teachings, conclusive? We cannot answer these questions in the negative, without reproaching the Savior. We cannot answer them in the affirmative, without admitting the validity of the argument in question.

But not to dwell on this point, let us look into the argument itself. Let us bring it to the test, so far as we may, in reference to both the kinds of miracles of which I have spoken. Here is an individual who has performed a miracle of knowledge. In other words, he has made a disclosure respecting distant future events, and the future actions of creatures, which surpasses the wisdom of man or angel, and which he cannot have made, without special Divine assistance. Now, what are we to think of this disclosure? Is it not in every case, and of necessity, a revelation from God? Whoever may have been the instrument of imparting it, is it not, in fact, a *Divine revelation*? From the nature of the case, no other conclusion can be formed respecting it. Every proper prediction then (and the Scriptures abound with such predictions) is a revelation from God. It is a disclosure of his secret will, of the great plan of his providence, which no being in the universe can make but himself.

Here is another individual who comes to us, as Moses went to Pharaoh, professing to bring a message from God. We ask him,

as we have a right to do, for his credentials. "How do we know that God has sent you with this message? How do we know that what you tell us is a disclosure of his truth and will?" In answer to these very reasonable inquiries, he performs a proper miracle. Or rather, God performs one by him; for it is by the power of God, in every case, that the miracle is performed. An event is caused to take place before our eyes, in direct contravention of some known law of nature, and which no hand could effect but that of Omnipotence. Now, what are we to think as to the Divine commission and authority of the individual supposed, at whose word the miracle has been performed? I hesitate not to say, that his Divine commission is fully vindicated, and that we are bound to receive his message as a revelation from God. We can come to no other conclusion in regard to it, unless we will suppose that the great Lord of heaven and earth would arrest the regular movements of nature, and cause an event to take place in contradiction to them, to confirm a lie.

And now if it be asked, What if the alleged revelation from God shall prove to be something unworthy of God, or in opposition to his previous revelations? I answer, that such a case is not supposable, or possible. It is no more possible, than it is that God should contradict or deny himself. God's own revelations, confirmed by miracles, have never been found self-contradictory; and they never will be. Indeed, so long as it remains true that God "cannot lie," they never can be.

The argument from miracles, therefore, in proof of the Divine authority of Scripture, I hold to be entirely conclusive. It may be briefly stated as follows: The inspired writers generally, as Moses and the prophets, Christ and his apostles, made their appeal to miracles; and proper miracles were wrought, in attestation of the Divine authority of their communications. But God only can perform miracles, and he certainly would not perform them in attestation of anything but truth; hence, the claims of the inspired writers to a Divine authority are established. Their messages have the broad seal of heaven upon them, and are to be regarded as veritable revelations of the truth and will of God.

If the question be asked here, whether *all* the revelations that God has made to the world have been confirmed by miracles; I answer, in the general, yes. By this I do not mean, however, that every individual whom God has inspired, has been endowed with miraculous gifts. This is not a necessary supposition; nor is it likely to be true; John the Baptist, for example, "did no miracle." But God's revelations are to be regarded as constituting one great system. And as a whole—a connected, systematic whole, they have been abundantly attested by miracles. A series of miraculous performances has attended them from first to last, from Moses

to the apostle John, by which the whole has been sealed and established as the truth of God.

If it be asked again, whether, in case an individual should now come forward, claiming to have revelations from God—revelations aside from those of our Scriptures, and which the miracles of Scripture cannot be appealed to, to attest ;—whether, in such case, we should have a right to demand of him miraculous performances ; I answer again, yes. We undoubtedly should have such a right ; and most happy had it been for the church and world, if this right had been understood in former ages, and not only understood, but strenuously insisted on.

God did not blame Pharaoh for demanding a sign from Moses, but for refusing to obey when the sign was granted. Our Savior did not censure the Scribes and Pharisees for expecting miracles, in attestation of his high and peculiar claims, but for not being convinced by the miracles which were actually performed. I am under no obligations to believe that a man has received revelations from God, simply because he says he has ; or because he sincerely thinks he has. He must give me satisfactory *evidence* of the truth of his pretensions ; and what evidence of this kind can he give me—at least, in any ordinary case—but to work a miracle ? I repeat, then, and I do it in accordance with my most sober convictions,—I think men have a *right* to demand miracles of those who come to them with pretended revelations ; and most happy, surely, it had been for the world, delivering it from enormous masses of rubbish and imposition, had this right been strenuously and constantly insisted on.

In the second century, for example, Montanus appeared, professing to be the promised Comforter from heaven, who should teach the disciples all things, and bring all things to their remembrance. He published his revelations, and drew numbers after him, among whom were some of the learned fathers of the church. If Montanus had been put upon the test of working miracles—proper miracles, and if none would have listened to him till these were performed, his career and his delusions might have passed quickly away.

In the third century, Manes arose, with the same pretensions. He declared himself to be the promised Comforter, uttered his revelations, made additions, numerous and strange, to the doctrine of Christ, and drew away multitudes after him. He was the founder of what was called the Manichean heresy. If Manes had simply been asked for his credentials—his miraculous powers, and no one would have heeded him till these were exhibited, his errors never could have prevailed, and the church had been saved from his corruptions.

In the beginning of the seventh century, Mohammed appeared, professing to have direct intercourse with heaven, and to make

new revelations for the benefit of the world. The story of his life and successes need not be told here. His iron sway has been extended, for centuries, over not less than a fourth of the entire human race. Now it was objection enough to Mohammed, from the first, that he brought with him no proper credentials. The palpable evidence of a Divine mission, which was furnished by Moses and the prophets, by Christ and the apostles, he failed to exhibit. He performed no miracle, he could perform none. Of course, he should not have been listened to for a moment.

In more modern times, we have had numerous pretenders to Divine revelation. We have had an Emanuel Swedenborg in Sweden; a Bockholdt and a Behmen in Germany; Anne Lee and Joanna Southcote in England; and Jemima Wilkinson, Joseph Smith, and others of less name and influence, in our own country. Now to all these pretenders, I have one and the same objection. They had no proper credentials. They wrought no miracles. They furnished no evidence which ought to have satisfied a reasonable mind, that their pretensions were well founded. If the world could have consented to bring them, and hold them to this single test—the performance of miracles, their delusions had injured none but themselves.

Before concluding, I propose to institute one inquiry more, and that relates to the *continuance* of miracles.

That they were wrought in ancient times, among that wonderful people to whom were committed “the oracles of God,” and who were the instruments of communicating his revelations to the world, no Christian can entertain a doubt; and that miracles continued to be performed, at intervals, down to about the middle of the second century, when the canon of Scripture was closed and settled, is the general opinion, I presume, of the Christian world. Some excellent Christians have supposed that they did not cease until as late as the fifth or sixth century, while Roman Catholics, and some sects of fanatics, insist that they have continued to the present time.

It will be seen, from the very nature of this question, that it belongs exclusively to the believers in miracles, and in Divine revelation. With infidels and those who reject all miracles, we have, at present, nothing to do.

In considering the question, we may safely assume, what all Christians admit, that miraculous powers continued in the church, till about the middle of the second century. Is there sufficient reason for believing that they continued later? For one, I must answer this question in the negative.

There are two considerations, *a priori*, which might lead us to suppose that miraculous powers would cease, near the time that has been mentioned. In the first place, the great and leading object of miracles had then been fully answered. This was, as

we have seen, to attest God's revelations to the world. But these revelations had now been made; the canon of Scripture was closed; and by the middle of the second century, it had come to be very generally settled. Nothing now remained towards its final adjustment, which could not well be accomplished by unaided human inquiry and criticism. The great end of miraculous interpositions having thus been answered, we might conclude, *a priori*, that miracles would cease.

Again, it is a fact that, in the age of the apostles, though others besides them frequently wrought miracles, they alone had the power of imparting the gift. This was the gift so frequently imparted, by the laying on of apostolic hands. Thus, when Paul laid his hands on certain disciples whom he found at Ephesus, "the Holy Ghost came upon them, and they spoke with tongues, and prophesied." They were endowed, at once, with miraculous powers. This was what Simon the sorcerer wished to purchase of the apostles Peter and John for money. "When Simon saw that, through the laying on of the apostles' hands, the Holy Ghost was given," i. e., in his miraculous influences, "he offered them money, saying, give me also this power, that on whomsoever I lay hands, he may receive the Holy Ghost." Simon thought, no doubt, that if he could obtain this apostolic power of imparting the gift of miracles, simply by the laying on of his hands, he should be able to make a great deal of money out of it, and, of course, he could afford to pay liberally for it.

There can be no doubt, I think, that among all those who wrought miracles in the first age of the church, the apostles alone had the power of imparting the gift. But if this be so, then the gift must have ceased with the immediate successors of the Apostles, who could not have lived much beyond the middle of the second century.

If now we turn from these *a priori* considerations to the facts themselves, as they are detailed on the page of history, we shall be led, I think, to the same conclusion. Two things are noticeable in regard to the miracles which are said to have occurred subsequently to the period I have assigned: 1. The testimony as to their occurrence is often far from being satisfactory. It is remote, roundabout, not current perhaps till after two or three centuries, when it must have passed through many hands. 2. The alleged miracles are, in most instances, of a suspicious character. They may be divided into three classes.

1. They are such events as may be easily accounted for, without the supposition of a miracle. Or,

2. They are manifest (or at least probable) impositions. Or,

3. They are mixed up with so much that is absurd and ridiculous, as to render the whole story incredible.

To the first of the classes here indicated may be referred some

of the most notable of the alleged miracles of the ancient church. Such was the miracle, so called, of the thundering legion, which occurred in the latter part of the second century. The Romans were engaged in war with a tribe of Germans, when their army came very near perishing for want of water. In the army were many Christians, as well as pagans, the former of whom earnestly prayed for rain, and the latter as earnestly called upon their gods. In their extremity they were visited with a plentiful shower, which relieved and saved them. Both parties agreed to call the shower a miracle; the Christians ascribing it to the only living and true God, and the pagans to their own divinities. But obviously it was no miracle at all. It was only a remarkable interposition of providence, by which much suffering was alleviated and many lives were saved.

To the same class may be referred the alleged miracle, at the time of Constantine's conversion. Eusebius' account of this matter is as follows: "While the Emperor was praying with earnest entreaty, a most singular Divine manifestation appeared. A little past the middle of the day, as the sun began to verge towards the west, he saw in the heavens a little over the sun, a bright appearance of the cross, with an inscription upon it, *τοῦτον νικᾷ*, *By this conquer*. Amazement seized him, and the whole army at the sight." The historian goes on to say, that the same night the Emperor saw the sign again in a dream, and received a direction from Christ to frame a standard in the likeness of it, to be borne in future in the front of his armies.

In regard to this statement, the main question is, Is it strictly true? Was there really such an appearance in the heavens, in the view of the Emperor and his whole army, as Eusebius describes? If so, it must have been a matter of immediate and general notoriety, heard of and talked of throughout the empire. How strange, then, is it that it seems to have been entirely unknown for twenty-five years; and then to have leaked out, in a private conversation between the Emperor and Eusebius! Other writers of the age mention the dream of the Emperor, and the consequent change in his military standard; but none except Eusebius have a word to say about the appearance in the heavens; nor he, until a full quarter of a century after the alleged appearance was witnessed.

There is no need of impeaching the veracity of Eusebius, or even of the Emperor, in this matter. But the probability is, that it was all a dream, or a vision, occurring (as such things most commonly do) in a state of partial slumber, and when the subject could hardly determine whether he was asleep or awake.

To the same class I refer the miracle of the fire-balls, bursting forth from the earth, which defeated Julian in his mad attempt to rebuild Jerusalem. This event (if it occurred at all) was doubtless of an electric or volcanic character, or was in some way the result

of natural causes. There is no necessity for supposing any miracle in the case.

To the same class I also refer another pretended miracle, which took place in the fifth century. I allude to those whose tongues Huneric, the Arian king of the Vandals, caused to be cut out, and who could afterwards pronounce the Nicene creed. The facts here seem to be well attested, and may be in the main true, and yet involve no miracle. The tongues of the confessors may not have been very thoroughly extracted, nor their speech, subsequently, very plain. Other instances are on record, in which persons have been able to speak, with tolerable distinctness, after having lost a considerable portion of the tongue.

Of the second class of alleged miracles, viz: those to be set down as palpable impositions, I might give instances enough to fill a folio. Not only the legends of the Romish church, but the most respectable ancient ecclesiastical histories, are full of them. When Clovis, king of the Franks, was baptized, in the fifth century, a dove is said to have come down from heaven with a phial of holy oil to anoint him. Yet no one, at this day, supposes that such a thing actually took place. It was either a trick got up for the occasion, or an unfounded story forged afterwards.

Such, also, was the alleged miracle upon St. Francis, when an angel descended from heaven, and impressed on him the five wounds of the Savior. That St. Francis received wounds, or had sores, on his hands, feet, and side, is quite probable; but that an angel from heaven inflicted them—or if he did, that it amounted to a proper miracle—is not so clear. A large proportion of the alleged miracles in the ancient church consisted in the casting out of devils; a kind of performances in which it was very easy for the principal actor to impose, not only on others, but on himself.

But the great mass of the miracles of the early and middle ages fall under the third class to which I referred, viz: the absurd and ridiculous. If any one wishes to amuse himself with stories of this sort, let him read the lives of such men as Simeon the Stylite, or Paul the hermit, or the more respectable history of the venerable Bede. Or he may dip almost anywhere into the *Acta Sanctorum* of the Romish church, and be sure to find marvels in abundance.

In illustration of what is here said, I may refer to St. Corbin's miracle of the bear, who, having killed one of the Saint's pack-horses, was saddled and bridled, and made to serve in its place. There is also the miracle of St. Winnock's handmill, which, when he let go of it to say his prayers, would turn itself. And when a too inquisitive monk looked through a crevice to behold the wonder, he was smitten with blindness for his presumption.

The following is one of the most romantic and marvellous of the class of miracles to which I now refer. St. Winifrid was a

noble lady of Wales. Being a devout nun, she could not yield to the suit of Caradock, a young prince of the country. Enraged at her obstinate refusal of him, the prince pursued her, and with a cruel blow, cut off her head. And now occurred, instantly, three splendid miracles. 1. The earth opened under the feet of the young villain, and swallowed him up. 2. On the very spot where the nun's head dropped, a spring of water burst forth, at which miracles have been wrought from that day to the present. 3. At that critical moment, St. Benno made his appearance, caught up the nun's head, kissed it, placed it on the bleeding stump, covered it with his mantle, prayed to the Virgin, and said mass; when, lo, St. Winifrid is instantly well! Her head is on her shoulders just as before, and the only visible evidence of the wound is a scarlet line or circle about her neck!

These instances are enough to give some idea of the kind of miracles which are said to have been continued in the church from the beginning to the present time. My readers must decide as to the measure of credit which is to be attached to them. For one, I feel quite satisfied to fall back on my former position,—that the era of miracles closed about the middle of the second century. I have adduced considerations to show that it might reasonably be expected that it would be so; and I know of no well attested historical fact which is not perfectly consistent with this supposition. I do not believe that a proper miracle has been performed on this earth, for the last sixteen hundred years; nor do I expect another, for centuries to come.¹ The great object of miracles has long since been answered; the canon of Scripture is closed; God has given to the world all the revelations that are necessary, or that we are to expect, until “the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of his Son;” and until that period arrives, a renewal of miracles, I think, is not to be anticipated.

Meanwhile, let us cling to, and rejoice in, that abundantly attested revelation which God, in mercy, has put into our hands. To much of the evidence in support of this revelation—many columns of evidence, as might be easily shown—I have not adverted in this discussion at all. My limits did not admit of it, nor did my object require it. I have simply gone into a consideration of the evidence from miracles. But this alone is conclusive and incontestable. It is such as can never be set aside, but by discrediting the sacred record, and calling in question the truth of the Bible history. If the Bible is true—a point which is here assumed—then the miracles which it records actually took place.

¹ Some good men think every instance of *regeneration* a miracle. But their ideas, either of regeneration, or of the nature and object of miracles, or of both, must be very different from mine.

And if they actually took place as there described, the hand of God was in them, and the seal and sanction of the Almighty is upon the whole of that sacred volume which contains them.

This, then, is altogether a book by itself. It is the book of books, and is well denominated in our good English tongue, **THE BIBLE**; or (which is the same) **THE BOOK**. It becomes us all to cherish such a regard for it, that we can never so much as open it without feelings of reverence. We should read and ponder it under the impression that it is in very deed, what it professes to be, God's Book; that its instructions, its counsels, its predictions, its warnings, its promises, its threatenings, all are from God. And we should "give diligent heed to it, as to a light shining in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day star arise in our hearts."

ARTICLE VI.

LYRICAL POETRY OF THE BIBLE.

By REV. GEO. H. HASTINGS, New York.

THE knowledge that avails us in the hour of Bible reading, is to be counted with our incorruptible treasures. Next to a heart open to the spirit of God's Word, ranks a mind open to its beauties. The Hebrew scholar is often rewarded for days of toil by the primitive meaning of a single word; for Hebrew words are pictures, and that primitive meaning may reveal to him an image of beauty that shall always delight his imagination, and live freshly in his heart. While, for example, the reader of the English only receives from the line, "the rain is over and gone," the plain thought that the rain has ceased; the reader of the original sees that "the rain has walked away with itself;" and that nature is all alive in Hebrew. For such an one, the Lyrical Poetry of the Bible, quivering with life in its every word, possesses an interest unrivalled by the poetic literature of the world: and although investigation may establish but a few principles concerning it, yet the knowledge of these becomes unspeakably precious to him; such meaning and spirit do they impart to the Sacred Record.

But the Hebrew scholar is not alone in his enjoyment of this subject. All who read with a clear mind our noble Saxon translation of the Bible, can be made to apprehend the peculiar beauty of its Lyrics, when these are drawn out before them in their original forms.

It is much to be regretted that, to the mass of readers, the Bible

is all prose. Nearly one third of it, indeed, is poetry. Yet there it lies, cut up into false divisions, as falsely called "verses," and marred by figures as a work correlative to the Concordance—a book of texts; a quiver of equal arrows for the preacher's bow; and by some regarded as a Homœopathic medicine box, with doses duly numbered, and each for best effect, to be taken carefully by itself. How unlike the manner in which the word of God was received by the Hebrews! It came to the mass of that people most often, through the poetic sensibilities of men, kindled by the Holy Spirit. It touched men's hearts as poetry; and it was used as such to inspire the nation with heroic sentiment, and lift it up in devotional ardor. The people heard the prophet as the bard also, and caught up his strains as their national anthems. Not the temple only, but the valleys and hill-sides of Judea, harvest fields and battle fields, home and the exile's prison, rang with the songs of Zion. In the same manner ought the same strains to come to us. Read as doctrinal formulas, as the careful utterances of moral philosophy, as the deliberate statements of men learned in all the controversies of the schools, the Psalms are lifeless to us, compared with what they once were to the Hebrews. Yet, as inspired poetry, they were intended for us also. As God's dealing with that chosen people fitly represents to us his dealing with the individual soul, so those national odes, with lawful accommodation of the language to Christian conceptions, become the heart-songs of his people in all ages.

There are a multitude of facts, and interesting associations, connected with the sacred Lyrics, which do not appear to the popular mind, and which in the customary use of the Bible are rendered of little avail to any. We think it cannot prove otherwise than refreshing to theologians, as well as to Bible readers in general, to bring the Lyrical Poetry of the Bible under review in respect to its original use, and its influence on the character and fortunes of the chosen people of God. At the same time, we hope, by the facts and principles adduced, to commend to all Christian worshippers that use of the sacred Lyrics which does justice to them as poetry, and most effectually moves a congregation with their devotional sentiment.

Those who have attentively studied Lowth, Michaelis, Herder, and De Wette, and verified their statements by reference to their own Hebrew Bibles, are doubtless satisfied, and justly so, that these scholars have exhausted the subject, so far as the characteristics and genius of Hebrew Poetry are concerned. But after all, the highest praise of these men is, that they have elegantly reproduced the ideas of the Bible; and inasmuch as the same ideas glow upon the sacred page for every mind gifted with poetic perceptions, and rightly instructed as to what is Hebrew, it is apology enough for any one who is moved to write upon the subject

now, that he gives forth these ideas again, through original convictions, and in some new harmonies of coloring caught from his own imagination.

As the different styles of poetry correspond to certain great mental phenomena, it is no disparagement to the simplicity of the Bible, to classify its poems as Epic, Dramatic, Didactic, and Lyric. The latter form may embody the peculiarities of all the rest; but it is distinguishable for its correspondence to the individual feelings of the poet. It is the style of poetry in which the heart abandons itself to its emotions, unfettered by rule, unconscious of display. Yet in these outgivings of the heart we recognise the highest method of beauty, and distinctive forms which are models for artistic effort. But, born of spontaneity, they take shape for themselves, like snow wreaths in the wind. The lyric is, therefore, the poetry for music; and in its subdivisions, corresponding to various moods of soul, it taxes all the resources of the musician to give it just expression. For example, in lyrical poetry we have the Ode, through which one rises into the sublimities of devotion, or patriotism, or heroism, or strong popular feeling of any kind. It usually implies an audience, and aims to impress them definitely. An ode must always have purpose in it. It should also bear us forward to the highest conception of the subject in hand, by a series of images or thoughts adapted to prepare us for it; and in the closing idea the mind should rest satisfied, as is the ear upon a finely wrought cadence. That final thought, too, should suddenly illuminate the whole ode, and show the connexion of its every part. Of this, the song of Moses at the Red Sea is a model. There is also, the Elegy, in whose prolonged strains, and fitful changes, the wailing, sobbing heart pours itself forth, by utterance, to find relief. Its close is usually placid; as the tumultuous rill that sinks at last into still waters. David's song on the death of Saul and Jonathan, and the forty-second Psalm, are fine examples of this. We have too the Idyl, which gently elevates the common things of life into poetic associations, and flows on in an easy, uniform style, without prescribed direction or necessary close. 'Tis the brook in the meadow; come to its brink anywhere, and you see it all. A model of this form of the lyric may be seen in the 107th Psalm. Then there are mixed lyrics, which take name from their subjects; as Pastorals, Nuptial songs, Hymns, Jubilee songs, and Acrostics, of varied spirit and object; of which abundant examples might be adduced from the Bible. But thus to systematize the sacred lyrics, and to comment upon each kind in order, were to write a volume. Our object now is to enter the subject of the lyrical poetry of the Bible as one enters a garden, to see its various productions of beauty just as they grow in their native soil. The flower, indeed, may be studied in a herbarium; but to enjoy it, one must see it alive, stalk and all. Where springs an ode, or an elegy, or idyl, or pas-

toral, there we may pause a moment to regard its beauties ; but in our course we shall wind through the natural openings in this garden of the Lord, and come upon these things as we may. In other words, we shall be guided by the interest of historic associations.

The Song of Moses at the Red Sea is the first divine song on record ; and it is, of all others, the most imposing. As to its scholarship, it is the production of one learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians—its spirit was breathed of God. Yet, for its utterances of joy and triumph ; for its heroic courage, and that sweet faith which takes the outstretched hand of God, to begin with gladness a march into the terrible wilderness ; for its free-born soul, and sublime antiphonies of thought, and passion, there was such preparation, through the providence of God, as never before or since stirred within the hearts of a people “the feeling infinite.” Its key-note is a holy, religious heroism ; and we must rise to an elevated devotional feeling before we can glide in unison through its changes. Imagination must bring before us in their order, those terrible plagues needed to relax the hand of Pharaoh from the throat of the Hebrew. We must share with the poor bond-slaves of Egypt their wonder and awe at the divine power aroused thus for their deliverance ; we must join them in their hurried flight from this land of horrors and death ; feel their despair, when with the sea in front, and their merciless enemies behind, they saw no way of escape ; their joy also, when “the sea stood up like walls,” and the people passed over ; we must stand with Moses, and the awe-struck multitude, whence we behold the waves returning, and Pharaoh and his host swallowed up in the depths of the sea ; the eye must sweep over that great and terrible wilderness, amid whose wastes the stoutest hearts do languish, and see suddenly, as by the enchantment of faith, its parched sands turned to pools of water, and looming above the clear mirage, the hill tops of the promised land, the mount of God, and the “tabernacle which his own hands had prepared.” Then, when every sensibility of the soul is roused from carnal torpor ; when, conscious of a divine relation, our God appears as he is in truth, and the thunders of his power are pealing, and his holy purposes flashing around us, then may we join with Moses and all the children of Israel in singing this song unto the Lord.

SONG OF MOSES.

Moses.—I will sing unto Jehovah, for he hath triumphed gloriously ;
Horses and chariots hath he hurled into the sea.

Cho. of Women.—Sing unto Jehovah, &c.

M.—Be JAH my strength and my song ;
For he hath become my salvation.
He is my God, and I will glorify him ;
My father's God, and I will exalt him.
Jehovah is a hero of war ;
Jehovah is his name.

Pharaoh's chariots and host hath he hurled into the sea,
The choicest of his war chariots are sunk in the Red Sea.

Ch. of Men.—The waves covered them ;
They sank into the depths like stones.

Ch. of W.—Sing unto Jehovah, &c.

M.—Thy right hand, O Jehovah, hast thou exalted in power ;
Thy right hand, O Jehovah, hath dashed in pieces the enemy.
In thine exaltation hast thou destroyed thine opposers,
Thou sentest forth thy wrath—it consumed them like stubble.

Ch. of M.—At the blast of thy nostrils, the waters heaped themselves up ;
The floods stood up like banks.
The waves were congealed in the midst of the sea.

Ch. of W.—Sing unto Jehovah, &c.

M.—The enemy said, I will pursue, overtake, divide the spoil ;
My lust shall be satisfied upon them.
My sword will I draw out,
My hand shall utterly destroy them.

Ch. of M.—Thou didst blow with thy breath, the sea covered them :
They sank as lead into the mighty waters.

Ch. of W.—Sing unto Jehovah, &c.

M.—Who is like unto thee, O Jehovah, among the Gods ?
Who is like unto thee, glorious in holiness ;
Fearful in praises, doing wonders ?

Ch. of M.—Thou stretchedst out thine hand,
The earth swallowed them up.

Ch. of W.—Sing unto Jehovah, &c.

M.—In thy mercy thou didst lead forth the people whom thou hast
redeemed ;

In thy strength thou guidest them to thy holy habitation.

The nations heard thereof and trembled ;

Terror took hold of the dwellers in Philistia ;

The princes of Edom were amazed ;

The heroes of Moab were seized with dread ;

The inhabitants of Canaan melted away.

Let fear and dread fall upon them ;

At the greatness of thy arm let them be motionless as stones.

Ch. of M.—Till the people, O Jehovah, pass through,
Till thy people pass through, whom thou hast redeemed.

Ch. of W.—Sing unto Jehovah, &c.

M.—Thou bringest and plantest them upon thine own mountain,
The place, O Jehovah, which thou hast made for thy habi-
tation.

The sanctuary, O Lord, which thine hands have prepared.

Ch. of M.—Jehovah is king for ever and ever !

Ch. of W.—Sing unto Jehovah, &c.

It will be seen that the Ode, after the introductory verse, divides itself naturally into six passages, through each of which, and on from one to the other, is a progression of sublime thought, rising in the closing passages to a divine foresight. It will be observed also that from each of these passages, with the exception of the last, there flashes a recognition of the awful event by which the Hebrews were delivered and the Egyptians destroyed ; and that immediately upon this, there follows a concise description of the scene. It is recorded that Miriam and all the women, coming out “ with timbrels and dances, answered them ; ” and that too in the

words of the first verse of the song itself. It is incredible that the mass of the people, amid all the confusion of the first entrance upon the wilderness, were taught to repeat its magnificent passages *verbatim*, and rise with Moses into its sublime conceptions of the character and purposes of God. Yet did the whole people, in some manner, have part in the great song. Look now at the arrangement given. First come Moses and the few capable of sustaining the elevated tone and prophetic spirit of the Ode; the people whose minds naturally revolve about one idea (the simple phenomenon of the destruction of Pharaoh), break in with an impressive description of the scene, as often as the song glances at the event; and this massive and solemn chorus of the men is answered exultingly by Miriam and all the women. The arrangement lies upon the very face of the Ode, and nowhere is there a national song combining so many elements of sublimity, with such fine adaptation of structure, to meet the wants of an impassioned people at a national jubilee.

An interesting field of inquiry is opened to us by the artistic structure and accompaniments of this Ode. We have before us, in the first divine song, a composition unrivalled for sublimity, and matchless in its beauty of form. We may call it a polished composition, as though it were slowly worked down to symmetry and smoothness; but we may safely say, that it could spring from none other than a mind instructed and self-disciplined in the laws of poetic beauty. We have before us a vast assembly ready upon sudden call, to celebrate the praises of their God in the chant; and with them a responsive chorus of women with timbrels and dances. These people have just escaped out of the land of Egypt, a land at this time first in civilization, learning, and the fine arts. Their leader, and the author of the triumphal ode, is learned in all the wisdom of Egypt; and Miriam, his sister, leader of the female chorus and dance, was with him educated in the court of Pharaoh. It is written that the people "spoiled the Egyptians." Did these leaders bring out no spoil from the schools of Egypt; no ceremony from its temples; no custom of beauty from its court? From the Egyptians the people had learned the arts, and taken the ornaments requisite to the building of the tabernacle; from the Egyptians they had learned to worship the works of their own hands, as verified in the event of their falling back *en masse* to the worship of the golden calf, in imitation of the Egyptian worship of Apis; and from them they had also taken whatever musical instruments were produced at this festival of triumph. Doubtless, then, from the Egyptians they had derived their preparation for this most orderly and beautiful celebration of the praises of their God in responsive song, with chorus and with timbrels and dances. This consideration is important for the subject. It follows of course that in order to appreciate the relation of music and song to the education and government of the He-

brews, and the designs of Moses in assigning them the place which he did in his institutes, and under the authority of the Levites, we should understand the place assigned them in that system of national education, conducted for centuries previous to the Exode, by the Egyptian priesthood. An investigation of this point will lead one to many other ideas of much importance to the interpreter of the Old Testament. But our limits forbid the discussion of the subject here.¹

In the light thrown upon the whole subject of Mosaic government from such an investigation, the fact that Moses instituted an order of men whose office it was to instruct the people in the praises of Jehovah, becomes highly significant. In this connexion, we attach importance to another fact; that all along the march through the wilderness, we hear snatches of songs celebrating events of popular interest, and to the praise of Jehovah. The record tells us that these songs were written in full in "the book of Jehovah's wars." It is conjectured by some that this book originated with Moses on the occasion of a victory over the Amalekites, when Jehovah commanded him to "write it for a memorial in a book, and rehearse it in the ears of Joshua." At the same time Jehovah said, "I will blot out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven." Upon this, Moses erected an altar there, and called it "Jehovah is my banner," and said:

The hand is upon the banner!

War to Jehovah against Amalek from generation to generation.

Whether this obscure passage was the beginning of a poetical record of the victory, and of the purpose of Jehovah just announced, and whether the book in which it was written was the veritable "book of Jehovah's wars," must be left entirely to conjecture. But in respect to the general character of that military history, we cannot be in doubt, if we rest our judgment upon the quotations from it.

The first quotation² brings the book before us as authority in a boundary question. The historian wishes to establish the fact that Moab was bounded by the river Arnon, and quotes this book as speaking of

Vaheb in Suphar, and the brooks of Arnon;
And the stream of the brooks,
Which winds toward the dwelling of Ar,
And presses upon the borders of Moab.

¹ See Dr. Burney's work on the History of Music. Wilkinson on Egyptian Customs, chapter—*Music*. Also the plates of the great work on Egypt, published under Napoleon.

² Num. 21: 14.

Thus it appears that the sober history of this book was written in poetry. The next quotation¹ is from a song upon the occasion of the gift of water at Beer :

Spring up, O well !
Sing ye unto it !
The princes digged the well,
The nobles hollowed it out with sceptres and staves.

This was probably only the beginning of the song, it being quoted to designate a place, as if the historian had said—This is the place where the song was composed :

Spring up, O well !
Sing ye unto it !

Another quotation² furnishes us with a song of triumph upon the victory over Sihon, king of the Amorites. The victory was the more notable from the fact that Sihon was just then in the flush of triumph over the Moabites ; a circumstance of which the Hebrew bard has availed himself with great effect :

Come into Heshbon ;
Let the city of Sihon be built and strengthened.
A fire went out from Heshbon,
A flame from the city of Sihon.
It consumed Ar of the Moabites,
The inhabitants of the heights of Arnon.
Woe unto thee, Moab !
Thou art undone, people of Camos !
Thy sons hath he given as slaves,
Thy daughters as prisoners,
To Sihon, king of the Amorites.
But we have shot at them.
Heshbon is lost as far as Dibon ;
We have laid waste unto Noppah ;
We have burned even to Medeba.

This probably was but part of the song ; such being sufficient for the purpose of the historian.

Thus from this "book of Jehovah's wars," we have three poetical quotations ; embracing history, jubilee song, and fiery ode. As far as this testimony goes, and we have no other, it was a book of heroic poetry ; and remembering that Moses had set apart an order of men to instruct the people in the praises of Jehovah, we may reasonably conclude that it was a work approved, if not compiled by him, and designed to follow up the impressions of the great song at the Red Sea, and to foster the courage of the Israelitish army. In many respects, the age was barbarous ; but it was the heroic age of the Hebrews ; and for this very reason the best age of their poetry. The brethren of Homer were then moving through the tribes. The reverence in which the bard was held, is

¹ Num. 21 : 17.

² Num. 21 : 27.

strikingly manifest in the conduct of Barak towards the prophet Balaam. He had called him "from the mountains of the east," "Come, curse me Israel." But Balaam, obedient to the angel of the Lord, spake only what the Lord put into his mouth, and blessed Israel four times. In vain did Barak remonstrate; in vain seek to elicit curses by changing the stand-point of the prophet. From the top of the rocks, from Pisgah, and from Peor, it was the same; Balaam would bless only, and not curse; nor could the house of Barak, full of gold and silver, tempt him to go beyond the commandment of God, or say anything of himself. And yet this ruthless soldier, resisted and confounded in the presence of all his captains, suffered Balaam to depart home in peace. A mere prosaic warning, though accompanied with "thus saith the Lord," would not have tamed such a man in the hour of vengeance. But when the truth came to him in the elevated language of poetry, a language which to his imagination bespoke the messenger of the gods, his soul was hushed within him. He dared not harm the Bard! In the same way, in part, were the stiff-necked and sensuous Israelites subdued to the rule of righteousness under the institutes of Moses. The poet held the hearts of the people in awe of Jehovah, and made them dare anything in his awful name. The style of Balaam's prophecies speaks highly for the poetry common to the age. We have no reason for supposing that Balaam excelled many other poets of his day; yet, in the opinion of Lowth, his prophecies rank with the finest passages in Job. It is not wonderful that, aided by the sublimity of passing events, poetry should become the natural language of religious instruction; or that the bard should sweep the passions of the people, as the winds do the sea. All people who have had an heroic age, have felt the spell of poetry; but none, like Israel, felt it as a healthful breeze from heaven.

The Hebrew bards were the life of that people; but the power of sacred song came upon them mainly through Moses. He stood before the nation, not as its ruler merely, but as its personator. The nation's soul was in him. Whatever thoughts charged his mind darted through the intellects of all Hebrews; and every throb of his bosom sent its pulsations to their hearts also. The Hebrew not in sympathy with Moses, knew himself for an apostate. No other man ever had such ascendancy among a people; none other, even according to his chances, ever put the impress of his mind so effectually upon the leading characters of his nation. Speaking of Hebrew legislation, we say "the laws of Moses;" and in speaking of Hebrew poetry, we may as well say, the poetry of Moses. His thoughts, imagery, passions, style even, may be traced down through the whole line of Hebrew prophets and bards. Looking particularly at the lyrical poetry of the Bible, from the high places of gladness held by the nation immediately upon the passage of

the Red Sea, we behold the ideas of Moses in his songs, raying forth and tinging the whole hemisphere of Hebrew mind. His odes were the great treasury of imagery for the later poets, and his eventful history their ceaseless theme.

The triumphal ode at the Red Sea was evidently the great model before the mind of Deborah and the author of the 68th Psalm; and a careful examination of it will reveal the substance of a vast many psalms. Agreeably to what we have said respecting the ode as distinguished from other forms of lyric poetry, let us mark the progress of thought in this ode of Moses. It commences with that ever-appropriate and beautiful self-excitation,

I will sing unto Jehovah;

words of the same force here, as "awake, my soul," or

"Begin, my soul, the solemn lay."

It then takes up an order of metaphors and comparisons that bear the heart steadily forward towards God.

First, Jehovah is his strength, his song, and his salvation. He was the same to his fathers, and filial reverence shall prolong his holy praise. Jehovah is also the great hero of battles: that is, amid the raging of his enemies and the shock of armies, Jehovah comes to his people in displays of power that utterly confound the mighty. His arm is uplifted in majesty, and his opposers are dashed in pieces. He breathes upon the sea, and it rises to overwhelm them. There is none like him among the gods of the nations; their boasted wonders are contemptible beside the mighty acts of Jehovah.

But while his outstretched arm stiffens the nations with terror like stones, he offers a gentle guiding hand to his chosen people, and leads them through the midst of their foes up to the tabernacle wherein he dwells among men—to the sanctuary which his own hands have prepared, where all divine blessings await those who love him and keep his commandments. Here the heart finds rest; we now behold our God in the aspect most endearing to a pious soul. His ancient care of our fathers, and those dreadful manifestations of his power upon his enemies, prepare us to appreciate his goodness to us in his holy courts. It is goodness from everlasting, goodness armed with power to give the righteous security for ever.

Any one familiar with the book of Psalms will see at once that these are the conceptions of God which most abound there, and that they are reproduced in very much the same words.

So perfectly did this great ode of Moses possess the hearts of the pious Hebrews, that it became enshrined amid their most splendid anticipations of future glory. The Apostle John warrants us in believing that Moses looked through its imagery into the spiritual world, and saw a mightier deliverance for the people of God,

than from foes of flesh, and the waves of the Red Sea ; a gentle guiding hand for the trembling soul, and a temple of God eternal in the heavens. The echoes of that song roll on from age to age over the battle field of the church militant, to be caught at last by the high places of the redeemed, and reverberated over the celestial city. Standing at heaven's gate, John hears the song of Moses and the Lamb ! The first and last songs of redeeming praise in sweet antiphony.

The two great odes composed by Moses near the close of his life, elevate us amid the dread sublimities of Sinai ; and more than any historic description, or even the highest efforts of the pencil, compel our hearts to bow, as did the Hebrews themselves, before the burning Mount. The first of these odes unites the didactic with the lyric ; and its wonderful influence in giving boldness and richness to the whole body of Hebrew poetry, demands for it a careful study in connexion with our subject. We may not, however, quote it in full, but simply point to its peculiarities as a model to the later poets ; the Prophets especially. The introduction is very impressive :

Give ear, O heavens ! and I will speak ;
Hear, O earth ; the words of my mouth.

Familiarity has made such language tame to us ; or rather the grandeur of the conception eludes us in our listless reading of the Bible. Yet where must have stood the outspeaking soul of Moses, to save these words from the charge of boundless extravagance ; that they should be truly apt to his emotions ? Seek him upon some rocky mount in the wilderness, beneath an Arabian sky ; where the vastness and silence of nature move all hearts with the feeling of sublimity ; where the pilgrim host seems lost in emptiness, and where, too, in the faithless passions of the people, the soul of Moses finds a yet more awful solitude ; and then will the truth and soberness of this apostrophe come home to us. How yearned his holy heart towards the pure heavens and the still earth, as witnesses before the Almighty, of his last remonstrance with the apostate Israel !

Living as the prophets generally did, aloof from the passions of the people, it was natural for them to feel near to Moses, and to meditate much upon his words. Hence their style is eminently Mosaic.

Isaiah opens his prophecy with this same apostrophe ;

Hear, O heavens !
Give ear, O earth !

and then proceeds in much the same manner as Moses to rebuke the sins of the people, and to proclaim the goodness and severity of God in connexion. Let any one take the ode in question and

cull out its ornaments, and he will quickly verify what we have stated above; that the Odes of Moses were the great storehouse of imagery for the later poets. Every reader of the prophets is familiar with

The words that distil as dew,
And as the rain upon mown grass;

and with the presentation of God as a rock, a judge, a father; as a God burning with jealousy because of the love of his people for idols; a God terrible in his judgments, then repenting him of his severity, and redoubling the appeals of mercy; as emphatically the avenger of Israel, and who also eats the fat of their sacrifices, and drinks the wine of their offerings.

The appeals to filial reverence in this and the triumphal song at the Red Sea, sound like the familiar exordium of a litany; and the remonstrance with Israel, as with "a people void of understanding," comes to be the established reprimand for apostasy. All recognised as the standard metaphors of the Psalms, the arrows of the Almighty, and his glittering sword; his wrath burning to the abyss, and his face turned away; the inheritance of God in his people, their relation to him as his wayward child; their beauty before him as his vine. All these conceptions, and many other shades of thought which give beauty to the Psalms, occur in the ode before us. There is one passage, however, of exquisite beauty which is nowhere reproduced. There are frequent allusions to the eagle in the Prophets and the Psalms, but Moses alone saw in her treatment of her young when teaching them to fly, an image of God's dealing with Israel in childhood:

He found him in a desert land;
In a waste, howling wilderness,
He encompassed him about, and watched him;
He guarded him as the apple of his eye.
As the eagle stirreth up her nest,
Hovereth over her young,
Spreadeth her wings and taketh them,
And beareth them upon her pinions;
So did Jehovah lead him alone;
There was no strange God with him.

That a whole race of poets so eminently imitative as the Hebrew, should have suffered such a comparison to lie untouched upon the page of Moses, is certainly a marvel; the more so, that it is the only gem of his treasury which they have not appropriated.

The last ode of Moses, his song of blessing, commences with that magnificent description of the descent of Jehovah upon Sinai; apparently more impressive to the Hebrew poets than any other passage in his writings:

Jehovah came from Sinai,
 He arose unto them from Seir ;
 And shone forth from Mount Paran.
 He came with ten thousands of saints ;
 In his right hand fire ; as a law unto them !
 He greatly loveth the tribes,
 All his saints are in thy hands.
 They lie down at thy feet,
 They receive thy commandments.

The song of Deborah commences in the same style :

Jehovah, when thou wentest out from Seir,
 When thou marchest from the land of Edom,
 Then did the earth tremble, and the heavens drop ;
 The clouds also dropped water ;
 Mountains melted before the face of Jehovah,
 Even Sinai, before the face of Jehovah, God of Israel.

The passage is repeated in the beginning of Psalm 68 :

Lord, when thou wentest out before thy people,
 When thou marchest through the wilderness,
 Then did the earth tremble,
 And the heavens drop, before the face of God—
 Even Sinai before the face of God, the God of Israel,
 Thou didst shower down plentiful blessings, O Lord ;
 Thine heritage that fainted, thou didst revive it.
 Thy host established itself therein ;
 In thy goodness, O Lord, thou preparedst it for the wretched.

Finally, see all the rays of this splendid introduction reflected with undiminished glory in the ode of Habakkuk :

God came from Teman,
 The Holy One from Mount Paran.
 His glory covered the heavens,
 The earth was full of his praise.
 His brightness was as the sun ;
 Rays darted from his hands,
 And these were the veil of his majesty !

But the moral grandeur of Moses is not reached in any of these passages. That single line—

In his right hand fire ; a law unto them !

lights up the whole Mosaic economy. In the turn which Habakkuk gives to the objective thought, we have a more brilliant image indeed, and one whose splendor is not surpassed by any in the Bible :

Rays darted from his hands,
 And these were the veil of his Majesty !

Yet, after all, this is but outward glory and brightness, corresponding to Milton's expression, "dark through excess of light." We admire the vision, but it does not impress like the thought of Moses, that the fire of God's right hand blazed into the consciences of men.

The blessings upon the tribes, which form the body of this ode, must have given it peculiar attraction to the people. The predictions of Jacob hung over some of them like portentous clouds. These blessings of Moses, without gainsaying the words of Jacob, greatly encouraged the descendants of the unworthy sons of the Patriarch. The blessing upon Joseph, so ample and beautiful in the prophecy of his father, is here reiterated in much the same language, and dwelt upon as though the soul of Moses lingered with Jacob in his love for this best of sons. As this is the only instance in which the poetry of an earlier age is reflected in the odes of Moses, it may be well to quote the blessing as given by each. It will be perceived that the style of Jacob is preserved in Moses throughout; that some of the lines are given verbatim, and that the prophecy is repeated in exactly the same number of distichs.

JACOB'S BLESSING UPON JOSEPH.

Out of the hand of the Mighty One of Jacob,
From thence, from the shepherd, the rock of Israel,
From the God of thy fathers who helped thee,
From the Almighty, who blessed thee,
Shall come the blessing of heaven above,
The blessing of the deep, which lieth beneath,
The blessing of the breast, and of the womb.
The blessing of thy father exceeds the blessing of the ancient mountains,
The delight and ornament of the ancient hills!
Let it come upon the head of Joseph,
And upon the crown of the consecrated one of his brethren.

MOSES' BLESSING UPON JOSEPH.

Blessed of Jehovah be his land,
With the most precious things of heaven;
With dew, and with the deep which lieth beneath,
And with the most precious products of the sun;
And with the choicest things quickened by the moon,
And with the grandest things of the ancient mountains,
And with the most excellent things of the eternal hills,
And with the richest things of the earth and her fulness.
And let the blessing of him that dwelleth in the thicket,
Come upon the head of Joseph,
Upon the crown of the chosen one of his brethren.

The closing passage of this ode has peculiar interest, as being substantially the last words of Moses. We should approach it through the history of his trials with that fickle and sensuous peo-

ple whom he led out of Egypt. We must see his great soul struggling to express its emotions, under the oppressive conviction that his people could not appreciate their spirituality. How shall he make them sensible of their blessings under Jehovah? By what word shall he rouse them to make their calling and election sure? It was not for such a mind, however, to pass away in disappointment. It emerges at length from all cares, and doubts, and forebodings; and surely never did the sun go down with sweeter radiance after a gloomy and tempestuous day, than did the mind of Moses, gathering about it the promises of God, and shedding in his last looks upon Israel the smiles of faith.

There is none like God, O Jeshurun !
 Who rideth upon the heavens for thy help ;
 And in his majesty upon the clouds.
 A refuge is the eternal God ;
 And underneath, the everlasting arms.
 He cast out the enemy before thee ;
 And said ; destroy them !
 Israel dwelleth safely, and alone ;
 The eye of Jacob is upon a land of corn and wine,
 His heaven also droppeth dew.
 Happy art thou, O Israel ! who is like thee,
 A people blessed of Jehovah ;
 The shield of thy help,
 And the sword of thy greatness !
 Thine enemies shall fawn upon thee,
 And thou shalt trample upon the high places.

Thus indeed close all the odes of Moses. They have all the same purpose (the one great purpose of his government), that of leading the minds of the people to recognise Jehovah as their spiritual king. Thus in his triumphal ode he bears them forward by a series of magnificent images until, their enemies dispersed, he plants them upon God's own mountain, before

The tabernacle which Jehovah hath made for his habitation,
 The sanctuary which his own hands have built ;

and there he bids them sing

Jehovah is king for ever and ever !

In the great ode of warning and reprimand, while he compels them to read with shame and horror the record of their apostasies, and overwhelms them with the terrors of an angry God ; he yet sustains throughout the note of faith, and resolves those dreadful passages at last into this cheerful cadence :

Rejoice, ye tribes, his people !
 For he avengeth the blood of his servants ;
 He renders vengeance to his enemies ;
 And is propitious to his people.

And in this closing ode, where the love which his full heart bore for Israel, overflows in the sure blessings of prophecy, he leaves them as his dying testimony a word which stands against the world :

Happy art thou, O Israel ! who is like thee,
A people blessed of Jehovah !

Can we wonder that the songs of Moses held within their attraction every poetic mind of his nation ? What higher office had poetry after him, than to prolong his strains ? “ Jehovah said unto Moses ; I have made thee a God unto Pharaoh, and Aaron shall be thy prophet.” In the same relation, virtually, did Moses stand to the rulers and bards of Israel. He was a God among them, and the poets prophesied for him. But though wielding the thunders of Sinai, he was eminently a man of peace. The spirit of his songs is that of moral heroism. To Moses belonged not that martial heroism which infused itself into the poetry of the subsequent age ; that zeal for religion which draws the sword and cuts off the right ear of the enemy of our Lord ; but that heroism which endures all things for righteousness’ sake, and stands by Christ when all men forsake him. His was the heroism of Christ indeed, which heals the wound of an enemy, and calmly meets the shock of an opposing world. The laws of Moses are not the fairest exponents of his character ; they were laws for a people to whose reformation the utmost severity was essential. His lyrical strains give us his true spirit ; for in these his personal feelings find expression. These, as we have said, bespeak his spirit, emphatically the spirit of Christ ; nor will the songs of any of the later poets allow us to rank prophet or bard beside him. The circumstances of his death were in accordance with his character ; and exactly as a heart imbued with the spirit of his poetry could wish.

The judgments of God have ever a two-fold aspect. That Moses, after enduring so much with Israel, in the forty years’ wandering in the wilderness, should not be permitted to enter the promised land, by reason of his sin at Meribah, was to that forgetful people, an impressive warning that their apostasies were written in the book of God’s remembrance. But the goodness of the decree towards Moses himself, is yet more impressive than its severity.

What Jehovah did at the Red Sea Moses could celebrate in songs of triumph, for his spiritual eye beheld the justice of God divested of passion. But how could he have sung the slaughter of the Canaanites ? We can conceive of such a massacre being permitted of God, upon the same principle that the extermination of a pestiferous tribe of animals is intrusted, through natural laws, to some other tribe peculiarly fitted for it by their propensities ; but that Jehovah approved those passions of the Israelites which gave them a mind to the work, is incredible. To a spiritual people, such

license could never be granted by a merciful God; and as a spiritual man, Moses was withdrawn ere the passions of his people were let loose.

In this light the death of Moses in the land of his pilgrimage, becomes the most fitting close of his history, and puts the seal of spiritual beauty upon it all. No man knoweth the place of his burial; but were it ours to build his cenotaph, it should be on Pisgah, whence he saw the promised land; and upon it should be inscribed the words of Herder: "We rejoice that those hands which stretched the rod over the Red Sea, which received the Law from Sinai, and which built the sanctuary, were not stained with the blood of the Canaanites, and even in the battle of the Amalekites were raised only in prayer."

The age of the Judges was emphatically an age of violence. The people were forsaken of the moral heroism of Moses; yet did those passing events which awakened martial heroism, favor a lofty and impassioned poetry. In a quotation from the Book of Jasher we find the germ of much splendid imagery in the later poets. It seems that the victory of Joshua over the Amorites at Gibeon, was favored by some remarkable phenomenon in the heavens, and consummated by a terrific hail storm. The event was celebrated by some poet of the time; and the historian, in place, introduces a quotation from the song, wherein the poet makes Joshua, the battle hero, command the sun and moon, as the rear guard of his army.

"Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon!
And thou moon, in the valley of Ajalon!
And the sun stood still,
And the moon stayed,
Until the people were avenged upon their enemies." 1

It is a beautiful characteristic of the Hebrew poetry (to which we shall refer more fully in the close), that it subjects all the powers and forms of nature to the service of God; and ascribes to them the emotions of conscious worshippers. There are no ascriptions of praise to the heavenly orbs in Bible poetry: against such the Hebrew poets were warned by Moses to "take heed,"² lest they should run into idolatry.³ The earliest reference to the sun is moreover the most poetical imaginable. He is God's vicegerent to rule the day; the moon also is the guardian of the night.⁴ The stars are God's host; at one time his choir, as at the laying of the foundations of the earth; when

The morning stars sang together,
And all the sons of God shouted for joy. 5

Again his army, which he marshals upon the sky, numbers, and calls by name.⁶

¹Joshua 10: 12, 13. ²Deut. 4: 19. ³Job 31: 26. ⁴Gen. 1: 16. ⁵Job 38: 7. ⁶Ps. 147: 6.

That these heavenly ministers should be directed of God to succor the armies of Israel, was an idea from earliest time perfectly congenial to Hebrew mind; and such a conception, once embodied in their poetry, would naturally become a favorite one. We may trace this idea all through the poetry of the Bible; and it is interesting to see what beautiful phases it assumes as it shines out through different minds. Thus the poet of Gibeon represents the sun and moon as standing still at the command of Joshua; but they only linger over the battle field as silent witnesses of the fight. In the song of Deborah, we see the stars suddenly seized with military ardor, and rushing into the conflict:

From heaven they fought!
The stars in their courses fought against Sisera!¹

David represents the sun as encamped amid the stars upon the heavenly plain:

In them hath he set a pavilion for the sun;²

and here also we see the sun as a hero in the race.

Habakkuk makes a finer use of the figure than any. He is rehearsing those rumors of Jehovah which had made him afraid; and after describing the descent of God upon Sinai, and his passage through the desert, he thus sets forth the scene at Gibeon:

The sun and moon stood still in their tents;
As light thine arrows flew,
As brightness the glitter of the spear.

What the poet of Gibeon ascribes to the word of Joshua, is here presented as the effect of a grander cause. Jehovah himself comes forth to the conflict, and in awe of him the sun and moon hide themselves in their tents, while his arrows fill the sky.

The song of Deborah demands our attention as the model of its kind, and as embodying the spirit of the age of Judges. The best commentary upon the ode were a good translation; but its length forbids us to introduce it here in full. From the passage already quoted it will be seen that a high moral sublimity may be allowed to the introduction; but the body of the ode is all ablaze with martial passion. When we consider that the army were in the very flush of victory; that the people had come forth from all sides to welcome the returning ones with jubilee shout; and that Deborah and Barak stood before the nation in that hour as did Moses and Miriam at the Red Sea; we can well imagine that this song of Deborah's must have aroused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm the princes, judges, army, and people, to whom she successively appeals. She wheels and charges upon tribe after tribe, with the

¹ Judges 5: 20. ² Ps. 19: 4.

rapidity of flying artillery ; commends the brave ; satirizes the cowardly ; curses the unwilling Meroz, and taunts the conquered foe. The stars rush down beside her into battle ; the river swells and raves, and swallows up her enemies ; again is she in the midst of the fight—on marches her soul against the mighty ; and before her kings and heroes flee ! It was indeed a time for glorifying ; and in the burning patriotism of the ode, we find that element which purifies a corrupt people, and makes them ready for the service of God as their national king. But what shall we say to this commendation of Jael, who so terribly fulfilled the letter of the commandment, in heaping coals of fire upon the head of her enemy by giving him drink ?

Blessed above women be Jael,
The wife of Heber the Kenite ;
Blessed above the dwellers in tents.
He asked water ; she gave him milk ;
She brought him curd in a lordly dish.
She seized with her hand upon the nail,
With her right hand the heavy hammer ;
And she smote Sisera, bruised his head,
Struck and pierced through his temples.
Between her feet he sank, he fell, he lay ;
Between her feet he sank, he fell ;
And where he sank, there fell he, slain.

Having feasted her revenge in the tent of Jael, she passes to the chamber of the mother of the murdered man ; who, unconscious of bereavement, solaces herself with her maidens in the delay of Sisera, with fancy pictures of the triumphal procession of the spoil. For refinement of triumph over a prostrate foe, where is there another strain like this ?—

The mother of Sisera looks from the window,
She calls through the lattice ;
Why are his chariots so long in coming ?
Why loiter the steps of his horses ?
The wise among her noble women answer ;
Yea, she herself answers her own word ;
Will they not find, divide the spoil,
A maiden or two to every man ;
Spoil of variegated garments for Sisera ;
Variegated and embroidered garments
For the neck of every spoil-sharer ?

Then, as if she saw the thunderbolt descend upon the vain dreamer she exclaims :

So perish all thine enemies, O Jehovah !

Were reproof of treachery treason towards the God of battles, that she must thus gloat upon the body of the murdered one ? Were a womanly pity for that bereaved mother, a guilty weakness, that

she must stealthily watch her dandling the bright embroidered garments for her son ; no more to return, alas ! and then as the dreadful tidings reach her, drown her wails in the exulting shout ?—

So perish all thine enemies, O Jehovah !

The spirit of the ode, as contrasted with the odes of Moses, is painfully obvious. Deborah lives again in Joan of Arc, the mother of a nation, but mother of no man. When we behold these unsexed heroes, rushing like angels of destruction over the battle field, with flaming eye, and sword drunk with the blood of enemies ; and then turn to the peaceful attitude of Moses, whose hands in the hour of conflict are uplifted only in prayer ; we feel that the hero of the battle field, even in a holy cause, is less favored of God and less approved indeed, than he who is called away to save his nation by his prayers.

We have said that the ode of Deborah embodies the spirit of the age of Judges. Yet, over those troubled years there floats one song of gladness. How exultingly rises the thanksgiving of Hannah.¹

My heart rejoices in Jehovah ;
Through Jehovah is my horn exalted.
He hath opened my mouth before mine enemies ;
For I rejoice in thy salvation.
There is none holy like Jehovah ;
For there is none beside thee,
And no rock like our God.

Here breathes again the spirit of Moses ; a pure, uplifted, heroic faith, divested of passion, yet glowing with thought and feeling. How many a heart has gone forth to God in this very song consecrated afresh as it reappears in the song of Mary !² The occasion of it was the dedication to God of a child of promise. At the door of the tabernacle stand rapine and lust ; no sacrifice [of acceptable praises invites thither the good ; but within is that consecrated child girded with a linen ephod, and ministering before the Lord. The yearly present of a little coat touchingly reminds us that she whose song had promised peace to Israel, still watches for its coming through God's blessing upon her boy. Darker and darker grow the days of evil. The dissolute priests are cut off in the flower of their youth ; the unfaithful Eli dies under the tidings that the ark of God is taken. The glory has departed from Israel. But in all this God remembers Hannah. Her song of thanksgiving was accepted ; and Samuel her son became the restorer of Israel.

What Solon was to the Athenians, that was Samuel to the Israelites. He found them stupified with fear of the Philistines, and lost to those noble sentiments which, in the first enjoyment of the institutions of Moses in the promised land, marked them as a

¹ 1 Sam. 2.

² Luke 1 : 45.

chosen people. His work was to revive those ancient statutes where they had become a dead letter, and to breathe into them that spirit which, under Moses, made them the salvation of the people. But in this he necessarily revived those delightful festivals, which, above all other institutions, were the means of uniting and elevating the people. These festivals, it is well known, abounded with religious and patriotic songs; for the idea of liberty was the soul of each; and liberty felt, makes all people sing. Indeed, song is the dialect of freedom; the natural language of patriotic sentiment. By what means had Moses first awakened the enthusiasm of his people in the acknowledgment of Jehovah as their king? By his triumphal ode at the Red Sea. And what was his last direction to them, when before his prophetic eye there passed the scenes of their coming apostasies, subjugation, and woe? He wrote a song, and spake it in the ears of Joshua, and bade them learn it, that the song should be a witness for Jehovah against them, and awaken, it might be, some wholesome shame in them when reduced to the worst. Slumbered there no poetic fire in Samuel, son of Hannah? Behold him looking abroad upon his oppressed people from the Hill of God. Around him gather a band of youth called prophets; in their hands are psalteries, and tabrets, and pipes, and harps.¹ This "school of prophets" is a school of bards; their office to sound into the ears of the people, and send home to their consciences the Songs of Moses; to rekindle their expiring patriotism by those heroic odes handed down in the book of Jehovah's wars, the book of Jasher, and by songs composed it may be by Samuel himself, adapted to the existing exigencies of the nation. Such a band of prophets, fresh from the instruction of Samuel, going forth to pervade the land with patriotic song, and to rehearse the wonderful acts of Jehovah in their earlier history, could not fail to rally the people with enthusiasm under the banner of the God of Israel. Saul heard them, to feel, as by the inspiration of God, the dignity and sacredness of his office; the people heard them to revere; for their astonishment that a man like Saul should chant with the prophets, tells us that the popular sentiment admitted only such as were of clean hands and pure hearts, to a station at once so mighty for the elevation of the people, and so liable to abuse. It matters little that the heroic songs of the age of Samuel have not been handed down to us. The songs of Moses and Deborah, models of their kind, embodying all that entered into the religious and martial heroism of the nation, and the songs of the subsequent devotional age, have been preserved to us; and from these we learn all that is of importance respecting the character, history, and ruling influences of that people. We need, however, to appreciate the use of patriotic song under Samuel, in order to feel ourselves borne by an easy

¹ 1 Sam. 10.

and natural transition from the heroic to the devotional age of Hebrew Song.

Loyalty, with the Hebrew, was allegiance to God as their invisible king. They gloried in Jehovah as their lawgiver, ruler, and national defence. He was also "the Lord of Hosts;" "the Hero of Battles;" "the God of Nations." He "whet his glittering sword," and made it "drunk with the blood of the enemies of Israel." In every way the cause of the nation was the cause of God. Such being the popular conceptions of the Most High in the Mosaic age, we readily see how the heroic and martial songs which enlisted the hearts of the people in the celebration of Jehovah as their national king, should prepare them to celebrate his moral attributes, as their judge.

Patriotism is easily modulated into devotion, and in the case of the Hebrews, it was but passing on to realize in their national king, what the spiritual eye might ever have discerned through the terrible acts of his natural power, a spiritual deliverer and Lord. With this preparation for the change came the true devotional poet. Before the suffering Saul there stands a minstrel. He is "ruddy withal, of a beautiful countenance, and fair to look upon." The youngest son of a shepherd, he has been called from his flocks to refresh Saul when the evil spirit was upon him, "for the lad was a cunning player upon the harp." "And when the evil spirit of the Lord was upon Saul, the minstrel took a harp and played with his hand, so Saul was refreshed and made well." But not from Saul alone; from our hearts also has that minstrel dispelled an evil spirit. On how many wretched hearts have his peace notes fallen! How many have they borne from sorrow's depths to heaven's gates in rapt devotion! Their sound hath gone out through all the earth. No bosom so wretched, no heart so dead to spiritual joy, but it shall be refreshed and made well, if, like the afflicted Saul, it cry: "Let David stand before me."

To David, called "the sweet singer of Israel," we owe a body of lyrics which for nearly three thousand years have proved the heart songs of the people of God. Yet did David not come down to us from heaven; his are not angel songs. David arose unto us from the fields of Palestine, and was made rich in soul with human sympathies by reason of peculiar afflictions. This blending of natural instrumentalities with inspiration is always a pleasing discovery to reflecting minds; and is secretly the charm of Bible poetry for all. David's history, therefore, has much to do with his poetry. Standing before Saul, he is already a skilful player upon the harp. His fame had reached the court while he was but a lad tending his father's sheep. Why, it may be asked, could none be found among the pupils of Samuel whose music might refresh the king? Was David himself one of those prophets? Whether this be so or not, matters little in the question of his indebtedness to

the great reformer. Such a body of prophets as appear to us under the administration of Samuel, using poetry and music for the end of national awakening, must have affected more or less directly, every poetical mind in the nation; and when walking abroad in the now quiet valleys of Judea, we find David, the lad so fair to look upon, singing his pastorals, we claim him at once as a sweet wild flower, for the flourishing crown of Samuel. We may allow to David's harp some power of itself upon the frantic monarch, but more, probably, is to be attributed to his songs; for neither the Egyptians, Hebrews, nor Greeks, possessed instruments of much compass, or made any account of music independent of singing or dancing. The same is true of the Orientals of the present day. Doubtless Saul found in David a sympathizing *improvisatore*; and charmed with the lad of beautiful countenance, he was ever refreshed by his performances. Then, too, when David killed Goliath, the first impulse of Saul was that of unbounded admiration, and "he loved him so that he would let him go no more to his father's house." But so soon as David became Saul's rival before the army, then Saul hated him. From that hour the strains which aforetime had soothed, exasperated; and twice did he seek to smite David to the wall with his javelin. Upon this our minstrel fled from the court of Saul, and the evil spirit ruled there unrestrained, until the monarch fell upon Gilboa. From the same period we may date the influence of David upon the poetry of his nation. To the persecutions of this tyrant we owe some of his most touching lyrics, composed as a solace in his exile, and afterwards used in divine worship. These songs are seventeen in all, and lie scattered through the whole Books of Psalms. But before opening that collection of devotional lyrics, for which some "preliminary observations" are required, let us turn to that beautiful elegy in which the fugitive minstrel so nobly renders good for evil to his persecutor.

The song of David on the death of Saul and Jonathan is regarded by Lowth, and by all tasteful scholars after him, as unrivalled among the elegies of any nation. Its passion and sudden changes are in perfect accordance with the workings of the heart in deep affliction. Sorrow knows nothing of logic. It is fitful and all-exacting, delighting in wild fancies (often the more unreasonable seemingly, the more true), and not until allowed the most unrestrained expression will it heed the consolation of sympathy. Thus, although the song commences in a subdued strain:

Beauty of Israel! slain upon the high places!

and though the chorus advances with soothing response;

Chorus. Alas! how are the heroes fallen!

yet instantly all is changed. The dreadful thought that his anguish is the joy of his foes rushes upon him, and he breaks forth:

Tell it not in Gath,
 Publish it not in the streets of Askelon !
 Lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice
 Lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph.

He then vents the bitterness of his heart upon the unfeeling mountains as though they were the cause of his affliction :

Oh you, ye mountains of Gilboa, let no dew,
 No rain upon you, no fields of offering.
 For there the shield of the mighty was cast away,
 The shield of Saul, as of one not anointed with oil.

In the remainder of the song we perceive a constant alternation between grief and admiration for the fallen ones ; and a like alternation between the prolonged elegiac stanza, and the concise outbursts of praise.

From the blood of the slain,
 From the fat of the mighty,
 The bow of Jonathan turned not back,
 The sword of Saul returned not empty.
 Saul and Jonathan were lovely and pleasant in their lives,
 And in their death, they were not separated.
 They were swifter than eagles.
 They were stronger than lions.
 Daughters of Israel ! weep ye for Saul ;
 Who clothed you in beautiful purple,
 And decked your apparel with ornaments of gold.

Chorus. Alas ! fallen are the heroes in the midst of the battle !
 O, Jonathan thou art slain upon the high places !
 I am distressed for thee, my brother Jonathan,
 Sweet wast thou to me,
 Wonderful thy love !
 Stronger than woman's love.

Chorus. Alas ! fallen are the heroes !
And the weapons of war perished !

It is suggested by Köster, in his essay on " The tragic quality of the friendship of David and Jonathan,"¹ that the lines—

Saul and Jonathan, lovely and pleasant in their lives,
 And in death not separated,

may refer to their conduct towards each other, and be thus a vindication of the name of Jonathan from the charge of high treason, of which his father at one time suspected him. Saul was not lovely in his life ; but it may have been, that

Saul and Jonathan *were dear to each other in life ;*

surely, no treason slumbered in that noble heart of Jonathan's.

The song was called the " Song of the Bow," probably from its laudatory notice of the bow of Jonathan. The fact that it was preserved in the Book of Jasher,² confirms the supposition started by the former quotation from that work, that the book, like the

¹ " Selections from the German, by Park & Edwards," p. 80.

² 1 Sam. 1 : 18.

Book of Jehovah's wars, was a compilation of songs available for the elevation and control of popular sentiment.

A consideration of the characteristics of the Book of the Psalms, which may be termed the Hebrew Anthology, and which embodies not only the most extensive, but in some respects the best effusions of the Hebrew muse, would carry us too far from our present limits, and must be considered at another time.

ARTICLE VII.

FOUNDATIONS OF A CHRISTIAN'S CONFIDENCE IN THE GOODNESS AND EQUITY OF THE DIVINE ADMINISTRATION.

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"If the foundations be destroyed, what can the righteous do?"—is an expression, the import of which is not unfrequently realized by the true believer, while passing through the ever varying and often darkened scenes of his earthly pilgrimage. In the imperfection which attaches to this world in its fallen condition, it would be seeking "grapes of thorns, and figs of thistles," to look for, from depraved man, an unfaltering continuance in the exercise of the highest degree of faith in God, and of love to him, and to all his commands and proceedings; for it is the design of the discipline through which the Christian passes during his abode on earth, to lead him to the possession of these graces; and until they are attained, the very necessity of his circumstances compels a perpetual alternation between his hopes and fears, his sorrows and his joys.

Now it is true, that all the promises of God are "yea and amen in Christ Jesus;" and also that those, at least, which contain an assurance of heavenly favor and protection in the present life, and of salvation in the life to come, belong to each individual specifically, of Christ's family on earth, as really as they belong to the church generally; and hence it is also true that Christians should not hesitate to apply them to their condition, as they find them to be applicable. What God has promised, cannot be too strongly confided in, for he always meant to promise just what he has promised; and we cannot honor him more, than by reposing the most implicit reliance in his declarations.¹ And further; it is

¹ Rom. 4 : 19—21.

likewise true, that it is not only the duty, but the privilege of every one thus to confide in these "great and precious promises," who truly sets before him all God's Word as the rule of his faith and life ; taking the precepts and approved examples as his guide, and applying the threatenings to drive him nearer to Christ. No self-deceiver or hypocrite can make such a use of the Bible as this ; and the soul that does thus employ it is entitled to the promises. It is his privilege through Christ, to apply any one of them to his own case, that will suit his circumstances, however sorrowful and afflictive those circumstances may be. He may, with perfect confidence, plead that promise at the throne of Grace, as he would present its own genuine bill to the bank that had issued it ; and he need never fear that the demand will be unanswered. He may in the fullest manner believe that "all things work together for good to them that love God ;" and that consequently they shall so work together for his good : or, when in the midst of the greatest sorrow and affliction, he may with joyful hope call to mind that glorious promise, which, for thousands of years, has cheered successive generations of the children of God, amid all the darkness and distress of their journey through earth's wilderness to their inheritance in heaven :

" Fear thou not, for I am with thee ;
Be not dismayed, for I am thy God.
I will strengthen thee ; yea, I will help thee ;
Yea, I will uphold thee with the right hand of my righteousness."

All this is confessedly true ; and yet the reflecting mind is, notwithstanding, often seriously perplexed, while scanning, or merely noticing the order of events which obtains in this world. This perplexity the pious Psalmist felt, and all experimental Christians (as well as all other reflecting minds) more or less realize. While this perplexity is felt in its full force, its causes, generally, are but vaguely hinted ; lest even the slightest intimation of it should seem to infer a doubt as to the goodness or equity of the Divine Administration. In our present state of temptation and sin, our fears and apprehensions will be often excited ; and doubts will arise which strike at the very foundation of the believer's hopes. Witness the case of Asaph, Ps. 7 : 3, and of Halyburton and Payson ; and of that almost inspired man, John Bunyan. It is more easy to say, that all such apprehensions and doubts should be at once silenced, than it is always to close up the mind against them. Still, a calm consideration of the whole subject, without transcending the proper limits of human investigation, will evince that, in the strange and awful phenomena which we witness in this state of being, there is nothing to justify either the cavils of a sceptical philosophy, professedly founded upon them, or to shake the ground of a Christian's confidence in the perfect goodness of His government, who administers the affairs of this fallen world.

When Aristotle remarked, that “no man alone is a whole man” (by which he means that no one is capable of contemplating a subject in all its aspects), he uttered a sentiment which the writer feels to be preëminently true in his own case. The subject is, however, of transcendent importance at the present time, when by mistaken friends, no less than by secret and open enemies, so many efforts are made to lessen our confidence in the statements of God’s Word. And hoping that the attention of others may be called specifically to a consideration of the same, I shall proceed briefly to enumerate strange proceedings of the Almighty Governor in reference to our world, and which would seem, on a superficial view, to impair our confidence in his goodness, his wisdom or his power; and secondly show, that they furnish no grounds to justify the cavils of infidelity, or to impair our confidence in the God who has revealed himself to mankind in the Bible.

I. In enumerating the difficulties referred to, we shall endeavor to state them in their full strength.

1. Natural disorder and moral evil have obtained an entrance into the universe while under the government of a good, and righteous, and all-powerful God. Was he not bound by a regard to the happiness of his creatures to prevent this?

2. Another singularly mysterious arrangement of God is, his making one sin the corrective or punishment of another. A warrior, for example, is raised up—an Alexander, a Cæsar, or a Napoleon, and with the malevolence of a demon marches over the fairest portions of earth, desolating like the tornado, and utterly regardless of the misery and wretchedness he produces, he burns and destroys its cities, and prostrates its happiest institutions in the dust. Yet God has marked out his track; selected his every victim; and appointed the boundaries which he cannot pass. See a remarkable passage in Is. 10 : 5-19.

Now why should a holy God employ such agents to accomplish his purposes? Or, if the ground be taken that they are not thus employed by him (which would be a preposterous supposition, as multitudes of cases mentioned in Judges, Samuel and Kings, abundantly testify); are we to believe that he has abandoned mankind to the fluctuations of events in which he is not concerned?

3. Another strange phenomenon in a moral government administered by a just and all-powerful being, is, the permission of sinners to live long, though they sin much and enormously; and though, like Paine and Voltaire, they corrupt and lead fatally astray thousands of souls.

4. Another mysterious arrangement is, the sufferings which children and other persons are called to endure for sins of which they personally are entirely innocent. This fact is stated throughout the Bible, and is no less clearly apparent in the volume of Providence.

5. Another mystery of this wonder-working providence, is, vice is often triumphant and virtue depressed. Yet God approves virtue, and detests vice. Still vice prevails.

Does not this, it is asked, impeach either the wisdom, the power, or the goodness of God? Why is it permitted that bad men should not only be tolerated, but even be exalted over the virtuous, and permitted sorely to oppress them in this world? Does not God know? Can he love iniquity, and hate virtue? Is he unable to vindicate the righteous? If not, why sleeps the thunder of his arm? Why not blast the oppressor to perdition, and exalt his virtuous, but down-trodden people? And why, on the contrary, permit the wicked not only to dwell on earth, but to pass life in affluence and ease, and even to grind his devoted followers in the dust, when at a single word he could shiver them to atoms? The perplexity of the Psalmist in view of this difficulty is stated in Ps. 73; and the use made of it by wicked men is also stated in Eccles. 8: 11.

6. Another perplexing difficulty is, parents are often snatched away by death, from the helpless and dependent children.

7. Also, youth die just as they are beginning to be useful. How mysterious the removal of a Spencer, a Martyn, and a Summerfield; while, on the contrary, the vicious and supine are left to flourish.

8. Genius of the highest order is often left to languish; and does not display the thousandth part of its gifts. It fades away unheeded and unknown; disappears, and is forgotten. Gray refers to this, in the exquisite stanza, "Perhaps in this neglected spot is laid."

9. Another perplexity arises from the fact that a small part only of mankind have been converted to God, though the Gospel which designs their conversion has so long been proclaimed. And of those who do profess the Christian faith, how few live in accordance therewith! How much jarring and contension exist between individuals, families, churches and nations, who are called by the name of Christ! The greater part of mankind appear to be no better than they would have been, says the objector, had Jesus never appeared on earth.

10. It is also remarked, that mankind are exceedingly alive to the subject of suffering. God has so constituted us, that the apprehension of being called to endure only a small amount of suffering or pain arouses all our anxieties. If there be but a bare probability that we shall suffer only a small degree of pain or agony, it makes us uncomfortable, if not unhappy. Our sympathies are also excited if we apprehend that our friend or neighbor will be called thus to suffer. God has made this natural to us. How can it be, then, that we look upon future and eternal misery with so much indifference; on the supposition that such a state of retribution exists? We are not alive to it; our fears are scarcely aroused by the

apprehension ; and our sympathy for our impenitent friends is permitted to slumber. Is this reconcilable with the truth of that doctrine ? Has God made us fully alive to all other pain, and sorrow, and agony ; and not to this which is infinitely more important than all the rest ?

11. Another subject calculated to astonish the reflecting mind, is the dreadful and inveterate corruption of the heart even after its renewal and regeneration. Surely the work of God is not imperfectly done, and yet what awful depravity still remains ? How almost unconquerable the attachment to things of time and sense ! What indolence in making advances in holiness ! What hateful and unclean passions rise up, and rage in the heart, or haunt the soul ! What can all this mean ? “If I love, why am I thus ?”

12. It is often said, in general, that the course of events in this world has not been such as we should have expected to transpire under the Divine administration, from the knowledge we possess of the moral character of God. He is a God of order, of wisdom, and of mercy ; yet we discover much disorder and confusion in the affairs of men, and in all sublunary things. We see the creatures of God oppressed with calamity, and environed with misery, sorrow and death :—“born to trouble, as the sparks fly upward.”

These spectres have haunted the souls of men, ever since earth became the abode of sinful beings ; and from the use which Infidelity has made of them, they have often perplexed the minds of the friends of God and of the Bible. Let us then give them a calm consideration. Let us lay hold upon them and bring them to the light of day, and define their outlines ; and we are persuaded it will be found that it is only the obscurity in which they have been suffered, through our timid apprehensions to abide, which has invested them with their terrors. We do not profess to be able to give a solution of problems which have puzzled the mightiest intellects in all ages ; but we are persuaded that it is our duty fairly to meet these difficulties ; and that they may be so met, as to show that they furnish the sceptic no justification of his scepticism ; and afford the sincere Christian no ground whatever, either of apprehension or doubt, in relation to the goodness and equity of the providence of God.

II. The question then arises, *How may we account for these phenomena, in consistency with the acknowledged merciful disposition and goodness of God ?* How are we to retain full confidence in the Divine administration ? In other words, are these occurrences, with all the weight of reason that can possibly be demanded for them, sufficient to shake a believer's confidence in the goodness and promises of his Creator ?

1. In relation to the whole subject, I would remark, that the most of these difficulties, as well as the weightiest of them, press

the unbeliever as severely as they do the Christian. The sceptic, if not an atheist, is as much bound as the believer, to tell how natural and moral evil entered the universe; why so much disorder prevails; why the innocent often suffer for the guilty; why genius is often bestowed, and then passes away without developing a tithe of its treasures, &c. The disciples of Paine and Jefferson, and other infidels who recognised the doctrine of a particular providence, are required, equally with us, to meet these difficulties.

Nor can those who deny a particular providence, obtain the least relief by so doing. They too must account for the seeming disorders in this world. Has God created the world in its present state of wretchedness and misery? Or was it originally created good, and then when it became sinful and wretched did he entirely abandon it? And are the innocent offspring of those who first offended, thus forsaken by their Creator, without the remotest possibility of their obtaining relief? Will the sceptic assert this, and then have the assurance to sneer at Christianity? Let him first reconcile these disorders with his own scheme, before he ventures to pretend that they afford ground of objection against the Bible, unless he would become the object of compassion to all reflecting minds. Nor will Atheism itself—the doctrine that chance or contingency rules the destinies of mankind,—afford its adherents even a momentary relief; for how can contingency be at the head of affairs, when, in relation to the very phenomena referred to, we behold such unvarying uniformity—when we behold mankind without exception miserable, and invariably sinful, and death the invariable portion of all? If chance could give an existence of a century's duration, might it not sometimes at least, by "haphazard," give one of a hundred or a thousand centuries; or of unending duration? It is not the character of contingency to be thus uniform in its operations.

In order to illustrate the power of sceptical philosophy to afford relief to those, who, having rejected the Bible, have fled to scepticism for relief, we shall furnish an instance or two.

David Hume, referring to some of the phenomena above named, says, "I am affrighted and confounded with that forlorn solitude in which I am placed by my philosophy. When I look abroad, I foresee on every side dispute, contradiction, and distraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? I am confounded with these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness."¹

¹ *Treatise on Human Nature*, vol. i., p. 458. Poor Hume! the foregoing presents a true portrait of his state of mind, living and dying. He had rejected the Bible; and the great Achillean argument of Epicurus was too much for him. It is thus stated by Lactantius—*Deus aut vult tollere mala, et non potest; aut potest, et non vult; aut neque vult, neque potest; aut et vult et potest. Si vult, et non potest, imbecillis*

The case of Voltaire furnishes an equally striking instance. In a passage which has been often quoted from his works, he says ; " Who can, without horror, consider the whole world as the empire of destruction ? It abounds with wonders ; it abounds also with victims. It is a vast field of carnage and contagion. Every species is, without pity, pursued, and torn to pieces through the earth, the air and the water. In man, there is more wretchedness than in all other animals put together. He loves life ; and yet he knows he must die. If he enjoys a transient good, he suffers various evils, and is at last devoured by worms. This knowledge is his fatal prerogative : other animals have it not. He spends the transient moments of his existence in diffusing the miseries which he suffers—cutting the throats of his fellow-creatures for pay ; in cheating and being cheated ; in robbing and being robbed ; in serving that he might command ; and in repenting of all he does. The bulk of mankind are nothing more than a crowd of wretches, equally criminal and unfortunate ; and the globe contains rather carcasses than men. I tremble at the review of this dreadful picture, to find that it contains a complaint against Providence itself ; and I wish I never had been born."

Scepticism, therefore, instead of affording its advocates any relief, only enhances the difficulty ; and thus dolefully must the unbeliever contemplate the apparently cheerless prospect which surrounds him. He has wilfully closed the only avenue through which heaven's beams could penetrate his soul ; and he complains of being shrouded in midnight darkness. The believer, as we shall see, can, in a manner entirely the reverse of this, survey the scene. In the very darkness that surrounds his path, he finds cause of gratitude, and increasing reason to love and obey God.

2. Without attempting to take up and explain the preceding summary of difficulties *seriatim*, we shall, in the next place, refer to a few known and admitted principles upon which many of them may be satisfactorily accounted for, without in the least implicating the divine wisdom or goodness. And though we cannot dispel the clouds and thick darkness which are round about the Almighty Governor of the universe, nor can they be fully penetrated by the ken of creatures, yet by the light of revelation we can discern reasons for his marvellous doings sufficient to remove all desponding fears.

(1.) As to " the Gordian knot," as it has been called, of theology and philosophy,—the introduction of moral evil into the universe, it makes no more against Christianity than it does against theism ; and while scepticism, therefore, can furnish no relief

est ; quod in Deum non cadit. Si potest et non vult, invidus ; quod æque alienum a Deo. Si neque vult neque potest, et invidus, et imbecillus est ; ideoque neque Deus. Si et vult, et potest, quod solum Deo convenit ; unde sunt mala ? aut cur illa non tollit ? Vide *Lib. de Tra. Dei, cap. 13.* It is a singular fact that this argument embodies the sum total of what Hume calls " my philosophy."

from the pressing difficulty, its advocates are obliged to confess that the difficulty itself affords no justification of their unbelief, and no ground of impeachment of the claims of Revelation. But with the Bible open we can furnish a reasonable and satisfactory solution. I have no discoveries to announce ; no theories to establish ; and no metaphysical speculations to intrude upon the reader. An appeal to the practical sense of mankind, with the Bible open before us, will make the matter sufficiently plain.

Now it is admitted, and the Bible announces the fact, that man at his creation was endowed with perfect freedom of will. By perfect freedom of will, I mean, not that he was independent of, or above law (which would be grossly absurd, and lead to a denial of the existence of what all allow—laws of nature), nor that God could not control all his mental, as easily as his physical operations (which would be no less absurd); but I mean that while man was wholly dependent upon God for the endowment and continuance of all his powers and faculties; and for rendering them fit and apt for their most natural movements and operations, he was not dependent upon him for his volitions: that is, he could and did act without being impelled or determined thereto efficiently and unavoidably, by a direct act of the Divine will.

It is obviously true, that God can create and uphold in existence a moral agent, whose mental operations shall be no more determined or irresistibly swayed by an act of the Divine will, than they would be were the universe, after having been fashioned and established, left entirely to itself. Nor does the assertion involve any contradiction. It is also equally obvious that all men are conscious of being no more swayed, or irresistibly determined by a Divine influence, in their mental operations or volitions, than in their physical operations. So far is this from being contrary to the Word of God, that it is plain upon every page of it. I suppose it will scarcely be denied, that our first parents were thus created free.

Man being thus free when created, it is clear, that so far as justice and equity are concerned, God was in no sense required, as the moral Governor of the universe, to secure his obedience, any further than law, as a motive, was calculated to influence him. This is too obvious to need illustration. Even the sceptic will not venture to object to it. No one will be so absurd as to say that man was under no law, when created; for if, for the sake of the argument, we yield this, in reference to a revealed moral law; what are termed "laws of nature," and laws of our being, will, by the concession of all men, still remain, and they are sufficient for illustration of the subject.

But before we pursue this point, let us hear the remaining portion of this difficulty. "We admit," says the querist, "that God was not bound by strict justice to prevent the sin and conse-

quent unhappiness of his rational creatures; but was he not required by goodness and compassion, and a primary regard to the welfare of those whom he created?" The shallow sceptic, Bayle, has, with a huge parade of learning and assumed profundity, presented this objection: and he attempts at great length to elucidate it by the supposed case of a woman and her daughter. The woman, from some point of observation, beholds her daughter assailed by a profligate youth, and just on the point of yielding. She can save her by the utterance of a word, and yet suffers her to be overcome. "What," says he, "should we think of such a parent?" And he concludes by attempting to apply the illustration to the case of Adam and Eve, and their heavenly parent.

Now, all this proceeds upon the assumption, that God, in dealing with intelligent and accountable beings, whom he foresaw would fall into sin, was bound by a primary regard to their welfare alone, to prevent it; and this without reference to other orders of intelligences then existing, or thereafter to be called into existence. But the moment we open the Bible, we find that God's proceedings here are designed to influence other worlds no less than our own. The afflictions of Job are thus accounted for; in fact the doctrine is distinctly avowed in Job, chaps. 1 and 2. The same truth is clear from 1 Kings 22: 19—23; and may be inferred from 2 Kings 6: 17, and Psalms 34: 7, and a host of other passages in the Old Testament. It is also clearly asserted in the New Testament; see Eph. 3: 10, and 2: 7 (Greek), 1 Cor. 4: 9, Col. 1: 20. Luke 15: 7, 10; 1 Pet. 1: 12, &c.

But further: Where would this objection of Mr. Bayle lead us? Plainly into blank atheism. The woman referred to would have hindered her daughter from yielding: but God, who could have done the like in the case of Adam, did not; therefore the woman was a kinder and better parent than God! How absurd it is for an atheist to offer such an objection!

But to pursue the argument. It may be said that our reply, so far, only shifts the difficulty; for in the same manner that God may be supposed to be able to prevent the sin of Adam, he could have secured the obedience of all orders of beings through eternity. We grant it, for the sake of the argument; and now let us recur to the foregoing admitted principles, and it will be seen that this objection is without any force.

Man, as we have seen, though endowed with a perfect freedom of will, was yet subject to law. And to prevent cavil and needless objection, we shall restrict ourself in this illustration to those laws, the existence of which all concede—the laws of our being. These laws have penalties annexed to them; for example, if a man persists in abstaining from food he must die. The design of these penalties (for *laws* without a design no man of sense can dream of) is to prevent, or deter *in general* from transgression, and

specifically, to deter the offender from a reiteration of his offence ; and also to deter others by means of the sufferings which the transgressor is called to endure. It would be absurd to say that the design is only to deter the offender from a repetition of the offence ; for how could this be, in the case of one who had starved himself to death ; or leaped over a mighty precipice ; or severed the aorta, the penalty of either of which is loss of life ? It is, therefore, clearly right and proper that wilful transgressors should suffer ; and it is right also that their sufferings should be a means to deter others from transgression, or themselves from a reiteration of the offence. And if this be right, in respect to what are termed "the laws of nature," it is also right in respect to just moral laws.

And now, as respects the query whether God could not have secured the obedience of all his creatures, and so have saved them from suffering—we answer, that undoubtedly he might have done so in any supposed case whatever ; so far as his Almighty power is concerned. He could have stretched forth his hand, and prevented any act of transgression whatever ; and so have prevented all incurring of penalty. "Therefore he ought to have done it," says the objector. But stay ; let us see whither this will lead.

The intelligent creature, as we have seen, must, in the necessity of the case, be subject to laws ; and in the case of mankind this is admitted by all. According to the objection, therefore, God is bound, after he enacts laws, to prevent any and every violation of them. Man has the power to violate the laws under which he is placed, but God is bound to see that he does not thus employ that power. If the Creator requires him to render obedience to any given statute, he must, out of a regard to his welfare, impel him to obey. No law of his being can be violated, for God is determined to prevent it, lest the creature should suffer. Now it would be sheer nonsense to attempt to reconcile such an idea with the admitted fact of man's freedom of will ; for one or the other is necessarily subverted. Either the laws referred to are rendered wholly useless, or liberty exists only in name, and man is but a machine.

Common sense teaches, that a test of obedience should be exacted of all intelligent creatures, before they can be approved, or pass into a state of confirmation ; as the holy angels and the spirits of the redeemed have done. Such a test was exacted of our first parents. God could have secured their obedience ; but other worlds were to be influenced by what was here done ; other orders of intelligent beings were to be called into existence through the ages of eternity, and whose obedience was also to be tested. This test, of course, allows full choice to disobey or obey. For the purpose, therefore, of furnishing an illustration of the consequences of disobedience, God suffers a part of the angelic host to

sin, and our little world also. And this illustration, derived from two orders of beings of different natures, evinces to all worlds and all orders of intelligences throughout eternity, the awful results of the least deviation from the holy requirements of God. The illustration is furnished, too, at the very best time. Had it been longer delayed, who can say that millions of worlds together, while on trial, might not have ventured on the fearful experiment? But by this exhibition of the fearful consequences of sin, the obedience of all worlds is now secured for ever. "Of the *increase* and *peace* of his dominion there now shall be no end."

Further: If, in disregard of the laws of nature and of my being, I thrust my hand into the fire, it is proper that I suffer the penalty of being burnt. If I wantonly sever an artery, it is right that I should be in like manner left to suffer the penalty of death. And it is perfectly consistent with equity, and benevolence, and all the Divine perfections, that I should be left to endure this penalty, in order to deter others from a similar course. No one will deny this. And why, then, is it not equally consistent with the Divine benevolence, that a rational creature, who, upon being subjected to the test of obedience, prefers to transgress, and so to put himself from under the favor and gracious protection of God, should be suffered to endure the consequences, in order to deter others from a similar course? It is as proper in one case as in the other, and such has been the course pursued in relation to the fallen angels, and to mankind. Where, then, is there any ground for impeaching the Divine attributes in this whole procedure? There is not the shadow of such ground.

(2.) But we proceed to the consideration of some of the other difficulties adverted to.

The fact that wicked men are permitted to live long on earth, and every day to add to the catalogue of their iniquities, while the virtuous few are not unfrequently trampled in the dust, is easily and satisfactorily explained by a reference to the Bible, without impeaching either the power, justice, or goodness of God. For, first, it is not his intention to distribute exact justice in this world, or in our present state of being; for he has appointed a day in which he will render to every one according to their deeds; and further, our Savior informs us that the destruction of all sinners now would be prejudicial to the best interests of his kingdom on earth; and that hence they are spared. This is distinctly made known and elucidated in Matt. 13 : 24-30, and 37-43; and then again, God is determined to punish transgression to the utmost; and therefore intends to justify himself in the estimation of all intelligent beings, from the imputation of undue severity, by granting the transgressor full time and opportunity for repentance. And finally, another principle of the Divine government, which is clearly made known in the Bible, is, that God allots to every one

a certain portion of time, in which to prepare for eternity : and hence, until the expiration of that time, he permits the sinner to take his course. These considerations alone (and many others could be easily suggested) abundantly obviate the supposed difficulty ; and evince that this arrangement, so far from leading us to question his goodness and wisdom, is but calculated to lead us to admire them the more.

(3.) In relation to the frequent triumph of vice, and depression of virtue, much the same considerations may be urged.

And further : When real virtue and piety are oppressed by the hand of violence and tyranny, we should remember that this earth, in its present fallen state, is not the appropriate abode of these graces. They are natives of the skies. In this, our present state of being, they are necessarily connected with imperfection and sin : and, as the great Captain of our Salvation was made perfect through sufferings, so God has seen proper to school virtue here in adversity, in order to wear off the contamination of vice, and the appetite for sinful indulgence ; that we may be led duly to appreciate the purity and bliss of the happy abodes reserved for us in heaven. And in such a state of mixed society as is found on earth, the necessary discipline can be better administered than in any other.

Nor is it to be forgotten, that God alone is acquainted with the real characters of men ; and that these characters not unfrequently depend upon thoughts and actions to which none but he is witness. If it be true that in the estimate which we form of ourselves we are often partial, it is also true that in judging of others we also err. We are liable to prejudice, and are perpetually receiving distorted representations concerning them.

(4.) With respect to the singular phenomenon of youth, dying just as they are beginning to be useful ; and of genius of the highest order, languishing and perishing before it has unfolded a thousandth part of its riches ; if it be youth and genius at enmity with God, the solution is easy. Why should such, in all instances, be permitted to spend a long life only in rebelling against heaven, and in perverting the ways of truth ? What incalculable evil had been spared the human race (humanly speaking), had Napoleon, or Voltaire, or Bolingbroke, or Paine, or Byron, died in infancy or childhood—or if their genius had languished in obscurity ? And yet even they have not existed in vain. They serve as beacons to the rest of mankind here, and thus perhaps will serve also to other worlds to all eternity. Our world needed some such illustrations of perverted intellect ; but why should every such instance be suffered fully to develop itself ?

But if the query be made respecting the removal of youth, and the languishing of genius consecrated to the service of God, the solution is, on scriptural principles, equally easy. The difficulty arises from supposing the present state to be the only one in which

talent and genius will have the opportunity to develop, and to be called into useful exercise. But why forget that we now exist only in the lower walk of creation—and in a world which has arrayed itself in hostility to its Creator? Genius consecrated to God, is designed and adapted to move in a more enlarged and exalted sphere; where, without any intermixture of imperfection, it can fully display its transcendent loveliness.

When, therefore, we witness the impressive phenomenon of the removal by death, of a Martyn, a Spencer, or Summerfield, let us bear this in mind. And then, they, though young, have performed what myriads who have lived thrice their years, have failed to accomplish. They have, as faithful servants, finished their work on earth; and now they go to mingle with kindred spirits in the skies; and with them to enter upon the active duties, and more enrapturing employments of a higher state of being: for which they have become speedily qualified by their seraphic zeal and diligence on earth. So, too, when an Edwards, a Cornelius, or an Armstrong depart, with their ripened knowledge and experience, and in the prime of life and usefulness, their work is likewise done. Their heavenly father has employment for these ripened saints in other worlds.

Further: Such a mysterious providence is likewise calculated, and doubtless designed by him who is Head over all things, to lead his followers to a closer and more intimate dependence upon himself. When “a mighty man in Israel has fallen,” we are led the more earnestly to turn our eyes towards Israel’s God; and to the hills, whence alone our help can come. It is also designed to teach the church of God, that the great Head of it can, when he thinks proper, dispense with the assistance or instrumentality of any of his creatures. He thus manifests, to the conviction of all, that though he uses instruments in the accomplishment of his purposes, he does not really need them. He can prepare, and elegantly polish them, so as to be capable of the most important service, and after all dispense with their use. He needs them not, even after they are prepared: and often removes them, to humble the pride and self-complacency of man. And hence we, who survive, are also taught to work diligently while it is day, so as to be ready to give account of our stewardship: for, as all such cases impressively declare, this account may be demanded even while we are engaged in forming and accomplishing the noblest designs to promote the glory of God, and the salvation of our fellow men.

(5.) The only other specific case that I shall here pause to notice, is that of the alarming prevalence of corruption in the heart after regeneration.

In relation to this, however, we are to bear in mind, that while regeneration is a moral change, ascribable to the efficient operation of the Spirit of God, we possess a nature which is, in consequence

of the fall, constitutionally biased to evil. Sinful indulgence is our native element. Hence, while regeneration infers at present only a subjugation of the will to Heaven, and not a destruction of our constitutional propensities, there must be of necessity, a perpetual conflict between nature and grace, so long as things on earth remain as they have been since the fall. This life, as already remarked, is to the good man a state of discipline for heaven; and one method by which God disciplines and prepares his people, is by a trial of their faith: nor can this in any manner be more effectually tried, so as at once to teach us our utter helplessness and consequent need of divine assistance, than by thus permitting our corruptions, to a limited extent, to accompany us through life. Thus we become heartily sick of sin, and long for the hour of our happy deliverance.

The same result is also accomplished by another branch of the discipline which the believer is here called to undergo; and which will of itself, also, explain why he is frequently annoyed by the presentation to his mind, of impure and defiling images, and temptations to sensual indulgence. We are necessitated to "wrestle against wicked spirits;" τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας. Satan, the "Prince" and "God of this world" is our grand enemy; whose master-piece of deception and cunning is, that impression which he has wrought upon the mind of the church and the world, in the present age, that he has little or nothing to do in the affairs of men. He exercises a far more powerful influence over our nature than we are always willing to believe. He stirs up our corruptions; especially when we are endeavoring to "press forward," to "fight the good fight of faith, and lay hold of eternal life." God permits it, in order that we may discover our own weakness; and to make us more earnest in our endeavors to grow in grace. And thus is it that "we must through much tribulation enter the kingdom of God."

Such trials, therefore, are necessary for God's people in this disciplinary state. That moral corruption which attaches to them must be subdued; and not by physical but by moral means. Pride must be abased; passion humbled; and evil habits, formed in the days of our impenitence, and now constituting our besetting sins, must be entirely overcome. The unhallowed love of the world—its pleasures, honors, emoluments, &c., must be removed from the soul, before we can enjoy the happiness of heaven. This explains the reason for many of the losses of God's people; and for many of their sore afflictions. This is why their property is oftentimes taken away; and why beloved companions, or children, are by death torn relentlessly from their arms; for if we permit our heart-strings to entwine around earthly objects, our Father, who is the Husbandman, must cut the tendril, or we should remain creeping along the ground, and never aspire heavenward. Nothing is so

well calculated to promote our ultimate happiness, as these trials of life. The happiest and most salutary attainments of God's people have been acquired in the school of adversity. Thence their souls have often derived their richest blessings. When all other means have failed to wean them from an undue attachment to earth, this discipline has succeeded in arousing them to the conviction that true and permanent happiness is vainly sought on this side of the river of death; and to lead them, as a consequence, to prepare for a mansion in the skies. Here the believer is taught *velle quod vult Deus*, the great secret of being always satisfied with the allotments of Heaven. In this school he is likewise practically taught compassion for his fellow men, while he is trained to fortitude; and forms habits of devotional intercourse with his Father, his Redeemer, and Sanctifier. He is moving on towards a holy and happy state; and must learn to endure the conflict with fortitude, if he would be crowned as conqueror. Here he learns thus to endure it; and being thus taught, he patiently passes through the furnace of affliction, until his soul, being purified and brightened, is at length fitted for the society of heaven.¹

III. It were easy to take up in the same manner each of the remaining specifications of alleged difficulty; but we shall, in the next place, proceed to show that these and other phenomena which may be regarded as unaccountable on the principles just stated, can yet afford no reason for lessening our confidence in the ineffable goodness of the Divine administration.

1. And *first*, we should never permit ourselves to lose sight of the fact, that all the proceedings of God in regard to this world are regulated by the consideration that we are fallen beings; having lost the image in which he created us; and being now permitted by a good God to furnish to other worlds an illustration of the evil results of wilful disobedience.

Every attempt to account for the evils and miseries, and all the apparent disorders of this world, while the depravity of man is denied, must prove worse than futile and abortive. It must produce scepticism; and, eventually, the denial of a God. The *fall of man* alone furnishes the key to the mysterious proceedings of God in relation to the children of men. Our race has lost its primal position in the scale of those orders of holy intelligence which God created to adore and serve him. Hence, in the very necessity of the case, when human nature thus was lowered from its position, in the persons of our first parents, all subsequent par-

¹ The following sweet passage is from an old writer: "Schola crucis est schola justitiae. Discipuli Dei sumus, qui exercet nos, et informat ad amorem justitiae. Arbores Dei sumus, quas ille purgat amputatis stolonibus lascivientibus, ut fructum justitiae feramus, et sic arbores justitiae fiamus. Castigatio quæ Deus utitur in nobis corrigendis est gymnasium in quo nos Deus erudit et instituit ad justitiam. Crux gignit in nobis contemptum et fastidium praesentis vitae." See Polanus *De Consolatione Christiana*.

takers of that nature are lowered also. God did not repeal his command to replenish the earth, because our first parents sinned; and hence their descendants are necessarily involved in the consequences of their guilt; and become inheritors also, of their inordinate and unholy dispositions and desires. Hence sinners live long, oftentimes, lest their posterity, whom God designs perhaps to bless and save, should be cut off. Hence, too, when a holy disposition is kindled within the soul by the Spirit of God, and the man thus favored labors to serve God, he finds the entire current of the world against him. His course is unpopular with a race of selfish and depraved creatures; and hence virtue and piety are depressed, and vice maintains its ascendancy. Hence when God permits (or in the course of his providence raises up) a Tamerlane or a Napoleon to scourge the nations for their sins, there is no need of any Divine influence to quicken him in the work of destruction; the gratification of his own depraved desires and selfishness is all the stimulus he requires.

Hence, too, we can see the necessity and propriety of those chastisements which our Heavenly Father finds it requisite to administer to his people in order to wean them from an undue attachment to this world, and to break the power of their corruptions; of setting before them examples of severity; and of every other species of dealing with them that is calculated to operate as a motive to lead them to prepare for a higher and holier state. For we are on trial here; and beyond this life there is a hell and a heaven—the one to be shunned and the other to be obtained while we are in this state of probation. No chastisement, therefore, can be too severe, which is necessary to arouse us from a dangerous security, and lead us to a timely attention to our best and eternal interests.

2. This leads us to another principle closely associated with the foregoing, which reflects additional light on the whole subject, to wit: the miseries and afflictions of mankind are the natural or penal effects of sin or moral evil.

There seems to be implanted in human nature a consciousness of this truth; and hence arise the terrors of conscience, of which no form of scepticism has any power wholly to relieve the mind. How strikingly is this exemplified in the case of Voltaire, and of Hume, in their last moments; and of almost all infidels and universalists! And what are war, murder, robbery, and all other crimes, but the natural fruits of the depraved passions of the heart—the results of that bias towards evil which human nature received in the fall? Our allotted space is sufficient barely for mere hints; and enlargement here on all the topics suggested is entirely out of the question.

3. Another consideration closely connected with this, is that God is, in this world, exhibiting to us and to other worlds, the true nature of sin, as remarked under a former section. He has

not, as many divines have dreamed, merely suffered man to fall into sin, that he might display to the universe his power, and wisdom, and goodness, in rescuing a portion of the race from the consequences of sin. But as our race has voluntarily and wantonly rebelled, he is permitting sin to develop its results in this once fair and glorious world, that other worlds may have a practical illustration of these results, and that beings yet to be created might for ever have the illustration before them, he suffers those results, in a vast multitude of cases, to go on developing themselves throughout eternity. But that the whole race might not thus for ever perish, he displays his wisdom and power and goodness in providing a scheme of salvation, so transcendently glorious and wonderful, as to command the astonishment of heaven itself, and by which multitudes of our race shall be recovered to holiness.

This consideration will also suggest satisfactory reasons for many of the marvellous doings of the Almighty. How awful must be the nature of sin when even this once glorious world is cursed as a consequence of its entrance! Gen. 3 : 17—19. Rom. 8 : 19—23. The animal creation and all nature partakes of the blight; and even our offspring cannot escape the contagion, but are involved with us in all its evils. Let other worlds witness the dread example, and tremble and obey.

4. Another principle ever to be borne in mind in considering this subject is, it is necessary that the future should be concealed from view in order that the present may be the scene of our duty. Complete information of the designs of God in his proceedings, could not but operate so as to frustrate their accomplishment, so far as human agency is concerned. Many things are strange and incomprehensible to us only from this circumstance: and many mysteries which now envelope us, would, if the future were unveiled, entirely disappear. How mysterious to himself must have appeared the cruel persecution of Joseph by his brethren? Yet, by the good providence of God, it eventuated in their salvation. So, too, his grievous and protracted imprisonment on a groundless charge by the wife of Potiphar. Yet this very occurrence resulted in the salvation of his own nation; and had a most important bearing on the existence of the very people from whom Christ himself was to descend. Who could have comprehended the design of God in permitting the Puritans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to be relentlessly driven from their homes and native land? Time has evinced the design, in peopling a new continent with Christians devoted to his service; by whom the happiest national institutions under heaven have been founded; and from whose toils, and sufferings, and blood, streams of living water should emanate to refresh and bless the universe of man. Such were God's designs, and such the means he selected for their accomplishment. His means were the very best for securing

the design ; but in no instance were they the means which man would have selected for that purpose.

The dark and horrid tragedies of the revolution of '89 appeared at the time awfully mysterious. Why should God permit a people thus impiously to blaspheme his name, proscribe religion, and act the part of incarnate demons ? We now can perceive that it was permitted for the twofold purpose of chastising the nation for its long-continued iniquities ; and also, to convince the thoughtless kingdoms of earth, that a human government could not exist upon principles, the very foundation of which was the denial of a God and the proscription of his ordinances. And these purposes being accomplished, France is rapidly returning from her atheism and infidelity.

The application of this principle to many other events in the government of God which appear dark and incomprehensible, and even to some transpiring at the present time, is sufficiently obvious, and cannot but result in soothing our unfounded apprehensions in relation to them. One man is removed from earth in the midst of a career of usefulness, just in season to avoid the evils and dangers which were about to burst upon him ; and thus, what God did to Lot formerly, he now often does for his people by means of death. Friendships, too, are dissolved when God perceives that their longer continuance would prove injurious. The loss, too, of a beloved and affectionate parent, leaves a family helpless and disconsolate ; but by this very step Providence is preparing it for great and unexpected blessings.

5. It is also to be remembered that while in this world we are in the infancy of our existence ; and our knowledge must of necessity be proportionate to our state and capacity. Paul presents this idea in the beautiful analogy in 1 Cor. 13 : 9—12. "For we know in part, and we prophesy in part ; but when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. (When I was a child I spoke as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child ; but when I became a man I put away childish things.) For now we see through a glass darkly ; but then face to face : now I know in part ; but then shall I know even as also I am known." Now if a little child cannot comprehend or estimate the motives which actuate, and the principles which guide mankind in mature life ; or if it cannot comprehend the principles and complexities of a human government ; or the reasons for any given exercise of power, of clemency, or of severity ; is it singular that we, in the very infancy of our existence, should fail to comprehend the principles of the government of God and his vast designs ?

It is also to be remembered that God's plan of procedure in this world comprehends at once many generations of men ; the former always relating intimately to the latter. When a great event, therefore, connected only with our present state of being, is to be

accomplished, the way must be prepared for it. Sometimes this way is preparing through many generations ; as in the fulfilment of prophecy, and in the accomplishment of many things that might be mentioned. How inadequate, therefore, are we to the task of comprehending the proceedings of a government based upon such principles, and thus comprehensive in its plans ! It would be well to ask ourselves whether many, if not all the seeming difficulties adverted to, do not result from our ignorance and incapacity to comprehend the doings of an infinite mind. Let us for a moment reflect how utterly destitute we are of the knowledge requisite to form any judgment whatever in such matters.

We know nothing of the nature of God, or of the manner of his existence. We can form no conception whatever of his eternity, his omniscience ; or of his being present everywhere and acting everywhere, though still impalpable and invisible as to his essence. As to his works of creation, their nature and essence, we know comparatively nothing ; and we can form no idea as to how the universe was created out of nothing ; or how form and feature was impressed upon the works of nature. We know nothing of the mode of our existence, or of the manner in which spirit operates upon matter. And if we are thus ignorant, shall it be thought singular that we cannot comprehend the designs of the infinite and wonder-working God ?

Our proneness to be deceived in this mere infancy of our existence may also well lead us to suspect the inferences which would induce apprehension and despondency in relation to any of the mysterious proceedings of God. Sin has made fearful havoc of our powers. We are constantly liable to deception. Our very senses deceive us. The sun appears to be a flat plate of burnished silver, about ten or twelve inches in diameter. The moon appears to be as large as the sun ; &c. So too in the moral world. Knavery puts on the appearance of uprightness ; hypocrisy wears the garb of piety ; deceit and evil put on the face of goodness and truth. Our imaginations, our passions and appetites deceive us. We are also deceived in our very education ; and by the authority of men ; and by custom. How carefully then should we abstain from the horrible presumption of calling into question any of the proceedings of the infinite God !

Further : There can be no manner of doubt that we are, in our present state of being, wholly incapable of understanding why God acts as he does ; even if the reasons were declared to us. A little child, though informed ever so many times, would still be unable to comprehend the reasons which might impel the ruler of a mighty empire to adopt a certain course of proceeding ; nor could it at once be made to comprehend all the reasons of its parent for imposing upon it some privation or restraint. Nor can we any more comprehend all his design, when Jehovah judges it proper to visit

us with affliction. The query with our heavenly Parent is not what is most suitable for us in this state alone, but what is best calculated to promote the welfare of our future and unending existence. Every moment of our present life bears a close relation to the life which is to follow. All that we here do, or suffer, bears upon that.

Now if children are improper judges of the method proper to be pursued in their education, for the term only of the present brief and transitory existence, are we competent to judge of the methods proper to be pursued in educating us for an existence never to end? We are even unacquainted with the dangers which are to be guarded against, and which threaten our natural life; and hence we know not what means are requisite to guard us effectually against them; but we are still less acquainted with that life which too is ours, the duration of whose existence must terminate only with eternity. How, then, are we to judge of the means proper to be pursued by our Heavenly Father in order to rescue us from eternal shipwreck on the rocks and quicksands of the ocean of despair! We may rest assured, however, that severe as may be the discipline which his wisdom and goodness may here apportion to us for this purpose, he will be with his faithful servants through it all. Nor shall they be always enveloped in their present darkness and ignorance of the design of God's proceedings towards them: "What they know not how, they shall know hereafter."

But to take still another glimpse at this unbounded prospect, let it be remembered that, as the universe is, in its dimensions, immense beyond our conception, so the scheme of Providence must be vast in proportion. Hence, the government of this world is a great and complicated system. It also, so to speak, includes two worlds at once; having reference not only to our present state of existence, but to that interminable state which is to follow. The present life constitutes but the merest atom of our existence; and hence, we can here discover only the beginnings of things. Like the mite on one of the columns of St. Peter's, we behold but a few fragments of a great whole. We obtain a partial glimpse of the evolution of some of the rougher and outside wheels of the vast machinery, which is rolling on, perfecting the wonderful purposes of the infinite God. The real knowledge which we may here acquire, and that which the pious believer possesses, is amply sufficient for all the exigencies of our present state. "Our province is virtue and religion, life and manners; the science of improving the temper and making the heart better. This is the field assigned us to cultivate."¹ Let us not presume to explore the vast designs of the Almighty; it is not our province: and much more let us never presume to indulge repining thoughts respecting them. They are

¹ Butler, Sermon XV.

unfathomable ; and even in a work of human art we must acquaint ourselves with the object of the whole, before we can possibly form a judgment respecting the appropriateness of its parts.

6. Finally : It may be further remarked, that man is a depraved being ; and that the influence of his depravity in obscuring his intellect is doubtless great. How great, it is impossible to tell.

That man is a depraved being, it were folly to question. His thoughts, words, desires, passions, and life, all prove it. His nature luxuriates in sinful indulgence. Now the effect or influence of this depravity in obscuring the light of Heaven, and in rendering the heart inadequate to appreciate its divine manifestations, and by consequence, in leading us to misjudge and misrepresent the Almighty's proceedings, must be indescribably great. An unholy heart cannot comprehend the designs and doings of a holy God. Unnumbered illustrations of this truth might be easily given ; we have space, however, but for one or two.

Take human depravity in any of its acknowledged manifestations, and look at its effect. In prejudice, for example.¹ Its effect in rendering the mind unable to appreciate moral beauty and excellence, was never more strikingly exemplified than in the merciless treatment which the Son of God received at the hands of men ; and which his sincere followers have ever met with. It is also shown by the opposition with which the principles of the Gospel have ever been obliged to contend. How difficult is it also to persuade men of the virtues of individuals against whom they are prejudiced ! How striking the illustration of this which the case also of Socrates affords ! And how difficult is it for even the best of men to rid themselves entirely of prejudice !

The hardening effects of vice and crime furnish also another illustration. The troubled feelings of the man who has for the first time perpetrated theft, adultery, or murder, bear no resemblance to those of the man who has long been inured to such crimes. Nor does a man thus addicted feel the force of reasoning against such practices, as he does who has never thus violated the principles of honesty or morality. The man who now shudders at the thought of being guilty of crime, has only wantonly to practise it a little, and he can view it not only without horror, but even with indifference and levity.

Now why is this ? It is simply because the practice of vice tends to destroy a sense of its turpitude. The power of moral perception is diminished in the man who habitually perpetrates it. You may reason with him on its enormity ; and it is more than probable that he will not only attempt an extenuation, but even a full justification of his course. But now suppose the contaminating influence removed, and immediately with its removal the power of

¹ See a striking illustration of this in the philosophical Allegory of Lord Bacon, Nov. Org., Lib. i., 42. "Idola Specus," &c.

moral perception returns. The regeneration of even the vilest sinners furnishes both an illustration and confirmation of this truth.

Such being the fact, who can estimate the obscuring effect of that depravity of which we all are the subjects, and which leads us naturally to delight in sinful indulgence ; and which has rendered us entirely selfish in all our aims ? Who can determine how much of the light of heaven is obscured thereby ; or how differently we should view the proceedings of the Almighty, were we relieved entirely from its darkening influence ? It is no wonder, that thus circumstanced, our views and interests and pursuits are circumscribed by the narrow limits of earth's scenes ; that Heaven entreats, and Hell threatens us in vain. It is only when by God's grace we are led to walk by faith and not by sight, that we realize the existence of eternal realities ; and that we feel the force of motives derived from thence.

In such a complex system of government, then, as that of our world, where all the parts refer to each other, and where the seen is often subordinate to the invisible ; how can it be otherwise than that such finite and depraved beings as we are, should often witness events, the design of which we are wholly unable to comprehend ? Let us not esteem it strange that our sin-perverted faculties should be inadequate to the task of comprehending the marvellous doings of Almighty God. In the Universe, at the helm of which Jehovah presides, nothing can come to pass causelessly ; and therefore nothing can come to pass in vain. He has determined the direction and result of every occurrence, and marked out the resting-place of even the minutest atom : "Even the very hairs of your head are all numbered." However disorderly and elastic human affairs may appear to our perverted and distorted vision, the same Being who

"Rides in the whirlwind and directs the storm,"

is there presiding, and will ultimately bring light out of darkness and order out of confusion. His great and ultimate design in all he does is the manifestation of his own glory ; and surely we are not competent to judge what are the best means requisite to accomplish that end.

IV. But it is time to reverse the picture, that we may contemplate its brighter side.

What we have hitherto offered on the subject, goes only to show that the apparent disorders which we witness in this world afford no real ground of objection to the truth that the government of the universe is administered by a Being who is consummately wise and good. The difficulties to which reference has been made, we have shown to be difficulties arising from our incapacity to judge of the proceedings and designs of the Almighty. Now let us take a brief survey of the positive grounds of a believer's confidence in the providence of God.

Nothing is so well calculated to relieve the Christian from those desponding fears and anxieties which not unfrequently beset him here, as a prayerful contemplation of the attributes of God as they are presented in his word. Nothing can frustrate the purposes of him who possesses these attributes, and nothing can come to pass without his knowledge and permission. Let us briefly refer to a few of his attributes.

1. His wisdom. God alone possesses wisdom in perfection. He "only is wise," 1 Tim. 1 : 17. And if this attribute, as applied to the conduct of an intelligent being, denotes the selection of good ends and of the best means for their attainment, how full and striking are the exemplifications of Divine wisdom throughout the universe ! How striking the display of it afforded by the heavens, as unfolded to our view in the revelations of modern astronomy ! The Psalmist frequently appeals to this proof of it. So too the revolution of the seasons ; the vicissitudes of day and night ; the provision made for the wants of men and animals, afford, with ten thousand other things easily enumerated, demonstrations of the perfect wisdom of God. Now this is the Being who is at the helm of the universe. Let us therefore learn humbly to acquiesce in all he does (See Job, chapters 38, 39, 40) ; and to ask ourselves "Who hath known the mind of the Lord, that he may instruct him." 1 Cor. 2 : 16. Let us be admonished to confide in him alone, Is. 31 : 1, 2 ; and to take heed how we contend with him. Job 9 : 3, 4, and 11 : 11. And let the contemplation of this glorious attribute lead us to sincerity in all our services ; and to seek wisdom of him alone to direct us in all the affairs of life, that we may be enabled to make the most of its precious moments ; Jas. 1 : 4—6 ; and also to praise and adore him continually. Rom. 16 : 27, and 11 : 33, 34.

2. His Power or Independence is also equally apparent from reason. He asserts it, too, of himself, Gen. 17 : 1. Now the Being who created all things, and this, too, by the mere fiat of his will ; who governs, and upholds all things ; is plainly able to do all his pleasure. Nothing can occur which can in the least frustrate his purposes. What he has said he will fully perform. See Is. 40 : 15—17, 28. Let undue anxiety, therefore, give place to praise and thanksgiving, as with the Psalmist, Psalm 89 : 10—14, and 150 : 2 ; and let us unite with Paul in his sublime doxology based upon this glorious and delightful truth. Eph. 3 : 20, 21. For, we may well ask, "Who shall harm us, if we be followers of that which is good ?"

3. In regard to His goodness or benevolence, the proof of its existence is also direct and positive. He has formed the human mind in such a manner that it necessarily regards benevolence as a high excellence of character. He has placed within our reach unnumbered sources of enjoyment. He directs us how to proceed

in order to obtain perfect and eternal happiness ; represents sin as odious to himself and ruinous to our best interests ; and requires us to recognise him as infinitely good. None is truly good but God, Matt. 19 : 17, and Psalm 34 : 9. With the full assurance of this, therefore, we may confidently approach him in prayer ; and in this character, it is our duty to render him adoration and praise. Psalm 119 : 68, and 33 : 5, and 145 : 7, 9. This truth should banish all undue anxiety on our part, when called to endure the trials and afflictions of life.

4. The love of God, as exhibited to our world, affords also the truest ground of consolation to the believer. A single illustration of this is all that is necessary. "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him might not perish, but have eternal life." John 3 : 16 ; see also Tit. 3 : 4, 5. Greater love than this it is impossible to conceive of. Such is the love he still bears our guilty race ; and in an especial manner those who have fled to him through Christ. Here then "is firm footing ; here is solid rock ; this can support us." On this is based that overwhelming *argumentum à fortiori* of Paul in Rom. 5 : 6—11 ; see also Rom. 8 : 28—39. One can hardly keep his pen from running rampant on these topics ; but our limits allow us barely to suggest them.

5. Omitting reference to the other attributes, the last that we shall specify is the immutability of God. If he is immutable, he is the same Being still as when he gave his Son for us ; uttered the promises ; and sustained, cheered, and protected his people through all past ages. And that he is immutable, the whole Bible testifies. "I the Lord change not," Mal. 3 : 6. The Father of lights with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning," Jas. 1 : 17, see also Num. 23 : 19, and Heb. 1 : 10—12, with Ps. 102 : 27, 28, and Heb. 6 : 17, 18.

As an illustration of this truth, it is worthy of remark also, that God has implanted within our very souls a disposition to calculate upon the unvarying uniformity of nature. The Psalmist, in Ps. 119 : 89—91, in which he reasons from nature up to nature's God, advances an argument and illustration on this subject, which is very satisfactory, and is well calculated to evince the solidity of the ground on which our faith may rest with the surest confidence in the goodness of God. "For ever, O God, thy word is settled in heaven. Thy faithfulness is unto all generations ; thou hast established the earth, and it abideth. They continue this day according to thy ordinances ; for all are thy servants."

This disposition is manifested in the earliest stages of childhood.¹ The little infant, who has listened to the noise made by the nurse in shaking its rattle, takes it into its own hand, and

¹ Chalmers, with his usual power and felicity, has illustrated this thought in one of his Sermons.

fully expects by shaking it to witness a repetition of the sound. A child who has burnt its hand by reaching at the candle, will carefully avoid a repetition of the act. And after an acquaintance of eighty or a hundred years with the movements of nature, the aged man entertains the same undiminished confidence in their uniformity. So uniform are her operations that we unhesitatingly calculate upon them. All men continue to believe that fire will burn, and ice cool; rivers flow, and the ocean bear ships upon its bosom. And were her operations not thus uniform, what would have been the result? The aged would have died with no more advantage derived from their experience, than the infant of a week old; nor could we, from knowing the past, make any provision for the future. How could the husbandman venture to sow his fields, seeing he had as much reason to expect a harvest of ice and snow as of grain. Such must have been the effect if man could not repose the most implicit confidence in the uniformity and regularity of nature. Hence, perhaps, God allows the performance of miracles but seldom, and at distant intervals; lest he should diminish the confidence which his creatures repose in the uniformity of her operations. "Thou hast established the earth and it abideth. They continue this day according to thine ordinances; for all (of them) are thy servants."

Now if God is thus constant in the operations of nature; if he never disappoints that reasonable expectation herein, which himself hath implanted within us; I ask, will he disappoint the confidence which we repose in his declarations—disappoint us without any inducement for so doing? Will he disappoint those who labor to serve him faithfully; those whom he loves; when he has all nature obedient to his will; and when it is just as easy for him to fulfil his promises, as it could possibly be to break them? Shall we behold all things sure and settled in his works, and yet everything unsettled and indetermined in his revealed will? The very idea is so monstrous that no sane mind could harbor it a moment. For if he adheres to the principles established in creation, much more will he adhere to everything that he has uttered. The grounds of that confidence, therefore, which he has given us in the constancy and uniformity of the operations of nature, and which he never suffers to be disappointed, are even less strong than that which we may exercise in relation to his promises. If he will stand fast to his appointed ordinances in nature, much more will he maintain his own avowed and often repeated declarations.

See here, follower of the Savior, the solidity of that ground on which you may rest your faith and confidence in God, notwithstanding all the mysterious and awful phenomena witnessed here.

Finally; the uncontrollable authority of Jesus Christ furnishes also a delightful ground of assurance. All power is his: com-

pletely and entirely his. Would he then die for his people, and yet fail to adopt all requisite measures to secure their ultimate salvation, and to overcome whatever dangers and difficulties may befall them? He exercises perfect dominion over all creatures, and over all events; and by an Apostle he has assured us that all things work together for the good of them that love God; for them who are the called according to his purpose. Whatever else we cannot understand, this we can understand. Here we have solid ground upon which to rest our hopes; and reason for being joyful even in sorrow. What! would this all-powerful Redeemer permit anything in the dark and mysterious events of this world to shut us out of his love? Never! At his mercy-seat the child of God will find an unfailing source of consolation. It is his hand that administers all our chastisements; and nothing can befall us but by his permission. No mysterious trial or difficulty can meet us without his will. Then there are express declarations on record, that nothing shall tear the lambs of his purchase from the arms of their Divine shepherd. "They shall never perish, and none shall pluck them out of my hands." See also Ps. 23 : 1, and 121 : 3, 4, and Rom. 8 : 31-39. Now his power and authority are such that he can fully accomplish all these declarations.

Seeing then that the power of Jesus Christ is without limits, and his authority uncontrolled, what has his Church to apprehend from anything that can befall it? What has the feeblest of all his flock to fear? The terms *accident*, *fortune*, *luck*, *chance* and *casualty*, are without meaning, as respects our state on earth—or if they have a meaning, it can only be as names for the unknown operations of a superintending Providence. God determines the direction of every event. In his sight, that mass of confusion and disorder, which the chaos of human affairs perpetually presents to our view, is all regularity and order. He is superintending and directing all, and will fulfil all his pleasure.


Where, then, is left any room for undue anxiety, or for immoderate care respecting events that occur or may occur in our earthly course? This anxiety fills the heart with passions which annoy and corrupt it; and tend to alienate our affections from God, and from the higher objects of virtue and religion. We mean not to deny that something depends upon ourselves. The good man, when devising his own way, and carrying out his plans, has his appropriate place in an order of means which Providence employs to bring about its designs, a part of which is his own ultimate happiness. But it still depends upon an unseen hand, whether our projects shall be overturned, or crowned with success. When you have faithfully performed your duty, therefore, "take no thought for the morrow." It is, with all its unfolded events, in the hands of God; and there we may entrust it with confidence and safety.

The most perfect science of human government cannot avoid,

oftentimes, sacrificing individual interest to the general good. In the Divine economy, however, this state of things has no existence. God conducts his vast plans to perfection ; but never is the individual interest of one virtuous being sacrificed to promote that end. The ultimate general good is the ultimate good of every virtuous individual of his innumerable family of intelligent and dependent creatures. This is the perfection of government ; and this perfection exists in the Divine administration. It is precisely the system unfolded to view in the Word of God. Rom. 8 : 38.

There is nothing, therefore, which should be permitted to shake our confidence in the goodness and equity of God's moral government. When we see nations overturning ; tyranny prevailing, and the sacred cause of Poland and liberty trampled in the dust ; or when we see our own freedom tamely yielded by our degenerate rulers into the hands of mobs and their ruffian leaders ; and our blood-bought institutions threatened with subversion by the wily emissaries of foreign despots ;—or, on a smaller scale, when we see infidelity prevailing ; and the church distracted through the unhallowed passions of worldly spirits who have intruded within her sacred enclosure ; or see removed from our midst the most needed and useful of our Savior's followers—shall these things dismay us ? Shall we tremble for the ark of God, or doubt the ultimate triumph of his cause on earth ? Never ! We will confide in Thee, blessed Jesus : assured, that though “ clouds and darkness are round about Thee, righteousness and judgment are the establishment of thy throne.”

Thus sustained and comforted, the child of God can flee to his bosom when anxious, afflicted, or oppressed. Here, the feeblest of the flock will meet an equal welcome with the strongest ; and shall not fail to find hope and comfort. Follower of Jesus, be content there to abide : “ For the mountains shall depart, and the hills be removed ; but my kindness shall not depart from thee ; neither shall the covenant of my peace be removed, saith Jehovah, who hath mercy upon thee.” “ When thou passest through the waters, I will be with thee ; and through the rivers, they shall not overflow thee : when thou walkest through the fire, thou shalt not be burnt, neither shall the flame kindle upon thee. For I am the Lord thy God, the Holy One of Israel, thy Savior.” Is. 54 : 10, and 43 : 2, 3.



ARTICLE VIII.

EXPOSITION OF JOHN II : 4.

Translated from the German of Dr. W. F. BRUNN, by Prof. WM. M. REYNOLDS, Gettysburg, Pa.

CONSIDERABLE difficulty still attaches to those words of our Savior : *Τί μοι καὶ σοί, γύναι ; ὅπω ἔχει ἡ ὥρα μου*, in which he refuses the request indirectly made by Mary in the remark, *οἶνον οὐκ ἔχουσι*. In the following hints we shall endeavor to show, that the granting of Mary's request by our Lord, in the miracle of changing the water into wine, is not contradictory of his previous refusal ; but that between the two moments of refusal and compliance, something intervenes which presents a sufficient motive for our Lord's change of conduct.

In the first place, it may be considered as decided, that Mary, when directing the Savior's attention to the want of wine, desired and expected a miraculous supply from him. Bengel remarks upon the words, *οἶνον οὐκ ἔχουσι*—"She says, I wish you to retire, that the rest of the company may do the same, before their poverty is exposed. Such being Mary's idea, the answer of Jesus is not only not harsh, but full of affection." According to this, our Lord, in the words, *ὅπω ἔχει ἡ ὥρα μου*, would merely say ; "the hour for doing what you suggest, i. e. retiring, is not yet come. But the hour for aiding was come." This explanation does not accord with the phrase *ἡ ὥρα μου* which Bengel himself appears to have felt. It would be singular indeed, for our Lord to express the idea, "I shall remain," by the words, "Mine hour is not yet come." In John 7 : 6, to which an appeal may be made, the phrase, *ὁ καιρὸς ὁ ἐμὸς*, results from the contrast with *ὁ καιρὸς ὁ ὑμετέτερος*, and even here, there is implied in the words, "My time is not yet come," more than the mere refusal to go to Jerusalem ; they at the same time answer the appeal, "Show thyself unto the world." As his time to show himself unto the world was not yet come, so neither was his time to travel publicly to Jerusalem yet come. And further, it does not appear that our Lord's language would lose any of its harshness, by supposing this to be Mary's meaning. The expression, *Τί μοι καὶ σοί, γύναι ;* does not naturally harmonize with the construction which Bengel puts upon it. But, finally, and this would of itself decide the matter, the context is throughout opposed to this explanation. Mary directs the servants to obey the Savior's orders ; she therefore evidently expects some sort of relief from him. But that she was, as Bengel will have it, first brought by our Lord's answer to the idea, that as he would not retire he would perform a miracle, can scarcely be made to appear probable. In the same way does Mary's state of feeling, as made known by her words to the servants, stand opposed to Calvin's view, according to which her words, *οἶνον οὐκ ἔχουσι*, merely exhibit her "anxious sympathy," whilst she neither expected nor re-

quested a miracle, but merely desired "that he would address a pious exhortation to the guests, which would both prevent them becoming weary, and relieve the bridegroom from the shame that he might otherwise feel" [in consequence of the poverty of his entertainment]. Our Lord's answer would be altogether inapplicable, or, at least, very obscure, if this were Mary's meaning. This interpretation has evidently arisen from apprehension of contradicting the express declaration of v. 2: "This beginning of miracles." If Mary were supposed to expect a miracle from the Savior, whilst such an expectation could have been grounded only upon some miracle previously performed. Tholuck is of the opinion that the difficulty can only be met by the assumption, "that Jesus had previously performed miracles in the circle of his family," and that v. 11 refers to the commencement of public miracles; and Olshausen presumes that the Lord must have given his mother some intimation that he was about to display his miraculous powers upon this occasion. How Olshausen arrived at this idea is incomprehensible to us; in fact it would be an extremely forced construction to assume that Jesus had, in anticipation of the approaching want of wine, given Mary to understand that he would supply it in a miraculous manner. It is certainly possible that the Savior had, during his abode at Nazareth, given some proofs of his miraculous powers; and supposing this to have been the case, v. 11 must be understood as Tholuck suggests. But not only do the canonical gospels give us no intimation of such "miracles in the circle of his family," but the only information that they give us of this circle, is that Jesus was "subject unto his parents," and labored with his foster-father at his trade as a carpenter (Luke 2: 51, Mark 6: 3); and this miracle of the humiliation of the Son of God, who submitted to the law, seems rather to lead us to regard the miracle at Cana, as in the strictest sense *τῆν ἀρχὴν τῶν σημείων* (the beginning of miracles). Notwithstanding this, we maintain that it is more difficult to believe that Mary would *not* expect miracles and signs from Jesus, than that she *would*. What? Mary, who had praised the Lord on account of this child, because, in spirit, she saw the deliverer of Israel making his appearance in him; Mary, who kept the words of the shepherds and pondered them in her heart; who had heard Simeon's prophecy; who had treasured in her soul the first words of Jesus of which we are informed, although she did not fully comprehend them; and now looked at the holy and quiet walk of her son in the light of all these prophecies and promises, and beheld him mighty in spirit, and full of wisdom; Mary, who had just seen the Lord go forth from his paternal house, and present himself before the people as a divine teacher; is it possible that this Mary should not have expected the manifestation of her son's glory, and not have believed him possessed of miraculous powers? It might indeed be objected (and Olshausen has this objection in his mind), not in general to Mary's expectation, that Jesus would manifest his glory through miracles, but to her expectation of one in this particular case. This objection is connected with a view of the miracle of changing the water into wine in which we do not participate. It is intimated that the Lord did not regard this occasion as the most suitable for manifesting his glory ("less suitable, though not un-

suitable, says Tholuck), and employed it only out of complaisance towards Mary ("as an affectionate son"). The connexion which this view appears to have with our Lord's answer to Mary's request will be met hereafter. The very doubtful distinction between less suitable and unsuitable is unworthy of him who always did what was *best*, as he did that which he saw his Father do. That the change of water into wine was a less suitable and becoming manifestation of the Lord's glory, than his other miracles, can be asserted only by those who misapprehend the true character of this miracle. Lücke says, "The difficulty is that a very unimportant occasion, a passing emergency in social life, not to say in a revel, which might have been relieved in some other way, serves to the manifestation of his glory. The correspondence of a worthy occasion seems wanting here." In order to remove this supposed singularity, it is not enough, nor is it necessary to refer with Lücke, to the miracle of the piece of money taken from the fish's mouth, nor to our Savior walking upon the sea. Is there not revealed, in the miracle before us, that condescending kindness which is so glorious in our Lord; that love which not only distributes bread to those who would otherwise faint in the wilderness, but goes so far as to grant relief where honor was in danger? Jesus might, to be sure, have said, 'If they have no wine, let them drink water!'—but this he would not do; he would much rather encourage us to regard the fourth petition in his prayer, broad enough to comprehend Luther's long exposition; he would strengthen our confidence to do as the Apostle says, namely—in "all things to make known our requests unto God with prayer and supplication" (Phil. 4 : 6). Nor do we understand why Lücke so decidedly opposes Olshausen's symbolical explanation of the miracle. It is true we also regard it as rather bold to find in this a special contrast with the "Baptist's earnest call to repentance;" but we have no hesitation in assuming, that our Savior in the very outset, wished his kindness and goodwill to men to be displayed by this wonder. And so if there was nothing objectionable in our Lord's performing the miracle, neither was there any impropriety in Mary's expecting it upon so common an occasion. It is another question, whether Mary made her request in a proper frame of mind.

Our Lord's answer : *Τί σοὶ καὶ σοί, γύναι*; compels us to assume that Mary did not make her request in a proper frame of mind. She would have been in such a frame if she had borne in mind, that the Lord's miraculous power, even when displayed in ministering and compassionate love, must still have the manifestation of its glory as its end and aim. For this manifestation it became her quietly to wait, undisturbed by carnal impatience. Now, whether it was, that she lost sight of the divine object of the Savior's miraculous power, lowering it to that which was merely human, and the occasion of her appeal to it; or whether she wished impatiently to hasten the manifestation of her son's glory, which she had long been expecting, she receives from the Lord, who undoubtedly knew her feelings, a decided reproof in the words : *τί σοὶ καὶ σοί, γύναι*; The word *γύναι*, as has frequently been observed, has not indeed the harshness of our word "*woman*," yet it is plain that *μήτηρ* would be entirely foreign to the passage before us, and even *γύναι*

intimates the position which our Lord took towards his mother, whom he did not know after the flesh (2 Cor. 5 : 16). The form of refusal : *τί ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ*—*τί μοι καὶ σοὶ* confines Mary to her proper sphere ; for it was not between her and her son, but between God and his Son, that it was to be determined when and how the Lord would manifest his glory. The words contain a reproof similar to those to Peter : *Ὁὐ φρονεῖς τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων* (Matt. 16 : 23). Thus are the following words closely connected : *οὐπω ἦκε ἡ ὥρα μου*. This is clearly equivalent to—“ The appointed time for manifesting my glory by a miracle (v. 11) is not yet come ; desist, therefore, from your request, for my Father has given me the power of working miracles only for the exhibition of my glory.” It is too far-fetched, to understand by *ἡ ὥρα μου*, the hour of the glorification of the Son by the Father, of entrance into his glory after the suffering of death, and to give Mary’s request this meaning : “ It is now the time for thee to reveal thyself as the Lord and king of Israel.” But if the words of our Lord cannot be taken in any other sense than that which has been given, the question arises, how is it to be explained, that the Lord, as if in the same breath, rejects and fulfils Mary’s request ? It is answered, that Jesus had expressed himself only in reference to *that time* ; when he turned to the servants with the words, “ Fill the water-pots with water,” then it is said, his hour was come ; when Mary presented her request, it had not yet come. Admit this ; yet without it is shown that something transpired between these two moments, whereby the hour came, the declaration cannot be freed from intolerable harshness, and will appear like an evasion. The passage in John 7 : 3, etc., even if the reading in v. 8 should be *οὐκ* rather than the explanatory *οὐπω*, admits of no comparison with that before us, for John removes the seeming contradiction of *οὐκ ἀναβαίνω* with *ἀνέβη* by the additional statement (v. 10), *οὐ φανερώς, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐν κρυπτῷ*, which words refer to the *φανέρωσον* of his brethren, with which the Lord had refused to comply (comp. Lücke in loco).

According to our view, the key for the solution of the difficulty is found in the conduct of Mary. The Lord had denied her request, with the distinct declaration that the appointed time for the manifestation of his glory was not yet come. What does Mary now do ? She says to the servants, “ Whatsoever he saith unto you, do it !” In this conduct we first observe her humility. She willingly submits to the words of the Lord’s reproof ; she no longer proposes to interfere with her counsel or assistance in his work ; she will stand still and let him have his own way. But Mary’s faith is also manifested in those words. She has found something in the Lord’s answer to which her faith adheres ; she believed that the hour which was not yet come, might, yea, would soon come—she is so confident in this belief that she prepares the servants for obedience to him. When the Lord saw her faith, then his hour was come. The faith of the humbled Mary is the connecting link between the rejection and the granting of her request. Her perverted, self-willed state of heart had hindered the manifestation of the Lord’s glory ; her submission and her reliance upon his goodness carried along with them the manifestation of his glory. The his-

tory of the Canaanitish woman presents a striking parallel. Here, as there, we have the humbling, purifying refusal of the Lord; here, too, the same willing humiliation and faith, "that clearly hears a yea, where-sounded simply nay," and, as it were, takes the Lord in his own words [Lowth]; and here, also, we have the Lord's compliance, who suffers himself to be overcome by the violence of faith in his own people. In the history of the nobleman's son also (John 4: 47, etc.), the Lord manifests this willingness to be overcome (*sich überwinden lassen*). Without Mary's faith the Lord's time would not have come then; and it was this very faith, that does not know, but trusts—as LUTHER says—which the Lord would develop in her. It does not make against our explanation, that John (v. 11) says, his disciples believed upon him, whilst the point must rather be the strengthening of Mary's faith, if she is to be made so prominent. That Mary's faith was strengthened by the manifestation of the Savior's glory, is so clearly derived from the narrative, that an express statement to this effect would have been a superfluous appendage; but that a salutary impression was made upon the disciples, is mentioned by John as a part of his own experience, and it would have been a defect if he had not mentioned this, especially upon the occasion of the first miracle that Jesus performed. This is an intimation of the influence exerted upon the disciples by the subsequent displays of Christ's power.

We do not, however, mean to assert that the miracle was performed exclusively or even principally for Mary, when we say that it was occasioned by her faith. The miracle from which flowed the salvation of the whole world, was also received through the medium of Mary's faith. In this way we think that the difficulty involved in the passage which we have been considering may be most simply solved. Instead of the unseemly assumption, that the Lord did anything as the son of Mary, which, as the Son of God, he did not consider proper to do, and instead of the indefinite assertion, that when the Lord performed the miracle, the appointed time for the manifestation of his glory was come, it results from our simple exposition, that the Lord granted to humble faith, what he denied to the fleshly mind.

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3. *History of the Discovery and Settlement of the Valley of the Mississippi, by Spain, France and Great Britain, and the subsequent Occupation, Settlement, and Extension of Civil Government by the United States.* By JOHN W. MONETTE, M.D. 2 vols. Harper & Brothers.

It would argue great want of skill and ability, if, with the exciting incidents, important movements, gallant exploits and rapid progress, of which the Valley of the Mississippi has been the theatre, the author had not produced a work of great and thrilling interest. The world has never before witnessed an experiment of colonization on so grand a scale and with such rapid strides, as the settlement of that valley; and the incidents of enterprise, hardship, courage and success, which make up the details of its history, have a grandeur and magnitude which partake almost of the sublime. The attempt to embody such facts into history deserves well, and cannot fail of being regarded with satisfaction.

The chief value of the present work, however, is as a pains-taking collection of facts. It has but little of the method and philosophy of history; and the author's opinions are often worse than none at all. A historian must rise above the prejudices and partial views of the mere partisan—a task to which there are indications that this author is unequal. Yet there is much lively, and even graphic, description, and a degree of enthusiasm in view of the magnificence of the events he describes, which is kindling. These events are so surpassingly attractive that the reader will easily forget all imperfection of the manner in which they are presented. The typographical appearance of the work is extremely beautiful.

4. *School Grammar of the Latin Language.* By C. G. ZUMPT. Translated by Leonard Schmitz, Ph. D. Corrected and enlarged by CHARLES ANTHON, LL.D. Harper & Brothers.

The lucid method and philosophical arrangement which distinguish Zumpt's larger grammar, decidedly the best grammar of the Latin extant, appear in this work for beginners. The skilful and learned author has taken the true course to develop the principles of the language, and at the same time to adapt them to the pupil's progress. The thoroughness of its exercises, the intelligibility of its rules, and its admirable style, finely adapt it to the purpose for which it is intended.

5. *Select Treatises of Martin Luther, in original German, with Philosophical Notes, and an Essay on German and English Etymology.* By B. SEARS. Mark H. Newman & Co.

The synopsis of words which have a similar etymology in English and German, with which Prof. Sears prefaces his work, is an admirable help to the pupil to a knowledge of this important language, and might be profitably extended further. The idea of selecting the best passages of Luther for the use of students in reading German, is a happy one on all accounts. There is no more idiomatic writer in the whole circle of German literature than Luther; while the earnest feeling and excellent sentiment with which his writings abound, render them useful as exercises. The work consists of the Sermon on Indulgences; an Exposition of the 37th Psalm; the Address to the German Nobility, one of the most stirring and eloquent productions in any language; an address in behalf of Public Schools; an Exposition of John 14: and a fragment. They are all noble effusions of a great soul; and can be commended to those who desire a knowledge of the language, as the very best exercises that can be had.

6. *Amenities of Literature, consisting of Sketches and Characters of English Literature.* By I. D'ISRAELI, D. C. L. 4th edition. Harper & Brothers. 2 vols. 12mo.

In many respects this is the most valuable of all the literary productions of its erudite and curious author. It abounds in acute and learned criticisms upon authors and their works, and brings to light a vast deal of information respecting the early literature of the language. Though not without his conceits, and a passion for oddities which sometimes becomes tedious, D'Israeli evinces a cultivated critical taste, and genuine good sense in his estimate of books. The present work is more than a bundle of criticisms—it seeks to penetrate the philosophy of books, and show the influence of authors and their views upon the age they lived in. It might almost be termed a history of English literature; and yet philosophy is so charmingly intermingled with anecdote and incident, that its lessons are learned unawares.

7. *Harper's New Miscellany of Sterling Literature.*

Two capital works of Schiller's have been added to this excellent series of popular works—the Thirty Years' War, and the Revolt of the Netherlands. The first is a thrilling picture of that terrible period, which succeeded the Reformation in Germany, in the attempt of Rome to regain her lost ascendancy. Schiller's political sympathies moved him to take a just view of the parties in that contest, while the deeds of lofty devotion and patriotism by which the war was signalized, kindled his poet soul with genial enthusiasm. It is seldom that history has to deal with so exciting and pregnant a period, and still less often that her tale finds so brilliant and stirring a narrator.

Of the history of the Revolt of the Rhine, less has been known in this country; but it possesses equal spirit and excellence. It warmly espouses the side of freedom, and depicts, with exquisite taste and spirit, the incidents of the great event it chronicles. The two works are well adapted to be popular in this country, where freedom and religion are both ready to sympathize with the noble sufferers, in each of these wars for truth and right. We think they greatly enhance the value of the series of which they form a part, which, as a series, has no superior in this country.

8. *An Exposition of the Apocalypse.* By DAVID N. LORD. Harper & Brothers. 8vo.

The Apocalypse has been so long the theatre for all the uncouth antics and crude experiments of exposition, that a new claimant is apt to be met with more than a just measure of distrust. No book has been so abused, nor had so much reason to wish to be saved from its friends. Yet exposition has not exhausted itself on the book, and there is abundant room for learning, insight and talent, to display themselves in unfolding its hidden meaning. We are glad to say of this work, that it incurs none of the suspicion which conceit or ignorance justly excite. Though advocating peculiar views, it exhibits undoubted learning, a kind spirit, and great ingenuity and talent. We can speak in high terms of its clear and graceful style, in which respect it is surpassed by scarcely no philological work of our acquaintance.

Mr. Lord is a millennarian, and finds of course, in the prophetic announcements of the Apocalypse, full warrant for the peculiarities of his creed. The personal advent and earthly reign of Jesus Christ at the millennium; the resurrection and enthronement of the saints; and the ushering in of a new dispensation at that time, are prominent parts of his theory. His general view of the outline of prophecy, in other respects, does not greatly differ from the current interpretation of the church—except that he protracts the period of the millennium to three hundred and sixty thousand years. His view of the principles of interpretation, though more literalizing than Newton, Edwards and Scott, are really less so than Prof. Stuart: and his exposition of the law of interpreting symbols is novel and excellent. This brief outline, all that we can make, will give the reader a hint as to what a work, composed with the candor and ability which characterizes this, will probably prove to be.

9. *The Works of the late Rev. Robert Murray McCheyne.* 2 vols. 8vo. Robert Carter.

The character, devoted labors, and early death of Mr. McCheyne, bring him within the cherished circle of such servants of Christ as Martyn, Spencer, Summerfield and Larned. He was a clergyman of the Free Church of Scotland, and though called from the scene of his labors before he had finished his thirtieth year, he won a high reputation as an efficient and acceptable minister of the word, and a godly Christian. The perusal of his life, and of his private papers and correspondence, as here published, justifies the estimate in which he was held. They breathe a spirit of devotion, holy living, and enjoyment in God, which explain the secret of his power in the pulpit, and the sweet influence of his private life. The sermons, as homiletic efforts, are clear, discriminating, and practical—well adapted for impression, and indicate an intimate knowledge of the language and spirit of the Scriptures. His preaching was eminently blessed; revivals were of frequent occurrence under it. We regard Mr. McCheyne as presenting many excellences of life and labor, which are worthy of the study of the ministry, and are particularly valuable to the young. Communion with his devoted and guileless piety, would quicken the heart that has ever felt the power of grace upon it.

10. *The Office and Work of the Holy Spirit.* By JAMES BUCHANAN, D. D. Robert Carter. pp. 520. 12mo.

Dr. Buchanan is the professor of Divinity in the Free Church College, at Edinburgh. The treatise before us is a full and very able discussion of the Spirit's work in regeneration and sanctification; and it is written with a degree of solemnity and earnestness befitting the august theme, and with a precision of statement and cogency of reasoning which indicate the union of a clear head and a sound heart. The views entertained are entirely Scriptural, and the method of setting them forth, though without novelty, is forcible and engaging. One part is devoted to the illustration of the principles of the work by Scriptural instances of conversion, which are ingeniously drawn and applied. The sanctifying agency of the Spirit is dwelt upon with great unction and impressiveness. The perusal of the work by the church as well as by the unconverted, must be adapted to leave a vivid sense of the infinite grace and indispensableness of the Spirit's influences, and to promote an enlightened and tender piety.

11. *The Genius of Scotland; or, Sketches of Scottish Scenery, Literature, and Religion.* By Rev. ROBERT TURNBULL. Robert Carter.

A very pleasant and useful work, which commands admiration for its subject, its information, and its agreeable style. It consists of descriptions of the principal points of Scottish scenery, interwoven with portraits of eminent personages, and sketches of society; all adapted to throw light upon the history and condition of a land to which no Christian, or philanthropist, or scholar, can turn with indifference. The descriptions of character, and criticisms upon authors, strike us as very sensible and acute. Mr. Turnbull possesses a warm admiration of his native land; and it is high praise of his ability as a writer, that he infects the reader with an equal interest. We doubt if so true and vivid a picture of Scotland and her religion and literature can be elsewhere found, in so brief a compass.

12. *The Constitutional History of England, from the Reign of Henry VII. to George II.* By HENRY HALLAM. From the fifth London edition. Harper & Brothers.

The voice of transatlantic criticism in respect to this great work, has been so unanimously and decidedly in its favor, that it appears here with a character already formed. The typographical execution is beautiful—exceeding in fairness and accuracy, the English copy, though costing far less. Without exhibiting the originality and research which gave to Mr. Hallam's previous works their high character, the present is perhaps the most popular and generally useful. The English Constitution is a widely significant term; and has a meaning in relation to the national existence and growth, not unlike that which the same word possesses in relation to the body. It is the expression and embodiment of the social, religious, and political condition of the English people; and its history is nothing else than that of all the great elements of national being and character. The work has, therefore, a wide scope. It generalizes all the great facts, events, and influences of English history for this long period; and the masterly, candid, and judicious style in which this great task is done, has been the praise of foreign critics ever since the work first appeared. Free from religious or political bias—a little too free in respect to the former—possessed of a comprehensive and yet highly analytical mind, a serene temper and cultivated taste, he has portrayed the men and the measures of the troublous epochs of England's history with masterly force, and generally satisfactory results. A friend of popular rights, and of liberty, he has given due justice to the people as well as to their rulers and oppressors; while religion and its influences are usually treated with candor and truth,—with occasional exceptions in reference to the analysis of the Puritan element of the Constitution. Though infinitely more just than any preceding historian to the character of the Puritans, and of Cromwell, it is painfully evident that Mr. Hallam understood neither. His portrait of the Protector is full of glaring inconsistencies, and rests on many an exploded error. But as a whole, it is a work of great and even exciting interest, of splendid scholarship, of trustworthy character, and incalculable worth.

13. *Interpretation of the word "Beasts," in Rev. 4, 5, 6.*

The following just remarks on the interpretation of the word "beasts," in ch. 4, 5, and 6 of the Apocalypse, are from the pen of Rev. Dr. Hutchinson of Warrenford, England, and published in the English Presbyterian Messenger.

The interpretation of this phrase is disgraceful to our theology as it stands at present. It shocks our feelings and does violence to our understanding. How repugnant to all our notions of heaven to meet with beasts in that holy and glorious abode; and to find them harping the praises of the Lamb that sits upon the throne; nay, taking the lead in conducting the sublime services of angels and glorified saints! We wonder that the strange incongruity has never before called forth remark, and strongly demanded censure and revision.

The error lies in the translation, and not in the original. The original word characterizes them properly, and terms them "living creatures." But our translators not knowing what to make of "living creatures," described (as in chap. 4 : 7) as resembling a lion, a calf, or flying eagle, or the face of a man; having each of them six wings, being full of eyes, and employed in praising God, most absurdly denominated them "beasts;" and most unaccountably in the same breath ascribed to them the most honorable place and office in heaven, viz., that of sitting in the midst of the throne, and of conducting the devotions of the glorious assembled company. These "living creatures" were the cherubs of Ezekiel, who possessed life, intelligence, and piety, and who filled a most important office under the Old Testament economy, viz., that of symbolizing the covenant of grace, or the incarnation of the Divine Word, under whose Government all things in heaven and earth are placed: and the word "zoa" should at once have been translated, though not literally, yet according to the sense and spirit of the passage, "cherubim." If they had been so translated, no one would have been offended with the offices and works ascribed to them; because every one knows, or ought to know, that cherubs have no real existence, but are simply visionary and symbolical beings. They were intended to shadow forth the humanity of Christ and its excellences, having the body of a man, and the head of some animal, the most excellent of its kind. They were first made of fire, and set up at the gates of Paradise to shadow forth Christ and the covenant of grace, which he was to ratify and fulfil. Four of them combined made a Cherubim; and two Cherubims with a Divine glory between them made a full symbolical representation. In Isaiah and Ezekiel they are represented as alive, and as taking an active part in the administration of the affairs of that covenant of which they were the visible symbols. So in the Apocalypse we meet with them again, after having fulfilled their typical office, as living *redeemed* creatures (because humanity was redeemed), and actively employed in the praises of God and the Lamb. But let it be distinctly observed, that they had no life, nor intelligence, nor piety, *except in visions*. They were at first constituted of fire; afterwards of gold, silver, or finely polished stone. They were set up in every principal place of Divine worship, and especially in magnificent temples among all nations in early ages, remains of which are to be found in their architectural ruins at the present day. We know for certain that they were set up in the Tabernacle of Moses' erection in the wilderness; and in Solomon's Temple, where God was pleased to give responses to his High Priests. They were also carried about in the ark; and it was this that made the loss of the ark so great a calamity to the Jews; because in losing the ark, they lost the symbol of the covenant of grace, through which God might at any time be consulted, and valuable directions be obtained. The study of the Cherubim is calculated to throw immense light on ancient theology, on the rise and progress of idolatry, and on the equity of God in communicating Gospel knowledge to all mankind. And it is the more worthy of study, because we see that the Cherubim is interwoven with the sublime imagery of this book, which unfolds the obstructions and the triumphs of Gospel truth; here the different cherubs are represented as filled with intense anxiety while the seals are opened, and as exclaiming each in their order, "Come and see;" here also they are exhibited as calling on all nature to join them in celebrating the praises of God and the Lamb for covenant love. They connect ancient and modern ecclesiastical history.

From what has been stated above, say, if much of the beauty and sublimity of the imagery of the Apocalypse be not altogether lost, by the unjustifiable use of the word "beasts" in the aforesaid passages? Say, if the mind of the Holy Spirit be not obscured, if not wholly hidden? Say, if a new and brilliant light would not

flash into the mind by the use of the word cherubs, understanding by that word, the Divinely appointed symbols of the covenant of grace, to which life, intelligence, and piety are ascribed in heavenly visions? Say, if that ugly, uncouth, and unnatural word "beasts" should not be expunged from our translation without delay, as injurious to the beauty and sense of the passages where it occurs, as obscuring the mind of the Holy Spirit, and as disgraceful to our literature, and our theology?

ARTICLE X.

New Publications in Germany.

From the long list of German publications, we select the following as worthy of special notice:

"Das Dogma vom heiligen Abendmahl und seine Geschichte. Von Dr. Augustus Ebrard, ausserord. Professor d. Theol. zu Zurich." 1 vol., large. 8vo. pp. 533. Frankfort.

The design of this work is to facilitate the union of the various evangelical confessions in respect to the Eucharist, by setting forth its true doctrine and history, and its connexion with the cardinal truths and facts of Christianity. How far the author has succeeded in harmonizing the views of Luther and Calvin, may be judged from his own summation of the result of his argument: "Christ is present in the holy Eucharist; but he is present not in the bread and wine, but in us: he unites himself with us. But yet this union is so connected with the participation of the bread and wine, that they become not mere signs, but a pledge and seal; not a mere memorial of Jesus, but a condition of union with him."

"Codex Friderico-Augustanus sive Fragmenta Veteris Testamenti e codice græco omnium qui in Europa supersunt facile antiquissimo. In oriente detexit, in patriam attulit, ad modum codicis edidit Constantinus Tischendorf." 23 pp. Prolegomena; 43 leaves text; fac-simile in lithograph. Professor Tischendorf gives, in the Leipzig Repertory, some account of this ancient MS. which he procured in the East, and to which he ascribes an earlier date than any previously existing in Europe, supposing it to have been written in the fourth century. Few can enjoy the opportunity of examining the MS. from which the text of the Scriptures is formed. This advantage is in a measure extended to a much larger number by accurate fac-similes, like the one above noticed. This MS. derives an additional value from a considerable portion of it having been collated with a copy of the lost Hexapla of Origen, and the variations noted upon it. Professor Tischendorf's journey to the East was made under patronage of the Saxon Government, by whom this work has been issued as a proof that so rare an acquisition to theological, philological, and palæological science is duly prized in Saxony.

"Commentar zur Genesis von Rabbi David Kimchi. Nach einem Manuscripte in der Bibliothèque royale zu Paris." Leipzig, pp. 95. *"Commentar zum Hohenliede von Obadja Sforno."* Königsberg, pp. 24. The above two tracts are in Hebrew, and their publication is evidence that the spirit of Biblical research is extending itself in new directions. There can be no doubt that great light may be thrown upon the Scriptures by the Jewish commentators, and we rejoice at every opportunity afforded the student of consulting their works, instead of taking his knowledge of them second-hand. The name of Kimchi is well known in the department of exegesis and Hebrew philology, as of high repute. The commentary of Sforno on Solomon's Song is reprinted from a rare Venetian edition. He explains the book allegorically, as setting forth the relation subsisting between God and his people.

"Das Evangelium Marcions und das kanonische Evangelium des Lucas. Eine kritische Untersuchung von Dr. Albert Ritschl." Tübingen, 8vo. pp. 318. The design of this work is to controvert the general statement of ecclesiastical historians, that the so-called Gospel of Marcion was a corruption of that of Luke, put forth for the sake of supporting the opinions of the heretic. The author attempts to show, on the other hand, that the Gospel of Marcion constituted the original groundwork from which the present canonical Gospel of Luke has been formed, by interpolations and alterations. There is, we think, little probability that the work, though confessedly written with considerable ability, will effect much towards the setting aside of Luke's Gospel.

"Ulrich von Hutten, der Ritter, der Gelehrte, der Dichter, der Kämpfer für die deutsche Freiheit. Dargestellt von Aug. Bärck." Dresden. pp. 356, 8vo. Hutten was a remarkable man, and performed great services to his country, to science, and to religion, in a most eventful period. "This work presents a true picture of the man and his times," says the Leipzig Repertory: "The brave old hero of words and deeds stands living before the reader's eyes, and speaks for truth and right, for light and liberty, with his own glowing zeal for his father-land, for his own and future times."

"Allgemeine geographische und statistische Verhältnisse in graphischer Darstellung von A. Borchstädt. Mit einem Vorwort von C. Ritter." This work, which consists of 88 sheets of tables, is designed to present pictorially to the eye some of the principal statistics pertaining to geography. The various numbers are represented by rectangulars, the size of which is proportionate to their value. The principle is not new, but there are several very ingenious applications of it. To represent the proportional density of population, a quadrat represents a square (German) mile; this is divided into as many lesser quadrats as there are inhabitants: Thus, the figure representing Europe has 1423 of these divisions, Asia 514, Africa 224, America 74, Australia 12, the whole earth 356. In like manner, the products, revenues, expenditures, and in fact all the leading statistics of the world are geographically represented, in this series of *statistical maps*. Carl Ritter, who is certainly authority on the subject, pronounces this one of the most valuable auxiliaries to the science of Geography which has been presented to the public.

"A Commentary on Paul's Epistle to Philemon, by Dr. Aug. Koch," has just been issued, of the character of which we are unable to speak. De Wette has just published new and enlarged editions of his commentaries upon Mark, Luke, and John. A German translation of Maimonides has just been put forth, executed by Elias Solowickyk. Fr. W. C. Umbreit (one of the editors of the Studien) has put forth an improved edition of his commentary on Isaiah, in one large volume, being one of his series of commentaries on the Old Testament Prophecies. G. Ch. Crusius, the author of the Homeric Lexicon, so ably translated by Prof. H. Smith, has issued a Lexicon of Virgil, with special reference to the Mythological, Geographical, and Proper names, and the explanation of difficult passages.

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JULY, 1847.

ARTICLE I.

REVIEW OF PROF. STUART ON THE DATE OF THE
APOCALYPSE.

By REV. GEO. DUFFIELD, D.D., of Detroit, Mich.

THE confidence with which some learned critics and biblical scholars have undertaken, in all cases, to decide upon the authorship, and even the original date of certain portions of the sacred Scriptures, from internal evidence alone, received a justly merited rebuke in that remarkable work, the "Amber Witch," written expressly to experiment on the extravagant pretensions of those who claimed to exercise such lofty powers of critical intuition. The success of the shrewd piece of irony has overwhelmed them with merited ridicule; and hereafter the biblical student need not be troubled by the professions of their superior skill and discernment, who, from language and style alone, affect to determine all that it is important to know about the author or the date of certain parts of the Scriptures, and paragraphs of the same.

We may now, with renewed proof of the propriety of such a course, adhere to the historical evidence, and require it in all cases to be thoroughly investigated. *A priori* reasonings may be of use, among the wise and learned, for the illustration and confirmation of positions already founded on fact. But *a posteriori* deductions are best suited to the common sense of mankind. External and internal evidence, each possesses its own distinctive and peculiar properties. In all investigations of the authenticity and genuineness of any work, we should be careful not to confound, or even to mingle them, at least until they have been separately examined. It will prevent prejudice, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth,

first to hear the credible witnesses; afterwards it may be proper to attend to the intrinsic evidence; and when both have been separately examined they can be better united.

Neglect of this common-sense principle has led to confusion and error on the part of some who have undertaken to inquire into the inspiration of the Apocalypse. Michaelis, as Woodhouse has remarked, is "an unfair reporter of the external evidence," in favor of its divine authenticity, having allowed his mind to be prejudiced, by an opinion previously formed, with regard to its internal evidence. If an author, from what he considers to have been an exact fulfilment of Apocalyptic prophecies, has been convinced of the divine inspiration of the book, he will be disposed to look with less scrutinizing eye on the external evidence. The internal evidence being accounted sufficient, he will care but little to examine the external. On the other hand, if he has been dissatisfied with all expositions of the Apocalyptic prophecies, and the contradictions and endless variety of sentiment among commentators have obscured or vitiated all internal evidence, and affected him unfavorably towards their inspiration, he will regard with more or less prejudice the external evidence of their authenticity.

These remarks are applicable to the evidence alike of the divine inspiration of the Apocalypse, and of its being the genuine production of the Apostle John; for the argument in support of the former derives much force from the latter. The external evidence, in both cases, is to be gathered from the testimony of ancient writers living at a period near to its publication. This testimony may be either direct and explicit, like any ordinary historical statement, or it may be indirect, furnished in the quotations or allusions found in the writings of those Christian authors in the second century, who received it as divinely inspired. Eusebius¹ has distinctly informed us that the rule he observed in estimating the evidence of the genuineness of scriptural books, was, "their being handed down as catholic writings," writings generally or universally received by orthodox Christians of preceding ages.

As to the inspiration of the Apocalypse, Professor Stuart—whose views with regard to its date we purpose in this article to examine—has no doubt. Yet, we regret to say, there are indications everywhere throughout his work on the Apocalypse, of his having been seriously influenced by the views of German critics on the nature of the inspiration of this sacred oracle. On this subject we think he has exposed himself, by his want of caution, to just censure; yet he has not departed from the well established foundation on which the faith of the church for ages has rested. He has collated, carefully, the evidence that John the Evangelist and Apostle, and not another John, was the penman whom the Spirit God employed to write this wonderful book. Yet, he tells us,

¹ 1. Euseb. Hist., lib. iii., c. 3.

that should recent leading German critics *only* be consulted on this point, the reader would scarcely suppose there is any ground for believing that it is a genuine production. Oeder, Semler, Corrodi, and others, not only questioned the fact, but heaped contempt and reproach upon it. Michaelis and Luther, and others, doubted; and, even in the third century, Dionysius of Alexandria, and in the fourth, Eusebius of Cæsarea, were sceptical in relation to John the Apostle being its author. DeWette, Ewald, F. Lücke, Credner, and others, although they vindicate it from reproachful criticisms as a rhetorical production, nevertheless are convinced, from its peculiarities of style and language, that the writer of the gospel and of the first epistle bearing the name of John, was not the author of the Apocalypse. The internal evidence is turned against the external; and, although Professor Stuart seems to regard it almost a desperate undertaking to defend the claims of the Apocalypse to Apostolic origin, yet, having "been the whole round of examination," he has come back "with the persuasion that the argument from the testimony of the ancient Christian fathers is strongly on the side of the common opinion;" and that "the internal evidence is not of sufficient strength to settle the question against the authorship of the Apostle."

We could wish that, on some other points, Prof. Stuart had exhibited equal logical accuracy in comparing the internal and external evidence. The TIME when the Apocalypse was written, presents an inquiry of vital consequence in any correct view, either of its origin or of its exposition. Prof. S. has magnified the internal evidence, that is, as he understands it, to the subversion of the entire chain of external evidence, or historical testimony, in relation to its commonly assigned date. It is essential to his entire views as to its structure, design, and exposition, to give it an earlier origin. For, inferring from what, according to his exposition of certain passages, he calls its internal evidence, that it was written during the reign of Nero, A. D. 68, he goes to work, most systematically and resolutely, to break up the whole chain of external evidence, or historical testimony, which has dated its origin A. D. 96, during the reign of Domitian. It deserves serious attention, that all this internal evidence is nothing more nor less than his preferred exposition of certain parts of the Apocalypse, sustained, chiefly, by some general remarks, and by results, to which he thinks he has been brought with regard to "the Economy of the Apocalypse considered as a great *moral* Epopee"—"circumstantially" differing from "the Iliad, the Æneid, or the Paradise Lost," as it celebrates "the deeds, not of an Achilles, or of an Æneas, with their associates, but of the King of kings and Lord of lords, with his angels and saints."¹

It is not our object to examine the correctness of his exposition;

¹ Vol. i., pp. 190, 191.

nor of the hermeneutical principles he deems applicable to the Apocalypse. His unprotestant views,—if we may be allowed this expression,—have already been unanswerably exposed, in the last number of the Repository; so that the book still remains a rich magazine, replenished with invincible arguments against the apostate church of Rome, that “Antichrist” or “Vicar of Jesus Christ,” who has usurped his prerogatives, and is doomed to irretrievable perdition, “with the spirit of His mouth” and “the brightness of His appearing.”¹ Some things we had prepared on this subject have been rendered unnecessary by the publication of the article above referred to. An examination of the internal evidence of the date of the Apocalypse, would necessarily lead more or less into an exposition at least of some of its parts; also of its object, economy, and the hermeneutical principles applicable, which would render our article too extended. We confine our attention to the external evidence. What is the character and force of that historical testimony which assigns the date of the Apocalypse? Prof. Stuart relies entirely on the internal evidence, rejecting the external as insufficient and unworthy of respect. Our object is, to vindicate the claim of the latter, and to show, that he has not invalidated the evidence which has commonly assigned the date of its origin to the reign of Domitian.

It may be proper, however, to state Prof. Stuart's general views. In what he calls “the proem” of “the Epopee,” he comprises the three first chapters of the Apocalypse, designed to administer instruction, consolation, and admonition to the Asiatic churches.² In the first part, comprising chapters IV. to XI. inclusive, he supposes the destruction of Jerusalem and the fall of the Jewish persecuting power to be set forth, forming “THE FIRST CATASTROPHE.” In the second part, comprising chapters XII. to XIX., he thinks is set forth, “Christianity struggling with the tremendous Roman power which governed the world—yea, carrying on a death-struggle for a long time, and with agonies often repeated—until final victory lights upon the standard of the cross”—which forms the SECOND GRAND CATASTROPHE, introducing the church into a long season of peace and prosperity diffusing themselves “over a great portion of the earth.”³ A sketch of this diffusion and prosperity, Chap. 20: 4—6, forms a brief *proem* to the THIRD AND FINAL CATASTROPHE, when “a new Heaven and a new earth appear, the new Jerusalem comes forth in all the splendor of the upper world, a dwelling-place fit for the habitation of God and his saints,” and “the Epopee” has terminated its “climacteric course.”⁴

The reader will perceive that this sketch depends on certain general views, which the author takes, of the nature, character, and design of prophecy, and likewise of the manner, or *modus operandi*,

¹ 2 Thessalonians 2: 8.

² Com. i., pp. 163 and 180.

³ Com. i., p. 173.

⁴ Com. i., p. 190.

of the Spirit of God, in imparting inspiration to the mind of the apostle John. Much of the matter collected in the first volume is intended to sustain his sentiments on these points. With their claims to our confidence we are not particularly concerned, but take occasion to remark, that we regard some of his positions untenable, his statement and exposition of others inconsistent and contradictory.

Has Professor Stuart any good logical ground for assigning the origin of the Apocalypse to the close of Nero's reign, A. D. 68?

In prosecuting an argument in support of this view, it may rightfully be demanded, that the falsity of the commonly received date should be exposed, and that satisfactory reasons be adduced in favor of the earlier date. Under any circumstances this course would be indispensable, but much more so where a large part of the entire exposition *mole ruit sud*—at once falls, if it be not established.

Archdeacon Woodhouse very justly remarks, that, if the Apocalypse shall appear to have been written and published in the early period of the apostolic age, we may expect to find testimonies concerning it, from those who had been personally instructed by apostles. The apostolic age dates from before the middle of the first century, when the apostles began to write, to the close of that century when John, the last of them, died. We are not to assume that it was published either early or late in this period, and reason accordingly: but if we shall find that external evidence assigns its origin to the latter period of that age, we shall not be justified in expecting or demanding earlier notice of it.

Different opinions have been entertained as to the date of John's writing the Apocalypse. The reader will find them stated by Michaelis. The earliest date is assigned to the reign of the Emperor Claudius, and that solely on the authority of Epiphanius, Bishop of Salamis, in Cyprus, in the latter part of the fourth century. Mosheim says of his work describing the different sects of Christians, that it "contains many defects and misrepresentations, arising from the credulity and ignorance of the author." Dr. Murdock says "his learning was great, his judgment rash, and his credulity and mistakes very abundant."¹ His character is given by Dupin and by Jortin² to the same effect. Spanheim, in his Introduction to Ecclesiastical History,³ has given an account of his gross mistakes.

The book of "the Acts of the Apostles," and the apostolical epistles, cover the period of the reign of Claudius, which lasted from A. D. 41 to 54. No traces of such a persecution as that referred to in the Apocalypse, at the period of its writing, can be discovered in the days of Claudius. Nero was the first emperor who persecuted Christians, and enacted laws against them.⁴ Nor is there

¹ Murdock's Tr. of Mosheim, Vol. i., pp. 242, 243. ² Rem. Eccles. Hist., iv., 115.

³ Sec. iv., p. 426.

⁴ Annal. Tac., Lib. xv., c. 44.

the least probability that the seven churches of Asia, addressed by Christ in the Apocalypse, had even been organized as early as the reign of Claudius. Yet this opinion, so utterly devoid of evidence, was maintained by the learned Grotius, who has indeed given it all its consequence.

The common, and for a long period, uniform belief in the church, as to the date of the Apocalypse, assigns it to the close of the reign of Domitian, A. D. 95 or 96. A strenuous attempt has of late been made to prove that its origin is to be dated toward the close of the reign of Nero, A. D. 68. No other opinion is deserving of attention. In one or other of these dates lies the truth. Prof. Stuart concedes, that "if the *number* of the witnesses were the only thing which should control our judgment in relation to the question proposed, we must, so far as *external* evidence is concerned, yield the palm to those who fix upon the time of Domitian." Yet he thinks that the value of the testimony is not equal to that which may be adduced in favor of its being written in the time of Nero. The "catena of external evidence starts with the testimony of Irenæus." His testimony, however, he sets aside as the mere "opinion" of that father. Consequently, the first link being broken, the entire chain of patristic testimony as to its date, falls to the ground. There is a very summary way of getting rid of the external evidence, to say the least; but let us examine whether it be merely "the opinion" of Irenæus, or something demanding more respect.

I. The language of Irenæus does not intimate a mere opinion on his part, but asserts a fact. As an opinion, it would certainly be entitled to respect; certainly much more so than the opinions of those who had not half the opportunities he had, for forming a correct judgment. The following is the passage in full, as given by Eusebius¹ with his introductory remark. Professor Stuart has quoted but the last sentence of Irenæus.

Γραφῶν γὰρ τοι ὁ Εἰρηναῖος περὶ τῆς ψηφῆς τῆς κατὰ τὸν Ἀντιχριστὸν προσηγορίας φερομένης, ἐν τῇ Ἰωάννῃ λεγόμενῃ Ἀποκαλύψει, αὐταῖς συλλαβαῖς ἐν πεμπτῶ των πρὸς τὰς αἵρεσεις ταῦτα περὶ τῆς Ἰωάννῃ φησιν. Εἰ δὲ εἶδει ἀναφανδὸν ἐν τῶν νυν καιρῶ κηρυττεσθαι τὸ νόμα τὸτο, δι' ἐκεῖνα ἀν' ἐρρεθῇ τὸ καὶ τὴν Ἀποκαλύψιν ἑωρακοτός· οὐδὲ γὰρ προ πολλῆς χρόνῃς ἑωραθῇ, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας γενεας, πρὸς τὸ τέλος τῆς Δομιτιανῆς ἀρχῆς.

"Irenæus truly writing concerning the calculation taken from the epithet of Antichrist, in the aforesaid Revelation of John, speaks concerning John, in the following manner, in his fifth book against the heresies. If, however, it was necessary openly at this time to proclaim this same name (i. e. Antichrist), it would have been spoken by him that had even seen the revelation; for it was not long since seen, but almost in this our own generation, at the

¹ Hist. Eccles., iii., 18.

close of Domitian's reign." If any language CAN *assert a fact* this does. There is nothing whatever here which intimates that it was a mere "opinion" he entertained on the subject. For,

II. Irenæus does not only assert it as a fact, that John saw the Revelation during the reign of Domitian, but states it as one about which there was no doubt—one admitted on all hands and requiring no proof. He speaks precisely as we should, in reference to a well known and undisputed fact. We say now as matter of fact, of the work of A. M'Leod, D.D., of New York, on the Apocalypse, that it was not long since written, but almost in this our own generation, during the war with Great Britain, near the close of the Presidency of James Madison. A learned critic, if an equal occasion served, might hereafter just as unceremoniously set aside this our direct testimony with regard to a matter of fact, as Professor Stuart has done that of Irenæus, by saying it is only our "opinion!" This will not do. Its absurdity is too apparent.

III. Still further: Irenæus states the fact for the purpose of proving another, and a very different, thing, viz. the propriety of not designating by name the Antichrist. His argument is: "It is unnecessary for us to proclaim Antichrist by name, for if it had been necessary, it would have been done by the author of the Apocalypse, who wrote that book so very near our own time, almost in our own generation, at the close of Domitian's reign." Here, he assumes the date of its origin as a thing unquestioned, and founds his argument on it, which derives all its force from the circumstance of its being fact. Had it been the mere "opinion" of Irenæus there would have been no point, propriety, or force at all in his argument. This evidence of the allusive kind, is better proof as to the correctness of the date mentioned, than even the simple historical statement of Irenæus on the subject. A fact assumed in argument as one unquestioned, can never be correctly styled an "opinion."

IV. So far from its being the mere "opinion" of Irenæus, it has been, from the very beginning, regarded and quoted as his testimony, or assertion, of a matter of historical verity. So Eusebius evidently understood it. He has, in three other and different places, quoted or referred to this passage of Irenæus, as testimony to matter of historical verity.¹ So Jerome and others have understood it. Even Professor Stuart himself is constrained to change his style in relation to it, and in one place to call it "testimony."² "The whole concatenation of witnesses in favor of this position," says he, "viz. that John saw the Revelation during the reign of Domitian, hangs upon the *testimony* of Irenæus."² Both the language and the style of the passage entitle it to be so designated. He is still further constrained to admit, that this concatenation of witnesses goes to prove how widely the tradition mentioned by

¹ Hist. Eccles. iii., 23, 20, and v., 8.

² Com. i., p. 269.

Irenæus had spread. Thus has he given three versions of it. It is at one time Irenæus's "testimony," at another his report of a "tradition," and at a third his "opinion." A little more precision in a matter so grave as the impeachment of the credibility of an author, might certainly be expected; especially, inasmuch as the character and range of evidence will be materially affected by the question to be determined,—whether it is his own testimony, or his statement of a tradition, or his opinion.

It has already been seen, that there is nothing in the language, or style, or in the occasion and circumstances of its delivery, that proves it to have been a mere "opinion," which Irenæus had formed on grounds known only to himself, but which, by the weight of his authority, had gained respect and currency in antiquity. This is Prof. Stuart's "constructive exegesis" of Irenæus, but unfortunately without any attempt to justify it from an analysis of its style and language. The utmost that can be said of the course he has pursued towards this Father, is, that he has advocated a mere hypothesis for the purpose, more successfully, of impeaching his credibility. Common minds are apt to confound between the opinions and the testimony of a witness; but in a matter of so much importance as the impeachment of a whole chain of witnesses, it is of consequence to discriminate.

We think it is impossible, on any fair pretext, to set aside, in this way the testimony of Irenæus. If it be not worthy of credit, let it be at once impeached. Should his testimony here be shown to have been his "opinion" merely, on a subject as to which he had neither sufficient means of knowledge, nor capacity and opportunity for investigation, it will go far to invalidate it. But if this cannot be done, it must stand, and continue, as it has done for centuries, to command deserved respect and confidence.

Having, therefore, shown that the passage from Irenæus is not the expression of a mere "opinion," but testimony or reference to an admitted historical fact, we proceed to examine whether the considerations adduced by Prof. Stuart, evidently, though not avowedly, to impeach the credibility of Irenæus, do actually invalidate the evidence he has furnished, that John wrote the Apocalypse during the reign of Domitian. And here, as it is important we should know something about the character and reputation of the witness whose testimony is impeached, we may inquire into,

V. His general character as a man, a Christian, and a historian.
1. Dr. Murdock says of him, that "he was an ardent and sincere Christian, and a discreet and amiable man. He possessed considerable learning and influence, but his mind does not appear to have been one of the highest order."¹ Yet did he possess mind enough to command the respect of his contemporaries. Mosheim, speaking of the schism in relation to the observance of Easter,

¹ Murdock's Mosheim, vol. i., p. 120, n. 5.

says that "the progress of it was checked by Irenæus, bishop of Lyons, in letters wisely composed."¹ Eusebius has occasion to quote from him, or to refer to him as authority, frequently, and he does it always with respect and confidence.

There is nothing on record to impeach his credibility in point of veracity, or his competency in point of judgment, in relation to matters of current and admitted historical fact. The only thing that tends to abate our respect for him is, that Eusebius, speaking of his treatise on the Ogdoad, or number eight, says that in that book he also shows that he was the first that received "the original succession from the Apostles."² What Eusebius means to teach that Irenæus precisely understood by this, we are at a loss to determine; for certain it is that the language of the former on this subject does not imply anything more than the regular chain of persons settled as bishops or pastors in particular churches, as at Jerusalem, Antioch, Rome, and elsewhere—not the high, exclusive pretensions to the only valid ordination made by prelatists. Irenæus may have been the first who collected historical information on the subject, and gave a list of the different pastors successively settled in the churches in Rome, Jerusalem, Antioch, Ephesus, and other places, from the days of the Apostles; which would only commend his diligence and care as a historian, and by no means impeach his credibility. Be this as it may, we cannot see ground sufficient to reject his testimony. His character, as a credible and competent witness, cannot be successfully impeached. Murdock does indeed say, that "as an interpreter of Scripture, he was too fond of tracing analogies, and as a theologian, few of the moderns will account him entirely correct in principle, or perfectly conclusive in his reasonings."³ All this may be, and yet not affect in the least degree the credibility of his testimony as to the historical fact, that John wrote the Apocalypse during the reign of Domitian. For neither his allegorical interpretation of Scripture, nor his theological peculiarities, nor even his high-church predilections, if he had any, can be shown to have any bearing on the point under consideration, which possibly might influence his judgment as a historian. Eusebius says explicitly of him, that "he may surely be regarded as worthy of all credit."⁴

Archdeacon Woodhouse bears the following testimony in relation to him. "Irenæus was born, according to his own account (as his words have been generally understood), in the age immediately succeeding that in which the visions of the Apocalypse were seen. The learned Dodwell has taken pains to show, that he was born in the year 97, the very year in which the Apocalypse will appear to have been published. But there is reason to suppose that he has fixed the birth of this father about ten years too

¹ Murdock's Mosheim, vol. i., p. 136.

² Murdock's Mosheim, vol. i., p. 136.

³ Eccles. Hist., l. v., c. 20.

⁴ Eccles. Hist., l. iii., c. 23.

soon.¹ He was a Greek by birth, as his name and language import, and probably an Asiatic Greek, for he was an auditor of Polycarp, who was bishop of Smyrna, one of the seven churches, and who had been the auditor of St. John the apostle. He was in his own character, the most learned, pious, prudent, and venerable prelate of the age in which he lived."²

2. We remark, however, in the next place, that we have the most pointed and satisfactory testimony as to his qualifications, and opportunities for obtaining correct information on this very subject. Eusebius quotes from his epistle to Florinus, in which Irenæus speaks of the accuracy of his recollection of what occurred when he was yet a boy, appealing to Florinus's own knowledge of the same. "I remember," says he, "the events of those times much better than those of more recent occurrence. As the studies of our youth, growing with our mind, unite with it so firmly, that I can tell also the very place where the blessed Polycarp was accustomed to sit and discourse; and also his entrances, his walks, the complexion of his life, and the form of his body, and his conversations with the people, and his familiar intercourse with John, as he was accustomed to tell, as also his familiarity with those that had seen the Lord. How, also, he used to relate their discourses, and what things he had heard from them concerning the Lord."³

Polycarp was a contemporary of the apostle John, very probably ordained by him to his office, and survived him many years, having suffered martyrdom A.D. 167, and lived a contemporary of Irenæus for half a century. The church of Lyons, of which Irenæus was pastor, was a daughter of that of Smyrna,⁴ among whom Polycarp lived and suffered martyrdom. There were abundant opportunities, therefore, for Irenæus to obtain authentic information relative to John. That he sought it, and preserved it carefully, he has, in his epistle to Florinus, apprised us. "These things by the mercy of God," says he, referring to what he learned from Polycarp, "and the opportunity then afforded me, I attentively heard, noting them down, not on paper, but in my heart; and these same facts I am always in the habit, by the grace of God, to recall faithfully to mind."⁵

To call the testimony of Irenæus, therefore, under such circumstances, an "opinion," is inadmissible. He lived too near the days of John, and had access to the most authentic source of information, John's own familiar friend, to be dismissed so uncere- moniously from the stand.

3. It does not appear that Irenæus was of a credulous turn of mind, so as to make him adopt hastily ill-founded and vague tradi-

¹ See Grabe's Proleg. ad Irenæum.

² Woodhouse's Diss. on the Div. Orig. of the Apoc., pp. 15, 16.

³ Euseb. Eccl. Hist., l. v., c. 20.

⁴ Milner's Eccl. Hist., vol. i., p. 260.

⁵ Euseb. Eccl. Hist., l. v., c. 20.

tions. That he was not indifferent to the character of evidence, but, on the contrary, careful to investigate the authority he had for believing what he stated, is proved to be the fact, in his disquisition on the name and number of Antichrist. For he declares, not only the time when the Apocalypse was written, but speaks of exact and ancient copies of the book then existing, showing that he had carefully collated manuscript editions, and conversed with those who had seen John himself. "These things being thus, and this number (of Antichrist) being in all the most exact and ancient copies, and they who saw John, attesting the same thing," &c.¹ Under such circumstances it is altogether gratuitous to reject his testimony, either on the ground of incompetency, or of being destitute of the qualification and opportunities for knowledge, wont to be demanded in a witness. Both the form of his testimony, and the facts he has recited relative to his knowledge of Polycarp, John's disciple, his intercourse with him, and his scrupulous care to determine the accuracy of manuscript copies of the Apocalypse, prove, that he speaks, not of his "opinion," but of what he had carefully ascertained to be historically matter of fact. We are surprised, therefore, that Prof. Stuart should have allowed himself to insinuate such an impeachment of the credibility of Irenæus as the following: "That Irenæus himself possessed *any other* knowledge, in relation to the time when the Apocalypse was composed, than what he drew from the exegesis of Rev. 1 : 9, may well be doubted."² Prof. Stuart has himself done this very thing; but there is not the shadow of proof that Irenæus inferred the date from his own exegesis. It is a refinement of modern criticism, unknown altogether in the days of Irenæus. We quote again Archdeacon Woodhouse on the claims of this Father to our confidence: "When Irenæus speaks upon such subjects as concern the external evidences of the church, he appeals, for a confirmation of the truth of what he has advanced, to Polycarp and to others, who, he says, had seen the apostle John. He appeals also to the Asiatic churches, in which he appears to have been educated.³ When removed from Asia to Gaul, where, upon the martyrdom of Pothinus, he became bishop of Lyons, he kept up a correspondence with the brethren of the Asiatic churches, from whom he would continue to receive the most genuine information then to be obtained concerning the Apocalypse." Having, therefore, had frequent and easy opportunities of access to the autograph of John's epistles to the seven churches, and having actually and carefully investigated,

¹ We have not access to Irenæus's work on Heresies above referred to, but give his words as quoted by the Rev. E. B. Elliott, in his *Horæ Apocalyptiæ*, vol. i., p. 23, a work which we must take the liberty to say, merits the attention of every biblical student, as well for its critical and historical learning, as for its clear exposition of Apocalyptic symbols, and which we hope will soon be given to the public in an American edition.

² Com., vol. i., p. 272.

³ Iren., lib. iii., v. 8. Euseb., lib. iv., v. 20.

under such circumstances, the most authentic copies of the Apocalypse, well may the archdeacon say, "Here then is a witness, far surpassing in authority and credibility, any that has hitherto been produced."¹ It is no easy or slight affair to set aside such testimony. But we remark, that,

VI. The process of argument adopted by Prof. Stuart to impeach the credibility of Irenæus, is by no means conclusive or satisfactory. He gives, somewhat at length, and very ingeniously, the evidence commonly adduced in favor of John's having written the Apocalypse during the latter part of the reign of Domitian. He first quotes Irenæus; refers to Eusebius's quotation or reference to him; then cites Jerome's statement, that it was during the 14th year of Domitian John was banished to Patmos; then gives Eusebius's quotation, from Clemens Alexandrinus, and from Tertullian, admitting that the former was understood by the historian to affirm, that the banishment of John took place during the reign of Domitian, thinking nevertheless it may be doubted, and intimating, that there is nothing in Clement's language which decides whether he meant Nero or Domitian. Origen's testimony, too, he regards in the same light. He quotes also Victorinus, Sulpicius, Severus, and Orosius, contemporaries of Augustine, and refers to Gregorius Turo-nensis, Cent. iv. : Isidorus Hispalensis, Cent. vii., and Marianus Scotus, Hippolytus, Photius, and Suidas. "It is plain then," says he, "that an ancient tradition existed, and was propagated through succeeding ages, that the Apocalypse was written near the close of Domitian's reign."² "If there were nothing else," he adds, "of a different tenor to be found respecting the question before us, we should be obliged to concede that the opinion is no longer to be controverted, which fixes upon the latter part of Domitian's reign as the period when the Apocalypse was composed." It is therefore very important to invalidate this testimony. But how is this attempted?

1. An assertion is made which is well calculated to mislead. To the above apparently candid review of the testimony, in favor of dating the origin of the Apocalypse within Domitian's reign, as given by Prof. Stuart, it is added, "But we know that the voice of antiquity is not uniform in relation to this subject."³ This phrase, "the voice of antiquity," is very vague. It behoves us, in a question of this sort, to determine its precise import. If by the voice of antiquity is meant the testimony of Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, and the fathers of the first three centuries, then it is a very important fact for us to bear in mind. For, in canvassing that testimony, if we should find it to be discrepant, it might indeed lead us to distrust the tradition which dates the origin of the Apocalypse under Domitian. But this is not the fact. That testimony is

¹ Woodhouse's Rev. of St. John, pp. 17, 18. ² Stuart's Com. on Rev., vi., p. 265.

³ Com., v. i., p. 265.

specific and direct—also uniform, unbroken, unequivocal, undisputed and unsuspected. And it occurs precisely during that period of antiquity lying nearest to, and reaching almost from, the very days of John for three centuries down. Not a shade of doubt, not a note of discord supervenes till the days of Epiphanius, bishop of Salamis in Cyprus, in the latter part of the fourth century. “The voice of antiquity” afterwards possesses not equal authority.

2. The next attempt to invalidate this testimony is by a virtual assumption that this uniform, unbroken, undisputed chain of evidence rests wholly on “the opinion” of Irenæus. “A majority,” says Prof. Stuart, “of the older critics have been inclined to adopt the opinion of Irenæus.”¹ It is not the fact that this chain of evidence rests wholly, nor is it correct to say mainly, on “the declaration” of Irenæus, which expression Prof. Stuart elsewhere uses for his “opinion.” For there is other testimony than that of Irenæus, and independent of him, to the same effect. Nor can it be proved that even Eusebius and Victorinus, Severus and Orosius, rest their judgment exclusively on the declaration of Irenæus, without having had other, and to them, satisfactory evidence, of the fact, which they did not detail. It is mere conjecture at best, that they rested their conviction wholly on Irenæus’s testimony. To assert it as fact that they did, is to take for granted what is not conceded, and cannot be proved; so that logically, the attempt to invalidate this chain of evidence, fails.

3. The third attempt is by neutralizing the force of that testimony which dates nearest to the days of Irenæus. This is done by assuming that it is wholly dependent on him. But there is nothing in the form of that testimony which renders this allowable. The assumption is altogether gratuitous.

Clemens Alexandrinus, for example, a contemporary of Irenæus, is as much entitled to credit, as an original, independent witness to the date of the Apocalypse. He was born anterior to Irenæus, A.D., 39, and is very explicit² in his *Quis Dives Salvetur*. *Ἐπεὶ δὲ γὰρ τοῦ τυράννου τελευτήσαντος, ἀπὸ τῆς Πάτμου τῆς νήσου μετέλθεν εἰς τὴν Ἐφεσόν, &c.* “After the death of the tyrant, he (John) returned to Ephesus from the island Patmos.” To this testimony it is objected that he does not name the tyrant. But it can be shown by circumstances affording the highest presumption, that he could not have meant Nero, and none other than Domitian. Prof. Stuart himself admits, that “the tyrant here meant is probably Domitian; at least, although he is not named by Clement, it is clear that Eusebius so understood the matter.”³

Eusebius’s judgment in the matter, certainly, deserves more respect than that of later authors. But, independent of this, there is internal evidence of the highest probability that his judgment

¹ Stuart’s Com., vol. i., p. 263.

² Euseb. Eccl. Hist., L. iii., c. 23.

³ Stuart’s Com., vol. i., p. 264.

was correct. In the story which Clement relates concerning the young robber, whom the apostle John had been instrumental in converting, and in relating which the above quotation occurs, the apostle is represented as being, at the time referred to, *an infirm old man*. This John might well be called after the death of Domitian, being then at least 80 years old; but could not during the reign of Nero, being then but 50, or at furthest, 60. For, says Mr. Elliott,¹ "he is generally supposed to be younger than our Lord. The traditionary reports of his age at the time of his death, all tend to that conclusion. (So Jerome adv. Jovin., Lib. i., of his age when first called by Christ, "*Ut autem sciamus tunc fuisse puerum manifestissime docent ecclesiasticæ historiæ.*") And Nero's persecution broke out A. D. 64, and ended A. D. 68, with his death.

This circumstance vindicates the correctness of Eusebius's judgment as to Clement's meaning. His language is explicit. "About this time also, the beloved disciple of Jesus, John the apostle and evangelist, still surviving, governed the churches in Asia, after his return from exile on the island, and the death of Domitian."² Clement's testimony, as quoted by Eusebius, is taken from his discourse entitled, "What rich man is saved." It seems to be a very poor pretext, that the name of Domitian not being mentioned by Clement, his testimony is therefore undeserving of respect. For, the quotation is made by Eusebius for a specific purpose, which did not lead him to be particular on this point; and yet it seems evident, from the use of the definite article in the quotation, that "*the tyrant*" had been previously named by Clement, or in some other way accurately designated. The plain and most natural view of the matter is, that the tyrant referred to by Clement being distinctly affirmed by Eusebius to be Domitian, and Eusebius having cited Clement as a witness in a particular case, the historian had given the name of Domitian as the tyrant meant by Clement on some sufficient ground which he at the time understood, but has not stated; so that it is inadmissible to suppose, without directly impeaching Eusebius's judgment, for which there is no shadow of warrant whatever, he misunderstood the meaning of Clement, whose language he quoted. Prof. Stuart has not even attempted to show that Clement meant any other tyrant than Domitian, or that Eusebius was mistaken.

Sir Isaac Newton has indeed virtually done this; for he has endeavored to draw a conclusion from Clement's narrative of the young robber reclaimed by the apostle John, in favor of the very date for which Prof. Stuart contends. "Chrysostom saith that the young robber continued their captive *a long time*. At length John returning to that city, and hearing what was done, rode to the thief; and when he, out of reverence to his old master, fled, John

¹ *Horæ Apocalypticæ*, vol. i., p. 34.

² *Euseb. Eccl. Hist.*, l. iii., c. 23.

rode after him, recalled him, and restored him to the church. 'This,' Sir Isaac remarks, "is a story of many years, and requires that John should have returned from Patmos rather at the death of Nero than at that of Domitian; because, between the death of Domitian and that of John, there were but two and a half years; and John in his old age was so infirm as to be carried to the church, dying above 90 years old, and therefore could not then be supposed able to ride after a thief."¹

The "long time" of Chrysostom is indefinite. It could not mean "many years," because the reprobate is designated still a young man, *τὸ νέος*. Clement, who is the author of the story, uses language, which, if Sir Isaac Newton had duly considered, would have shown the fallacy of his conclusion, attempted on the second-hand authority of Chrysostom. He calls him a *youth*, one who has obtained puberty, *juvenis*, when he was presented by John to the pastor of the church; when brought back again from his apostasy he calls him still a youth—*juvenis*; and speaks of the interval as "*aliquanto post tempore*"—*after a certain time*. Nothing therefore invalidates Clement's testimony as an original, independent witness, understood by Eusebius to testify identically the same fact with Irenæus, that John wrote the Apocalypse during the reign of Domitian.

The testimony of Tertullian has been also supposed to corroborate that of Irenæus, and has therefore been objected to by Prof. Stuart. It is by no means as distinct and definite as that of Irenæus, or even of Clement. It behoves us, however, in this canvas of evidence, to investigate it. He is the first of the Latin fathers whose works have come down to us. He was born A.D. 160, and lived to a great age; was regarded of great authority; was called by Cyprian his master; and exerted an extensive influence in the church. In his Apology² he says, "*Tentaverat et Domitianus, portio Neronis de crudelitate, sed qua et homo facile cœptum repressit, restitutis etiam quos relegaverat.*" This in fact is no testimony; but Eusebius, in quoting the passage, says: "This is the statement of the historians of the day. It was then, also, that the apostle John returned from his banishment at Patmos, and took up his abode at Ephesus, according to an ancient tradition of the church."³ "How Eusebius understood Tertullian," says Prof. Stuart, "seems to be clear; but the words of Tertullian himself leave the matter in doubt, and nothing certain can be drawn from them in respect to John."⁴ We regret that we have not access to the works of Tertullian; for Prof. Stuart admits that in another passage he says, "*Ubi (sc. Romæ) apostolus Johannes, posteaquam in oleum igneum demersus nihil passus est, insulas relegatur.*" Nothing here, or in the context, decides whether he regarded this

¹ Obs. on the Apoc. of St. John, pp. 237, 238.

² Euseb. Eccl. Hist., l. iii., 20.

³ Tertul. Apolo., l. 5.

⁴ Stuart's Com., vol. i., p. 264.

as happening under Nero or Domitian. The reference here is not given ; but the Rev. Mr. Elliott,¹ having quoted on the authority of Lardner, ii., 286, more largely from Tertullian's treatise de Pres. Hær., c. 36, remarks, that while he was the first author of the story referred to, the conjoined mention of John's being thrown into burning oil, and of Paul's and Peter's death, is not at all a chronological, but a local conjecture. It was not *when* Peter suffered martyrdom of which he spoke, but *where*. Not a word is said of the event of John's being thrown into boiling oil having taken place under Nero. On the contrary, tradition has referred it to the times of Domitian. That very learned critic and profound scholar, Danberg, having cited the quotation from Irenæus, in proof that John saw the Revelation about the end of Domitian's reign, adds, "and this full evidence is backed by another, Tertullian, who saith, that Domitian, having commanded that St. John should be thrown into boiling oil, but he coming out again alive, was exiled into Patmos, where, as he tells us, he saw these visions."²

Prof. Stuart says that this passage in Tertullian "is applied by Newton to the banishment of John by Nero." We presume he means Sir Isaac. The fact in the case is, that Sir Isaac Newton having questioned the accuracy of Irenæus's testimony, that the Apocalypse was seen during the reign of Domitian, having also started the perfectly gratuitous supposition, that "John might himself at that time have made a new publication of it, from whence Irenæus might imagine it was then but newly written;" and having further referred to Eusebius as of like judgment with Irenæus, undertakes to impeach the credibility of the historian by remarking, that in his Evangelical Demonstrations "he conjoins the banishment of John into Patmos with the deaths of Peter and Paul," and continues, "and so do Tertullian and Pseudo-Prochorus, as well as the first author, whoever he was, of that very ancient fable, that John was put by Nero into a vessel of hot oil, and coming out unhurt, was banished by him into Patmos." He gives his references as follows : vid. *Pamelium* in notis ad Tertul. de præscriptionibus n. 215, and *Hieron.*, l. i., contra Jovinianum, c. 14, edit. Erasmi.³

We have already seen that the "*ubi*" of Tertullian, which might afford a pretext as to identity of *time*, if translated *when*, instead of *where*, denotes association of place. We give the passage itself to the reader. "Ista quam felix ecclesia cui totam doctrinam apostoli cum sanguine perfuderunt: *ubi* Petrus passioni Dominicæ adæquatur; *ubi* Paulus Joannis (sc. Baptistæ) exitu coronatur; *ubi* apostolus Joannes, posteaquam in oleum demersus nihil passus est, in insulam relegatur."⁴ It is surprising that Sir

¹ Horn Apoc., vol. i., p. 40.

² Com. on Rev., p. 80.

³ I. Newton's Observations upon the Apocalypse, p. 236.

⁴ Lardner, i., 286.

Isaac Newton should have been led by such a circumstance, to assert, that either Eusebius or Pseudo-Prochorus has associated the deaths of Peter, John, and Paul, in point of time. Not having access to this work of Eusebius, we quote Mr. Elliott, who says: "After briefly sketching the earlier persecutions of the apostles and disciples, as related in the book of the Acts of the Apostles, Eusebius adds, that subsequently to these (ἐπὶ τούτοις) James, the Lord's brother, was stoned to death; and then passes to the following notice of Peter, Paul, and John, which is the passage referred to by Sir I. Newton: καὶ Πέτρος δὲ ἐπὶ Ῥώμης κατὰ κεφαλῆς σταυρῶται, Παῦλος τε ἀποτεμνεται, Ἰωάννης τε νησὶ παραδίδεται—a passage followed by the general statement that the surviving disciples, undeterred by these things, persisted in their Christian profession and designs. Eusebius Dem. Evang., lib. iii., p. 116 (Paris, 1628). Thus we see that there is no intimation whatever of synchronism between the two events."¹

Prof. Stuart admits that the passage contains no certain evidence respecting the *time* when banishment took place. Even Jerome, referred to by Sir Isaac, and who Prof. Stuart says seems directly to assert, that Tertullian meant to convey the idea, that what had happened to John was during the life of Nero—immediately before this passage speaks of John as exiled by Domitian. This contradiction of himself, Prof. Stuart reconciles by saying, that "when Jerome says, 'a Nerone missus in ferventis olei dolium,' he is only giving his views of what Tertullian had said, and not his own opinion. Jerome's views of Tertullian's opinion may be correct. Besides, Tertullian does not here speak of John's exile."² Prof. Stuart, therefore, does not make much account of Sir Isaac Newton's views, who is just as far from being correct, in his reference to the Pseudo-Prochorus, as to Tertullian and Eusebius.

"The Pseudo-Prochorus, who tells the story at full length (of John's being thrown into boiling oil), and similarly conjoins the mention of this event with that of Paul's and Peter's martyrdoms, as a mere association of *place* (for he supposes it to have occurred at Rome, and that thus the *porta Latina* in that city became a memorial of the one apostle, as the *orta Vaticana* was of the two others), expressly states the emperor, by whom St. John was thus thrown into the oil, to have been Domitian, who soon after banished him to Patmos, not Nero. Audiens Domitianus de adventu ejus (Joannis) jussit ut proconsul duceret ante portam Latinam, et in ferventis olei dolium illum vivum dimitti. * * * Deus enim per crudelem tyrannum consilium suum disponebat, ut sicut virtutibus et signis Joannes et Petrus socii fuerunt, ita in urbe Romæ memoriam haberent sui triumphi, sicut enim *porta Vaticana*, &c. Domitian is again and again mentioned, by this writer, as the

¹ Horæ Apoc., i., p. 40.

² Stuart's Com. on Rev., vol. i., p. 267.

Emperor concerned in the persecution of St. John. B. P. M., ii., 52.”¹

It does not appear, therefore, after a careful examination of this whole matter, that the early testimony, as to the Domitian date of the Apocalypse, is at all invalidated. Clement, for anything we know to the contrary, was an original, independent witness, and took not his testimony from Irenæus. Eusebius interprets Tertullian conformably with the received traditional history, which was not disputed or doubted till in the fourth century by Epiphanius, whose authority in this matter, in consequence of his great inaccuracies and blunders, is entitled to no respect.

VII. The more direct evidence adduced in favor of the Neronian date of the Apocalypse does by no means establish it. That which deserves attention first, is the title page of the Syriac version of the Apocalypse. This declares that “it was written in Patmos, whither John was sent by Nero Cæsar.” But Michaelis states expressly, “the Syriac version of the Apocalypse is now known to be a part of the Philoxenian version, which was made by Polycarp at the beginning of the sixth century.” (P. 521.) Prof. Stuart admits, that the old Peshito version of the second century “has never comprehended the Apocalypse;” that which now appears, in our Syriac New Testament, and in the London and Paris polyglotts, having been copied in the East by Caspar, a resident of Western Asia, and thence passed through the hands of Scaliger, the younger, to the library of Leyden, where it was copied, and then published by Ludovicus de Dieu, in 1627. Yet he doubts whether this version, as Michaelis states, “belongs to the so-called Philoxenian version, which was made about A. D. 508. It would rather seem,” continues he, “that there was a version of the Apocalypse into Syriac earlier than the Philoxenian; for Ephrem Syrus, in his commentaries (Cent. iv.), often appeals to the Apocalypse; and it is generally supposed that he did not understand Greek, and therefore must have read it in Syriac,”² referring to Hug’s *Introd.*, § 65. This, it is obvious, is not evidence, but doubt and supposition. Yet he remarks, “If this view is correct, then does the inscription mentioned above acquire additional importance. It becomes an early, as well as a plain testimony, respecting the current opinion in the East with regard to the time when the Apocalypse was written.” The fact, however, that Ephraim the Syrian quotes the Syriac version does not prove the correctness, or even the existence of the title. It might, as Michaelis intimates, have been annexed to the more ancient Syriac version, and it might perhaps also, as Archdeacon Woodhouse replies, have been added in later times. For, of what authority are some of the subscriptions to other books of the New Testament, even those which are printed

¹ *Horæ Apoc.*, i., p. 40.

² *Stuart’s Com. on Rev.*, vol. i., p. 267.

with the Greek text?¹ They are anonymous, and without date, and, in some cases, are known to give false information.² Michaelis, in his Introduction, has twice asserted that "no subscription of this kind is entitled to the name of evidence."

2. The next direct evidence is from the Commentary of Andreas, bishop of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, probably about the beginning of the sixth century. He says that Rev. 6 : 12 was applied by some to the siege and destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, giving at the same time his own opinion, that it is rather to be applied to Antichrist. Of Rev. 7 : 1 and 2 he says similar things. Hence Prof. Stuart argues : "It is plain then, from what Andreas says in these passages, that in his time there was one class of interpreters, who referred part of the Apocalypse to the destruction of Jerusalem, and of course believed that this book was composed before that event took place."³ It may have been so for anything we know : but this inference is a *non sequitur*. It is no uncommon thing to accommodate the language of Scripture to other things than those to which the writer intended immediately to apply them. Besides, there are parts of the Apocalypse, as Rev. 12 : 1, referred, by many commentators, to events even before the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, who never meant to intimate, by that circumstance, that the book was written at such an early date. At all events it is a specimen only of the manner in which some attempted through their interpretation, or by what might be called internal evidence, just as Prof. S. himself has done, to determine its date.

3. Arethas, the successor of Andreas, is the next witness cited against the Domitian date. This author, who is generally supposed by critics to have lived near the middle of the sixth century, has left a Greek commentary on the Apocalypse, consisting chiefly of extracts from Andreas and other expositors. Although he quotes what Eusebius says of the Domitian date of the Apocalypse, and objects not ; yet in speaking of the passages in Rev. 7 : 1 and 4, he evidently places its origin before the destruction of Jerusalem. But Lücke (p. 409), as Prof. Stuart states, speaks of him in reference to these passages as "confused and contradictory." Prof. Stuart, nevertheless, attempts to shield him from this judgment by saying, that "Arethas only cites the opinion of others." This, however, does not help the matter ; for Prof. Stuart himself is constrained to admit, that "what Arethas says on Rev. xi. would rather afford some occasion for the remark of Lücke."⁴ His testimony, therefore, is worth nothing ; since, like that of Andreas and Prof. Stuart, its whole value depends upon his exposition, by which he manufactures internal evidence for its support.

¹ Woodhouse on the Apoc., p. 12.

² Ch. vii., sec. 10, p. 320, and ch. xi., sec. 1, p. 14.

³ Stuart's Com., vol. i., p. 268.

⁴ Com., vol. i., p. 268.

Mr. Elliott assigns a much later date, however, to Arethas, from what he says, viz. "On Apoc. 13: 2, the beast that I saw was like a leopard and his mouth like a lion's, he (Arethas) writes; Per os leonis regnum designatur Babyloniorum, cui Saracenorum regnum manifestè successit, quod in hoc usque tempus regia eorum Babylone sit." B. B. M. IX: 771. Now the Saracen capital of Bagdad, near Babylon, was not built till A. D. 762. It seems strange that this clear evidence of a date attaching to Arethas, at least as late as about A. D. 800, should have been overlooked by so many critics, who have spoken of him as of the sixth century."¹

The testimony of Arethas, therefore, deserves no respect as evidence. Nor do those cited from the *Martyrium Timothei*, and the *Synopsis de vita et morte prophetarum*, the former of which assigns Nero's, and the latter Trajan's reign as the date of the Apocalypse. Prof. Stuart has pronounced the former a fabulous work; and all it does say is that "under Nero's reign John made a voyage to sea, where some accidents befell him." The latter "states only that John wrote his gospel at that time (Trajan's reign), and mentions that others fixed upon Domitian's reign for these events," of which his exile was one. "The author," says Prof. Stuart, "does not seem to pretend that he has any certain knowledge; and the whole document is of little worth."²

4. The Chronicon Alexandrinum is appealed to by Berthold in proof that John returned from Patmos at the beginning of Vespasian's reign. Prof. Stuart has given specimens of its confused and contradictory statements, and says of it, "It is useless to appeal to such documents."

5. The last testimony against the Domitian date is that of Theophylact, who says that John was an exile in Patmos thirty-two years after the ascension of Christ, which would make it in the reign of Nero. But he was of the XIth century.

Such is the character and amount of the direct testimony adduced in favor of the Neronian date. How insufficient it is the reader cannot fail to have perceived. Prof. Stuart admits, that "we must, so far as *external* evidence is concerned, yield the palm to those who fix upon the time of Domitian." Yet he affirms that a careful examination of this matter shows that the whole concatenation of witnesses in favor of this position, hangs upon the testimony of Irenæus, and their evidence is little more than a mere repetition of what he has said. In such a case the concatenation of witnesses goes to prove how widely the tradition mentioned by Irenæus had spread, rather than to establish the degree of credit which it deserved."³

The reader will be able to judge for himself, whether such a concatenation of testimony as Prof. Stuart has adduced, is entitled to

¹ Horæ Apoc., i., p. 39.

² Com., vol. i., p. 269.

³ Com., vol. i., 269.

more credit than the conclusion of German and hermeneutical professors, drawn from what they call the internal evidence of the book itself. The opinion as to the Neronian date of the Apocalypse slept unnoticed for centuries. It has indeed been waked up by critics; but, as Michaelis admits, it has been because such a date has been rendered necessary, in order to support what they have judged to be a satisfactory exposition of the Apocalypse. It is surprising to what extent the confidence of commentators, in their own expositions, has been carried, and upon what trifling criticisms they will set aside the long and well established opinions of the church for centuries together.

VIII. The internal evidence does not invalidate the external. The internal evidence, as it is called, deserves a fuller consideration than we have space left for it. A few remarks, however, will close this article; sufficient, we hope, to convince the reader, that it merits not the reliance placed upon it. Dr. Tilloch, an English author, in his "Dissertations introductory to the study and right understanding of the language, structure, and contents of the Apocalypse," has pursued this subject much further than Prof. Stuart. We proceed to give a few specimens from both of the methods of argument adopted, the one being the exponent of the English, and the other of the German views on the subject. *Ex una parte disce omnes.*

The seven epistles, addressed to the seven churches of Asia, contained in the Apocalypse, it is said by Prof. Stuart, "disclose a state of the churches, in various respects different from that which is disclosed in the earlier epistles of Paul;" the former contemplating a state of active persecution, the latter the reverse. This, as a presumption in favor of the Domitian date, is judged by Prof. Stuart to be as "true respecting the Asiatic churches in Nero's time." Dr. Tilloch presents this point in a much stronger light, alleging that there were but seven churches in existence in Asia, when the epistles to the seven churches were sent, and that as Colosse is not mentioned, the Apocalypse must have been written before that church was founded, insisting on critical ground that *ταῖς ἑπτὰ ἐκκλησίαις ΤΑΙΣ ΕΝ ΑΣΙΑ*, must include *all* the churches in Asia at that time. But there are certain things in profane history that militate against this, and make the internal evidence, in this particular, point to a later period than the time of Nero, and most appropriately to that of Domitian. One is, that it does not appear that the persecution of Nero extended far beyond the precincts of the city of Rome.¹ There is no evidence whatever that it reached Asia. Another is, that there is no evidence that banishment formed any part of the persecution by Nero, whereas there is

¹ See Neander Eng. Tr., i., 90. Dean Waddington's Hist. of Chris. Church, p. 42.

abundant that this very punishment was inflicted by Domitian.¹ And a third is, that about the sixth year of Nero's reign the city of Laodicea was destroyed by an earthquake,² by which same earthquake, according to Eusebius, and at the same time, the cities of Hieropolis and Colosse, the one lying north of Laodicea some ten or twelve miles, and the other the same distance south, were also destroyed. Laodicea was rebuilt soon after, and Hieropolis not long afterwards, Papias having been pastor there somewhere between A. D. 98 and 111. But there is no evidence that Colosse recovered from its ruins. "As to Colosse," says Mr. Elliot, "it would seem, from the silence of Ptolemy in the second century, and Chrysostom's way of speaking of it in the fourth, that the city and church had not even then been restored."³ As to the use of the Greek article, on which Dr. Tilloch lays much stress, we may remark that the words *ταῖς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ*, in Rev. 11 : 1, are rejected from the later and most approved versions of the Greek Testament, so that the enumeration, by name, which follows, makes the definite article *ταῖς* equivalent with *these* or *those*, viz. those specifically and immediately designated.

In Rev. 1 : 7, Prof. Stuart finds internal evidence of the Neronian date. "Here, then," he says, "on the very front of the book, is exhibited a title page, as it were, indicative of a conspicuous part of the contents of the work. The punishment of the unbelieving and persecuting Jews must follow the coming of the Lord; and this it is one leading object of the book to illustrate and confirm. If so, then the prediction must have preceded it."⁴ Here it will be perceived, that he assumes the metaphorical import of the phrase "*the coming of Christ*"—a point that should have been previously and carefully discussed, and determined. For, it is, and has been an open question, whether the great theme of the Apocalypse is the second personal, visible coming of Christ in the glory of his Kingdom, or his mere providential dispensation, a metaphorical coming. We are not called at present to say which is correct; but we demand that the metaphorical coming be distinctly settled before appeal is made to this verse for internal evidence, as to the date of the Apocalypse. Until this is done, it is but begging the question to cite it as Prof. Stuart has done. He translates a part of the verse so as to suit the use he designed to make of it, viz.—"they who pierced him shall see him, and all the tribes of the land shall wail because of him." This he applies to the Jews, in contradistinction to the Romans, saying, "the Jews were the instigators and the proper authors of the deed." Yet was it the Romans who executed it. They cannot, by any possible rule of interpretation, be excluded, and are as strictly and

¹ See Suetonius on Domitian and Dion Cassius, lib. 67. Lardner, vol. vi., 647. Burton's Hist. of the Church, p. 159.

² See Taciti Annales, xiv., 27.

³ Horæ Solit., i., p. 63.

⁴ Com., vol. i., p. 273.

properly included in this reference as were the Jews—a circumstance which strikes a fatal blow at his exposition. Take the word “pierced” literally or metaphorically, and no subtlety of exposition can exonerate the Romans, or prove that the word has exclusive reference to Jews. Prof. Stuart has yet much to do, before such a bold and magnificent preface to the Apocalypse as that in ch. 1 : 7, can be admitted to mean nothing more than that the inhabitants of Palestine should be visited with retributive dispensations by the unseen providence of Jesus Christ. “Behold he cometh with clouds!” “EVERY EYE shall see him.” It is not true that either Jews or Romans universally were convinced, and regarded the destruction of Jerusalem as the coming of Christ, i. e. metaphorically, the retributive interposition of his providence. This, metaphorically, the *seeing him* here announced, must mean. Metaphorically—here it can mean nothing else. Neither is it true that, ἐπ’ αὐτὸν πᾶσαι αἱ φυλαὶ τῆς γῆς—all kindreds of the earth wailed on that account, or on Christ’s account, literally lamented upon Him—not even all the tribes of the land, as Prof. S. has it. The phrase πᾶσαι αἱ φυλαὶ τῆς γῆς has a much wider meaning than Prof. S. gives it. Daubuy has shown, we think very satisfactorily, that its accepted biblical import is, all idolatrous nations. So far from its being the fact that the Romans so wailed, they rejoiced in the destruction of Jerusalem; and there stands in Rome, to this day, in the triumphal arch, erected in honor of the conqueror, the monument of that rejoicing. But exposition is not our object. Enough has been said to show how gratuitous is the inference from this verse, that John wrote the Apocalypse before the destruction of Jerusalem.

Lücke and Ewald have dated the Apocalypse under the reign of Galba, A. D. 68. Prof. Stuart cites Rev. 6 : 9, 10, to prove that “the time of writing the Apocalypse cannot be deferred until after the death of Nero, and the suspension of the persecution under Galba; for persecution was evidently raging when the Apocalypse was written.”¹ On the sealing, Rev. 7 : of the 144,000, “selected from the tribes of Israel, who were to be exempted from the impending destruction,” he asks, “Why from the twelve tribes of Israel? Because,” he answers, “the destruction threatened, in connexion with this event, was to overtake *Judea*. If not why should Jewish Christians alone be here mentioned and selected?” “Of John’s commission (Rev. 11 :) to measure the inner temple, the altar, and the worshippers, while the outer part is given up to destruction by the Gentiles,” he asks, “How could such a command be supposed, in this case, if the temple had already been entirely destroyed by the Romans?” This is literal interpretation of the most ludicrous character. John shows throughout that what he saw was an ἀποκαλύψις, a revelation, a vision—scenic re-

¹ Com., vol. i., p. 274.

presentations made by some direct miraculous display ; and yet Prof. Stuart will have it that it was the literal tribes, the literal Jerusalem, the literal temple to which the Apostle refers. He admits that the transaction is wholly symbolical ; “ But, although allusions to the temple might be made after its destruction, yet allusions to the altar and worshippers, in the manner here presented, cannot be deemed probable, some twenty-five years after the destruction of the whole.” Indeed ! not even in the way of symbolical vision from God ! What then will he say of Ezekiel’s symbolical vision, and allusions to the temple, if not exactly twenty-five years, at least fourteen after its destruction, more than one half of it, enough to put to the test the correctness of his idea of probability.¹ Would eleven years make so great a difference ? The truth is, that Prof. Stuart has taken a very unwarrantable liberty in judging of the Apocalypse as an ordinary human production, regardless of its scenic character as a divine miraculous exhibition, or series of visions, made to John by the Spirit of God ; and thence, in his exposition founded on the rationalistic principles of German critics. By the very same process of exposition Herder, Eichhorn, and Heinrichs, make the two witnesses of Rev. 11 : 2, 3, to be enemies, and Jesus slain by a faction in Jerusalem, and *of course* the composition of the Apocalypse must have preceded the destruction of Jerusalem. But this is too bold for Prof. Stuart ; nevertheless the great city of Rev. 11 : 8, he makes to be the literal Jerusalem, and the two witnesses a competent number of divinely commissioned and faithful Christian witnesses endowed with miraculous powers, (who) should bear testimony against the corrupt Jews, during the last days of their commonwealth, respecting their sins ; and “ all beyond this,” he says, “ is mere costume or symbol.” “ This same city it is which in the sequel meets with the overthrow as predicted in vs. 13, 19. How then,” he asks, “ can we avoid the conclusion that Jerusalem was the city threatened ; and of course, that the prediction was written before the event.”² This is a remarkable demonstration by the aid of internal evidence.

We add one more specimen taken from Rev. 17 : “ There is no room for mistake here,” he says, that Rome is the great city spoken of in this chapter. Accordingly, paying no manner of attention to the prophetic style of Daniel—whose predictions the Apocalypse unfolds,—which as frequently designates dynasties as individuals by the word kings, he says on 17 : 10. “ We have only to reckon then the succession of emperors, and we must arrive with certainty at the reign under which the Apocalypse was written. If we begin with Julius Cæsar, it stands thus : Cæsar, Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius ; these make the five who have fallen. Of course the Apocalypse was written during the

Ezek. 40 : 1.

² Com., vol. ii., p. 236.

reign of Nero the sixth.”¹ Another demonstration that will surprise the reader who allows not his imagination to be his expositor. He is indeed much perplexed with the septimo-octave head of the beast, or the line of his succession after Nero—“the king which was and is not and yet is.” But “ὁὐκ ἔστι,” he says, “seems to say that he who is spoken of, is no longer living.” “Nothing is more common in the predictions of the prophets, than the use of the *præter* and the present in order to designate future things. John seems simply to mean, that the beast first exists as king, then disappears or dies, and afterwards (as was generally supposed and had been predicted by the *μαρτυρῶν*) will reappear.” “The writer means simply to say, the beast symbolizes one of whom it might be said, ‘He was and is not and will reappear.’” “In short, the more I reflect on these circumstances, the more am I compelled to believe, that John wrote his book pending the Neronian persecution.”² Thus, to say nothing of other inconsistencies, we have the divinely inspired apostle, if not endorsing, at least availing himself of the heathen predictions that Nero should rise from the dead and actually reappear as emperor, merely to give a hint as to the individual meant to be designated by the beast. We know of nothing more perfectly at war with every well established principle of common sense exegesis. Such hermeneutics, employed to elicit internal evidence of a date, render the whole subject of prophecy as truly contemptible, as it feebly arrays itself against the impregnable fortress of Protestant exposition, armed, as it has been for centuries, with logical demonstrations and unanswerable arguments.

The above specimens of internal evidence will suffice, so far as our author is concerned, whose main reliance rests upon it. Others, equally confident with him as to the accuracy of their interpretation, by the very same process of argument, might place its origin, with equal show of evidence, at a much later date. This he is constrained to admit. “If,” says he, “it was viewed as in part a prediction, respecting the destruction of Jerusalem, then, of course, the composition of the book would be looked upon as having taken place anterior to that event; if, however, all the former part of the work was referred merely to the coming of Antichrist, or to any event of the times that followed the first century, then the era of Domitian might be fixed upon without any apprehension of difficulty.”³ The article in the last number of the Repository has settled, we think, which of the two expositions is correct, and leaves nothing further on that point to be said. The internal evidence, therefore, does not, and cannot be rendered available to set aside the external or traditionary.

Dr. Tilloch presents the argument from the former for an early date in a different aspect, and with much less that is postulative

¹ Com., vol. ii., p. 226.

² Com., vol. i., p. 277.

³ p. 270.

in the way of exposition. A brief notice of his method of argument, with a remark or two as to its inconclusiveness, shall conclude this article. It consists in general, in tracing a similarity of thoughts and language in many respects, with those of the epistles of Paul, to prove, as it is alleged, the priority of the Apocalypse. Thus in 1 Cor. 15 : 52, where Paul speaks of "the last trump," the reference, it is contended, is to the series of trumpets or blasts, spoken of by John. When Paul, in Hebrews 11 : 19, says that Abraham looked for *την τους θεμελιους εχουσαν πολιν*, "the city having *the* foundations," the use of the article, it is said, implies that the subject was familiar to those whom he addressed. As to the *last* trump, Paul might have learned enough from the prophets, as some understand Isa. 27 : 13, and 54 : 11—17, Zach. 9 : 14, to authorize such an expression ; but we prefer to say, that there is nothing remarkable in the fact, since Paul too was divinely inspired by an original and independent revelation. Certainly the Old Testament predictions set forth, distinctly enough, the heavenly city—the city of God's abode, that shall be called *ΙΕΡΟΥΣΑΛΗΜ*, Ezek. 48 : 35, Jer. 3 : 17, and Zech. 2 : 10—13, which was the great object of hope and expectancy, on the part of the ancient worthies who "died in the faith"—familiarly and confidently spoken of and anticipated, anterior to, and during the days of Christ and his apostles.

The value and force of this sort of internal evidence may be judged of by the reader from one or two additional examples. Peter speaks in Ch. 1 : 3—9 of the appearing of Jesus Christ, and in v. 13 of his revelation. The word is *αποκαλυψις* in both places. This, Dr. Tilloch accounts to be a reference by name to the book of Revelations—*εν αποκαλυψει Ιησου Χριστου*—and hence he infers that it must have been written prior to Peter's first epistle. In the epistle to the Colossians also he finds "a *torrent* of internal evidence of its having been written later than the Apocalypse," and is surprised that critics "should not have perceived it." But that evidence is found in such expressions as "*the inheritance of the saints*," Col. 1 : 12, compared with Rev. 21 : 7, delivered as from "the power of the darkness," &c. ; and Col. 1 : 13, compared with Rev. 16 : 10, 22 : 5. Col. 1 : 14, 16, 17, 18 with Rev. 1 : 5, 9 and 4 ; 11 : 10, 6.¹ Just as if different writers, referring to a common subject of deep interest, would not sometimes adopt similar expressions, especially those by which it is most frequently and forcibly presented :—and, as if separate and independent communications might not be made by the same Spirit of inspiration, and in the case of Paul, who actually received by inspiration the Lord's Supper, an ordinance previously established (1 Cor. 11 : 23—25), and the Gospel he preached, which was identical with that of the older apostles (Gal. 1 : 12, *δι' αποκαλύψεως Ιησου Χριστου*)—not certainly from John's Apoca-

¹ Tilloch on the Apocalypse, p. 88.

lypse!! Who does not see, that this is in fact learned trifling? and that *such* exalting of the internal evidence against the external, is only exposing its weakness and want of just claim to the confidence demanded for it!

It is much more direct and manly to do as Bauchmair has done, —amend the reading of Irenæus by introducing a syllable into a word, and claim that what he is reported to have written, ΔΟΜΙΤΙΑΝΟΥ was originally Δομιτιου, which was the pronomen of Nero. Certainly it is much more ingenious to do as Guerike suggests, that when Irenæus says “that the Apocalypse was seen not long ago, but almost in our generation πρὸς τῷ τέλει τῆς Δομιτιανοῦ ἔρχης,” the word Δομιτιανου is to be taken, not as a noun, but adjective, and if an adjective, according to Greek formations, it belongs properly to Domitias, as Δομιτιανικός would to Domitian, so that Irenæus has been always thus understood, having in fact meant to date the Apocalypse in the reign of Nero! Prof. Stuart, however, cannot accede to the correctness of the criticism, however important it would be for his argument, and however convincing it was to Guerike.

Such is a careful and we think candid investigation of the evidence pro and con, on the subject of the date of the Apocalypse. The reader will make his own reflections, and the whole is submitted to his serious consideration.



ARTICLE II.

CHRISTIANITY FORETOLD UNDER THE SYMBOLS OF JUDAISM.

By Prof. E. P. BARROWS, Jr., Western Reserve College, Hudson, O.

In the beginning of the fourth chapter of Micah, occurs the following passage, which, by the beauty and grandeur of its imagery, never fails to arrest the attention of the reader of taste, while its bright anticipations of the future glory of God's house, send a thrill of holy rapture through every pious bosom :

“But in the last days it shall come to pass, that the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be established in the top of the mountains, and it shall be exalted above the hills; and people shall flow unto it. And many nations shall come, and say, Come, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us his ways, and we will walk in his paths: for the law shall go forth

of Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall judge among many people, and rebuke strong nations afar off; and they shall beat their swords into plough-shares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up a sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. But they shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig-tree; and none shall make them afraid: for the mouth of the Lord of Hosts hath spoken it."

The same words, with the exception of the last sentence, occur also in Isaiah (2: 1-4), with some unessential variations. As Micah and Isaiah were contemporaries, the context alone will enable us to decide to which prophet the passage belongs as original, if indeed both have not quoted from some source to us unknown. The evidence from this would seem to be in favor of Micah; for in him it appears in connexion with what precedes and follows, while in Isaiah such a connexion cannot be clearly discovered. But this is a question of no importance to the view which we propose to take of the prophecy, and, with these passing remarks, we dismiss it.

That these remarkable words contain a prophecy of the extension of Christianity over all the earth, with the peace, plenty, and blessedness that ever follow in its train, will hardly be denied by any one who believes in the reality of prophetic inspiration. Under the Mosaic economy, which has vanished away never to return, they were not fulfilled either in form or in spirit. It remains that they be fulfilled under the gospel. But, though the matter of the prophecy is the Christian dispensation, its *dress* is wholly Jewish; and this is the point to which we wish particularly to direct the attention of our readers—Christianity foretold under the symbols of Judaism. The conception of the prophecy is throughout thoroughly Jewish. Under the Mosaic ritual, "the mountain of the house of the Lord" was the central point of divine worship. According to this ritual, all the public services of religion were restricted to one place—the tabernacle, and afterwards the temple erected by Solomon upon Mount Moriah, which, by the Jewish writers, is reckoned as a part of Zion. Whoever wished to bring an offering to the Lord from any part of the land, was compelled to repair to Jerusalem, and present it to the priests in attendance at the temple; for, by the laws of Moses, no sacrifice or oblation could be offered except by the priests, and at no other place except the altar in the court, first of the tabernacle, and afterwards of the temple. "Take heed to thyself that thou offer not thy burnt-offerings in every place that thou seest: but in the place which the Lord shall choose in one of thy tribes, there thou shalt offer thy burnt-offerings, and there thou shalt do all that I command thee." (Deut. 12: 13, 14.) The same rule applied to unbloody offerings of every kind, as abundantly appears from an inspection of the Levitical institutions. To "the mountain of the Lord's house" the people were, moreover, commanded to resort three times every year, and that with offerings according to their ability.

“Three times in a year shall all thy males appear before the Lord thy God, in the place which he shall choose; in the feast of unleavened bread (the passover), and in the feast of weeks (the feast of Pentecost), and in the feast of tabernacles: and they shall not appear before the Lord empty: every man shall give as he is able, according to the blessing of the Lord thy God, which he hath given thee.” (Deut. 16: 16, 17.)

And the priests were commanded, in return, to instruct the people in the knowledge of God’s law. It was especially enjoined upon them to do this on the Sabbatical year. “At the end of every seven years, in the solemnity of the year of release, in the feast of tabernacles, when all Israel is come to appear before the Lord thy God, in the place which he shall choose, thou shalt read this law before all Israel in their hearing. Gather the people together, men, and women, and children, and thy stranger that is within thy gates, that they may hear, and that they may learn, and fear the Lord your God, and observe to do all the words of this law.” (Deut. 31: 10–12.)

Jerusalem was also the seat of royal authority, the fountain of civil as well as of religious law. There were “set thrones of judgment, the thrones of the house of David.” In a word, Zion was the centre of both political and ecclesiastical power. Ark, altar of burnt-offering, altar of incense, priest, king—all were collected within the walls of Jerusalem. There God dwelt between the Cherubim in the holy of holies, concealing the brightness of his glory from all mortal vision, save that of the high priest, who was allowed to enter into his immediate presence once every year, on the great day of atonement. It is hardly possible for us to conceive of the depth and tenderness of emotion with which the pious Jew thought of Mount Zion. To him the holy city was “the beauty of perfection.” (Ps. 50: 2.) At the prospect of visiting her, his heart leaped for joy. “I was glad when they said unto me, Let us go into the house of the Lord. Our feet shall stand within thy walls, O Jerusalem.” (Ps. 122: 1, 2.) When he beheld her sacred walls, he exclaimed, in a transport of holy rapture, “Beautiful for situation, the joy of the whole earth, is Mount Zion, on the sides of the north, the city of the great King. God is known in her palaces for a refuge.” (Ps. 48: 2, 3.) He ever conceived of her as the appointed residence of Jehovah. When his king had gone forth to battle, he prayed that God would succor him from Zion, as from his constant dwelling-place. “The Lord send thee help from his sanctuary, and strengthen thee out of Zion.” (Ps. 20: 2.) In exile, he ever turned his face towards Jerusalem in prayer (Dan. 6: 10); and, though her walls were laid in ruins, he took pleasure in her stones, and favored the dust thereof. (Ps. 102: 14.) It was impossible for him to form any other conception of the extension of the true religion to the diffe-

rent nations of the world, except that of its diffusion under the forms of the Mosaic ritual from Jerusalem, as a central point, and the consequent flowing together of all people to the solemn festivals there annually celebrated.

In perfect accordance with this Jewish idea, is the prophecy now under consideration. It represents the universal diffusion of the knowledge and the love of God, under the conception of an expansion of the Mosaic economy over the whole earth. In the indefinitely distant future, so often indicated in the Hebrew Scriptures, by the words "the last days," he sees "the mountain of the Lord's house" "established in the top of the mountains," and "exalted above the hills." As Zion is now to be the central point of attraction to the whole earth, he beholds this mountain with its temple lifted up to the very summit of the highest mountain ranges of Palestine, and established there above all the surrounding hills, a conspicuous object of observation to the whole human family.

The spirit of prophecy has lifted up the prophet himself between the earth and the heaven, and brought him in the visions of God to Jerusalem, and placed him on the topmost pinnacle of her temple. There he beholds the men of every nation, flowing in mighty streams to Mount Zion from all quarters of the globe, and urging each other forward in their course. They come with an obedient spirit to learn and do the will of God. "Come," say they, "and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us his ways, and we will walk in his paths." The Lord sits enthroned in his temple, and proclaims to all the gathering millions his holy law, so that Jerusalem now becomes the fountain of truth, knowledge, and justice to all mankind. "For the law shall go forth of Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem." As of old he judged between the tribes of Israel, justifying the righteous and condemning the wicked, so now he is made the Judge and Arbiter of "many people," even "strong nations afar off." Having in an obedient and loving spirit, submitted their controversies to his righteous tribunal, instead of an appeal to arms, as heretofore; and having received with willing hearts, the holy and benevolent principles of his government, all the implements of war become unnecessary. Universal peace, plenty, and security, succeed to the tumult and bloodshed which have hitherto filled the world with terror and wretchedness. "They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up a sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. But they shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig-tree, and none shall make them afraid." This state of the world is so different from that which has heretofore prevailed—the change is so great and glorious—that the promise almost stag-

gers belief. But it is made certain to us by the word of the omnipotent and ever faithful God. "For the mouth of the Lord of hosts hath spoken it."

Let us now inquire after the meaning of this sublime imagery. With those who would represent these words as only a fond dream of human enthusiasm, we have at present no concern. Assuredly we regard them as spoken by the spirit of prophecy, and as containing a promise of the future extension and glory of God's church which, when realized, shall fully meet the highest hopes and the brightest anticipations which they are naturally adapted to create in the mind of the believing reader. What are these hopes and anticipations?

Thus much must be conceded by all—that the extension of the true religion over the whole earth, with the blessed accompaniments of universal peace, security, and plenty, is here predicted in unequivocal language. The true religion is, for substance, that which was possessed by the Jews to whom this prophecy was uttered; the same religion which we now possess; for Christianity is not the substitution of a new religion for an old, but the old religion embodied in a new and better form. We must carefully distinguish between the substance of religion and her accidents—between the living being herself and the dress in which she presents herself to us. Religion herself is immutable. From age to age she remains ever the same. The piety of Enoch and Noah, before the Abrahamic covenant, was not different from that of Abraham and Joseph under this covenant; nor that of Abraham and Joseph under the Abrahamic covenant alone, from that of Moses and David and Isaiah under the superadded economy of the law. Nor was the religion of these Old Testament saints another religion than that of John the Baptist, who lived, as it were, between the Jewish and the Christian economy; or that of Peter and Paul, who lived under the full light and glory of the gospel dispensation. The faith of those who shall be found living upon the earth when the last trumpet shall sound, will be the same as the faith which made Abel's offering acceptable to God.

But while religion herself remains in all ages the same living being, the forms in which she clothes herself may vary to meet the varying exigencies of the different periods of the world's history. In the institutions of Moses, she was the same spirit that had vivified the simple rites of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But she had, by God's appointment, and for the accomplishment of a specific end, become clad in the splendid ritual of the tabernacle service, with its august priesthood; its numerous sacrifices and oblations; its solemn assemblies; its distinctions of clean and unclean meats; its "days and months and years." These constituted the new habiliments in which piety was to exert her living energies, until, in the fullness of time, she should be

permitted to drop this magnificent but cumbersome attire, and be clothed upon with her last and most perfect earthly form. That it is under this simple and spiritual form, and not under that of Judaism, or some *tertium quid*, analogous to Judaism, to be hereafter introduced, that the prophecy now under consideration is to receive its fulfilment, admits not of a reasonable doubt. At the time of our Savior's appearance, the old theocracy, with its sacrifices and its central place of worship, adapted expressly to the wants of one particular nation, and totally unfitted for universal extension, had waxed old and was ready to vanish away. Its sacrifices were for ever superseded by the all perfect offering of Christ: its central temple, by the gift of the Holy Spirit, ushering in a dispensation not confined to places and seasons—a revolution in the constitution of God's church which our Savior had already intimated when he said to the woman of Samaria, in answer to her inquiry respecting the right location of the temple: "Woman, believe me, the hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father. Ye worship, ye know not what: we know what we worship, for salvation is of the Jews. But the hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth; for the Father seeketh such to worship him." (John 4:21-23.) And as to the *tertium quid* which some have imagined—an economy distinct from both Judaism and the present dispensation of Christianity, but analogous to the former in its having Jerusalem for its central point, we shall presently see that the prophecies of the Old Testament, soberly interpreted, furnish no certain ground for this hypothesis.

Why, then, it may be asked, was the spiritual economy of Christianity foretold under the symbols of Judaism? Why was it not set forth in its own naked majesty and simplicity, instead of being enigmatically shadowed forth under the gorgeous trappings of the Mosaic ritual? To this it might be a sufficient reply to ask in turn, why are not the glories of heaven set forth in the Scriptures in their naked majesty and simplicity, instead of being dimly shadowed forth under images taken from all that is esteemed noble and excellent among men—marriage feasts, white robes, golden crowns, thrones, crystal streams, trees of life? Is it quite certain "that the spirits of just men made perfect" will literally walk with Christ in white, and wear golden crowns, and recline in Abraham's bosom? The true answer to both the above questions is, that what things men are not prepared to apprehend in their simple spiritual excellence, must be symbolized to them by images taken from objects with which they are familiar. This principle our Lord distinctly avowed in his teachings. "Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God: but to others in parables. (Luke 8:10, and the parallel passages.) "I have yet many

things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now." (John 16 : 12.) So also the apostle Paul : "I have fed you with milk, and not with meat : for hitherto ye were not able to bear it, neither yet now are ye able." (1 Cor. 3 : 2.) The passage so often quoted and applied to the blessedness of the heavenly world, "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him" (1 Cor. 2 : 9), was applied by the apostle, not to the glories of heaven, but to the glories of the gospel dispensation, as exceeding all that the ancient patriarchs and prophets had been able to conceive of. It is especially worthy of remark, that in a majority of the passages in which the apostle Paul uses the word "mystery," he applies it to this very thing, the abolition of the Mosaic economy, with the exclusive spiritual prerogatives which it conferred upon the Jewish people, and the introduction, in its stead, of a catholic dispensation which placed all nations on a common level in respect to religious prerogatives. He speaks of this as a mystery made known unto him by revelation, "which in other ages was not made known unto the sons of men, as it is now revealed unto the holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit ; that the gentiles should be fellow-heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of his promise in Christ by the gospel." (Eph. 3 : 5, 6.) The Jews were willing enough to believe that all nations should finally be brought to the knowledge and worship of the true God in subordination to themselves, as their religious and political head. The accomplishment of this, they supposed to be the proper work of the Messiah. But that all nations should be placed on a level with themselves, as co-ordinate members of God's family, was a truth which they could not receive, even when forced upon them by miracles the most stupendous, and judgments the most terrible. How much less could they have received it in the days of Isaiah and Micah, while the theocracy was yet in its vigor, and had not, as in the days of Christ and his apostles, fulfilled its mission, and fallen into the decrepitude of old age ?

God, therefore, wisely withheld a premature disclosure of the future dispensation of Christianity in its naked simplicity and spirituality ; a disclosure which would, humanly speaking, have been followed by much error and misapprehension, and would have had the effect to bring existing forms into dishonor, without giving men anything better in their stead. He left his church to conceive of that future glory and enlargement which he promised her, under the idea of the extension of the Mosaic economy over all the earth.

In accordance with this simple principle, a large class of images employed by the Old Testament prophets in predicting the future extension and prosperity of the church, finds a natural and easy solution. The subject-matter is the triumphs of Christianity in her present simple and spiritual form ; but the drapery is borrowed

from the economy under which these prophets lived, and were educated. The bright visions of the future, with which they are favored, and which they describe in such glowing terms, are the revelations of God's Spirit; but they are all cast in the mould of Judaism. Whoever denies this principle in Old Testament prophecy, will find himself involved in formidable difficulties.

A writer on prophecy who, as an able and faithful minister of Christ, merits and receives our highest esteem, states as "among the points, or facts believed by different writers who have pursued their investigations furthest, to be taught in prophecy," that, after a series of preparatory events, among which are the restoration of the Jews to their own land, in the midst of great revolutions and convulsions among the European and Asiatic nations; a general dissolution of society through the spirit of lawlessness and violence, of corruption and revolution; a great conspiracy among the anti-christian nations, leading to the great war of Gog and Magog predicted by Ezekiel:—

"That some time, either previous to, or during these movements, the sign of the Son of Man coming in the heavens, shall be seen, and he descending from the heaven in the air with his saints, for the resurrection of their bodies, and catching up the saints alive on the earth, into the presence of the Lord;—that at this coming, which will be sudden and unexpected, he will inflict dreadful judgments on the apostate nations by means of volcanic and other fires, which will destroy the seat of the Beast, the mystic Babylon, but not all the nations of the earth;—that while his saints remain for a series of years in the immediate presence of Christ, before he descends from the air to the earth, being judged and allotted to their stations and work, he will be conducting his retributive judgment on the nations of the earth, preparing the way for the full restoration of Israel and their national conversion, in a manner analogous with his Providence towards them, for forty years in the wilderness;—and that when the work of judgment by various interpositions of his Providence, shall have gone on, and the wickedness of the anti-christian nations shall have come to the full, at the last signal stroke of Divine vengeance, he will descend from the air, and stand upon the Mount of Olives, utterly to destroy the hosts of the wicked, to change the geological structure of Jerusalem and its vicinity by a terrible earthquake, and to produce those transformations designed to fit it for being made the metropolis of the world;—that he will re-establish the Theocracy in Jerusalem in more than its pristine glory, with its temple re-built, and rites of worship adapted to the dispensation in which Jerusalem and the Jewish nation are to stand pre-eminent among the nations;—that having concluded his work of retributive justice by various means, through a series of years, to the entire extermination of the wicked on the face of the whole Roman earth, there shall be found rem-

nants of people, on whom the abundant and mighty influences of the Spirit of God shall have been poured out, and nations to be born in a day, by their thorough conversion and cordial submission to the dominion of Heaven, by means of the saints;—that these powerful effusions of the Spirit, and the dominion of Christ by means of his raised and quickened saints, will bring the heathen nations, and the uttermost parts of the earth, the whole world, into peaceful, blessed subjection;—that the risen and glorified saints will be his Kings and Priests, for the administration of the political and religious interests of the nation;—that the Theocracy, with its temple rebuilt as described by Ezekiel, and established in Jerusalem, shall be the nucleus and centre of all political and religious influences, and all the nations of the earth be united to it.”—&c., &c.¹

Here is a host of particulars, to pass a judgment on which individually would be an undertaking too gigantic for us, and if accomplished, useless; for we have observed that, ever since the beginning of the Christian era, all such particular specifications beforehand, of the events foretold in prophecy, have proved delusory, and we firmly believe that they will prove so in this case. The only point to which we wish at present, to direct the attention of our readers, is the idea advanced by our author “that he [Christ] will re-establish the Theocracy in Jerusalem in more than its pristine glory, with its temple rebuilt, and rites of worship adapted to the dispensation in which Jerusalem and the Jewish nation are to stand pre-eminent among the nations”—“that the Theocracy, with its temple rebuilt as described by Ezekiel, and established in Jerusalem, shall be the nucleus and centre of all political and religious influences, and all the nations of the earth be united to it.” To avoid misapprehension, we here remark, that we keep this question of the re-establishment of the Jewish Theocracy distinct from that of the literal restoration of the Jews to Palestine, which latter might be advocated on separate and independent grounds.

The whole fabric of our author’s argument with regard to the restoration of the Theocracy, rests on the untenable principle, that whatever prophecy of the future extension of Christianity is couched under the forms of Judaism, must be fulfilled under these forms. Now if this is a sound principle, we ought to carry it out without flinching at any of the consequences to which it leads. In reference to this very event which we are considering—the universal extension of the true religion—God says, “from the rising of the sun unto the going down of the same, my name shall be great among the Gentiles; and in every place incense shall be offered unto my name, and a pure offering; for my name shall be great among the heathen, saith the Lord of hosts.” (Mal. 1:11.) Here is a reference to the Jewish rite of burning sweet incense on the golden altar. But are we to understand that, in the latter days,

¹ Duffield on the Prophecies, pp. 164, 165.

all nations shall literally offer sweet incense to God? If so, then the Romish church is, for once at least, more orthodox than we Protestants, or the primitive Apostolic churches.

Again, it is said in the prophecies of Zechariah, with reference to the same day, "And it shall come to pass that every one that is left of all the nations that came against Jerusalem, shall even go up from year to year to worship the king, the Lord of hosts, and to keep the feast of tabernacles. And it shall be that whoso will not come up of all the families of the earth unto Jerusalem to worship the king, the Lord of hosts, even upon them shall be no rain, and if the family of Egypt go not up, and come not, that have no rain, there shall be the plague wherewith the Lord will smite the heathen that come not up to keep the feast of tabernacles. This shall be the punishment of Egypt, and the punishment of all nations that come not up to keep the feast of tabernacles." (Zech. 14: 16—19.)

Here we have an extension of the law of the feast of tabernacles, in all its strictness, to "all the families of the earth," and that under the most tremendous penalty. The law of the feast of tabernacles was, that every male should repair, once a year, at a set time, to Jerusalem, and there dwell eight days in booths, in commemoration of the sojourning of the Israelites in tents in the wilderness. (Numb. 29: 12—35. Deut. 16: 12—15.) The kind of argument which goes to prove the literal restoration of "the Theocracy with its temple as described by Ezekiel," goes also to prove the literal visit of all the nations of the earth to Jerusalem annually, to keep the feast of tabernacles, and their residence in that city eight days in booths, according to Zechariah. But this latter is so evidently an impossibility, that no man in his sober senses will contend for its literal fulfilment. Why then contend for the literal restoration of the temple and the Theocracy?

But this is not all. In the same chapter of Zechariah, sacrifices are spoken of as still in use. "In that day the pots in the Lord's house shall be like the bowls before the altar. Yea, every pot in Jerusalem and Judah, shall be holiness unto the Lord of hosts; and all they that sacrifice shall come and take of them, and seethe therein." (vs. 20, 21.) The allusion is here to the peace-offerings, upon which, after a portion had been burned upon the altar, the offerer and his friends feasted. It follows, according to the principle of interpretation which we are considering, that, in that day, every pot in Jerusalem and Judah will be consecrated to the work of seething the flesh of the peace-offerings that shall be offered by "all the families of the earth." But inspiration has taught us that literal sacrifices of every kind are done away by the one perfect sacrifice of Christ.

And why contend for this principle of interpretation? Is it not enough that the prophecies of the future glory of God's church

that are couched under the symbols of Judaism, be fulfilled in their spirit and substance—more gloriously fulfilled than the prophets themselves were able to conceive of? Must we insist also upon the fulfilment of the Jewish drapery in which they were clothed, in accommodation to the ignorance, carnality, and narrow ideas of the people to whom they were addressed? That the Old Testament prophecy, “Behold I will send you Elijah the Prophet,” may be fulfilled, will it not content us that John the Baptist has come “in the spirit and power of Elias,” but must we demand that Elijah himself, the identical man who was translated to heaven, should come again? To us it seems plain that when a prophecy is fulfilled in its “spirit and power,” in its very substance, it is enough. If we interpret the prophecy, which is the subject of the present article, in its “spirit and power,” disregarding the Jewish symbols in which it is clothed, it foretells the universal triumph of Christianity (which originally proceeded from Jerusalem as her central point of radiation), with the peace, security, and happiness that follow in her train. Less than this, it cannot be understood as asserting. More than this, the laws of sober interpretation do not warrant us to infer from it; although we wish not to affirm that, when the prediction shall have been fulfilled, more will not be seen to have been included in it.

Before closing, we wish briefly to allude to an argument upon which the writer above quoted, and those who adopt for substance his views, lay great stress. This is the slow progress of Christianity under the present instrumentalities employed for its propagation; and the apparent hopelessness of its final triumph, without a second miraculous interposition in its behalf. But here we are extremely liable to deceive ourselves, while we look only at the surface, and not at the deep under-current of human affairs. A system of good influences often works for many successive generations against opposing malign influences, without seeming to make much progress; nay, more, without apparently holding its own, and yet in the end comes off triumphant in some mighty struggle, in which it summons to its aid all the resources which it has been silently, but steadily, accumulating for ages. The Jewish Theocracy had for its main end, the establishment in the nation placed under it, of the fundamental truth that Jehovah is the true God, and that beside him there is no other God; and this as preparatory to the introduction of the Christian dispensation. Yet, for many successive centuries of degeneracy, it seemed to be receding further and further from this end, rather than approaching nearer to it. All its resources were exhausted, apparently in vain, upon a stubborn and rebellious race, who only waxed worse and worse under the efforts made to reclaim them. At the era of the Babylonish captivity, the defection had become almost universal. A few good men only, were left to weep over the abominations

which they could not prevent. And yet, in the deepest gloom of this night of degeneracy, the Theocracy had almost reached its goal—had almost accomplished the work assigned to it. That final, decisive stroke—the captivity of the nation for seventy years—brought all the labors of the patriarchs and prophets for many preceding centuries, to a focus, and the triumph, so far as the outward service of God is concerned, was complete.

If another illustration were needed, it could be drawn from the victory of primitive Christianity over paganism. For three centuries of suffering and blood, she had maintained the conflict with the “great red dragon” of imperial Rome, with all the pomp, power, patronage, civil and religious institutions, and ancient traditions of the civilized world arrayed against her; while she had on her side only the truth and the Spirit of God. Never were her prospects apparently more dark than under the fierce and long continued persecution of Dioclesian. But this was the last fiery ordeal of the conflict, and the victory gained here was decisive.

And all along her course, Christianity has been impeded as well by the mistakes of her friends, as by the malice of her enemies. But she has survived the perils which have come upon her from both these sources, nor has she survived to no purpose. From every error of her defenders, from every new assault of her foes, some lesson of practical wisdom has been gained, and recorded for the benefit of succeeding generations.

The era preceding the Reformation was dark and dreary—an iron age of ignorance and crime; but it was followed by a brighter day than the Church had seen since the primitive ages. Yet very much that had been gained at the commencement of the Reformation, was lost within half a century, through the folly of its friends and the craft of Rome, and the remainder was only half saved. Still, with all these drawbacks, the gain to the cause of truth was incalculable. The principles established in that mighty struggle of spirituality against formalism, remain in the world—a precious leaven, which is slowly, but certainly, working throughout the whole mass; and, if we do not misinterpret the signs of the times, is preparing the world for a still greater and more successful conflict, in which the truth shall gain such victories over error as earth has never yet witnessed.

But whatever is to be the issue of the present agitations in the religious and political world, God’s promise is sure. There shall come a day of universal holiness, peace, and blessedness; “FOR THE MOUTH OF THE LORD OF HOSTS HATH SPOKEN IT.”

ARTICLE III.

JESUS CHRIST ATTESTED BY MIRACLES, AND YET REJECTED BY THE JEWS.

By REV. SAMUEL T. SPEAR, Brooklyn, N. Y.

THE title placed at the head of this article, presents a singular fact in the history of this world. Let us endeavor to comprehend this fact. It is manifestly a compound fact, having two parts.

In the first part, Jesus Christ is set before our intelligence, as the worker of miracles, and by those miracles proving the truth of his claims, and the certainty of what he taught. This aspect is both historical and extraordinary. *What are miracles?* They are not simply unusual and extraordinary events; but such as are contrary, and superior to, the established laws of nature, as ascertained by human experience, individual and general, with the exception of that experience which affirms the reality of the miracle. In the very nature of things, miracles cannot be general and common events;—these attributes would at once destroy their miraculous character. They are facts, but not such facts as conform to the laws of nature;—in the want of which conformity lies the miraculous property. The *direct* inference of the theist is, that the miraculous fact must be referred to the power of God for its cause. The propositions given as the conditions of this inference are these, i. e. that there is a God, who has power; that the laws of nature are established by God; that none but Himself can in any instance set them aside, or produce an event contrary thereto; that the law, or laws contravened by the miracle, are certainly ascertained by the human mind. These propositions exist in the faith which affirms the reality of miracles. A miracle is an event calculated to arouse these thoughts from the intellectual dormitory, and bring them out upon the field of mental visibility. It becomes an impressive proof, both of the existence of God, and the direct presence and exertion of his power. The *indirect* inference from a miracle involves the question of its ultimate design. Since it is of God, what does he mean by this event? It is difficult to adopt more than one answer to this question; and that answer must be this, i. e. God means to authenticate the divine mission of those by whose agency the miracle occurs, and by consequence, the infallible truth of the messages they deliver. A miracle is God's argument—one method, by which he reasons with men; a call for their attention; Jehovah's finger pointing towards the agent, and bidding others to hear. He, "whom no man hath seen, nor can see," speaks first in the miracle, and then by the lips of its worker. The event is to the beholder, or believer, a simple declaration in

reason's ear, that God is nigh for the purpose of revelation and instruction; it is not itself a revelation of doctrine or duty, but the antecedent of the divine voice. The generic proposition, on which this moral inference rests, is, that God will never work a miracle in support of falsehood. The miracle commits the divine veracity, but does not prove it. In application to its design, it assumes the existence of that veracity. If this assumption be questioned, then Jehovah adopts no method to refute the cavil; the mind is left to do so at its peril. It is enough for God to evince the fact that he hath spoken. He does not propose to prove everything.

This sketch contains the leading ideas of Christians in respect to the nature, the direct and ultimate uses of miracles. They are not *a priori* conjectures—mere hypotheses having no real theatre of application; they belong to the religion of the Christian, and connect themselves with the claims and credibility of Christianity. A very material part of that Christianity is reported to us in the four gospels. These contain the earthly life of Christ, so far as God has chosen to give it to the world. From them it appears, that Jesus wrought miracles, publicly, under various circumstances, in Judea and Galilee, continuously from time to time, for about the period of three years; and that on repeated occasions he appealed to those miracles as proofs of his divine mission, as evidence of the truth of what he said. We have a detailed account of a very considerable number of these miracles, and general allusions to a much greater number. Those which are described, are miracles; it is not possible to view them in any other light, without violating every law of interpretation. It is evident, that the historians intended to assert miracles; and as evident, that they have done so. Jesus, therefore, the founder of Christianity, is attested to us, and was to the Jewish nation, by the evidence of miracles. The thoughts contained in the foregoing sketch apply to him and his doings, with their utmost strength.

In the second part of the complex fact we are endeavoring to comprehend, we find this same Jesus rejected by the people, among whom these miracles were wrought. This rejection was not universal, as will be shown in the sequel. Yet it was extensive—so much so, that it became a national act. It included a constant disposition to cavil against the doctrines of the Great Teacher; frequent complaints of his practice; refusal to believe in him or accept his teachings; the exercise of violent and unholy passions towards him; slanderous and reproachful remarks about him; the deliberate purpose to accomplish his death, and ultimately its execution in a most cruel and terrible manner. These facts are spread over the evangelical history; some one or more of them appear from time to time, during the whole course of the Savior's ministry. To a good extent, their parallel is found in the subsequent treatment of his disciples by the same people. In their aggregate, they consti-

tute that awful act of the Jews, which Christians have styled the rejection of the Messiah. The apostles were accustomed to allude to this series of transactions, as being well known, too public for a denial. Their statement is copious in respect to particulars; they speak with an honest plainness, and sometimes with a truthful severity. In the preface to his gospel, John gives this comprehensive summary of the Savior's treatment by the Jews: "He came unto his own, and his own received him not." In a subsequent passage he combines the miracles and rejection of Jesus, in a single statement: "But though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him." On the day of Pentecost, Peter thus spake to the Jews: "Ye men of Israel, hear those words; Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you by miracles, and wonders, and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you, as ye yourselves also know: Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain." The apostles preached Christ crucified, as the Hope and Savior of Israel—the Light of the Gentiles; and, although their ministry brought to view the divine interdictment in regard to the crucifixion of Jesus, yet they never lost sight of the fact, as an historical truth, or of the awful criminality of the Jews in respect to the same.

The above statement is intended to open the field of our present inquiry; it contains, in an abridgment, the historical phenomena to which it is now proposed to invite the reader's reflections. The treatment of Jesus by the Jews—his rejection in opposition to the proofs he gave of his commission from heaven; this certainly is a most wonderful event. It strikes us as a singular incongruity between what *was* and what *ought* to have been; as a very strange mode of treating evidence. Even pious minds have looked upon the scene with astonishment; and sceptics have affected to regard it as too unnatural and improbable to be believed. The question was frequently asked of the Christians in early times, Why was not Jesus better received, if he was the Son of God, the Messiah, the Great Teacher, and if he did in the presence of the people, those wonderful things, which are assigned to him in the gospel history? This question has not become obsolete in the tactics of modern scepticism. It will be the purpose of this article to make some comments upon the facts involved in this inquiry.

I. A man would do great injustice to the case, were he to make its mere strangeness, its assumed improbability, the only theatre of his mental observation. Suppose the fact, as stated in the Gospels, to be among the strangest things that ever occurred—so much so, that we look at it with profound amazement, and hardly know what to say; that it forms a climax of improbability in the action of men. Is it, then, just to spend the entire energy of our faculties upon the mere strangeness of the fact? Shall we try so great an

issue as that of Christianity, at this single point ; observe nothing else ; and by consequence fail to see the extent and character of the proof, which establishes the fact ? This is the uncandid and intellectually dishonest position of cavillers ; it is a very general characteristic of such minds to misapply the strength of their faculties, to seek for the difficulties of Christianity ; and then glory in the artificial darkness which has eclipsed the broad field of its evidence. This mental procedure is not such as philosophy in its sober senses can sanction, or experience approve. Men, who are accustomed to think, know better than to take this course ; and if they be strictly honest inquirers, it is fair to presume that they never will. The career of Napoleon Buonaparte is an historical wonder ; it contains so many *a priori* incongruities, and as a whole may be viewed as so improbable, so unlikely, that a very plausible scepticism might be adopted in support of its rejection. His origin, the zenith of his power, and his subsequent fate make an historical congeries, widely different from the ordinary course of human event. In a little tract entitled "Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte," Archbishop Whately, assuming to be a philosopher taught in the school of Hume, attacks the credibility of Napoleon's history on the ground of its improbability. The argument is a just application of Hume's principles ;—the reader smiles at its beautiful plausibleness, as he reads ; and yet nobody doubts the truth of the history which delineates the career of the wonderful Napoleon. There have been but few Napoleons, perhaps never but one. Shall we therefore say, that the history is a fiction on account of its extreme singularity ? In the more common concerns of life, men believe when they are not a little astonished at the objective materials of their faith. A jury may pronounce a man guilty of murder upon sufficient evidence, when their own minds are amazed that he should have committed the deed. In itself, it has such strange peculiarities, as to make the event improbable ; yet that improbability is completely overcome by the force of evidence. The man is condemned, because, according to the proof, he must have done the deed ; and yet it is a matter of wonder, that he should have done it. If the jury were to think of the marvel of the fact only, they would do great injustice in the case. The assumed improbability of the Savior's rejection by the Jews, if he wrought miracles before them, is plainly therefore, not the only, or principal field of mental observation, if we mean to be candid men. The aggregate weight of the Christian argument is amply sufficient to neutralize this improbability ; it has vastly more power to prove, than the improbability has to deny. He, therefore, who muses simply upon what he chooses to style the strange mysteriousness of the event, would be logically wise, and probably cured, were he to give a broader range to the action of his intellectual faculties. Campbell on

Miracles, and Lardner on the credibility of the New Testament Scriptures, I am sure, would be of no disservice to such a mind.

II. The wonderful miracles of Christ, and his rejection by the Jews, are stated to us by the same historians. The Gospel narrative is the principal source of our knowledge in respect to both of these events. The same events appear among all the Christian writers of the first ages of the Church. They also appear, more or less, in heathen writers of contemporaneous existence. Tacitus distinctly alludes to the fact, that Christ was put to death in the reign of Pontius Pilate; and Celsus, a Pagan and infidel of the second century, in his comment upon the Gospel Memoirs, brings to view these events so largely, that the leading facts in the life of Christ, as stated in the Gospels, may be found in different passages of this infidel writer. The case, however, as made for our consideration, is so made by the narrative of the four Evangelists. Here we find Jesus working miracles; here also, we see Him rejected and crucified by the Jews. Now, if the testimony of the Evangelists be credible in respect to one of these events, it is equally so in respect to the other, unless between the two there should be a manifest contradiction, when it would be credible in respect to neither. It will not be pretended that the miracles of Jesus, and his rejection by the Jews, involve anything like an absolute contradiction; and if not, he who reasons from either, admits the validity of the Gospel history; or he is playing a mere game upon his own mind. He goes to the Evangelists for certain facts. He either believes in the truth of their record, or he does not. If he admit the narrative in respect to one of the facts; if it be convenient for the purposes of his argument, to view Jesus as *rejected*, because the Evangelists say so, then why should he not hear these same witnesses in respect to the other point, *i. e.* the miraculous powers of the Savior? If they are competent to testify to the one, they are to the other. He, who consults history for a fact of history, is bound to presume the truth of that history on all the points to which it testifies, unless its falseness in respect to some one or more particulars shall be established by a more credible history, or by involving a necessary impossibility, not a mere improbability. We have no right to be fanciful eclectics in respect to the records of history. In regard to historic testimony, some persons have the unphilosophical habit of believing when and where it suits their purpose to do so; also of disbelieving when this is convenient. They smite and caress the same historian with equal grace; use and repudiate his testimony in the same breath. He is good to give them one fact, but another equally clear statement must be rejected, not for any historical reasons, but because they have imagined, that the first being granted, the second is improbable. This process converts a man's own conceptions into a standard of the past; he carries the greater

light within himself; that of history is a mere addendum to set his faculties in motion, rather than present objects for the apprehension of those faculties. A witness, or a series of witnesses, whom I admit in respect to one point, unless there be some special reason to the contrary, may justly claim my confidence in respect to other points, where they are equally competent to testify. If the report of the Evangelists be credible in respect to the rejection of Christ; if they be good to assure the world of this fact, then their narrative in respect to the miracles of the Saviour is not to be set aside, simply because he was thus rejected. The two classes of phenomena are by no means so incongruous, that they might not both exist, as will more fully appear in the sequel. There is no evidence for the one, which does not equally support the other; and in respect to either there are no historical sources of denial. The improbability, therefore, of the one event, the other being granted, is completely neutralized by the credibility of the testimony which asserts both. The light of Gospel history in the premises is a clearer light than any mere conjectures.

III. It is not probable that the Evangelists would have stated the case, as we find it in their narrative, unless it had been real. The alleged unnaturalness of the account, the very quality which excites the surprise, would have prevented a forger from making it. It is not at all wonderful that the Evangelists have written as they have, the things being as they have described them. The certainty of the things, as known to themselves, would lead them to speak and write in the simple and artless manner of honest witnesses—precisely as they have done—making no provision for the cavillers and sharpshooters of after ages. The realities are such, so marked, so exciting to the attention, that, without any reference to their inspiration, we cannot suppose the Evangelists would pass either class in silence, if they were about to publish the memoirs of Jesus. The obviousness of those realities to themselves, the simplicity and entireness of their own convictions, would supersede the necessity of any critical or philosophical comment to harmonize the different parts of their story, or place their narrative in an attitude that would forestall all objections. In neither of the Gospels have I been able to find a single passage, that bears the least appearance of being a reply to an apprehended criticism of posterity. On the other hand, if the authors of the Gospel narrative were inventing a story for the gaze of future generations, there is a moral probability that they would have made a different narrative. The skill displayed in this narrative is most astonishing, if it be an invention—an intellectual miracle of the highest order. Such skill must have been competent to the foresight of all difficulties. We cannot suppose that it would have brought the wondrous Hero, so well conceived, to the cross of Calvary—cursed by the Jewish nation, and murdered in awful

violence. It would have seemed to the fabricators, as it did to the disciples during the ministry of Jesus, that such a being could never meet such a fate. I venture to say, that no mere human fancy would be likely to make such a combination as this—i. e. Jesus walking on the sea of Galilee, and, at a word, hushing the storm; and then hanging in apparent helplessness on the cross. The contrariety is too striking to be admitted, if the inventors were laying a plan to entrap the faith of after-ages. That some miserable wretch, without friends or power, should be crucified, would not be at all unnatural; but that Jesus, with the powers attributed to him, should die on the cross, is not such a scene as an inventive fancy would project. It would make the inventors appear as writing with all the seriousness of faithful history—with an equally serious attempt to make others believe in the truth of their statement; and yet in reference to the end proposed, nothing would be gained by such a combination; it would seem to them a decided disadvantage to their story, a peroration not comporting at all with the exordium, or body of the discourse. The entire historic picture of Jesus is not such an one as human art would, or could make; the marks of reality and truthfulness, as appertaining in the Gospel narrative, are “so great, so striking, and so perfectly inimitable” by mere invention, that to suppose it a fabrication is to suppose superhuman powers in the fabricators. The tone of character, the type of morality, and the grade of wisdom, assigned to the distinguished person, either existed in him, or were conceived by the Evangelists, and all combined by their genius. Jesus, the subject furnished in their narrative, is confessedly without a parallel. Would inventors and hypocrites (for the supposition would make them such) have ever planned and finished such a supernatural achievement? Never. The Evangelists have made combinations unnatural for a fabricator; in the qualities and attributes they have assigned to Jesus they have made a perfect being. How then came this story to be told, as it is? Because God’s providence first made the facts; secondly, because inspiration qualified the biographers of Jesus to give a true picture of those facts, and this is the only *reasonable* account of the matter. If any one should think that this view has its difficulties, its hard points for faith, let him find any other not embarrassed with vastly greater difficulties.

IV. A process of reasoning *a priori* with regard to human conduct, in opposition to the truth of authentic history, is by no means satisfactory and safe. We reason *a priori* in regard to human conduct, when we infer from the *nature* of the case what men will do in given circumstances, assumed to exist. This mode of reasoning is undoubtedly admissible under certain limitations; yet it is never to be set in opposition to the plain light of history, or testimony which proves a different state of facts. These two cir-

cumstances are always to be taken into the account: First, we are not infallible in our mode of reasoning from the nature of the case; we cannot comprehend perfectly all the antecedents which belong to the subject; our view at best is but an imperfect one. Secondly, it is not true, that men *always* do as they *ought* in the circumstances, from which we reason, and thus judge what they will do. Juries often astonish us by their verdicts; and even common sense itself, as developed in some minds, becomes a fool. Passion, prejudice, and selfishness, not unfrequently make human conduct exactly the opposite of what it should be in the circumstances. We may calculate upon the sequence of physical phenomena with very considerable accuracy; but in respect to those which are mental, involving moral agency, the case is widely different. Whether our creed be that of philosophical liberty, or moral necessity, in either case *a priori* presumptions clearly have no right to change, or reject the facts of authentic history.

This view has an important bearing upon the question under review. The miracles of the Lord Jesus appear to us so wonderful, that at first it seems almost impossible that the Jews could have rejected him. But the Evangelists tell us, they did refuse to receive and honor him as the Messiah, and thus they contradict our inference. What we think they ought not to have done, history declares to be a fact of their practice. That the case as given in the record is more credible than the one made *a priori*, is a point which needs no argument with any mind at all conversant with the extent of credibility, which belongs to the evangelical history. It should also be remembered, that the case as furnished by the Evangelists stands alone by itself. There never was but *one* Messiah. Never before, or since, were a people situated precisely as were the Jews, when Jesus appeared among them, wrought his miracles, and was finally crucified by their hands. The case of Jesus of Nazareth in his ministry and fate, has no parallel in the world's history; and hence there is not even one historic case from the days of Adam to this hour, that can be assumed as a standard, to determine how a people would treat such a being in such circumstances. The nearest parallel is to be found in the history of the Jewish prophets. How did the Jews treat these prophets? Did they always hear their voice and obey it? Far otherwise. They often stoned them and killed them. These messengers of God were frequently compelled to say, "Who hath believed our report?" or, as in the case of Elijah, to exclaim, they have "slain thy prophets with the sword; and I, even I only am left; and they seek my life to take it away." The most impressive manifestations of God were made to the Israelites for forty years in the wilderness; and yet their rebellions and sins were so frequent, that only two of all that came out of Egypt, ever entered the land of promise. Subsequently for about a thousand years, God at suc-

cessive periods, sent prophets to teach this people; and yet the Jews, as a nation, often rejected these prophets and put them to death. And again, after they had rejected and murdered the Prince of Life, their conduct in the war with the Romans, a war which involved the catastrophe of the nation, presents a people whom Satan seems to have taken into his charge. If then we are to reason about the statement of the Evangelists from the nature of the case, the history of the Jews is the legitimate field of our thoughts, and not some abstract and hypothetical state of humanity. I venture the opinion, that whoever shall carefully study this history, will have his surprise at their rejection of Jesus very considerably abated; it will seem to him less wonderful, that a people, who had done so many other things somewhat like this, should also have committed this act. This was unquestionably the climax; and in it, and the other history of the Jews, we see how much God may do for a people, and yet how depravity may lead them to treat the divine procedure. It is possible for a nation to be exalted to heaven, and yet cast down to hell.

V. The historic case presented by the Evangelists was fully anticipated by prophecy. The Old Testament Scriptures are clearly prophetic in reference to the Messiah and his times. They specify a long series of characteristics to be found in the person of the Messiah, by which He might be recognised, when he should make his appearance on the earth. Jesus was accustomed to appeal to the words of prophecy, and by them to support his claims. The Apostles were in the constant habit of using them, when enforcing the Christian argument upon Jewish minds. Now it was fully predicted, that the Messiah should be treated by the Jews, notwithstanding the evidences of His Messiahship, as the Gospel narrative tells us he was treated in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. This point has been so frequently argued by Christian writers, that I shall content myself with merely a general reference to the scope of prophecy. Despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief; oppressed and afflicted; brought as a lamb to the slaughter; wounded for our transgressions and bruised for our iniquities; cut off out of the land of the living; not esteemed by the nation to which he came smitten as the Shepherd of Israel; these and similar categories are some of the characteristics which prophecy had assigned to the Messiah ages before—"the Holy One and the just" suffered on the cross. What the Gospels describe as matter of history, the Spirit of prophecy had essentially anticipated. They state no stronger case than that of which the Jewish prophets had written, but the very same case. The foresight of such a wonder requires the inspiration of God; its history, when compared with the prophecy, makes an appeal of no ordinary strength. The two melt into an overwhelming argument, and constrain the soul to

cry out, "Jesus of Nazareth! we know thee—who thou art—the Son of God, the Savior of the world; in the very fact that thou didst come to thine own, and thine own did not receive thee, we are the better convinced that thou art the promised Messiah." The conduct of the Jews, so far from being an objection to Jesus, is really an important item, which proves the truth of his mission; it fulfills prophecy, and thus sustains the credibility of the Gospel narrative. Had it been different, there would have been a discrepancy between prophecy and history. In the synagogue at Antioch, Paul alludes to this thought with pertinency and power—"For they that dwell at Jerusalem, and their rulers, because they know him not, nor yet the voices of the prophets which are read every Sabbath-day, they have *fulfilled* them in condemning him. And though they found no cause of death in him, yet desired they Pilate that he should be slain. And when they had fulfilled all that was written of him, they took him down from the tree, and laid him in the sepulchre." Acts 13: 27, 29. The Apostle's idea is, that the Jews, in guilty blindness, had done what God by his prophets foretold they would do. What in this aspect is the Gospel narrative? The testimony of the Jewish prophets in actual fulfilment. Though it be more complete in historic details, it is not more distinct as to the main point, i. e. the rejection of the Messiah by the Jews.

VI. According to the Gospel narrative, the rejection of Jesus was not universal among the Jews. If the Evangelists had narrated all the wonderful things, which they do, in regard to Jesus; and if in the course of their account it had appeared, that no impression was produced on any mind—that not a solitary human being was in any way affected by these extraordinary manifestations of the distinguished person—no thought elicited—no inquiries awakened; then indeed the account would be singular in the extreme, and we should be led to imagine, that a new edition of human nature had been published, since the days of Jesus. This, however, is by no means the strangely improbable case, which these writers have submitted to the world. According to their accounts, Jesus of Nazareth, by the signs and wonders which attended him, as well as by his preaching, did produce a most powerful impression in Palestine. His fame spread like lightning over all that land, and into many adjacent countries. His ministry and miracles most thoroughly awakened the attention of the Jewish people. In the courts of royalty and in the cottages of the poor, he was a strange, an exciting problem for thought. Multitudes followed him; the sick and the infirm were brought into his presence; journeys were taken to see the wonderful Prophet of Galilee; the knowledge, that he was in a place, was sufficient to draw masses of people together; the Scribes and Pharisees, and the Jewish council, had their attention specially turned towards him, and kept a close watch of his

movements. Many believed on Him, and confessed Him as the Christ, the Savior of the world; even some of the chief rulers believed, but did not confess Him because of the Pharisees, loving "the praise of men more than the praise of God." Terms of astonishment and surprise were falling from a thousand lips in respect to Jesus of Nazareth. He was the theme of great, intense, and universal excitement, as every one must see by a perusal of the Gospels. Nicodemus spake for more minds than his own, when he said—"thou art a teacher come from God; for no man can do these miracles which thou doest, except God be with him." These facts are in perfect harmony with those extraordinary powers and evidences, which the Gospel narrative assigns to the Prince of peace; they are some direct effects, whose absence we can hardly conceive to be possible, in any community of men that ever-lived. The Evangelists make no special effort to give prominence to these facts, as if anticipating their necessity in the argument of a future age; they simply weave them into the tissue of their narrative, as they advance—each fact falling naturally into its proper place, and being sufficiently accounted for by the circumstances which surround it. There is a simple and inimitable truthfulness apparent in Peter's appeal to the Jews on the day of Pentecost—"Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you by miracles, and wonders, and signs which God did by him in the midst of you, as ye yourselves also know." Though they at last had murdered the Savior, they were not by any means ignorant of his miracles; neither was the nation unaffected by them. Peter knew the facts; and he knew, that they knew the same facts. The fact also, that the first converts to Christianity were drawn from Jewish ranks—that this occurred not in some age remote from the time of Christ, but as an immediate sequent to the facts of the Gospel story, and on the theatre of those facts; this adds not a little to our conception of the impression among the people, which the Savior had produced. He had left upon the records of their memory the materials for a subsequent conviction and conversion. The first Christians, whose contiguity to the time of Christ gave them the most perfect opportunity to know the facts, received Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ attested by miracles, yet rejected and murdered by the Jews. They acted like men, who so well understood both classes of facts, that they had no occasion for a philosophical harmony to adjust their relations. Their action is an honorable testimony to the Son of God—in perfect coincidence with what we should expect from the records, which that age bore of His eventful life. The Church was planted amid perils and persecutions upon Jesus Christ, miraculously attested, and yet spurned by His countrymen according to the flesh. The evangelists, in writing their Gospels and presenting Jesus under these aspects, do not write like men, that are starting *new* ideas, but like men, who are

stating what everybody knows. Jesus had not lived in vain ; and they knew it ; the impressions of His wonderful life were stamped on the consciousness of the age, without one written syllable to perpetuate its memory. Their memoirs of Jesus clearly show this ; and the establishment of the Christian Church is full proof to this effect.

The artifice of Josephus in recording the events of this period is apparent to any critical eye. He was a general in the war of the Jews with the Romans ; prior to the siege of Jerusalem was taken prisoner ; and was treated with favor both by Vespasian and Titus. He shows himself to be an extensive historic scholar, well versed in the affairs both of the Roman and the Jewish people. Of the latter he collected and published a history, giving a full account of the war which overthrew his nation. He lived upon the very confines of the Savior's ministry. He *was* not, and he *could* not have been totally ignorant in regard to the wonderful things, which had transpired during that ministry. With events that have no direct relation to Christ, he shows the most perfect familiarity ; yet, with the exception of a single passage, whose genuineness is in controversy among the learned, he makes no allusion to the life or death of the Savior. His history passes directly over this period, most amply confirming the occasional or incidental facts of the evangelical history ; yet in respect to Jesus Christ he manifests the most studied silence ; as also in respect to his followers. Was there nothing for Josephus to record ? Had the Savior produced no public impression ? Was he absolutely unknown ? The testimony of the evangelists, supported by ancient Christian authors, and in some respects by heathen writers, gives a very different verdict. We suppose, that Josephus, as a Jew, chose not to lend his pen to transmit to posterity the memory of Jesus Christ ; his silence seems to be " wilful and affected "—he preferring a chasm in his history, rather than to fill it up by speaking of Christ. His silence could not have been owing to ignorance ; it must have been the politic design of a Jew. Dr. Lardner observes, that " Josephus knew how to be silent when he thought fit, and has omitted some things very true and certain, and well known to the world." Even in respect to his own people, there are many apparently designed omissions by this historian. He has passed over in total silence the sin of the Israelites in making and worshipping the *golden calf*. So also he makes no mention of the *brazen serpent*, " so expressive of the crucified Savior of the world." His silence in respect to the life of Christ and the affairs of the Christians, is an act, which God has overruled for his own glory. Josephus manifestly has no sympathy with Christ, no concert with his followers. In recording the state of things in Judea during the ministry of Christ and his apostles, he has most amply confirmed the evangelical narrative in respect to

its *incidental* facts. He proves the evangelists to have been well acquainted with the country, its condition, and circumstances; and to have made a true statement in regard to those things, which were merely incidental to their main design. The reader is referred to the works of Dr. Lardner, vol. i., for a very elaborate and learned exposition of this coincidence between Josephus and the writers of the New Testament. In his account of the destruction of Jerusalem he has also borne the most valuable testimony to the fulfilment of the Savior's predictions in respect to the fate of that city. In this aspect Josephus, without intending it, has become a collateral witness to the credibility of the New Testament, not easily set aside. Collusion with the Christians surely cannot be imputed to him. On the whole, therefore, his silence in respect to Jesus is not a loss, but rather a gain to the Christian argument. Posterity needed to have such a man as Josephus perform the work he did, and omit what he did. Jesus did not need the honors of his pen. Other and better hands were appointed to draw up an account of his wonderful life.

VII. It is the character of the miraculous dispensation, not absolutely to compel men to the exercise of faith, but simply to produce a powerful occasion for the exercise. On this point we are very liable to form erroneous opinions. We have never lived in an age of miracles; we have seen no miracles. We are apt to imagine, that the evidence of miracles, when addressed to the senses, is so powerful, that it commands faith by an absolute necessity—that there can be no infidelity in an age of miracles—that no obliquity of mind or perversion of heart can turn the evidence aside; but, that the mind must receive the teacher and the doctrine miraculously attested, having no power to do otherwise. This opinion is without any good foundation; it is believed to be a false opinion. Let us look at the question for a moment.

A miracle is obviously composed of two parts, i. e. the *physical* or *phenomenal*, and the *rational* or *inferential*. The first part contains the facts, of which the senses take notice; the second, certain inferences, which are the work of reason. These were adverted to in the commencement of this article. They are such as the following, i. e. that the miracle is wrought by the power of God, that the doctrine uttered by the visible worker is of divine authority, and ought to be received as the truth of God. Now it will be granted, that the physical department of miracles constitutes a most wonderful occasion to arouse the reason, and force these deductions upon the understanding; it is morally sufficient, and makes faith a duty. But does it compel the mind to these inferences, and necessarily secure the obedience of the will and the affections to the doctrine, or the duty?—Not at all. It is perfectly possible to be an infidel in an age of miracles in respect to the rational or inferential department of such a dispensation. God has never made

the circumstances of faith on *moral* subjects such, that the mind, called upon to believe, may not disbelieve. Faith, considered as involving intellectual assent not only, but moral practice in the light of that assent, is not always in the ratio of evidence; other causes, as the state of the heart and the processes of the understanding, have much to do in deciding the effect of evidence.

In the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, the former is represented as desiring that the latter may return from the scenes of eternity to those of time, to give a warning to his brethren, "lest they also come into this place of torment." The answer is, "They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them." The rich man replies—"If one went unto them from the dead, they will repent." To this the response is returned—"If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." The supposition is, that they might reject a miracle and message as wonderful, as the resurrection of one from the dead to speak to them; more, that they would do so, if they will not hear Moses and the prophets. This is the conception of the Great Teacher; and it conclusively shows, that miraculous testimony, though addressed to the senses, does not compel the obedience of faith in respect to the doctrine taught, or the duty to be done. According to the account given by the evangelists, John the Baptist witnessed the miraculous testimony of the Father to the Son at the baptism of Jesus; was assured of his Messiahship, and certified the same to the Jews. When, however, he was cast into prison, some new phase came over his mind; he began to waver, and sent messengers to Jesus to know from his own lips, whether he were the true Messiah. The Savior directs those messengers to go and tell John the things they saw and heard; here he leaves the matter, where God always leaves it, i. e. short of the absolute compulsion of faith. This state of John's mind is the more significant, on account both of his previous conviction and the excellence of his character. I can hardly suppose, that any one will impute to the evangelists the invention of this story, that it might serve for the argumentative use to which I now apply it. Again, as we trace the history of the Savior, we find that the Scribes and Pharisees, when beholding, or ascertaining the miracles he wrought, did not enter upon those processes of thought, which were appropriate to the events. They were offended with his doctrine, or the time of the miracle; and, when most severely pressed with the evidence, they had a way of avoiding the proper inferences deducible therefrom. He hath a devil, and by Beelzebub, the prince of devils, he casteth out devils; the thing is done—the physical part of the miracle is here; but God is not in it. Their mental occupancy was not such as the evidence demanded; and the reason appears in every stage of our Savior's ministry. The evangelists have not described these men

as giving attention to the facts with an earnest and unprejudiced effort to ascertain what they proved, and then coming to the strange conclusion attributed to them. Celsus, a celebrated infidel of the second century, admitted the reality of Christ's miracles; yet he refused to believe in him. He had a method of explaining them away by referring them to magic. The history of the miraculous dispensation and of human beings in connexion with it, prior to the time of Christ, abounds with particulars showing that miracles, though sublime and impressive manifestations of Jehovah, and powerful occasions for faith, are nevertheless capable of being perverted; that they may fail of their proper effect. The proof on this subject is primarily an historical question; and what history affirms is not to be set aside by any assumed philosophy in regard either to miracles, or the nature of man. What may be is a fair inference from what has been; and the latter is a question for history, and not conjecture, to decide. And if we follow the historic light, our conclusion is, that there never was an age, in which either the philosophy, or the superstition of men, or ingenious contrivances of some kind, might not prevent miraculous attestations from producing their appropriate effect on human beings. In respect to the possibility of disbelief, a supernatural and revealed religion, and the doctrines of deism, occupy a common relation to the human mind. The fundamental point of God's existence is proved, but not so proved that man in his perverseness may not say, "There is no God." The distinction between right and wrong is manifest, yet not so manifest that it cannot be denied. Every article, in the wide circle of religion and morals, is susceptible of a denial. So far as we know, it is the general economy of God, in dealing out evidences to beings in a state of probation, not to coerce their faith, or make it unavoidably necessary. It is a characteristic of his moral government, with which the miraculous dispensation, as we find it in history, conforms. The obvious design of it is to make the circumstances of existence appropriate for the formation of moral character; not to make a moral being necessarily good, or necessarily bad.

In the light of this view, we remark, that the rejection of Jesus Christ, notwithstanding his miraculous powers, is by no means an incredible anomaly. Had his rejecters considered, as we verily think they ought, the evidences within their reach, it is not at all probable that they would have done as they did. That they should not, however, have thus considered these evidences, and treated the case according to its merits, is not an impossible supposition. The manner in which the Messiah conducted the miraculous proof of himself, bears decisive indications that he meant to present a complete test of the character of the nation. The proof, taken as a whole, made a very powerful case to any mind disposed candidly to appreciate it; and with such minds it was amply

sufficient. It was, however, so adjusted in its times and circumstances, as to give the utmost scope to the action and character of the Jewish people. There was no effort to produce what might be called grand miracles, whose mere magnificence should excite the nation. His miracles were not those of destruction, terribly suited to fill the land with fear. There was no studied plan to make them public. In general they were performed upon persons in the lower ranks of life, so that the mere subjects of them should not give them any undue importance. They were considerably dispersed both as to time and place; and thus gave the fullest opportunity for thought. The Savior also consented to have every one of his acts called in question; he did not by mere power repress mental operations against himself. It was not perilous to dispute with Jesus, to speak against him. Though he had power, he did not use that power to crush his antagonists; he was ready to meet them; he did nothing to excite their fear in respect to personal safety. When his "hour" was come, and the murderous purpose of his enemies had reached its climax, then the miraculous glories of the Son of Man were chiefly suspended. Having given the marvellous proof of three years in regard to himself, at this moment he pauses, and submits his person into the hands of those who sought his life. He neither avoids them, nor intimidates them by any display of power. The Savior distributed the testimony so as to make it progressive in quantity—always sufficient to convince candid and well-disposed minds—yet always leaving the character of the nation with its rulers to a natural expression of itself. He did not burn down their cities, or rock the land with earthquakes. He did not storm the castle of the national faith, so as to expel his enemies against their own consent. He appeared as a man, was seen as a man, spake as a man. Though his miracles often excited great astonishment, and those who heard him were constrained to confess, "Never man spake like this man;" yet the whole ministry of the Lord Jesus was not planned so as to take the faith of the nation by surprise, or compel his own acceptance by the force of circumstances. His appeal was not addressed to mere curiosity, not to the love of the marvellous, not to the ambition or the fears of men, but to the conscience and moral feelings of the heart. The miraculous evidences by which the appeal was sustained, were so graduated as to leave the people in a state of intellectual, as well as moral, probation. The question, whether Jesus was the true Messiah, demanded thought; and, if we may judge from the records of his ministry, it was not meant to be so perfectly obvious, that even perverseness itself could not by any possibility make a mistake. Coercion of faith was not the necessary sequent of the miraculous dispensation, as evolved in the hands of the Great Master. Those, who then lived, needed candor, freedom from prejudice, attention to the evidences;

correct reasoning, independence of popular currents ; they needed essentially the qualities of mind and heart requisite for moral discovery, in order that they might treat the great question of the age according to its merits. Neither the ministry nor the miracles of Jesus were intended to supply the place of these qualities, and compel the formation of just conclusions in their absence.

VIII. The Jews in their rejection of Jesus did not regard him as the Messiah foretold in the Old Testament Scriptures. The predictions of the prophets had led the Jews to expect the coming of the Great Prophet. This was not a new idea at this time ; it had long been entertained ; it is still cherished by this ill-fated people. The prophetic period indicated in the chronological prophecies of Jacob and Daniel had expired ; and there was a prevalent expectation, that the Messiah would come about the time at which Jesus appeared, claiming to be that Messiah. This explains the inquiry submitted to John the Baptist, i. e. whether he was not this Messiah. Luke informs us, that "the people were in expectation, and all men mused in their hearts of John, whether he were the Christ, or not." The attention was so strongly turned to John, that "the Jews sent priests and Levites from Jerusalem" with the distinct question, "Who art thou?" Dr. Lightfoot supposes, that this expectation contributed to the convocation of the Jews from all countries, unto Jerusalem, at the feast of Pentecost. Several impostors took advantage of this crisis in the national faith, and assumed to set up the kingdom of the true Messiah. Josephus had the iniquity to flatter Vespasian, a heathen emperor, with the pretended belief, that he, Vespasian, was the true Messiah of the Jewish prophets. All the historic light we have in respect to this remote period, shows that the age was distinctly marked with the Messianic faith ; it was both the popular and the learned faith of the nation.

This point being premised, we inquire, what was the posture of Jewish mind in respect to the question, whether Jesus of Nazareth was this Messiah? That the question was canvassed, that Jesus was understood to affirm his Messiahship—are points which fully appear in the gospel narrative. What was the result? I think, we may discover in the gospels, three distinct states of opinion upon this fundamental question:—

1. In the first place, there were some who were satisfied that Jesus was the Messiah, and were prepared to give full credit to his statements. How numerous was this class, we have no means of determining ; yet they appear to constitute a very decided minority in respect both to number and influence. Of this number were the disciples, the twelve and the seventy, many of those who had been healed by the Savior, many pious women, some rulers of synagogues, and even some of the priests and chief rulers. In the grade of their attachment and devotion they exhibit very considera-

ble variety; yet, on the main question, they appear to be of one mind. Of Jesus and his Messianic kingdom, their ideas were exceedingly inaccurate. Although they were prepared to say, "thou art the Christ," they very imperfectly understood the import of their own allegation. They had adopted the prevalent opinion, that Christ was to be a temporal king; and at times they appear much embarrassed by not seeing this expectation realized in Jesus. They were, however, friendly; some of them were ardently attached to the Savior; they never appear in the ranks of his opponents. They believed on him, and believed what he said, though their faith in its objective aspect was not at all distinct. These persons are not to be placed among the open and active rejecters of Christ, for had all sympathized with their state of mind, he never would have been crucified.

2. In the second place, there were others, who were greatly excited and astonished at the preaching and miracles of the Lord Jesus; thought him a most wonderful being; and yet reached no fixed and stable opinion in respect to his person. Herod, at one time, seems to be of this number. Hearing of Jesus he conjectured that he might be John the Baptist, risen from the dead. Some thought that he was Elijah; others, that he was Jeremiah; and still others, that he must at least be one of the prophets, risen from the dead. At times they entertained some idea of the Messiahship of Jesus, and were disposed to crown him as King. In number, they exceed the class previously mentioned. Nothing appears in the evangelical history to justify the opinion, that, if left to themselves, they would have sought the death of the Son of Man. They were often offended and left him; yet they exhibit no strong, deliberate, and self moved tendency towards deeds of violence. They were uncertain friends, if friends at all—yet too much impressed with what they saw and heard, coolly to contrive and then industriously to prosecute the enterprise of death against Jesus. They formed a mass of humanity, in the movable state of opinion. Had Jesus in certain respects answered their Messianic expectations, they would have been his followers. His failure on this point made them accessible by influences adverse to the Savior. Their state of mind was not to be trifled with, but managed.

3. In the third place, there was another class of men, whose minds were in a state of the most violent and burning antipathy to Jesus of Nazareth. They were determined to resist him, to resist all his evidences; they early imbibed a strong prejudice against him; they never surveyed him with the candor of an equable and well-balanced judgment; their chief motto was to put him down, and ruin his reputation in the estimation of the people; they had assumed a mental position, which made it morally impracticable for them to judge, free from bias. Who were these persons? They were the Ecclesiastics of the age. The rulers of Synagogues, the

Elders, the Scribes, the Pharisees, the Sadducees, the priests, chief and common, the members of the Sanhedrim—these are the men, that in the gospel history appear prominent, as the opponents of the blessed Jesus. They were the leaders of the people, both in church and state, combining ecclesiastical and civil functions. They were united in dreadful and persevering concert against the Prince of life; were constantly engaged in filling the masses with prejudice; were ever ready to take exceptions to the Savior, to his doctrine and his practice. Their position gave them power; and they exerted it with malignant industry. They had the reputation of being very pious; yet were they a generation of vipers, whited sepulchres filled with dead men's bones. Like the priesthood of Rome in the dark ages, they baptized crime in religion. Thus they appear in the gospel narrative; and Josephus, their own historian, gives substantially the same view of their character. They were wicked men, armed with power, plethoric with traditions, and fully committed against Jesus in the very commencement of his ministry, for causes to be named in the sequel. Their attitude made it exceedingly difficult for the Savior to convince them that he was the Messiah, by any species of evidence he saw fit to produce; and then their known position had great effect in neutralizing the impression of his ministry upon the popular mind. "Have any of the Pharisees believed on him?" was a potent argument in that age. These men were never in a condition to be good and impartial judges of Jesus Christ; their intellectual energy was expended at an enormous disadvantage for the discovery of truth. They began their career against Jesus in such a way, that consistency required progress; they created the necessity for every species of device in resisting the Messianic evidence; and in that resistance they deceived, and fatally diverted their own minds from the truth. The account of Dr. Lightfoot, in reference to the conduct of "the faithless Jews," at a subsequent period, furnishes an appropriate commentary upon the spirit of the Savior's opponents, when he was on earth. The learned author observes, that they have adopted two expedients to evade "the undeniable force and argument of Christ's miracles." First, they say, "that the Messiah, when he came, should do no miracles at all. This position is asserted in the Talmud, in Sanhedrim, in that famous chapter called 'Helek,' where the Gemarists do speak exceeding much concerning the Messiah, and about his coming; and from thence it is produced by Maimonides. The wretched deceivers having this poor shift to answer to all the miracles that Christ did, which indeed were infinite." Secondly, they say, "that what miracles Jesus did, he did them by the power of the devil." As, "the Pharisees said, this man casteth not out devils, but by Beelzebub, the prince of devils." And so the Talmudists, in the treatise Sabbath;

“did not the son of Satda (so they title our Savior, and there is a blasphemy in it) bring sorceries out of Egypt.”¹

From this sketch of the state of the Jewish mind, it is easy to perceive what power began and continued the opposition to Jesus Christ, and finally made it successful in procuring his death. His enemies did not reject him with a calm and pious persuasion, that he was indeed the true Messiah, but in guilty misapprehension of his person and mission. They had sufficient influence, and they so managed the exertion of that influence, that they caused the nation, as such, to acquiesce in the deed. Themselves in a lamentable mistake, they became “blind leaders,” and had more power to destroy, than had the friends of Jesus to preserve. This false apprehension appears in the evangelical Memoirs, and is fully conceded to the Jews by the Apostles. “But though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him.” In allusion to the Jewish persecution of his disciples the Savior said, “And these things will they do unto you, because they have not known the Father, nor me.” Peter concedes the same point—“And now, brethren, I wot, that through ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers.” To the same effect is the language of Paul; “For they that dwell at Jerusalem and their rulers, because they knew him not, nor yet the voices of the prophets, which are read every Sabbath day, they have fulfilled them in condemning him.” The latter Apostle declares, that had they known him, “they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.” A sad instance of mental obliquity! The people, whose prophets had for ages sung of Christ, under the influence of their leaders refuse to receive him, when he comes! To this there were many honorable exceptions, yet not sufficient to destroy the national character of the act. The Evangelical charge against the Jews is not, that they murdered the Messiah knowing him to be such, but that they did it in a state of guilty ignorance, for which the evidence furnished left them no apology. Their leaders and doctors were at the head of this dreadful enterprise: and at last the people became willing to say, “Crucify him, crucify him.” “His blood be on us and on our children.” A deed so appalling, in such perfect violation of evidence as we now view the case, deserves further consideration.

IX. The Jews entertained some expectations in regard to the Messiah, which they failed to verify in the person of Jesus. It is true, that many of the prophecies had assigned to the Messiah indications of royalty and great dignity. He was to be a King—to have a kingdom—to sit on the throne of his father David—to subdue his enemies—and to his kingdom there was to be no end. In this aspect the prophetic drapery was sublime—brilliantly painted with the tokens of power. The phrase so often occurring in the New Testament, “The kingdom of God,” or, “The kingdom of

¹ Lightfoot's Works, vol. v., p. 268, 269.

heaven," was evidently derived from the style of Messianic prophecy current in the Old Testament. Equally true, according to the words of prophecy, was it, that the Messiah was to be a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief; in some respects a very humble personage, despised and rejected of men. If he were David's Lord, he was nevertheless David's son; and as son, he was predicted as "a root out of a dry ground," having "no form nor comeliness," no "beauty," or worldly attractions, that should lead the ambitious and carnal to "desire him." His humble appearance, his passions and sufferings, were largely the themes of prophecy. Extreme humiliation and the royalty of empire were equally visible on the prophetic canvas. This made an apparent contrariety, which the exegesis of an ambitious, corrupt and tumultuous age, would not be likely to solve.

At the time in which Jesus made his appearance, the Jews had fixed their attention upon those prophecies which relate to power and triumph; they seem to have forgotten those other prophecies, which described the humble condition and lowly aspects of the Messiah. This period of Jewish history is replete with indications to this effect. It is not the great design of the evangelists to set forth this fact, yet it incidentally appears in various parts of their narrative. Herod the Great evidently entertained this idea of the Messiah. He murdered the infants of Bethlehem, hoping in the destruction to involve the infant King, in whom he saw a temporal rival, and by whom he feared that the government would pass from himself and his family. The visit of the Magi aroused his attention; "he was troubled" at the inquiry of the wise men, "Where is he that is born king of the Jews?"—and demanded to be instructed on the question, "where Christ should be born." When God had providentially defeated his first contrivance, he causes the infants of Bethlehem to be slain. The evangelist does not specify the motive of Herod in this cruel deed; yet the motive is perfectly apparent. His design was to destroy a supposed rival, from which plainly appears the interpretation of Messianic prophecy current in his own mind. The popular idea on this subject frequently shows itself in the course of the Savior's ministry. After Jesus had miraculously fed the five thousand, the people, who had witnessed the miracle, adopted this saying—"This is of a truth that Prophet that should come into the world." John informs us, that they were disposed at once to "come and take him by force, to make him a king;" and that the Savior evaded their intended honor. The moment they think of Jesus as the Messiah, that moment you see their exposition of prophecy in respect to him. The shouts and honors, attending the Savior's triumphant entry into Jerusalem, were unquestionably occasioned by the same view. He had recently wrought the miracle of raising Lazarus. The miracle had become public, and produced a strong impression

—so strong, that the chief priests intended to assassinate Lazarus. Under the influence of this impression the people go out to meet and salute their king; their conceptions of him, as the Messiah and as a temporal prince, are simultaneous. This view led the mother of James and John to prefer the ambitious request, that her two sons might be prime ministers in his kingdom, the one sitting on his right hand and the other on his left. The disciples themselves were Jews; their original ideas on this subject were strictly Jewish; though they attended upon the ministry of Christ, they long cherished the prevailing interpretation of the age. This explains the slowness of their minds to understand their own teacher. That he should die, that he should be crucified and set at naught by men; *these* ideas did not comport with their conceptions of the Messiah; and hence their great reluctance to receive them, though Jesus often told them of these things. His death for the time extinguished their worldly expectations; his resurrection revives them; and they are ready to say, "Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?" These incidental facts manifest with great distinctness the existing faith of the Jewish nation in respect to the Messiah. Those false Christs, of whom Josephus gives us an account, sought to embody in themselves the current idea; they promised to be temporal deliverers, such as the Jews were anxiously expecting.

In regard to the particular things the Jews had expected to witness in their Messianic king, Dr. Lightfoot makes the following statement: "1. From Messiah they expected pomp and stateliness, a royal and victorious kingdom. 2. From Messiah they expected an advancing and heightening the rites of Moses. 3. By the Messiah they expected to be redeemed and delivered from their subjection to the Roman yoke. 4. By the Messiah they expected that the Gentiles should be subdued, trod under their feet and destroyed."—(Lightfoot's Works, vol. vi., p. 365–366.) The Messiah as king was to be *their* king, for their special advantage and glory, and in opposition to the rest of the world. The teaching of the Old Testament Scriptures in regard to atonement for sin, justification, and spiritual salvation, by the Messiah, had become obsolete in the faith of the nation. The Messiah was seen only as a great and triumphant Jewish prince and leader, making the nation illustrious and powerful by his own wisdom and power. This interpretation of Messianic prophecy also had special charms with the Jews at this period. They were a proud people, accustomed to despise the other nations of the earth; yet they were in a state of vassalage and subjection to the Roman government. This humbled their pride, deeply mortified their national feelings, made them discontented and restless. As a people, they had no love for Cæsar. The Romans also in their administration were not careful to accommodate the prejudices and conciliate the feelings of the

nation. Their government was purely one of power. It often interfered with the sacred things of the Jews; very materially abridged their rights; subjected them to onerous and offensive taxations; and very often the procurators, or provincial governors, were cruel and oppressive. There were several insurrections about the time of Christ, that were suppressed by the Roman arm; the elements of insubordination were rapidly ripening, and at last issued in that terrible conflict, which overthrew the nation and destroyed their city. In this state of affairs they cherished with enthusiastic interest their idea of the Messianic king. Their religion, their love of country, their national pride, their passionate hostility to the Romans, their exposition of prophecy, even their vices were all coalescing in one great impression, i. e. that the Messiah would appear as a temporal prince, break the Roman yoke, and make them a powerful nation. Their desperate purpose at the siege of Jerusalem was fostered and kept alive by this illusive hope.

The reader surely need not be informed, that Jesus of Nazareth did not at all answer these expectations. Though he claimed to be the Messiah, and gave John's ministry and his own miracles as proof, he was not such a Messiah as the Jews had anticipated. In his appearance he was an humble personage; plainly attired; without any of the usual marks of royal grandeur. His immediate attendants were from the lower walks in life. Nothing was observable in him, which sympathized with earthly thrones, or pointed to national conquest. Can he, such a being, this humble son of Mary, the carpenter's son; can he be the Messiah? The natural response of the Jewish nation, as then educated, was in the negative. Look at him—see his family connexions; behold his friends—see his poverty; surely this is not the Prince and Redeemer of Israel, whom we had expected to see. Yes;—but look again: What mean those signs and wonders of his public ministry? the curing of the sick, the raising of the dead, the casting out of devils, the feeding of five thousand, the hushing of the storm? What shall we say to these things? This looks somewhat as if the Messiah had come, or was about to come. There must be something in all this. Perhaps he is the very Messiah: let us assume it, and at once make him a king. In more than one instance the popular feeling and judgment came to this very point, when Jesus, had he been ambitious of power, could have turned the current of the nation towards himself, and all the Scribes and Pharisees in the universe could not have prevented this result. The blessed Savior, however, declined to be made king in the sense they intended; he frustrated their Messianic expectations; he did not do what they judged he ought to do, were he in truth the Messiah. He was not such a Christ as they wanted. His miraculous evidences had to encounter the strong and powerful prejudice of false opinions, which they failed to correct. He was not rejected, because

he wrought miracles, but for other reasons, which the miracles did not overcome.

The history of Jesus in connexion with the Jews, as a people, presents a very singular scene. He did not answer their expectations in his appearance; yet when his wisdom and miracles triumphed over this obstacle, and they were inclined to crown him as king, then he declined the proffered honor; and here again he disappointed them. They were astonished, wondered, and were offended. The nation was moved; everybody heard of Jesus; every mind was more or less at work about him; he was indeed a strange and mysterious problem in the view of that age. The hope of relief in some, curiosity in others, and watchful malignity in still others, kept him in constant contact with the national mind. The final aspect of that mind resulted from a composition of moral forces, in which the rejecting force became prevalent, though he had done so many miracles before his countrymen according to the flesh. This result was not attained without difficulty, without a struggle between truth and error, between light and darkness.

X. Finally, great offence was taken to the character of the Savior's doctrinal ministry. Whoever conceives of Jesus as a silent and august worker of miracles, saying nothing, uttering no doctrines, does not see the case as it was, or as the Jews themselves saw it. He *taught* the people; he commented on the religion and morals of the age. His ministry of preaching and that of miracles were synchronal; and both extended over the period of about three years. We learn from Luke, that Jesus "began to be about thirty years of age" at the time of his baptism; and by the number of Jewish passovers mentioned in the Gospel of John, we estimate the extension of his ministry from the time of his baptism. John has stated certainly three, and probably four passovers. If the former be the true number, then the public life of Jesus lasted less than three years; if the latter, then it somewhat exceeded three years. During this period he was in all parts of Palestine, and in frequent contact with all classes and varieties of mind. He was greatly devoted to the work of teaching; he pursued it with unwearied constancy to the day of his death. He had no public hall in which he gave his lectures—no digested and uniform outline of instruction. He spake readily and freely—taught anywhere and everywhere—taught whomsoever he met, sometimes one, and sometimes thousands. He seems never to have wanted for hearers of some kind. Jesus then was a teacher; so he appeared, and so he was. A very large part of his memoirs is devoted to a recital of his discourses.

It certainly is no unusual phenomenon for a teacher to offend his age, and provoke intense excitement against himself by his doctrines. Jesus of Nazareth is a very striking example to this effect. The least attention to the gospels will show any one, that great offence

was taken at times, and indeed generally taken to the contents of his ministry. Even his disciples could not always endure what he said; and sometimes his apparent admirers turned back and left him, greatly displeased with his preaching. As a whole, in respect to other minds, the Savior's preaching is much more distinguished for resistance than acceptance. This great fact lies upon the very surface of the gospel history, and must be apparent to every student of the Bible. As a mere preacher, Jesus was not very successful with the Jewish people. There were then some peculiarities in the ministry of Christ, which made it offensive and him offensive to the men of this age. What were those peculiarities? It will be sufficient for my purpose to advert to three particulars.

1. In the first place, the character of his moral exegesis, or the type of ethics he taught, gave great offence. The religious morality existing among the Jews when Christ came, formed an exceedingly corrupt system. The prevalent theory of the age was, that moral qualities pertained to the outward act, without reference to the inward state and motives of the mind. The result was, that the spiritual purport and intent of the divine law were virtually set aside. From this proceeded another, i. e. the religion of the nation became a religion of mere forms, of outward observances, in which consisted mainly the piety of Judaism. The number of these forms had been greatly increased by the traditions of the fathers. With the Pharisees these unwritten traditions were equal in authority to the Word of God; they were taught as a part of divine revelation; and to them both priest and people were alike devoted. The observances of the temple worship, the merely ritual sanctity of the Sabbath, the holy washings, indeed all the punctilios of an outward religion, were in great repute among the Jews. Their nice particularity in these respects made them self-righteous. Their conception of themselves, as the peculiar people of God, as the descendants of a sacred ancestry with Abraham at its head, and Moses for a distinguished lawgiver, united bigotry with corruption. Their teachers were as bad as their doctrines, blind leaders of the blind, straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel; in general they were a set of depraved hypocrites, full of cunning and artifice, sitting in Moses' seat, binding heavy burdens for others to carry, devouring widows' houses, for a pretence making long prayers, clothed in the robes of sanctity. True piety, as an institute for the affections towards God and man, as described in their own Scriptures, as containing the elements of real holiness, was almost extinct; and yet the nation was very religious; its ceremonial and traditional purity was at its zenith. Papacy in its very worst days was not a greater departure from true religion, than was Judaism when Christ was on the earth. The Jewish Church was in an apostate condition, honoring God

with their lips when their heart was far from him. The evangelists did not compose their narrative to transmit to posterity the corruptions of this period, neither do they show any plan to use them for the purpose of explaining the ill-treatment of their Lord. The facts were so connected with what they proposed to narrate, that they could not separate the two. Their exceeding brevity subjects us to the necessity of close study, in order to apprehend the terrible picture they have incidentally drawn. This corruption was so great, the case of Judaism was so hopeless, that it was past recovery. In view of it the Savior predicted the subversion and overthrow of the Jewish Church: "The kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof." The fall and subsequent fate of this people have invested this prophecy with all the stern truthfulness of history.

It should be recollected, that the Savior's entire ministry, both of preaching and of miracles, was expended upon this theatre of professed piety, but of varied and appalling depravity. In his teaching he freely and without any disguise assailed the current religion of the age, pronouncing it to be false, abhorrent to God, containing no true and acceptable worship of the Supreme Being, a departure from the scope and spirit of the Jewish Scriptures. He attacked their carnal interpretations, glosses, and perversions of the law; attributed to them the grossest ignorance of the God of Israel, of the nature and purport of his economy. His attack was pointed—without fear or favor;—it doubtless appeared exceedingly severe; it sometimes threw the masses into a spasm of anger, and caused them to gnash their teeth, and drive the Lord Jesus from their presence, and even purpose his death; it kept the Scribes and Pharisees, the paragons and guides, in a perfect rage. He called on the people to repent, to purify their hearts and not their garments; by parables and didactic instructions he taught them, that they must have a better righteousness, or they should all be lost in hell together. Some of his discourses were marked with the most withering rebuke; and his colloquial rejoinders often cut like a two-edged sword. He turned the teaching of the prophets, and of Moses, and the example of Abraham, against the religion of the age; and as for the mighty pyramid of venerable traditions, he swept it to the ground with a single blow. He dealt plainly with that perverse generation, and drew out the violent reactions of unsubdued depravity. His speech was so much to the point, that it was difficult for his hearers to remain in an equivocal position; they must either repent, or be offended. It is true, that many had sufficient discrimination to perceive his wisdom; that some wondered at the "gracious words" which he uttered; that some thought, "never man spake like this man;" that all felt that there was something remarkable and unusual in his sayings. Neither friends nor foes regarded him as a common

teacher. Yet his preaching was too plain, pungent, and severe, on its own account, to be universally popular, either with the people, or the polluted conservators of a corrupt Church. In the absence of his miracles, the common people would not have tolerated his ministry of the Word. The attention which his miracles gave him, contributed to mortify and arouse more deeply the jealousy of the Jewish doctors; for had he been some obscure peasant, these Church dignitaries would not have condescended to notice him.

The purity of the Savior's doctrines in opposition to the impurity of the times and the men of the times, should therefore be well considered, if we would understand the events of this age. He offered no worldly attractions to gain followers; he pretended no bribe to charm the sympathies of vice; the rich and the poor were alike common in his view; publicans and harlots were as much the creatures of God as the Scribes and Pharisees, and vastly more likely to enter the kingdom of heaven; the despised Samaritans were as good as the Jews. The entire tone of the Savior's morality, both as he lived it and taught it, was in conflict with Judaism, theoretical and practical. To this fact we assign no inconsiderable influence in causing the offensiveness of Jesus, and procuring his rejection. It is the history of depravity to find fault with truth that condemns it; and aim its shaft at the bearer of that truth. This feature is never more marked, than when corruption is sanctified by religious titles, and barricaded with ecclesiastical organizations. Then you have the strength of depravity added to the strength of bigotry, and a perverted intellect ministering to both; and the moment you touch the mass, you may look for the strangest phenomena which ever appear in the history of human nature. The Son of Man had to deal with such a fearful compound; he shone upon it, revealing its deformity; and all its pestilential and angry elements were put in motion against him. There was real anger, rage, and passion; deep-seated offence at his morality, truthful and sublime, but terribly condemnatory in reference to the great proportion of those who heard him. He reproduced God's orthodoxy;—and he fell, the victim of violence, yet, as the captain of our salvation, made "perfect through sufferings."

2. In the second place, the Savior was direct, personal, and justly severe in his denunciations against the religious teachers of that corrupt age. In this remark I allude to the Scribes, the Pharisees, the priests, the men who held the censer, made the offerings upon Jewish altars, and superintended the interests and concerns of the Church. The severest part of his preaching was turned against these persons. He marked them out as a class, and denounced the wrath of God upon them. This he did in their presence and in their absence. Many of his parables were for their hearing and profit; and they understood themselves to be meant.

He portrayed their character under the category of hypocrisy envenomed with the poison of the viper; and let fall on their ears the death-knell of their hopes, crying: "Woe! woe! unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites!" He pierced with the sharp arrows of truth their official dignity, and rent their pontifical robes, as it seemed to them, with a ruthless, but in truth with a faithful hand. These were the men, who were contributing more than any others to the corruption of the times. This fact the Savior was wise to perceive; he knew with perfect accuracy the state of things; he saw the nation hastening to its ruin under the influence of bad leaders; and as the Great Prophet he sounded the last loud tocsin of alarm. He had a right to speak as he did; it was the truth, and he knew it. It required the wisdom, and excellence, and authority of such a being as the Lord Jesus to do justice to these men, both for their instruction and that of after ages. They did not repent as a body of men, but were greatly offended; their passions were kindled; they addressed their united power to the work of destroying Jesus; were the authors of the movement, which at last brought him to the cross. They adopted an order, that if any one confessed Jesus as the Christ, he should be put out of the synagogue. They kept some of their emissaries almost constantly upon the Savior's path; they sought to entrap him; seized upon every act, or word, which could by any possible construction, be turned to his disadvantage; they left no stone un-
ed, until they had secured the tragedy of the crucifixion. To accomplish this appears to have been their great work during the passover week, in which the Savior suffered. They acted, as we can easily imagine that wicked men would act, condemned by truth, smarting under reproof they knew to be just, and yet determined not to repent and reform their lives. Poor judges were they of Jesus Christ, with such violence of passion and wickedness of heart. Eminently did they put out their own eyes, and hate the light, "because their deeds were evil." Their state of feeling kept all their philosophy in motion to obliterate the miraculous credentials of him, whom they hated. To be taught, and so signally condemned, by the carpenter's son—this was too much for the Jewish doctors. They were the teachers of Israel; they understood the law, and the prophets, and the traditions; and had no idea of having such a Messiah as Jesus appeared to be. What though he does perform many miracles? Who cares for that? The God of Israel is not in it. Beelzebub, the prince of devils, the lord of idols, is helping Jesus, that he may seduce the nation. Dr. Lightfoot informs us, that the Jewish Talmudists, taught on this subject by their fathers, declare, "that Jesus of Nazareth, our Lord, was a magician, a broacher of strange and wicked worship; and one that did miracles by the power of the devil, to beget his worship the greater belief and honor." "Among all the devils they es-

teemed that devil the worst, the foulest, and, as it were, the prince of the rest, who ruled over the idols, and by whom oracles and miracles were given forth among the heathens and idolators. And they were of this opinion for this reason—because they held idolatry above all other things chiefly wicked and abominable, and to be the prince and head of evil. This demon they called ‘Baal-zebul’ (or Beelzebub), not so much by a proper name, as by one more general and common; as much as to say the ‘Lord of Idolatry;’ the worst devil and the worst thing; and they called him ‘the prince of devils,’ because idolatry is the prince, or chief of wickedness.”* These passages shed light upon the manner in which the Jewish rabbies and doctors expounded the origin of the Savior’s miracles. They were not prepared to attribute them to the God of Israel; and thus feel their force, as a moral argument demanding their reception of the visible worker. They so hated this worker, because his preaching so thoroughly condemned them and aroused their depraved passions, that they could more readily see in Jesus the aid of the “prince of devils,” than the authoritative presence of the true God. Where there was so much sin and intense enmity against Jesus, there were not wanting intellectual devices to neutralize the claims of the Son of Man. It was truly a hard case for them to solve; yet they preferred to solve it, rather than believe on him.

3. In the third place, Jesus assumed and taught certain things in regard to himself, which were grounds of offence to the Jews. The Christian is prepared to concede that no inspired man, no mere prophet ever spake of himself, as did Jesus Christ. There is a peculiarity here, for which we in vain seek a parallel in other parts of the Bible. What is this peculiarity?

Though Jesus Christ appeared as a man, spake as a man with human lips, it is perfectly certain that, on repeated occasions, the Jews understood him as asserting a divine character, prerogatives, and attributes for himself, to an extent that involved his equality with God, that made him God in nature as well as Messiah in functions. Jesus knew that this construction was placed upon his words; and he permitted his language to be taken in the sense affixed to it by his Jewish hearers. His Apostles entertained the same idea, and preached it as a part of the Gospel system. He accepted from many persons the expressions of divine homage without any marks of disapprobation, or correction. Matt. 8:2; 9:18; 15:25; 28:9, 17; John, 20:28. In this respect, how unlike the conduct of their Lord and Master, was that of Paul and Barnabas at Lystra. Acts 14:11–18. He professed to exercise the divine prerogative of forgiving sins; and when certain scribes imputed to him the crime of blasphemy, inquiring, “who can forgive sins but God only?” Jesus at once wrought a miracle to con-

¹ Lightfoot's Works, vol. ii., pp. 185, 196.

firm his right in the premises. Matt. 9 : 2-8 ; Mark 2 : 1-12. He spake of his existence as being prior to that of Abraham, and in doing so, assumed the title of the Lord Jehovah, "I AM;" at which the Jews were offended, and took up "stones to cast at him." John 8 : 58-59. He again spake of himself and his Father as being "one." This immediately aroused the Jewish imputation of blasphemy, and the purpose to stone him, according to the law of Moses. When he asked the Jews why they purposed thus to treat him, they replied, "for a good work we stone thee not; but for blasphemy, and because thou being a man, makest thyself God." John 10 : 30-33. The title, "the Son of God" was appropriated by Jesus to himself, in a way to convey to his Jewish hearers the full belief, that he meant to claim equality with God. His enemies accused him of blasphemy for assuming this title; it formed the basis of the charge on which he was condemned before the Jewish Council. Matt. 26 : 63-66 ; John 19 : 7. It is as certain as language can make an idea, that Jesus did so speak and act as to imply and assert, that he was a divine person. This is his own testimony with regard to himself. It was so understood by friends and foes, both when he was on earth, and after his ascension into heaven. While in his ministry, as reported in the evangelical records, you see a man—you as plainly see a God. He assumes to be the appropriate object of religious affections—performs miracles in his own name—speaks with supreme authority, "verily, verily, I say unto you"—commands men to love him, to believe on him, and honor him even as they honor the Father—promises to dispense eternal life to those who shall observe his precepts—declares that he will raise the dead, and at last be the Supreme Judge of the world. He made no secret of these divine aspects of himself; they appeared with unmistakable plainness. The great question, often discussed in the Christian church, who was Christ?—what was the constitution of his person?—was a question with men, when he was on earth; and was made such by his own conduct and language. The idea of his divine nature started with Jesus himself, not with his disciples, or enemies; he fostered it; others received it from him; it was a growing idea during his ministry. It was the very point in respect to which he was interrogated by Caiaphas; on that solemn occasion he affirmed it, as his judges understood, and as he knew they understood. Though other causes inflamed the passions of his enemies, and made them zealous to procure his death, this, and this only, was the ground of legal accusation before his Jewish Judges. It was not with them a new idea at this moment; the manner in which they submit the question to Jesus perfectly implies, that they already understood what he claimed for himself. Their object is to elicit from him a confession, that he might be condemned as a blasphemer upon his own testimony. The Savior knew their object; and

under the solemnities of an oath, gave the very confession they wanted. To say that he did not mean to speak as he was understood, is the most sacrilegious trifling. Here then is a grand peculiarity in respect to the ministry of Christ; it is plain and palpable; whoever reads, free from theoretical bias, cannot fail to see it.

What was the relation of Jewish opinion to this proposition of the Savior? They understood it. What did they think of it? I answer; their Unitarianism caught fire at this peculiar claim of Jesus, and ended in the charge of blasphemy against the claimant. Archbishop Whateley, in his "Kingdom of Christ," has very properly distinguished between the Jewish expectation of a Messiah, and the views entertained with regard to his person. It is very manifest, that the Jews expected the coming of the Messiah. They knew very well, that Jesus reported himself to the nation as this Messiah. But were they accustomed to view that Messiah as in any sense a divine person? It is clear, that they did not entertain this view, but precisely its opposite. Their Messianic theory led them to regard Jesus as a blasphemer, arrogating to himself divine attributes, and justly punishable with death, under the statute of Moses against blasphemy; and this, not simply because he claimed to be the Messiah, but because he superadded a supernatural and divine character for himself. Not more did his lowliness as a man offend them, than did his extraordinary pretensions as God; for in neither respect did he conform to the popular and learned theory of the age. Neither in his appearance, nor in his preaching was he the Messiah to suit the conceptions of the Jewish people. Their minds formed a soil unpropitious for the reception of his words. Had they gone to their own Scriptures, they might have corrected their theory, and easily have answered the question, how Christ was David's son, and at the same time David's Lord. This they had neither the wisdom, nor the piety to do. For various reasons, their passions were aroused; Jesus must in some way be destroyed; his miracles, though a very hard problem to solve, are not sufficient to make his words credible, when both his appearance and his words are so totally opposed to the true Messianic theory; he must be a blasphemer and a sinner; it is more easy to suppose that the prince of devils helps him, than that the God of Israel is authenticating his mission. This appears to be the style of logic adopted by his Jewish murderers; and the whole nation was a theatre suited to give power to such thoughts, and in the same ratio impair the force of the Savior's miracles. His rejection, in these circumstances, is not so wonderful in view of second causes, as at first it might appear to be.

It serves to complete our view of this important point to know, that the Jews, as a people, have trodden substantially in this awful track of their forefathers. Though scattered, and suffering under the providential judgments of God, they are still expecting the

coming of the Messiah ; and have been from the times of Jesus to the present hour. What is the present posture of this people in respect to Jesus? They reject him as an impostor, and justify their forefathers for putting him to death as a blasphemer. Archbishop Whateley has given us the language, as he tells us, of "a learned modern Jew" on this subject, who affirms that Jesus "falsely demanded faith in himself as the true God of Israel;" and adds that "if a prophet, or even the Messiah himself, had offered proof of his divine mission by miracles, but claimed divinity, he ought to be put to death" according to the command in the thirteenth chapter of Deuteronomy.¹—From this passage it will be perceived that this learned Jew understands Jesus as the Apostles did, as orthodox Christians now understand him, as his Jewish forefathers understood him; and for this reason he justifies the act of the Savior's rejection and death. In the article entitled "the Jews and their Religion," drawn up by the "Rev. Isaac Sesser, pastor of the Hebrew Portuguese congregation, Philadelphia," and published in the "History of all the religious denominations in the United States," we find the following passage in respect to the Messiah: "The Messiah whom we expect is not to be a God, nor a part of the Godhead, nor a son of God in any sense of the word; but simply a man eminently endowed, like Moses and the prophets in the days of the Bible, to work out the will of God on earth in all that the prophets have predicted of him."² Here again we see the purely humanitarian theory of the Jews in regard to the Messiah, evidently intended to be placed in opposition to the claims of Jesus as understood by this writer. In "Greenleaf on the Testimony of the Evangelists," pp. 529–532, the reader will find the comment of "Mr. Joseph Salvador, a physician and a learned Jew," upon "the trial and condemnation of Jesus." Speaking of the scene which occurred before Caiaphas, this Jewish defender and impugner of Jesus, remarks: "The question already raised among the people was this: has Jesus become God? But the senate having adjudged that Jesus, son of Joseph, born at Bethlehem, had profaned the name of God by usurping it to himself, a mere citizen, applied to him the law of blasphemy, and the law in the 13th chapter of Deuteronomy, and the 20th verse in chapter 18th, according to which every prophet, even he who works miracles, must be punished, when he speaks of a God unknown to the Jews and their fathers: the capital sentence was pronounced." In reference to the sentence he says: "the sentence was founded upon this fact, that he had unlawfully arrogated to himself the title of Son of God." These are the words of an enemy of Jesus—a Jewish plea in modern times, to justify the murderers of our blessed Savior. They involve the same construction of the Savior's claims, as that

¹ Whateley's *Kingdom of Christ*, p. 14.

² pp. 365, 366.

adopted by the Sanhedrim that condemned him. By a stern necessity this is, and must be, the Jewish argument for rejecting Jesus of Nazareth. It should be remembered also, that this plea is by no means an invention of *modern* Judaism. As it was used at the time in which Jesus suffered, so it has been used ever since by the Judaistic enemies of our Lord. The nation has holden fast to its own act—perpetuated its own deed—and in its condition has fulfilled the declaration of Moses, that God would require it of them, if they should refuse to hear the great prophet. The Talmudists never call Jesus the Christ, the Messiah. In their dialect he is “a magician, a broacher of strange and wicked worship; one that did miracles by the power of the devil, to beget his worship the greater belief and honor.” “Ben-Satda,” by which they mean the Christian’s Christ, a term of awful reproach, “brought magic out of Egypt by cuttings which he made in his flesh.”¹ This “strange and wicked worship,” to which this refers, plainly alludes to the divine claims set forth by Jesus, when he was upon earth, and subsequently preached by the Apostles. It is the comment of enemies, showing that orthodox Christians have correctly understood their Lord and Master. Buxtorf, in his Talmudic Lexicon, cites a curious piece of Rabbinical testimony, admitting the subornation of false witnesses against Christ before his crucifixion, and describing the mode: “Against none of those guilty of death by the law are snares to be laid, except against one that has endeavored to pervert another to idolatry and strange worship. And it is thus performed: they light a candle in an inner room, and place the witnesses in an outer, so that they may see him and hear his voice, without his seeing them. And so they did to the son of Satda (Mary); they placed men privately in the next room to witness against him, in Lud (Jud or Judea), and hanged him upon the cross on the evening of the passover.”² What was this “idolatry and strange worship” taught by him, contemptuously styled the “Son of Satda,” and requiring the subornation of false witnesses? It plainly refers to the claim of Jesus, that he was the “Son of God,”—a title understood to imply a divine nature, and so understood by the Sanhedrim, and by their Rabbinical apologists. These Jewish testimonies shed valuable light upon the gospel account of the issue between Jesus and the Sanhedrim. It was a great question about the nature, the constitution of his person. Who was he? He answered this question, and was condemned for the answer.

The merits of this question, as between Jesus and the Jews, or between the Christian and the Jew, it is not the purpose of this article to consider. It would be easy to show, that the divinity of the Messiah was clearly taught in the predictive testimony in re-


¹ Lightfoot’s Works, vol. xi., p. 106.

² For this passage I am indebted to Hale’s Analysis of Chronology, vol. iii., p. 209.

gard to him ; and that, therefore, Jesus being the true Messiah, claimed no more than he ought, according to the prophets. The miracles he wrought were such as to assign the most perfect competency and credibility to his own testimony, though not so viewed by the prejudiced Jews. The miracles subsequently wrought by the Apostles in his name, and the fate of the Jewish nation, are to be added to the proof, that what Jesus said of himself was true. It was no blasphemy for him, being divine, to say so. He knew his own nature, and was competent to speak of it. His condemnation upon his own testimony, is placed in such a relation to the constitution of his person, that the credibility of the Christian religion turns upon the justness of his claim. To make him simply a prophet, an extraordinary human teacher, is to justify the act of the Jews in condemning him, and make a prophet of God give false testimony. Hence the divinity of Jesus Christ is essential to the credibility of the Christian religion. How any sect of religionists can assume to be Christians, profess any respect for Jesus as a teacher of truth, place any confidence in his words, and yet deny his divinity ; this is one of those marvels in theology I shall not undertake to explain. It is a fact worthy of notice, that the Jews denied, in respect to the Messiah of prophetic promise, what the different species of "Unitarians" now deny in respect to Jesus Christ, as the Messiah of gospel history. The former, though wrong, are far more consistent than the latter. They repudiate Christianity and its founder *in toto*—an awful mistake—yet having the consistency of error. If the "Unitarians" are right now, then the Jews were right eighteen centuries ago, and are still right. Both agree in a common denial : both are offended with a common affirmation. That, for asserting which the Jews rejected and condemned the Savior, is the very idea which modern Unitarianism equally denies, while it professes great respect for Jesus Christ as a teacher, and assumes to be a true expression of the Christianity he taught. Its inconsistency in this respect is glaring and painful. The condemnation of the Lord Jesus is placed in such historical relations, that whoever receives him as an infallible teacher of irreproachable character, must also receive him as a divine person, or be inconsistent with himself.

With a single explanation I shall now pause in these observations. The death of the Savior, considered as an atonement, as woven into the gospel system and constituting an essential part of the science of salvation, it has not been the aim of this article to examine. The single aspect, which has given shape to this whole inquiry, is contained in the title : "Jesus Christ attested by miracles, and yet rejected by the Jews." This is primarily an affair of history ; and in this light purely, we have endeavored to consider the subject. The existence, life, doings, sayings, death, resurrection, and ascension of the Savior, are matters of fact, events

in a wonderful series ; they constitute historical Christianity, the “kingdom of God” evolved in the facts pertaining to the great oracle of that kingdom. In relation to human belief, the historical precedes the doctrinal parts of Christianity ; the “ Evangelicon” (so the fathers styled the gospel memoirs) is necessarily the basis of the “ apostolicon” of the New Testament. That there was a Jesus of Nazareth, who appeared on earth, a true original of which the evangelical narrative is a transcript, and that as we see him in this narrative, so he was in the days of his flesh ; these are points which are vital in the faith of every Christian. He is set before us as the worker of miracles, yet as rejected by men with the opportunity of seeing and knowing these miracles. The credibility of the narrative, considered as making such a report, has formed the field of the previous inquiry. The writer’s object has been, not only to explain the fact of the Messiah’s rejection in its relation to second causes, but also to show, that there are no sufficient elements of improbability to invalidate the history which reports the fact. The divine intendment in the Messiah’s mission ; the doctrinal use made of his history ; the inspired exposition of Jesus and his cross—these wonders form the immortal garniture of the history ; and for them we more appreciate the history, and for the history, the more appreciate them. In their light we can the better understand, not the motives of the Jews in rejecting the Messiah, but why Jesus, with such high prerogatives, such awful powers, such infallible knowledge, permitted himself to be thus treated. These sublime aspects of the history present to us its final cause, Jehovah’s purpose, God’s economy triumphing over the madness of men, and amid the fiercest rage of wickedness, announcing peace and pardon in the ear of a ruined world. Great and lowly, lovely and awful, simple and mysterious personage is Jesus Christ, the wonder of history, the Redeemer of men ! May we see him, know him, love him, trust him, be saved by him, and dwell with him for ever and ever.



ARTICLE IV.

LIFE AND CHARACTER OF VOLTAIRE.

By REV. SAMUEL M. HOPKINS, East Avon, N. Y.

Lives of Men of Letters and Science, who flourished in the time of George III. By HENRY, LORD BROUGHAM, F. R. S., &c.

THE life of Voltaire, with which this series of literary portraits opens, is evidently brought forward by the author with considerable satisfaction. He expected it to create a sensation, both among the friends and the enemies of revealed religion. He accordingly undertakes to show in his preface, why neither class should find fault with him. It should satisfy the latter, that while disapproving Voltaire's method of attacking the Gospel, he has done full justice to the excellence of his heart, and the splendor of his literary merit. The former, if disposed to quarrel with the biographer's extreme tenderness towards the character and principles of his subject, should be mollified at observing that he decidedly condemns the use of poisoned shot in his warfare against Christianity. If after this any sparks of dissatisfaction remain, they must be wholly extinguished at learning that, "with powers infinitely below" those of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Hume, he has written nearly as much, in one way or another, *for* religion, as they have written against it; and that several persons have intimated their conversion from infidel opinions, by reading his notes and Illustrations of Paley.

Occupying this conspicuous post on the walls of Zion, Lord Brougham feels enabled to indulge his amiable tendency towards compliment, and to bestow all sorts of knightly courtesies on his antagonists. Voltaire, to be sure, had his failings, but he also had extraordinary virtues. "His nature was open and ardent." "Jealousy formed no part of his character." This, by the way, agrees but indifferently with the assertion in another place, that "his constant undervaluing of Rousseau's genius can scarcely be ascribed to anything but jealousy, if not of his talents, yet of his success." "He had a rooted horror of envy, as mean and degrading." "He had an excellent heart;" "It would be unjust, nay, ungrateful, ever to forget the immense obligations under which he has laid mankind by his writings." "The impression which this great genius has left will remain; and while his failings are forgotten, and the influence of his faults corrected, the world, wiser and better because he lived, will continue still to celebrate his name."

It stands in rather singular contrast to all this, the hearty good will with which the author, a Protestant and a Christian, comes down upon Luther and Calvin. There are no amiable qualifying

phrases here; no gentle regrets for the "errors" and "failings" of the two Reformers. Courteous after the manner of true knighthood, towards his enemy, he reserves all his terrors for his brethren. We think we see Great-heart flourishing a graceful salute to Giant Slay-good, and then turning round to apply the flat of his sword to the shoulders of old Honest. The one Reformer is "a fiery zealot, who has outraged all taste and decorum by his language;" "whose coarseness and low ribaldry make the reading of his works in many places disgusting, in not a few offensive to common decency" (nothing of which is true we suppose, with respect to Voltaire); the other is "a gloomy religious persecutor who has scandalized all humanity by his cruelty." These severe blows are put in, we presume, by way of *caveat*, against the suspicion of too decided and unphilosophical a preference for Protestant Christianity. His Lordship is a believer, but after an enlarged and liberal fashion. He disapproves of atheism; but then, you observe, he looks with great contempt on the Reformers. Supposing our information limited to the present biography, we should conclude the patriarch of Ferney to be a far more respectable character than either the bigot or the persecutor aforesaid.¹ Happily, however, we have some other means of forming a judgment. The Protestant world, with inconsiderable exceptions, is agreed, that although, standing as they did on the edge of revived civilization, a century and a half at least before Voltaire was born, Luther and Calvin fell into mistakes which better views of truth and duty repudiate and lament; yet they performed a ministry bearing more influentially on the emancipation of the human mind, and the progress of society, than any others since the days of the Apostles. The readers of the Repository are tolerably familiar with the title which the leading Reformers possess to the admiration and gratitude of mankind. With the claims of Voltaire they may be less acquainted. It will not perhaps be an unacceptable office, therefore, to give a brief view of the life and writings of this distinguished philosopher.

The life of Voltaire extended from 1694 to 1778—a period of eighty-four years; coupling the reign of Louis XIV. nearly with the Revolution, or the palmiest days of the French monarchy with its downfall. His literary life reached, with the exception of the first few years, through the whole of this long period. For nearly seventy years he was an author. During all this time, plays, romances, histories and historical tracts, controversy, philosophy, poetry, miscellanies in immense variety, infidelity in solid columns, besides that which skirmishes through the whole body of his works, and a perpetual stream of correspondence, flowed with astonishing

¹ One would almost conclude, were it possible, from the character of Lord Brougham's criticism on the Reformers, and the particular facts he cites against them, that all his knowledge of the subject was derived from the chapters in Voltaire's Essay. It is well known to be an unfortunate habit of his Lordship's to pronounce magisterially on the basis of a somewhat too superficial knowledge of facts.

facility from his pen. He possessed in large measure the national vivacity; he had an acute, penetrating, restless genius; and he was spurred to the most active employment of his powers by two strong sentiments—an exorbitant vanity, and a passionate hatred of religion. It is not strange then, that his collected works should mount up in the edition to which Lord Brougham refers to seventy-five volumes.¹

Out of this huge mass we shall undertake to furnish a list only of the author's leading works against religion. They possess an interest for the Christian, resulting from the vast influence for evil they have exerted, and still exert, on the educated mind of continental Europe. Bishop Wilson gives the following estimate of the diffusion of the mischief: "Between 1817 and 1824, the Paris editions of Voltaire's works amounted to 1,417,000 volumes. Supposing the same number to have been circulated in the six following years, and twice the number in the forty preceding, we have a total of six millions of volumes issued from the Paris press only."² Few of these, if any, circulate in this country. The published infidelity which poisons the minds of young and ignorant persons in England and America, is of a coarser quality; the malice of Voltaire without his wit and learning; the ribald blasphemy of Paine, which effects its end by the mere confidence of its mockery and assertion; or the stupid and reckless falsehoods of Taylor, "the Devil's chaplain." The poison of Voltaire's infidelity is conveyed in a style of almost unequalled clearness and simplicity; with a vivacity that never tires; and an apparent gaiety and good humor that, except in his correspondence with his "brethren in Beelzebuth," serves to disguise his unrelenting hostility to the Gospel. He is known, however, to most American readers only as the historian of the reign of Louis XIV., and the author of the *Henriade*. The *Philosophical Dictionary* translated, circulates, we believe, to some extent, as part of the library of irreligion.

The histories and historical miscellanies of Voltaire are all alike pervaded by a vehement spirit of literary and religious scepticism. Sacred history, he is accustomed habitually to mock at; and in profane history, there is no fact so universally received as to be safe from the scrutiny of his questionings. One might think he had read the first meditation of Descartes, and stopped there; *qu'il n'y a rien dont on ne puisse en quelque façon douter*; or at all events had got no further than the third, *qu'il y a un Dieu*.

The philosophy of history, prefixed originally to his *Essay Sur les Mœurs*, and dedicated to that worthy patron of infidels, the Empress Catharine of Russia, has no other aim than to discredit the facts of the Jewish Scriptures, in paralleling them with the

¹ The edition we use is that of Fournier, Paris, 1828. It is loosely stitched in three cumbrous volumes, in minute type with double columns; each volume containing more than two thousand pages.

² Lect. xxii.

fables of Pagan antiquity. Bacchus and Moses, Sampson and Hercules, the sybils and the prophets, are paired off together, as if their story was alike worthy to interest the ignorant, and amuse the philosopher. Great respect is professed, according to the usual mocking hypocrisy of the writer, for whatever the Bible affirms, and the Church endorses; but at the same time, all those circumstances in the history of the Jews, from the Exodus onwards, which stand apparently or actually in revolting contradiction to our notions of right and virtue, are studiously brought forward, as if the inspired history which records them, recorded them for imitation or approval. This is an old but shallow fraud of the enemies of revelation. The whole work, though exhibiting the fruits of a good deal of acquaintance with ancient history, is superficial and dishonest. It is a philosophy of history, very much as a mocking and jumbled commentary on the XII Tables, the Vedas, Leviticus, and the Blue Laws of Connecticut, would be a philosophy of legislation. At the same time it is to be observed, that the Essay on Universal History and the manners of nations, to which it served as an introduction, is a work of great interest and value. It passes rapidly over an extensive field, touching briefly where the facts were of no significance, and elsewhere dwelling with the minuteness of contemporaneous history. The style of the narrative is as sprightly almost as that of his highest *Facetiæ*, abounding in just remark and fine criticism. No book pretending at all to the character of a general history, is near so readable. In all that considerable portion of it which relates to religion and the history of the Church, it requires, of course, to be read with caution and distrust. The words which he says he had occasion constantly to place in his margin, in writing on the conflicting pretensions of the emperors and the popes, *vide, quære, dubita*, must be the motto of Voltaire's readers; an author whose vanity led him to question everything, who made everything subservient to his hatred of religion, can never be taken on trust, either for opinions or facts.

The Pyrrhonism of History is a tract of great interest, in short chapters, calling in question, or exploding a considerable number of historic facts then—many of them still, current. The following may be taken as specimens of his lively and confident manner. They are both cases of alleged poisoning :

CHAPTER XXXVII.—Of the Dauphin Francis.—The Dauphin Francis, son of Francis I., being heated, and in a profuse perspiration from playing at tennis, drank freely of cold water, and died. The Emperor, Charles V., is accused of poisoning him. What! the conqueror assassinate the son of his vanquished enemy! Assassinate the child at the court of France, when he had just, in open war, stripped the father of two provinces, and by an infamous and useless crime like this, stain his character for ever! Murder the

Dauphin, and leave two brothers to avenge him ! The accusation is shocking and absurd.

But the Dauphin had about him an Italian gentleman, Count de Montecuculi, who presented him the cold water that caused his death. This count was by birth a subject of the emperor, and had on one occasion spoken with him. On this ground he was arrested, and put to the torture. Ignorant physicians declared that the spasms caused by the cold water were produced by arsenic. Montecuculi was drawn and quartered ; and all France regarded the conqueror of Solyman, the liberator of Christendom, and the most illustrious man in Europe, as a convicted poisoner. Who were the judges that condemned Montecuculi ? I know nothing about it. Neither Mezerai nor Daniel mentions them. The President Henault merely says, the Dauphin Francis is poisoned by Montecuculi, his cupbearer, not without suspicions against the Emperor. Montecuculi's guilt must be held, to say the least, extremely doubtful. Neither he nor Charles V. had any interest in such a crime. The Italian's expectations of fortune were all from the Dauphin ; and the Emperor had nothing to fear from a young man like Francis. This tragedy, in short, must be set down among the multitude of judicial atrocities committed under the intoxication of prejudice, ignorance, or passion."

"CHAPTER XL.—Alexander VI. Cardinal Bembo, Paulus Jovius, Tomasi, and finally Guicciardini, appear to believe that Pope Alexander VI. died of poison, which, in concert with his bastard Cæsar Borgia, he had prepared for the Cardinals of Capua, Modena, and others. All the enemies of the Holy See have credited this horrible story. For myself, I wholly disbelieve it ; and my great reason is, that it seems wholly improbable. The Pope and his son were beyond dispute two of the greatest wretches in Europe, but they were not fools. The poisoning of a dozen Cardinals at one supper would have made both father and son so detested, that nothing could have saved them from the fury of the Roman populace. Such a crime could never have been concealed ; and it was, moreover, directly opposed to the interests of Cæsar Borgia. The Pope, his father, was on the verge of the grave. Borgia, with his party, could hope easily to secure the tiara for one of his creatures. It would scarcely have been a judicious method of conciliating the College of Cardinals to begin by poisoning a dozen of them. Finally, the family register of Alexander VI. makes him die of a double tertian fever ; poison fatal enough for a man seventy-three years old."

The "Creed of the Theists" is a polemical confession, stating in each article, what is claimed as Theism in doctrine and practice, and setting the teaching of the Scriptures and the influence of Christianity, as exhibited in the Church of Rome, in the most

odious point of contrast. Like all the rest of Voltaire's "divinity" it is characterized mainly by its zealous destructiveness. The author cares very little whether Theism or anything else is built up, provided the Gospel is only pulled down. Infidel sermons and homilies follow; and then other solid matter, called "The tomb of Fanaticism," "God and Man," &c.

"The Bible at last explained" is a labored attack on the several books of the Old Testament. It consists of selections from the sacred text, with a copious commentary of infidelity in notes. These notes carry a shallow and mocking pretence of respect for the Scriptures, citing at large the strongest infidel objections, and then opposing to them the dictum of Dom Calmet, or the authority of the Church, or making some ridiculous defence designed to give the whole thing up to laughter. The author "quotes with great regret" the revilings of Toland or Bolingbroke against the facts of Scripture history, and then adds, "However the Holy Spirit dictated the story, and can doubtless justify it," "Moses may have been a poor general, and an ignorant legislator; but he did as God bade him, and we must respect him for it." "The manners of those times were very different from ours;" and other similar forms of expression which are meant to deceive nobody.

Then comes an abridgment of the "Testament of Jean Meslier," a priest of Champagne, who left a labored posthumous work against Christianity, "begging pardon of his God for having for twenty years preached the Gospel." Next, with increased rancor, "The History of the Establishment of Christianity," which is a mass, original and compiled, of the most virulent scoffing against Christ and the Apostles. Then a series of infidel dialogues; and lastly the Philosophical Dictionary. It is but justice to say of this work, that it is written with wonderful vivacity and spirit, with a great display of various learning, and a richness of satirical humor, which, if the object were not monstrous, and the means frequently offensive to truth and decency, would make it vastly attractive. Some one remarks that the man is not thoroughly bad who can indulge in a hearty fit of laughter. Voltaire's laughter is always dry and sardonic; such as displays the truth, without flashing in the eyes; like the grin with which Ulysses regarded the suitors revelling in his hall, as he fitted the arrow to his death-dealing bow. Mistranslations—designed to cast contempt on the Scriptures; mocking, covered up with a thin tissue of respect; salacity, which lingers about, and recurs to, offensive images and illustrations; "Lust hard by Hate;" and the aim of the whole,—the mark at which the keen point of every article, however remote it might seem from the object, is directed, viz. the prostration of man's only hope and refuge, combine to render this celebrated Dictionary a masterpiece of perverted human ingenuity. Considering its malignity and its mockery, we may say it contains as much of

the "essence of devil," to use John Foster's phrase, as any vessel of similar capacity. There is a strong flavor both of Satan and Belial in it. It is not strange D'Alembert should say it certainly came from the press of Beelzebub.

The Philosophical Dictionary was designed as a sort of pocket edition of the *Dictionnaire Encyclopédique*. Voltaire, much as he professed to despise the "canaille," perfectly appreciated the importance of reaching the popular mind, if he would effect a revolution against Christianity. He knew the power of tracts and cheap books for the people. In writing to the King of Prussia, under date of 5th April, 1767, he says: "If I were younger and had better health, I would quit, without hesitation, my chateau and my gardens, to establish myself with a few philosophers in the *pays de Cleves* under your protection, and devote my last days to the publication of a few useful books. But cannot your majesty, without compromising yourself, encourage some Berlin publisher to print and circulate them throughout Europe, at a price which will render the sale rapid and general;" (*à un prix qui en rende la vente facile.*)

The *Dictionnaire Encyclopédique* was for men of wealth and leisure; for kings and philosophers. It was to circulate in the best society. It cost far too much to be the scripture of unbelief for the nation. "Je voudrais bien savoir (says Voltaire, remonstrating against the Government's interfering with the sale of this work), quel mal peut faire un livre qui coute cent ecus. Jamais vingt volumes in folio ne feront de revolution. Ce sont les petits livres portatifs à trente sous qui sont à craindre. Si l'évangile avoit coûté douze cent sesterces, jamais la religion chrétienne ne se serait établie." It was just to furnish a manual of infidelity of this sort, a "*petit livre portatif*," which, like a fleet of gun-boats, should penetrate into every creek and bay, while the heavy batteries of the Encyclopedia kept the open sea, that the Philosophical Dictionary was written. It compressed into a more pungent essence, the stimulating mischief of the larger Dictionary. It sharpened the mockery to a point more perceptible to the duller sensibilities of the million. It was just the book for the apprentices, marchands, and "badaux de Paris;" to settle, like the effluvium that causes certain fevers, down towards the level of the city, a pestilence walking in darkness, while, in the upper regions of society, the destruction wasted at noonday.

This suggestion of Voltaire's has been well improved upon for profit and mischief, by more recent inventors of evil things. The craft and mystery of reaching the mass of the people with a corrupting literature, seems to have been carried to a degree of perfection among ourselves, that scarce leaves room for improvement. The scheme is as complete as unprincipled cupidity can make it. First, there are great distilleries, where those good gifts of God,

paper and ink, are worked up by Grub-street operatives into "strong drink" and "mixed wine" for the mind; barrelled and boxed and bottled; labelled with attractive titles, and vended by wholesale. Such are certain "publishing companies" so called, who appear to keep in pay a corps of literary scavengers, that Curll and Lintot, in their best days, might have envied. "Two translators (of Eugene Sue and Dumas) in a bed together at the Marlborough." At the Three Tobacco-pipes in License lane, "one that has been a preacher of liberal Christianity, in a rusty black coat, my best writer against revealed religion." "In a washer-woman's garret near Long wharf, the compiler of my Pirate's own Books, and tragedies of the sea; the author of 'Love and Murder,' 'Crime and Retribution,' in a house of ill-fame, at the corner of Shin-bone Alley."¹

Next came the dépôts for the retail of the same articles; the ginshops of the mind, in every city, town, and street, where the issues from the grand reservoir are distributed in lots to suit purchasers; and then the vast army of colporteurs who waylay the unsuspecting traveller in the street, besiege the doors of railroad cars, and thrust their many-colored ware under his nose on the gangway plank and deck of every steamboat. The titles are full of promise; the price is trifling, "only twenty-five cents;" the day is long, and you have no company; you must be very defective in a taste for literature, if you fail to buy. O Literature! we may well exclaim, borrowing an apostrophe of Madame Roland, O Literature! what monstrous stuff is vended in thy name!

Think of the busy compilers, translators, and transmogrifiers, the Gildons, Cibbers, and Oldmixons of our time, who furnish marketable matter, for a consideration, to the grand caterers for the public. Think of the presses that thunder night and day, pouring out an incessant stream of the lowest and most corrupting grade of fiction; think of the dépôts, by the synagogues and at the corners of the streets, with their calls for enterprising young men as agents and pedlars, to whom is guaranteed the exclusive possession of a certain district, and the prospect of making a fortune, if industrious; think of the lads who come up like frogs over the face of the whole land, slaving this spume of Lucifer, "half froth, half venom," and we get some idea of the prodigious mass of influence at work to debase and corrupt society. The only relief to the mind under the painful impression this view gives, is reflecting on the energy with which the Church of Christ is availing herself of the same powerful enginery. The idea of a cheap portable literature for the people belongs, according to Voltaire's own sagacious remark, originally to Christianity. Had it been necessary to the propagation of the Gospel, that complete copies of the Scriptures, or even of the New Testament, should be circulated, or none, we

¹ Vide Dean Swift, vol. xvii. Condition of Edmund Curll, &c.

may almost agree with him that the attempt to plant the Church would have failed. It was the small, separate treatises, each of which contained enlightening and saving truth in adequate measure for the time being—the “*petits livres portatifs*” which the wisdom of God provided, which found their way by a thousand channels among the people, where no large or expensive book could possibly have passed. With the revival of Christianity, Luther brought out this weapon from the apostolic armory, and wielded it, as we know, with prodigious effect. It is now for ever incorporated into the discipline of the Church, as an arm of the service, second in efficiency to nothing but the voice of the living preacher; and so we may add to the points of comparison suggested by Coleridge, as an interesting external feature of resemblance between Luther and Voltaire, that each stands at the head of a revived literature for the people; the one a savor of life unto life, and the other of death unto death.

All the works of Voltaire thus briefly catalogued, except the first, are brought out under false names. The anonymous author of the *Philosophical Dictionary* quotes with eulogy, the author of the *Essay Sur les Mœurs*. The *Pyrrhonism of History* is by a “Bachelor in Theology.” The *Bible at last Explained*, is the work of *quatre savans Theologiens*. The “Confession of Faith of the Theists” is “translated from the German.” The *Dieu et les Hommes* is by the Rev. Dr. Oberlin. Even his “*Romans*” and “*Facéties*” were disguised in the same way. His chosen method of making war on morals and religion was ambush, treachery, and assassination. Dearly as he loved the praise of the exploit, he shunned the danger. He would stab, but in the dark. Nothing threw him into a greater state of excitement than to have publicity given to his name, in connexion with any of his indecent or infidel works. An edifying instance of this occurs in the memoirs of Madame de Graigny, which we will quote hereafter. Lord Brougham mentions the manner in which he disowns the authorship of *Candide*, a novelette, designed to satirize optimist views of the world, and which, so far at least as religion is concerned, can scandalize nobody who believes in the corruption of human nature. With much greater vehemence of falsehood, he disowns even to D’Alembert, any connexion with the *Philosophical Dictionary*. “I swear” (he writes, under date of 2d October, 1764), “that I am not the author of this infamous thing. You must do me the essential service to affirm, that this book which I disown, is not mine. ‘The brethren’ must not be exposed, by such suspicions, to calumny and persecution. The book is divine with some exceptions; “*mais je jure par Sabaoth et Adonai quia non sum auctor hujus libri. Il ne peut avoir été écrit que par un saint inspiré du diable; car il y a du moral, et de l’infernal.*”

The same system of warfare he frequently recommends to D’Al-

embert himself, and others of the "initiated." Stab, he says, but don't write your name on the poniard. "Frappez, mais cachez votre main." "Dieu vous maintienne, mon cher destructeur, dans la noble resolution où vous êtes, de faire main basse sur les fanatiques, en fesant patte de velours."

The letter from which this last extract is taken, ends with the dreadful expression, so well known as the watch-word of the conspirators against religion and social order, *Crush the wretch!* The same phrase occurs passim, in other parts of the correspondence, both with D'Alembert and Frederick, and, more than all, Damilaville. It is frequently found at the close of Voltaire's letters in an abbreviated form, thus: *écr l'inf...*; and it is somewhat remarkable, as if they shrank with a sort of fear, from speaking or writing out the blasphemy, that even when the verb occurs at length, the noun is, with scarce an exception, contracted. It imparts an additional horror to the impiety of these relentless persecutors of Christ, if there were fears lingering in the depths of their souls (as we must believe), which made them often shudder at the extremes to which they were proceeding. Even if we do not regard the expression *l'infame* as applicable to Christ personally, but to the Gospel or the Church, the malignity it displays is scarcely less shocking. Throughout the whole correspondence, Voltaire appears the master conspirator and fiend; prompting his subordinates to keep up a war of extermination against "fanaticism," rebuking their coldness and divisions, rallying them to the assault when they shrank, and setting an example of the most daring impiety for their encouragement and imitation. He strides before them, like Mezentius, *contemptor divum*, before the Latin host; or Satan towering on the cloudy van of battle. "Au milieu de toute votre gaîté (to D'Alembert, 30 Jan., 1764), tâchez toujours d'écraser l'inf...; notre principale occupation dans cette vie doit être de combattre ce monstre." "Je voudrais (23 June, 1760) que vous écrassiez l'inf...; c'est là le grand point; il faut la reduire à l'état où elle est en Angleterre; c'est le plus grand service qu'on puisse rendre au genre humain;" and so over and over again, to Damilaville, to the Marquis D'Argens, to Helvetius, and others of the initiated, *Ecr. l'inf...*; "Cultivez la vigne du Seigneur, et écrasez l'inf... tant que vous pourrez;" "*Ecr. l'inf...* je vous en conjure."

We will not shock the readers of this article by quoting worse expressions of a similar kind. The mind of Voltaire clung to the idea of overthrowing Christianity with the tenacity of monomania. He seems to find it impossible to finish a letter to any of the adepts, without giving vent to the burning hate against religion, that consumed him. Mockeries of the incarnation, of the trinity, of any fact or statement of the Gospel that comes in his way; contemptuous abuse of the Apostles and ministers of the Gospel, break out upon the surface of a correspondence, inimitable otherwise for

its vivacity, variety, and wit, like the gushing up of nether fire in the forests and by the flowers. If suppressed through the body of the letter, it is almost sure to be vented in his customary savage war-whoop at the close.

Our readers, we imagine, will find it rather difficult to sympathize fully in the philosophical equanimity with which the author of *Lives of Men of Letters, &c.*, regards this correspondence. He thinks it "impossible not to have our admiration excited, as well as to take a lively interest in the zeal and untiring activity which the aged philosopher displayed in encouraging his young correspondents." As to "admiration," and "lively interest," we must be permitted to hesitate. One may be willing to confess a certain sort of admiration for Catiline or Jefferson in the relation they sustained to the young men whom they made it their business to pervert and ruin; but the predominant feeling is of so very different a character, that we should never think of putting admiration foremost.

We believe that most persons will know of but one word properly descriptive of the tone of sentiment on religious things pervading these letters. If this is not blasphemy, we shall be at a loss where to look for it. Lord Brougham, however, has provided a shield broad enough, in his opinion, to protect his subject against this charge. Voltaire, it seems, was so thoroughly corrupted as to be beyond the reach of blasphemy.

"It is evident, that, strictly speaking, blasphemy can only be committed by a person who believes in the existence and attributes of the Deity whom he impugns, either by ridicule or by reasoning. An atheist is wholly incapable of the crime. When he heaps epithets of abuse on the Creator, or turns his attributes into ridicule, he is assailing or scoffing at an empty name; at a being whom he believes to have no existence. In like manner, if a Deist, one who disbelieves in our Savior being either the Son of God, or sent by God as his prophet upon earth, shall argue against his miracles, or ridicule his mission or his person, he commits no blasphemy; for he firmly believes that Christ was a man like himself, and that he derived no authority from the Deity. Both the atheist and the deist are free from all guilt of blasphemy; that is, of all guilt towards the Deity or towards Christ."

This is positive enough. It has quite the air of an opinion in the case of Religion and Decency *versus* the Whole Company of Scoffers, pronounced from the woolsack;—judgment for the defendants. There are, however, two qualifications to the opinion, viz. First, that the defendants shall be *bona fide* atheists and deists, and not mere sceptics; and second, that they shall be atheists and deists on good and sufficient grounds; that is, "after applying their faculties to the inquiry with that sober attention, that conscientious diligence, which its immense importance demands of all rational creatures."

These qualifications set the matter quite right again. They are certainly broad enough, in our view, to convict of blasphemy every scoffer at the Lord and his Anointed, in the whole diabolic succession. We are perfectly satisfied that the blasphemer never lived who could claim the benefit of these exceptions; who "had applied his faculties to the inquiry" into the divine origin of Christianity, "with that sober attention, that conscientious diligence which its immense importance demands," and who, on the ground of such examination, stood forth a scoffer, with no shadow of doubt or fear upon his spirit. God never made a rational creature whose faculties, so applied, could lead him to such a result. And yet, strange as it may seem, Lord Brougham regards Voltaire as having fully come up to the terms of these two exceptions; Voltaire, whose infidelity began almost in his boyhood;¹ whose warfare against the Son of God partook throughout of that passion and hate which imply fear; and who died with remorse and horror, calling upon the name of Christ.

This is doubtless a most ingenious calculus, by which the innocence of a reviler of Christ is made to increase in the direct ratio of his guilt; by which the more he is able to pervert his judgment, and silence his conscience, and the more his insulted Maker gives him up to strong delusion to believe a lie, because he received not the love of the truth, the more he brightens under the process into a state, *quoad hoc*, of righteousness. 'This is blasphemy made easy; a system admirably adapted to encourage beginners to proceed on till they arrive at the stature of perfect men "in Beelzebub." Voltaire's sin, according to this method, in mocking at Christ,—the sin of Condorcet, Helvetius, and Diderot, we suppose, *pari ratione*, in mocking at God, is of precisely the same character with Elijah's in mocking at Baal. Had Elijah believed Baal to be divine, or even suspected he possibly might be, it would have been very profane to intimate that he was perhaps asleep, or absent on a journey. But having become perfectly satisfied, by sober attention and conscientious diligence, that Baal was vanity and a lie, the ridicule was sanctified by its subserviency to truth. We have only to suppose the French atheists to have reached an equal confidence of unbelief, and Saul also is among the prophets.

¹ It is worth notice, as standing near the fountain of Voltaire's passionate hatred of Christianity and its ministers, that his first literary effort was an unsuccessful competition for a prize before the Academy, where his successful rival was a clergyman. A man whose infidelity becomes *settled* at eighteen or twenty, cannot possibly have met the requirement of Lord Brougham's second rule. Lord Brougham himself states that Voltaire came very early under the influence of the Abbé de Chateauneuf, his godfather, "a person of loose morals and sceptical opinions;" and adds, that "in this association (that of Ninon de L'Enclos and her circle), Voltaire, then a boy, became inured to the oblivion both of his law-books and of his religious principles." In regard to the rebuke given him, while at the college of Louis le Grand, by his Professor, the Jesuit Le Jay, "unfortunate young man! you will one day come to be the standard-bearer of infidelity," Lord Brougham merely says, that "the story, if true, shows how early he had begun to think for himself."

We certainly regret that sentiments so loose and unsound should ever have been recommended by so high an authority. We are ready to do full justice to the value of Lord Brougham's labors in the field of natural theology; and are disposed to rejoice with him in the "heartfelt satisfaction" he expresses at the intimated conversion of certain persons by the influence of his writings. But the very liberal form of Christianity which his lordship represents, makes us hesitate. We would rather first ascertain just what it was they were converted to.

But Voltaire, we are assured, was no atheist. "He was a sincere believer in the existence and attributes of the Deity." "Not one irreverent expression is to be found in all his numberless writings towards the Deity in whom he believed." "He has consecrated some of his noblest poetry to celebrate the powers of the Godhead." All this we have no objections to admit. It would have been hard indeed if the High Priest of Ashdod had blasphemed his own Dagon. Taking full license to cut and carve among the attributes of Jehovah,—shredding away his providence here and his justice there, and reducing him to an imbecile kind of *Dieu Paternel*, it would have been monstrous if he had then made ridiculous verses about him. We never heard of anybody wicked enough to set about deliberately turning into laughter "the Deity in whom he believed." Voltaire had sufficient literary foil at hand, to afford gilding handsomely the image he had set up. It cost him little to write a theistical homily or a devotional couplet. Epicurus, the aim and tendency of whose writings, like Voltaire's, was wholly to eradicate a sense of religion—*radicitus evellere religionem*—had done the same thing. At etiam de sanctitate, de pietate adversus Deos libros scripsit Epicurus. At quo modo in his loquitur? Ut Coruncanium, aut Scævolum, pontifices maximos te audire dicas; *non eum qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem.*¹

Lord Brougham greatly overvalues this sort of cheap tribute to religion. It is not worth mentioning as constituting any grade of comparative innocence between Voltaire and Vanini. Among a band of Italian or Spanish cut-throats, we have no better opinion of the captain, who falls on his knees and beats his breast before an image of the Virgin, than of the lieutenant who laughs at the service and the God. Voltaire standing at the head of the conspiracy, enlisting recruits, disciplining, organizing, cheering to the assault, putting the torch and the dagger into the hand of his "brethren in Beelzebuth," appears to us, we must say, a much blacker devil than Condorcet or Diderot. This "martial metaphor" is quite after his own taste; "Je vous assure," he writes to Damilaville (19th Nov., 1767), "que dans un peu il n'y aura que la canaille sous les étendards de nos ennemis; la victoire se declare pour nous de tous cotés. Allons, brave Diderot, intrepide

¹ De Nat. Deor., I., 115.

d'Alembert, joignez vous à mon cher Damilaville, courez sus aux fanatiques et aux fripons."

It is not worth while for us to attempt anything like a connected notice of Voltaire's life. We shall touch only on a few points which seem necessary, in order to give a more correct view of his character than is contained in the work before us.

In 1728 Voltaire, then thirty-four years of age, returned from a two years' residence in England, where he had made acquaintance personally, or by their writings, with the infidel and licentious wits, who had shed so bright, yet so disastrous a lustre on the reign of Queen Anne. Pope and Congreve he knew personally; Swift and Bolingbroke he learned to read and admire; the influence of the Dean of St. Patrick's is easily perceptible in his lighter writings and correspondence.¹ Not long after his return began his intimacy with the celebrated Madame du Chatelet. His "memoirs" open with a brief account of this liaison. "I was ready to quit Paris in disgust with its crowds of fops, and multitudes of wretched books, printed *avec approbation du Roi*, when I met in 1733, a young lady whose views harmonized entirely with my own; and who had resolved to quit the tumult of the world, and retire for some years into the country for the improvement of her mind. This was Madame la Marquise du Chatelet. Her father, the Baron de Breteuil, had caused her to be thoroughly instructed in the Latin language; she had by heart the finest passages of Horace, Virgil, and Lucretius, and was at home in the philosophical works of Cicero. Her prevailing taste, however, was for mathematical and metaphysical studies. Seldom have so much taste and judgment been found united to such a passion for knowledge. She was, at the same time, fond of the world, and cultivated all the accomplishments and graces suitable to her age and sex. All this she quitted, however, to bury herself in a dilapidated chateau on the borders of Champagne." He proceeds to mention the repairs and improvements effected in the chateau of Cirey; the addition he himself made to it, of a suite of apartments furnished with every luxury, which became for the next fifteen years or more, his principal residence, and the sort of society which, allured by the odor of philosophy, resorted to the chateau.

"In this delicious retreat (he continues), we thought only of mutual improvement, without caring what the rest of the world were doing. Our chief attention was for a long time turned to Leibnitz and Newton. Madame du Chatelet was then attached to the philosophy of Leibnitz, and developed a part of his system in a well written treatise. We cultivated, however, all the fine arts.

¹ It is a bitter remark of Voltaire's, that two of the writers who have done most to encourage others in scoffing at religion and the decencies of life, were *clergymen*, Rabelais and Dean Swift.

I composed there, *Alzire*, *Merope*, &c. I worked, at her desire, upon an Essay on Universal History, from the reign of Charlemagne to our own time. I began with Charlemagne, because Bossuet had ended there; I would not venture to meddle with anything handled by that great writer. She, however, was far from satisfied with his History; she admitted the eloquence of its style; but was indignant that almost the whole work should relate to a people so contemptible as the Jews. After passing six years in this retreat, occupied with science and the arts, it became necessary for us to visit Brussels, where the family of du Chatelet had an important lawsuit depending. I had the satisfaction of arbitrating the dispute, which had been going on at a ruinous expense for sixty years, and of securing for the Marquis the payment of two hundred and twenty thousand livres in ready money."

This is one of the very few instances in which any mention occurs of the respectable old husband of this metaphysical young woman. He seems to have been a mere nobody in his own house; thrust aside with scarce any semblance of respect by our male and female philosopher. Whether he would have had philosophy enough to submit to this sort of thing under other circumstances, we cannot tell; but he was poor; his lawsuit had emptied his pockets, and Voltaire had freely advanced him the means of repairing his chateau, and keeping up the establishment. Forty thousand francs of borrowed money was a strong argument for a charitable construction of the attentions lavished on Madame la Marquise.

It is rather more difficult for us to understand how Lord Brougham, with no such inducement, should persuade himself to pass the whole thing off *platonic*. The Abelard of this liaison, profligate, unbelieving, and domesticated in the chateau; the Eloise, handsome, passionate, and "above all vulgar prejudices;" and the "bon homme," bribed to nod or be missing, indicate too clearly its character.

It is a question of some interest, how Voltaire became possessed of so considerable means. His patrimony was but trifling. Ninon de L'Enclos left him two thousand francs to buy books with. This constitutes, until the time of his visit to England, his whole visible means of support. The *Commentaire Historique*, at the close of his works, states that while there, a large subscription for the *Henriade* was raised, headed by George I. and the Princess of Wales; and that on returning to France in 1728, he made a successful venture with these means in a Government lottery. In his own memoirs, he says nothing either of the subscription or the lottery; but intimates rather mysteriously, that, finding he must be either hammer or anvil, he hammered out his own fortunes by speculating dexterously in the funds.

There is an anecdote given by the Abbé Baruel which may

possibly cast some light on the subject ; and which is at least as well authenticated as the anonymous story of the lottery. The Abbé declares he learned it from men who knew Voltaire well in the earlier part of his life. Voltaire had an elder brother, it seems, the Abbé Arouet, who was a zealous Jansenist and a man of fortune. He detested the impieties of François, and openly said he would not leave him a halfpenny. But his health was failing ; he could not last long, and Voltaire had not relinquished all hope of the inheritance. He turns Jansenist and acts the devotee. On a sudden he appears in the Jansenistical garb, and becomes indefatigable in his attentions at church. Choosing the same hours for devotion as the Abbé Arouet, he would be found prostrate before the altar, or listening, with tears in his eyes, to the sermon ;¹ in short, with all the external signs of profound compunction. The Abbé was imposed upon ; encouraged his brother to persevere in pious ways, and died, leaving him all his fortune.

If this is not true, all we can say is, it is sufficiently probable. Voltaire's first published work was a devotional poem ; and he had a power of hypocrisy adequate to this or any other imposture. He was accustomed regularly to receive the sacrament, all the time that he was leading the warfare against Christ and the Gospel ; and jokes about his finding it so much more to his taste to play the part of confessor than of martyr. "Had I a hundred thousand men," he writes to Comte d'Argental (16 Feb., 1761), "I should know very well what to do ; but as I have not, I shall receive the communion at Easter ; and you may call me hypocrite as much as you please." This was a very proper person doubtless, to rail at the hypocrisy of the clergy !

Of the sort of life led in this "terrestrial paradise of Cirey," as well as of the tempers of the two leading characters, Madame de Graigny gives us some rather striking ideas. This woman, an authoress of some little reputation, separated from her husband, poor and profligate, came, at the close of 1738, to eat the bread of toadyism at Cirey. She remained there two or three months ; making her exit precipitately, and in quite another state of mind than at her entrance. She stayed long enough, however, to qualify her for showing what a "hell," according to her own expression, this Eden of philosophy and friendship actually was.

We referred to Voltaire's extreme uneasiness at having any of his attacks on religion or morals circulated with his own name. The evenings at Cirey, it appears, were spent, after the "good man" had retired, in such exercises for "mutual improvement" as reading some of Voltaire's works in manuscript ; among others, that most indecent and profligate poem, the *Pucelle d'Orleans*.

¹ Voltaire appears at least to have heard somewhere, what often passes for moving eloquence. His homiletical canon is this ; *Adspice audientiam torvis oculis, percute pulpitum fortiter, dic nihil ad propositum, et bene predicabis.*

Madame de Graigny was so charmed with this work, that in writing to a correspondent, she gave *him* an analysis of one of the cantos. This became for the poor woman the direful spring of woes unnumbered. Voltaire and Madame du Chatelet were in the habit of intercepting the correspondence that passed to and from Cirey. In the course of this virtuous espionage, they caught and read and retained the gentleman's answer, in which he acknowledged receiving "*the charming canto of Joan.*" As to what followed, we may allow the lady herself, after effecting her escape from this paradise, to tell her own "dreadful story."¹

"On the 29th December, the post arrived as usual; but there were, as they said, no letters for me: supper went off as usual, and nothing announced the storm which was brewing. I went to my chamber and was preparing to seal a letter to you, when greatly to my surprise, Voltaire suddenly entered the room. You may guess how my surprise increased, when he exclaimed, 'that he was undone,—that his life was in my hands. There are a hundred copies of the *Pucelle* abroad,' said he. 'I am off this instant; I shall fly to Holland—to the end of the world—to—I know not where. M. du Chatelet is going off post to Luneville. You must write to Panpan (her correspondent), to help him in recalling these copies; he cannot refuse to do that.'

"I, poor simpleton, assured him you would do all you could to help him. Write then, said Voltaire, write, and write with your whole heart. Willingly, I exclaimed; how happy am I to have an opportunity of showing you my affection; and I added some words of regret at the necessity which obliged him to ask my assistance. He started up like a fury, and exclaimed, 'No prevarication, madame; it is you, you yourself, who have circulated it.' I was astonished; I assured him that I had never read nor written a line of it. 'On the contrary,' he exclaimed, 'you copied it—you sent it to Devaux, and he published it.' I, in all the confusion of a surprise, but with all the vivacity of truth, denied it; he insisted, with increased violence, and added that you had given copies to everybody; and that Madame du Chatelet *had the proof all in her pocket.*

"What could I say or do? I did not, as you may believe, understand what he meant, but I was not the less frightened. At last he insisted that I should sit down and write to you to send me the original, which I had sent you, and all the copies you had made. I humbly submitted, and began to write; but as you can well conceive, I could not ask you to return what was never sent, and which, I believed, never existed. He read my letter and threw it down in disgust. 'For shame, madame,' he cried; 'a little honesty is at least due to a poor wretch whom you have ruined;' and then redoubled cries, redoubled violence, till at last, as all my pro-

¹See Quart. Rev., 1820, Review of Madame de Graigny's letters.

testations only rendered him more intolerable, I was reduced to silence. This frightful torture lasted a full hour, but it was nothing : it was reserved for the *lady* to make it still more frightful. She rushed in, screaming like a fury, upbraiding me in the same way, which I received in the same silence ; at last she pulled a letter out of her pocket, and stuffing it almost into my mouth, ‘ There,’ said she, ‘ there is the proof of your infamy ; you are the most abandoned of creatures ; you are a monster that I received here, not out of regard, for I never had any, but out of pity, because you did not know where else to go, and you have had the infamy to betray us—to stab us—to steal from my desk a work, to copy and circulate it.’ Ah ! my poor friend, where were you ? A thunderbolt would have astonished me less. That’s all I remember of the flood of abuse with which she overwhelmed me. I was so lost that I could neither see nor hear ; but she said a thousand things worse, and but for Voltaire she would have beaten me. He seized her round the waist, and dragged her away from me ; for all this was said with fists clenched in my face, ready at every word to strike me. But in vain would he drag her away ; she returned whenever she could get loose, screaming against my infamous treachery—and all this in the hearing of my servant. I was a great while without being able to speak ; at last, I begged to see the letter ; ‘ you shan’t have it,’ she screamed ; but at length I was allowed to look at a passage of it ; it was a letter of yours, in which you say *the canto of Joan is charming*. This unhappy phrase brought the whole affair to my recollection, and I remembered my innocent account of the canto, which I had heard read. I told them so ; and to do him justice, Voltaire believed me at once, and begged pardon for his cruel suspicion and violence. This dreadful trial lasted till five o’clock in the morning.”

The philosophers saw they had gone too far—a woman so outraged was not safe to go at large, with the wounds of her spirit unmollified with ointment. The balmy diachylon of apology and adulation was freely applied ; and the lady professing contentment, hastened her departure. Voltaire took the further precaution to write from time to time to “ his charming friend,” in a style of the most honeyed compliment, comparing her to Melpomene and all the muses. He probably revenged himself by ridiculing her unmercifully behind her back, as he was accustomed to do to others of his “ angels.” We confess to a little aggravation of our surprise still, that Lord Brougham, in speaking contemptuously of these “ letters” of Madame de Graigny, should add that “ they tend only to raise our admiration of Voltaire’s talents, if that be possible, and also of his kindly disposition.”

The praise lavished upon Voltaire for kindness of disposition, hatred of oppression, and the ready championship of suffering virtue, is founded mainly on the active part he took in the affairs of

Calas, Sirven, and Abbeville. These were all cases in which a stupid and bigoted priesthood set itself about its old favorite work of avenging the church with the fagot and the wheel. The original documents, letters, examinations, &c., are found in Voltaire's works at considerable length, and possess great interest.

The main facts in the several cases were as follows :—There resided at Toulouse a respectable Protestant family by the name of Calas, engaged in merchandise. The parents are represented as eminently kind and indulgent; an evidence of which appears in the fact that, although the elder son had become a Catholic, the family lived in perfect harmony, and his father allowed him a liberal pension. A younger son, Marc Antoine, was dissipated and irreligious. His habits caused him to be refused a license to practise law; and being without business he became depressed and gloomy, and turned his thoughts to suicide. It appeared in evidence, that he was accustomed to read passages from Seneca, Montaigne, and others, justifying self-destruction, and to repeat the famous speech of Hamlet—"To be, or not to be, that is the question!" On the 13th October, 1761, the family had taken tea together as usual, with a young friend named Levasse, from Bordeaux, in company. Marc Antoine Calas quitted the table abruptly before the others, and went down stairs. The others continued engaged in conversation till near nine o'clock, when some one of the family descending with M. Levasse, who took his leave, Marc Antoine was found suspended between the folding doors of the warehouse, and already dead. The cries, the confusion, the running for help which followed, soon collected a crowd; some one suggested that it was possibly a murder and not a suicide; others added that it was the established practice among Protestants to put to death any of their children who were in danger of renouncing the reformed religion; and soon the story grew up that Marc Antoine Calas had designed entering the Catholic church next day, and that his father had hanged him to prevent it. The brotherhood of White Penitents seized upon the matter as an excellent occasion of signalizing their zeal. The body was interred with great religious pomp in the church of St. Stephen. A *catafalque* erected in the middle of the church, on which appeared an image of the deceased, holding in one hand a paper inscribed "*Abjuration of Heresy*," and in the other a palm branch, the emblem of martyrdom. The cordeliers repeated the same ceremonies next day.

Under such influences the municipal court of Toulouse instituted process against the family, threw them into prison, and proposed torturing them all to extort confession. They contented themselves, however, with breaking the father alive on the wheel, and banishing the rest. The wretched widow and children fled to their Protestant brethren at Geneva, and enlisted Voltaire in their

defence. "He at once devoted himself to their service, and succeeded in obtaining the reversal of perhaps the most iniquitous sentence that ever a court, professing or profaning the name of justice, pronounced."

We have taken this account from the "documents" referred to, because the statement in the "Life" before us, though not exactly chargeable with suppressing facts, does not bring out as distinctly as truth requires, the prominent part in the tragedy enacted by the Catholic clergy. The magistrate appears much more active than the priest. The "memoir" of Donat Calas, one of the sons, says truly, that "the cordeliers and White Penitents dictated his father's sentence."

We may take the account of the other cases briefly from Lord Brougham. "About the same time with this memorable event of Calas, there was an attempt made by the same fanatical party in Languedoc, to charge a respectable couple named Sirven, with the murder of their daughter, a young woman who had been confined in a monastery under a *lettre de cachet*, obtained by the priests, and having suffered from cruel treatment, and made her escape, was found drowned in a well. Sirven and his wife fled on hearing of the charge; he was sentenced to death *par contumace*; she died upon the journey, and he took refuge in Geneva. Voltaire exerted himself as before; and succeeded in obtaining a complete acquittal."

"This happened in the year 1762. The year after, another horrid tragedy was enacted in the north; although here Voltaire's great exertions failed in obtaining any justice against the overwhelming weight of the Parliament of Paris, which basely countenanced the iniquity of the court below. A crucifix was found to have been insulted in the night, on the bridge of Abbeville. Two young men, d'Etallonde, and the Chevalier La Barre, were accused of this offence, on mere vague suspicion. The former made his escape; the latter, a youth of seventeen, and highly connected, ventured to stand his trial. The court pronounced La Barre guilty, and sentenced him to suffer the rack, to have his tongue torn out, and then to be beheaded. This infernal sentence was executed upon the miserable youth. The courage shown by Voltaire in exerting himself for La Barre was the more to be admired, that one of the charges against the Chevalier was the having a work of his own in his possession, and treating it with peculiar veneration."

The important facts stated in the "*Relation*" of M. Cassen, *avocat*, to the Marquis Beccaria, do not here appear, that just as in the case of the Calas family, and other celebrated cases much older, it was *the priests* who stirred up the people to fury, and dictated the sentence of the magistrates. Two of the main charges against La Barre, were ridiculing the consecrated wafer, and

neglecting to take off his hat to a procession of Capucins. The Bishop of Amiens and Abbeville made a solemn procession to the insulted crucifix ; and it was through the force of his *Lettres monitoirs*, that the testimony was drummed up on which the young man was condemned.

We have no wish to deny that these frightful exhibitions of fanaticism may have touched Voltaire with indignation and pity. We should be sorry to believe the man existed whom they could affect otherwise. But at the same time, it is perfectly clear that the great attraction of these cases for Voltaire was of a different character. The oppressor was identified in his mind with the object of his deadliest animosity ; and the victims fled to him personally for refuge. His two master passions, vanity and hatred of religion, were directly interested in the issue. The *venue* was changed, and the parties. It was no longer the family of Calas *vs.* the Aldermen of Toulouse ; nor the Chevalier La Barre *vs.* the Parliament of Paris ; but *Athanasius contra mundum* ; Voltaire against the clergy. He fought out the battle as part of his general crusade against religion.

This comes out distinctly in many of his letters. "Palissot," he writes to D'Alembert (12th July, 1762), "has sent me his comedy. I am occupied just now with a real tragedy much more important ; one man hung, another broken on the wheel, a family ruined and dispersed, and all for the sake of our holy religion." "Vous êtes sans doute instruit de l'horrible aventure des Calas à Toulouse. Je vous conjure de crier, et de faire crier, *ecr. l'inf....*" Again under date of 25th September, "Criez partout, je vous en prie, pour les Calas, et contre le fanatisme, car c'est *l'inf....* qui a fait leur malheur." So to Damilaville ; "Je me flatte toujours que cette affaire des Calas fera un bien infini à la raison humaine, et autant de mal à *l'inf....* ;" and in many other places to the same effect.

The same thing is true of the interest he took in the Sirven and Abbeville cases. He cared for them mainly, as they formed a part of the battery with which he hoped to prostrate Christianity ; and not satisfied with these, he even set himself to hunt up other cases of which he could make a similar use. The charm of the thing was, that here he could speak out without disguise. The "judicial murders" committed at the instigation of the priesthood, led to a general cry of horror ; and Voltaire could *faire main basse* on the fanaticism that produced them, without bringing his motives into suspicion. He could assassinate religion all the more effectually, for being in circumstances to steal the garment of philanthropy. It was just one of those cases in which Satan transforms himself into an angel of light.

As for real goodness or benevolence, we are bound to say that not a particle of anything like it appears in Voltaire's character. He was accustomed to scoff habitually at all those things which

good men hold sacred. He delighted to use his powers of ridicule, without restraint or mercy, for the humiliation of those he hated. Of truth he was utterly reckless. His insincerity and hypocrisy knew no bounds. Towards all human affections and infirmities, he ever bore the mocking air of a Mephistopheles; and the whole labor of his life was to tear from the hearts of men their only ground of consolation and hope, with nothing whatever to offer them in its place.

It is not to be denied that for the creation of such a character, the Roman Catholic Church and priesthood are to be held largely responsible. The undisguised profligacy of many of the higher clergy; the incredible ignorance and fanaticism of the lower; and the transparent absurdity of the dogmas which were exhibited as the Gospel, could scarcely fail to produce infidelity in minds even less acute and less independent than Voltaire's. But then it is to be remembered, that Voltaire was under no necessity of confounding Romanism with Christianity. He knew the differing tenets of the Evangelical and Reformed Churches, and hated them more bitterly than he did the Catholic. He had the Gospel in his hands, and appears, from his frequent scoffing quotations, to have been familiar with its contents. His war, finally, was not against this or that form of Christianity, corrupt or purified, but against Christ, the Apostles, and the Gospel. When, shortly after his return from England, M. Herault, the Lieutenant of Police, said to him, "Do what you can, you will never succeed in destroying Christianity," Voltaire promptly replied, "*That is what we shall see.*" He himself, to be sure, attributes this reply to somebody else, but that was one of his usual tricks; and to D'Alembert he writes that "it is impossible but five or six men of merit who understood each other, should be able to pull down what twelve low scoundrels had built up."

There are some things in the history of Voltaire's connexion with the King of Prussia, the crowned "Lucifer" of the sect, on which we should like to comment; but on such a subject our remarks are already sufficiently extended. We pass over everything to come to the account of the Philosopher's death.

In the early part of 1778, he returned to Paris, from which he had long been outlawed; and was received with enthusiasm by all classes of people. The audience rose up to receive him in the theatre, and crowned him with flowers. Franklin, then our Minister at Versailles, carried his grandson to see him, and receive his blessing; and the two great philosophers,—alas! both philosophers—"took their places side by side at a public sitting of the Academy, amid shouts of applause which burst involuntarily from the whole assembly." Voltaire had for some time previous become greatly enfeebled. Many of his letters during the last year or two of his life, have the melancholy signature, *Le vieux malade de*

Ferney. To one of his correspondents he says he is "bending under the weight of eighty-four years, and as many disorders." The excitement of his triumph at Paris proved too much for him. He was seized with a profuse bleeding from the lungs, and felt the approach of death.

The account of this most impressive period in the life of his subject, Lord Brougham appears to have taken implicitly from Condorcet, a man too deeply pledged to philosophism to be trusted in his description of an infidel death-bed.

"While in his last illness the clergy had come around him; and as all the philosophers of that period appear to have felt particularly anxious that no public stigma should be cast upon them by a refusal of Christian burial, they persuaded him to undergo confession and absolution. He had a few weeks before submitted to this ceremony, and professed to die in the Catholic faith in which he was born—a ceremony which M. Condorcet may well say, gave less edification to the devout than it did scandal to the free-thinkers. The Curé (rector) of St. Sulpice had, on this being related, made inquiry, and found the formula too general; he requited the Abbé Gauthier who had performed the office, to insist upon a more detailed profession of faith, else he should withhold the burial certificate. While this dispute was going on, the dying man recovered and put an end to it. On what proved his real death-bed, the Curé came and insisted on a full confession. When the dying man had gone a certain length, he was required to subscribe to the doctrine of our Savior's divinity. This roused his indignation; and he gave vent to it in an exclamation which at once put to flight all the doubts of the pious, and reconciled the infidels to their Patriarch. The certificate was refused; and he was buried in a somewhat clandestine, certainly a hasty manner, at the monastery of Scellières of which his nephew was Abbot."

The account given by the Abbé Baruel, and known through one channel or another to most readers of religious miscellany, is considerably more particular. The Abbé indeed gives no authority for his statements, the reason of which probably is that his work was so nearly contemporaneous with the events described. Voltaire died in 1778, and the history of Jacobinism was published some time before the close of the century. The death of Voltaire was, at all events, too recent to permit any material misrepresentation; and the Abbé challenges denial of his statements.

"In spite of all the sophisters flocking around him in the first days of his illness, he gave signs of wishing to return to the God he had so often blasphemed. His danger increasing, he wrote the following note to the Abbé Gauthier: "You had promised me, Sir, to come and hear me. I entreat you would take the trouble of calling as soon as possible. Signed, VOLTAIRE.—Paris, the 26th Feb., 1778."

A few days after he wrote the following declaration, in the presence of the same Abbé Gauthier, the Abbé Mignot, and the Marquis de Villeveille, copied from the minutes deposited with M. Momet, notary at Paris.

"I, the underwritten, declare, that for these four days past, having been afflicted with vomiting of blood, at the age of eighty-four, and not having been able to drag myself to the Church, the Rev. the Rector of St. Sulpice having been pleased to add to his good works, that of sending me the Abbé Gauthier, a priest, I confessed to him, and if it pleases God to dispose of me, I die in the Holy Catholic church in which I was born; hoping that the Divine mercy will deign to pardon all my faults: if ever I have scandalized the church, I ask pardon of God and of the Church.

2d March, 1778.

Signed,

VOLTAIRE.

"In the presence of the Abbé Mignot, my nephew, and the Marquis de Villeveille, my friend."

Voltaire had permitted this declaration to be carried to the Rector of St. Sulpice, and to the Archbishop of Paris, to know whether it would be sufficient. When the Abbé Gauthier returned with the answer, it was impossible for him to gain admittance to the patient. The conspirators had strained every nerve to hinder the chief from consummating his recantation, and every avenue was shut to the priest whom Voltaire himself had sent for. Terror and rage then got complete mastery of the dying man. D'Alembert, Diderot, and some twenty others who had beset his apartment, never came near him but to be received with reproaches and execrations. "Begone," he would exclaim, "it is you who have brought me to my present condition!" Then succeeded alternate blasphemies and prayers. Sometimes he would cry out in plaintive accents, "O Christ! O Jesus Christ!" and then would complain, that he was abandoned both by God and man. The scene was too dreadful to be endured. His friend and physician, M. Tronchin, withdrew in terror, declaring that the death-bed was awful, and that the furies of Orestes could give but a faint idea of those of Voltaire. The Marshal de Richelieu also fled, acknowledging that the scene was too terrible to bear."

To this account, a striking confirmation is added by the anecdote given by Bishop Wilson, to the effect that "the nurse who attended him, being many years afterwards requested to wait on a sick Protestant gentleman, refused till she was assured that he was not a *philosopher*; declaring, if he were, she would on no account incur the danger of witnessing such a scene as she had been compelled to do at the death of M. Voltaire." The excellent Prelate, in whose Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity this anecdote occurs, declares that he received the account from the son of the gentleman to whose dying bed the woman was invited.

All this was much too unphilosophical, we suppose, and much too solemn, to find any place in the Lives of Men of Letters, &c. Those, however, whose reading or experience has given them better information than Lord Brougham had, of the way in which bad men and haters of Christ do often die, will find a strong argument from analogy, for the truth of the Abbé Baruel's statement.

D'Alembert also shrank when he came to face death ; and would have betrayed his remorse and fear, by calling in religion to his aid, had not Condorcet barred the door against the priest and rendered him inaccessible. *Had I not been there*, said Condorcet, relating the circumstances, *he would have flinched also*.

Diderot, too, was willing to find something better than philosophy to lean on in his last hours. He had in his employment as librarian, a young man of a religious turn of mind, who felt greatly concerned at the thought of his dying without repentance. After having, by the advice of a clergyman, made the matter a subject of prayer, he ventured to address Diderot with regard to his preparation for death. "Are you certain," said he, "that your philosophy has not left you a soul to save ? I have no doubt on that point ; and I cannot reflect on it without warning my benefactor to avoid the eternal misfortune that may await him. See, sir, you have yet sufficient time left ; and excuse an advice which gratitude and your friendship force from me." Diderot heard him with attention, and even melted into tears. He promised to give the subject his serious consideration.

The result was that the Curé M. de Tersac was invited to visit him ; and after several conferences, Diderot prepared for a public recantation. His own private circle of friends, however, watched him as he had helped watch Voltaire. They persuaded him that he was imposed upon, and that a little country air would immediately recover him. Diderot for some time resisted their entreaties, but finally consented to try the country. His departure was kept secret. It was pretended he was still in Paris, and the deception was carried on by issuing daily reports of his health. In the mean time the jailors, who had seized his person, watched him till they had seen him expire, and then brought the body back to Paris, and gave out that he had died suddenly at table. He expired the 2d of July, 1784, and was represented as having died calm in all his atheism, with no signs of remorse. It will not be easy to satisfy any one who has had the least observation of the power of a guilty conscience, and the "fearful looking for" with which the last hours of the wicked are often attended ; that all this agitation, shrinking, and sending for clergymen, respected a question of no greater importance than securing a Christian burial.

The Abbé Baruel may have been led by his alarm, and the liveliness of his imagination, to overdraw somewhat the picture he has given of the conspiracy against religion and government ; but for


facts like the above, his testimony is amply sufficient. We are ourselves well informed of two instances, in a considerable Western town, in which the companions of dying infidels, seeing them begin to "flinch," closed round their bed, bolted the door against every religious person, and in one of the cases, stupified their victim with brandy, till he died. Gather not our soul, O Lord! with sinners!

Now, we will not deny that the world may be wiser and better, in the long run, because such a man as Voltaire lived in it; but we think it will be in a very different way from what Lord Brougham anticipates. That "Glory to God in the highest" will accrue from it in some way, we have no doubt.

"If plagues and earthquakes break not Heaven's design,
Why then a Borgia or a Catiline?"

At the feeble malice of those who thus take counsel against the Lord and against his Anointed, he that sitteth in the heavens sometimes laughs and has them in derision; and again speaks unto them in his anger, and vexes them in his sore displeasure. But so far as human happiness or improvement is concerned, there is a frightful deduction to be made on account of those whom Voltaire has taught to live, and fitted to die, like himself. Perhaps the man never lived, who is followed in his course through eternity by the accumulating execrations of a greater number of victims. "With what dreadful vehemence (says Jay, in one of his Evening Exercises) did the writer once hear a fine young man, while dying, exclaim, again and again, 'O curse you, Voltaire!'" How it must roll on, through age after age, here and hereafter, in one broad, deep, swelling current of blasphemies and agonies, the mind shudders to think of!

The crisis, however, is already well passed. The most formidable conspiracy ever organized against religion, with every circumstance of advantage presented by a corrupt church, and people, at that time, as Voltaire often says, half monkey, half tiger, recoiled in wide ruin on its inventors. True religion raises her placid head from the waves, as the tempest sweeps away; and now the Scriptures and the *petits livres portatifs*, circulated in connexion, are sowing all over France the seed of a different harvest, that shall one day wave like Lebanon, when the influence of Voltaire shall have withered like the grass of the earth.



ARTICLE V.

NICHOLAS I. AND THE FORGED LITERATURE OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

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IN speaking of the Forged Literature of the Middle Ages, we take the papacy of Nicholas the First, as the point of vision, A. D. 858-867; in the first place, because he first appealed to the forged Decretals, the most wonderful instance of forgery ever known in the history of the church, and then, because he is a fine exemplification of that spirit of matchless impudence with which the leaders of the corporation of Rome have imposed their forgeries and frauds on the world in all ages.

After Gregory the Great, A. D. 590-604, and before Gregory the Seventh, A. D. 1073-1085, this same Nicholas is, beyond all doubt, the most remarkable of the pontiffs. And although his name has not the same bad eminence in the popular mind with that of the notorious Hildebrand, yet so great was the influence exerted by him on the course of events, that Guizot does not hesitate to assert that the sovereignty of the Pope really takes date from his reign.

When he ascended the throne, the Popes of Rome, in their progress towards supremacy, were exposed to the resistance of four powers. The Patriarch of Constantinople, their most dangerous spiritual rival and antagonist; the national churches of Europe, which had arisen since the invasion of the Barbarians, especially those of Italy, France, Spain, and England; the Metropolitans, an ecclesiastical nobility who ruled the bishops of particular provinces; and the civil power, whether imperial or royal.

Three of these powers were represented by two men, quite as remarkable as Nicholas himself. The chair of the see of Constantinople was filled by Photius, a man of vast native powers, of unrivalled scholarship and learning, of exhaustless energy and infinite ambition. Before he was raised to the patriarchal throne, he had passed through almost all grades of civil office and promotion.

Without entering into the details of the warfare, it is enough to say, that these ambitious rulers of the Eastern and Western Churches met in fierce encounter. Nicholas excommunicated Photius, and Photius Nicholas; and the great and incurable Greek Schism was the ultimate result.

The national churches were represented in the person of the celebrated Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, and Primate of France, the great churchman of the age, and the most learned canonist of the church.

In his relations to his own bishops, he also represented the ecclesiastical nobility, whom the Pope needed to subdue, in order to centralize all the bishops directly in himself.

By the canons of the Council of Sardica, A. D. 347 (which yet was not œcumenical), the papal power was extended beyond all precedent, and contrary to all right, in merely allowing appeals at all, from metropolitan councils to the Roman pontiff; and for centuries after this council, the African bishops forbade such appeals. And yet even by these canons, the Pope could only order a new trial in the province, aided by his legates; and, if need be, by delegates from neighboring provinces (Bower 1: 57, 58). Nor did the East, or Africa, ever receive this council, nor did the Council of Chalcedon sanction its decrees.

This council, then, did not furnish the materials needed to establish and consolidate the papal power. Such materials, in fact, did not exist. It was necessary to forge them, and thus to set up claims which should give to the Pope the right of removing all such cases to Rome, to be tried before his own tribunal. And this point, too, was to be carried, and was carried, against such a man as Hincmar of Rheims.

The regal power was also to be subdued, and was subdued, in the person of the feeble Lotharius. Had the regal authority been represented by a sovereign like Charlemagne, swaying with strong grasp the power of a united empire, the aggressions of Nicholas would have met with less success, had he dared to engage in a warfare so unequal.

But the vast dominions of Charlemagne had been divided among his feeble descendants; and they had turned their arms against each other. Two grandsons and three great grandsons of Charlemagne, then sat on feeble thrones. The grandsons were, Louis in Germany, and Charles the Bald in France; the great-grandsons, Louis in Italy and Rhoetia, Lotharius in Burgundy, Alsatia, and Lorraine, and Charles in Provence. The rest of these could, in a moment, be stirred up to invade the dominions of any of the five whom the Pope should excommunicate. Hence, each was powerless in single combat with the Pope. A single papal anathema would become the signal for the invasion and subjugation of his territories by the others.

Of course, Nicholas felt that he was their master, and declared himself such. He singled out Lotharius as the object of an attack, designed to demonstrate and establish his power. Lotharius, having married one wife, Theutberga, desired, like Henry the Eighth in after days, to divorce her and to take another, Waldrada. So, in fact, he did, and that with the countenance of his own bishops, led on by the archbishops, Gunthier and Teutgaud, a brother and uncle of Waldrada. Notice now the influence of weakness in a king, on the conscience of a Pope. Charlemagne twice did the same thing.

He also left illegitimate children behind him as the fruit of his licentious excesses. But he was strong, therefore the papal conscience was undisturbed, and he was sainted. But Lotharius, his luckless descendant, was weak. This aroused the tender conscience of the Pope; and with apostolic zeal he declared war upon him for his manifest crime.

Even so—the conscience of Gregory the Seventh was very sensitive, in the case of Henry the Fourth, who was enfeebled by a revolt in his empire; but was quite torpid in the case of William the Conqueror, for he was unconquerably strong. Yet William had sinned as grievously as Henry. At the Synod of Winchester, A. D. 1076, Gregory's law, enjoining the celibacy of the clergy, was very materially modified. The bishops, whom Gregory had summoned to Rome, were forbidden by William to obey the summons, to the very great annoyance and chagrin of Gregory. The King, too, continued to exercise the right of investiture, which, in the case of Henry, was so impious. Other presumptuous demands of Gregory were repelled with cold indifference. Yet no thunderbolts of divine wrath were hurled from the pontifical throne against the royal sinner. Gregory prudently declined the encounter with so vigorous an antagonist—fearful of provoking him to terrific retaliation. Hence the spirit of the papal policy in all ages is truly described in the old saying, in which we are told that the chief end of man is to keep what he has got, and to get what he can. The aggrandizement of their power has been their constant end in all ages. In pursuit of this, they have, as circumstances favored, steadily augmented their claims, regarding merely the principles of selfish policy, and never those of benevolence, honor, or truth.

So Nicholas acted in the case of Lotharius. Theutberga solicited his aid. He undertook her cause, and under pretext of defending her, put forth and established the most arrogant claims of papal supremacy. He encountered and defeated both king, archbishops, and bishops.

Though the council of bishops at Aix la Chapelle, in accordance with the wishes of the king, had divorced her, this was nothing to Nicholas. He sent legates into Lorraine, and at a second council at Metz, caused the case to be reëxamined by his legates. Lotharius bribed the legates, and the second council confirmed the doings of the first. Nicholas was enraged, but not dismayed. By an extravagant assumption of power, by his own authority, he declared the decision null and void, and deposed at a blow, the king's archbishops, Gunhier and Teutgaud, and he was victorious. Though they struggled long and desperately against him, they could not retain their office, but fell before his power. He also excommunicated Waldrada, and compelled Lotharius to take back Theutberga. Thus did he effectually subdue the regal power.

Twice also, in an ecclesiastical conflict, he defeated Hincmar, and here he invested himself in the panoply of the forged Decretals. Of these we may safely say that, of all the forgeries that ever disgraced the nominal followers of Christianity, they are the most gigantic in conception, successful in execution, and terrific in power. They changed the whole face of the Christian world, and are the spirit of the canon law, and the basis of the papal corporation to this day.

Gieseler fixes their composition between A. D. 829 and 845, in France, and ascribes them to Benedict Levita of Mentz. Guizot coincides. As to the direct agency of the Popes in their composition, opinions vary. But Mosheim does not hesitate to regard the Popes as their knowing and deliberate authors. He regards it as impossible that such a forgery should have come into existence and use, touching, as it does, all the springs of their influence and authority, without their knowledge and coöperation. At all events, Nicholas the First has the unenviable notoriety of having first appealed to them as authentic documents.

From him, till the Reformation detected the cheat, that is, for about seven centuries, they were appealed to without suspicion, in the public affairs of the Church, and used by the Popes to gain their ends without any material opposition. That we do not falsely charge Nicholas, facts show. None of his predecessors have referred to them.

Leo IV., A.D. 850, does not include them among the standards of judgment. Nor does even Nicholas I., in 863; but in 865, in his letters to all the French bishops, he defends their authority.¹

Nicholas was a fit leader in the enterprise of introducing so vast a scheme of fraud, for the purposes of hierarchical aggrandizement. He is an exact image of Gregory VII., or Innocent III. He was a man of uncommon intellectual power, of great attainments for his age, and of gigantic energy of will. He was also ambitious to the highest degree, and strained his claims of supreme authority, infallibility, and irresponsibility to man, to the highest pitch of extravagance and arrogance. And having fought and gained a great battle with the civil power, in the person of King Lothaire II., on the points already specified, he also determined to gain a victory over the ecclesiastical nobility that came between the Pope and the common order of bishops, and over national churches, in the person of Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, head of the French Church. Hincmar had, without sufficient reason, suspended Rothade, bishop of Soissons. He appealed to the Pope. Hincmar disregarded his appeal, and deposed him at the synod of Soissons. Rothade appealed again, and Nicholas called up the affair at Rome, and by his own authority, annulled the decision of the council, and restored Rothade. Hincmar resisted, but was obliged to submit.

¹ Gieseler, II., 65-69.

To defend himself in this high-handed measure, Nicholas appealed to the authority of the forged Decretals, thus introducing the use of that vast system of fraud; for this is the first example, as before stated, of an appeal to this forgery.

On this occasion, also, he asserted the Pseudo-Isidorian principles in full, that obedience was due to all papal decrees as such, and demanded from all metropolitans, at their investiture with the pallium, an oath to this effect. Hincmar was the most learned canonist of the age; but so low was the general standard of scholarship and of criticism at that time, that he could not expose the forgery. He did not deny the genuineness of the Decretals as he ought, but resisted their authority. Nicholas, of course, prevailed.

But we should misunderstand Nicholas, and the men of that age, if we supposed that they suddenly, and by one gigantic stride, so enormously overleaped the eternal barriers of truth, and unaided, and uninfluenced by preceding generations, at once completed, like Satan and his workmen in Hell, the vast fabric of falsehood, so that at once "the ascending pile stood fixed in stately height." Neither communities nor individuals become suddenly thus corrupt. The conscience of the Church had been seared as with a hot iron, and she had spoken lies in hypocrisy, long before Nicholas. These portentous results were but the mature fruit of seed early sown, and plants assiduously cultivated, from almost the earliest ages of the Church. One who comes fresh from the pure morality of the New Testament, consigning all liars to the lake of fire, finds it impossible to utter the feelings of shame and disappointment which agitate the mind, when the history of the opinions and practices of the early ages on the subject of pious frauds is first unfolded. When, however, the power of these first emotions has somewhat subsided, and he attempts to take a philosophical view of the facts, he finds in depraved human nature a deep foundation for such frauds; and soon discovers that a propensity to them is not limited to the Romish church, but that even in the Protestant world there is a constant temptation to fall into them. For a more full illustration of this dangerous tendency, we refer to an able essay of Archbishop Whately, on Pious Frauds, in his work entitled, "The Errors of Romanism traced to their origin in Human Nature."

We shall, therefore, proceed to speak of the general nature of pious fraud; the early introduction of it into the Christian Church; of its pernicious effects in the earlier ages, upon the literature and history of the Christian body; its most perfect development in the forged Decretals, in the frauds of Baronius, Bellarmine, and others; the subsequent power and state of the system among the Romanists; and finally among the Puseyites. In a field so extensive, only a general sketch can be expected in a brief essay.

Pious frauds, as defined by Whately, are "those which any one

employs and justifies to himself, as conducing, according to his view, to the defence or promotion of true religion." "There is, in such conduct," he remarks, "a union of sincerity and insincerity—of conscientiousness in respect to the end, and unscrupulous dishonesty as to the means; for without one of these there could be no *fraud*, and without the other, it could, in no sense, be termed a *pious fraud*."

It is, therefore, only a specific case under the general diabolical maxim, that the end sanctifies the means—a doctrine which God has emphatically condemned, by declaring that the damnation is just, of all who teach, Let us do evil that good may come.

Yet is it not still an oft-disputed question among us, whether a lie is in any case justifiable? E. g. is it right to lie to a highwayman, in order to save our money, or our life? So, too, the question may be raised, was it not right for Rahab to save the spies by a lie; and for Jael to deceive Barak, the enemy of the Jews, in order to destroy him? It may be asked did not Samuel deceive, when he said, I am come to sacrifice to the Lord, when yet his real and main end was to anoint David as king? Yet God directed him so to do.

We refer to these things to show that if the early Christians were tempted to use pious frauds, there were materials enough of easy self-deception at hand. And if any one will look at the temptation in advocating a great and good cause, even at this day, to select and state only facts adapted to excite the public mind, and produce liberality, and to slur over unfavorable facts, he will see how easy it is to be led to overstate, or falsely to color facts, or to suppress what truly belongs to a full presentation of the subject considered.

In addition to the case of temptation which we have stated, Whately supposes eight cases more, in which, even among Protestants, there might be a temptation to employ pious fraud. And even these he specifies, not as exhausting the cases, but as illustrating the extent and power of the temptation. He refers also to the heathen legislators and philosophers, who encouraged or connived at a system of mythology, which they disbelieved, in order that they might, through fear of the wrath of the gods and of Tartarus, and the hope of Elysium, keep the populace in order. Their statesmen deluded and overawed the populace with oracles and prodigies, just as the priests of the Romish and Greek Churches have, with false miracles and revelations. The present use of fraud and forgeries to gain important political ends, or to save the country, we need but advert to as of the same general kind. And many, even now, attempt to use similar influences in governing children.

Also he remarks, that when the process has once commenced, and some falsehood has been wrought into a system regarded as

in the main sound, there is a temptation to tolerate it, through fear of greater evil in destroying reverence for the whole system, or of losing influence in assailing it. We thought it necessary to take this general view, before coming to exhibit the development of these principles in the primitive church.

The mass on whom Christianity operated, had been already degraded by such maxims and practices, in the Pagan world; and they were not thoroughly and in a moment purged of their pollutions, when they became Christians. Moreover, a higher power of fraud prepared through them the way for results of which they little dreamed, when they began their work of promoting truth by the use of fraud. Let us now consider the early introduction into the church of the system of pious frauds.

Mosheim states¹ that the Platonists and Pythagoreans deemed it not only lawful, but commendable, to deceive and to lie for the sake of truth and piety. The Jews, in Egypt, learned from them this sentiment even before the days of Christ. From both, this vice early spread among Christians. Books were forged under the names of eminent men; also the Sibylline verses were fabricated by some Christian, in order to bring idolaters to believe in Christianity. The Pagans were indignant at this forgery, which they ascribed to Christians.² He also tells us³ that a similar mode of argument was used by Origen and Tertullian. From such principles came the forged Apostolic Canons and Constitutions; the Recognitions of Clement; the works of Dionysius the Areopagite, in the fourth and fifth centuries. The system of pious frauds was adopted even by Ambrose, Hilary, Augustine, Gregory Nazianzen, Jerome, and Sulpitius Severus, in vita S. Martin. Thus was the way prepared by Satan, for the deepest delusions of the middle ages.

Gieseler⁴ gives passages from Jerome and John Cassian, in which the principles of the system are unfolded. The same fathers who thus wrote and practised, ascribed accommodation to Jesus and the Apostles. Cassian argues its lawfulness from the case of Rahab and of Delilah. Though they used lies, they were aiming at great and good ends. Gieseler tells us,⁵ speaking of spurious writings up to A. D. 200, that their purpose was to encourage the persecuted, to convince the unbelieving, and to give the sanction of antiquity to certain opinions.

For such ends, old spurious writings of the Jews were interpolated; e. g. the Book of Enoch; the Fourth book of Ezra. Others were forged, e. g. the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs; the Ascension of Isaiah; the Shepherd of Hermas; the books of Hystaspes; the Acts of Pilate; the Sibylline prophecies, &c. All of these are designed to promote Millennarian views.

Waddington⁶ traces many of the forgeries in the names of

¹ Cent. ii., vol. 1, p. 130.

⁴ i., p. 298.

² See Origen contra Celsum.

⁵ i., p. 298.

³ p. 183, Cent. 3, 184.

⁶ p. 54, 55.

Apostles and Fathers, to an imitation of pagan philosophers, who, without attempting delusion, introduced ancient worthies as uttering their own opinions. Christianity, too, he tells us, was then in the hands of Greeks and Africans, to whom our maxims of morality were not known. "We shall never," says he, "do justice to the history of our religion, unless we continually bear in mind the low condition of society and morals, existing among the people to whom it was first delivered."

Some of the passages adduced by Gieseler, we will translate. Jerome (Epist. 30 al. 50, ad Pammachium) thus defends the propriety of lying in certain cases: "It is one thing to write controversially, another didactically, or dogmatically (*γυμναστικῶς, δογματικῶς*). In the former, the controversy is not restricted by fixed principles; and he who is replying to an antagonist, may state now one thing, now another; may argue as he pleases; may declare one thing, but act on the opposite supposition; may pretend to show bread (as the saying is) when he has in his hands nothing but a stone." "But in the second kind of writing, open-hearted frankness, and if I may so say, candor and ingenuousness are necessary."

For evidence that they were disposed to allow far too great a latitude of accommodation (*οικονομία*), attributing it in the same extent to Jesus and the Apostles, see Suicer s. v. *συγκαταβάσις*—T. II., p. 1067.

In this way, Jerome wished to explain the passage, Gal. 2 : 11, seq.; but was opposed by Augustine, whose principles were more strict.¹ Chrysostom, de sacerdotio, I. 5, lays down very questionable principles concerning the lawfulness of deception in certain cases. He was followed in this, by his pupil, John Cassian, Coll. XVII., 8 seq. e.g. cap. 17:—"Therefore, we ought to regard and use falsehood, as if it were of the nature of hellebore, which, if taken when threatened by a deadly disease, is salutary; but if without the necessity caused by such danger, results in immediate death. For God not merely investigates and judges our words and actions, but also regards our purpose and intention. But if he sees that anything has been done or promised, by any one, for the sake of eternal salvation, and with that perception of results which proceeds from divine contemplation, although it appears to men shameless and unjust, yet he, regarding the interior piety of the heart, will consider in his decision, not the sound of the words, but the purpose of the will; for the end of an undertaking, and the disposition of the agent, are to be considered. In this way some, as has been remarked before, have been able to secure justification by lying (e. g. Rahab, Jos. 2 :) and others, by telling the truth, have incurred the penalty of eternal death. (Delilah, Judg. 16.)"

¹ See his writings, de Mendacio; and contra Mendacium. See correspondence on this point between them, Epist. Hieron. Ep. 65, 67-73, 76.

Yet at this time they tithed mint, anise, and cummin. The neglect of ecclesiastical forms was a great crime. All oaths, the taking of interest, self-defence, capital punishments, and second marriages, were reckoned as crimes. In comparison with the violation of mere ceremonial laws, a disregard of the weightier matters of truth and justice were deemed venial offences, or even virtues, if meant for good ends. Hence, we can see how men could come to such a state of mental delusion, as to perpetrate for good ends the abominable imposition of the invention of the cross. Hence, we can see how far Ambrose could conspire with a butcher, to hide bones and blood under the pavement of his church, and then pretend to be informed by a special revelation, that the relics of the martyrs Protasius and Gervasius, of whom no one had ever heard before, were hid there. And that he should dig them up, and prepare for them a shrine, and transfer their remains to it with the solemn mockery of prayer and preaching; and that miracles of healing should be wrought by these remains; and that the bones and blood should be sold for a great price. Was not the end a good one? Was it not important that the church of Milan should have influence and wealth? Are not these the means of doing good? But, alas! she had no martyrs. Hence, there could be no shrine, no saint-worship, no miracles of healing, no casting out of devils, and, above all, no precious gifts. Why, then, should there not be an invention of martyrs, as well as an invention of the cross? To be sure, if it were to be found out, it might seem a shameless fraud to man; but God would judge in view not of the words, but of the purpose of the heart.

Hence, too, the working of false miracles for a good end, admitted of an easy justification, and no less the forging of saints, and the ascription to real saints of miracles which they never wrought. Hence, the deluge of saints' lives and miracles with which the world was flooded, and the Romish world still is flooded; for in Alban Butler, these forged saints keep their place even to this day. Hence, too, we find in leading men, both in the Latin and Greek churches, shameless lying for any ends that interested men could convince themselves were good ends.

The celebrated Photius, no doubt, regarded it as of great importance, that he should be Patriarch of Constantinople, for the glory of God and the good of the Church. Hence, he did not hesitate to give to the Emperor a letter in the name of Ignatius, severely censuring the Emperor, and another in the name of the Pope, in favor of Photius, which Eustralius, arriving at Constantinople in the habit of a monk, had delivered to him. And yet there is no reason to doubt that he had caused these letters to be forged, in order to get Ignatius, whom the Pope declared to be the true patriarch, out of the way. Lotharius (or Bishop Adventinus of Mentz for him) did not hesitate to forge the tale that he was married

to Waldrada when young, by the command of the Emperor Lotharius, his father, and was afterwards forced by Count Herbert to marry his sister; and Bishop Adventinus related it as a fact in the counsel of Aix-la-Chapelle. He also wrote for him a lying letter to the Pope, and finally lied to excuse himself to the Pope.

When we meet with such things in the leading characters of the nominal church; when we find in Gregory the Seventh, a system of deliberate lying, adapted and designed to reduce the world to one vast feudal monarchy, of which he should be the head, and the kings of the earth his vassals; instead of feeling that we are in the kingdom of God, we seem to be involved in the deepest gloom of hell itself, and are, for a moment, overwhelmed with horror and amazement. But when we trace the system to its origin, we see that a single key is enough to open the bottomless pit. And as we read the corrupt maxims of some of the leading doctors of the Church, we seem to see a star fall from heaven to earth, and take the key of the bottomless pit and open it, and to behold the smoke as of a great furnace, arising from the pit, till the sun and the air are darkened by reason of the smoke of the pit. Never was there such a lesson, as it regards the danger of tampering with the truth, even in the least degree, as may be read in the history of the Church. Let us look at the pernicious effects of the system of pious frauds on the literature and moral condition of earlier and of subsequent ages. Waddington, speaking of the literary forgeries that corrupted and disgraced the Ante-Nicene Church, says, "Their immediate effect was exceedingly injurious." We will hint at some of their effects.

1. They tended to disgrace the moral character of the age, by the circulation of degrading materials of thought. The truths of God's word are pure, simple, elevating. The devil might well exult to see the people of God neglecting such heavenly food, and turning away to feed on false gospels, sibylline oracles, spurious saints' lives, and degraded and degrading acts and decisions of the Apostles.

2. They have immeasurably injured the interests of all subsequent ages. The welfare of all ages is involved in the correctness of the historical and literary documents of the early ages. Nowhere is historical truth more important, and yet, through the influence of the system of pious frauds, nowhere is it harder to be discerned. The decision of whole controversies is prevented by the doubtful state of early documents. To illustrate this, it is sufficient to refer to the interminable controversies as to what Ignatius actually said concerning bishops. We know that his letters have been more or less interpolated for purposes of pious frauds; but who can tell how much? By this uncertainty, whole controversies are kept alive, that otherwise would easily be

settled. Let any one read Binius, Baronius, and Bellarmine, and then try to strike out all that is spurious and forged in their writings, and he will find himself in a labyrinth at once.

3. The earlier forgeries furnished principles and precedents for worse deeds. And very soon the lowest depths were reached by men speaking lies in hypocrisy, and having their consciences seared as with a hot iron. Bad as are the forged Decretals, they are no worse, except in extent, than many preceding forgeries. Nothing can be worse than the attempts by Popes Zosimus and Celestine to palm off the canons of Sardica as those of Nice, because the Council of Nice was an œcumenical council, and that of Sardica was not.

4. It provokes God to abandon the church, and thus produces strong delusion to believe a lie. Whately well says, that how far any one who propagates a lie may be himself deceived, or may be guilty of pious fraud, and how far a fraud is a *pious* fraud, God only knows. Probably most have begun in wilful deceit, and advanced towards superstitious belief. Those who report a lie often believe it. The curse on those who do not love truth, is strong delusion to believe a lie. Thus a man, intent on an end, may first deceive himself into a belief that it is a good end, and then that it is right to lie to gain it, and finally that the lie is a truth. Many are conscientious in the sense that they have led their conscience to approve the purposes of the will, and not that their conscience has led their will to form its purposes. They persevere in wrong till they convince themselves that it is right.

Let us now consider the most perfect development of this system, in the forged Decretals.

The ultimate result of them was twofold; to concentrate the bishops around the Pope and subject them to his authority, and to raise the ecclesiastical above the civil power.

To accomplish this, they seemed to propose to defend the bishops against the tyranny of their own metropolitans, and of their civil rulers. Before the papal despotism was established, bishops were tried and judged by the bishops of a metropolitan province, under their metropolitan, and without appeal to the Pope. Of course they were liable to injustice; and if the metropolitan were imperious and haughty, as was often the case, they were to expect often to experience it. Hence very likely the origin of the canons of the Council of Sardica. But as these only authorized the Pope to command a new trial in the province, the main and ultimate power was, after all, not in the Pope, but in the metropolitan. But to remove the case to the court of Rome, and to put the power of a final decision into the hands of the Pope, would effectually break down the power of the metropolitans. And if at any time they were guilty of abusing that power, it would create in the bishops a wish to see it done. In like manner bishops

might wish a defence of their spiritual power against their kings.

Things were tending in this direction when the forged Decretals made their appearance. They purport to be decretal letters, written by the early Popes, from Clement downwards to Gregory the Great. They were published in a collection with other canons. This collection of canons and decretals, in the name of St. Isidore, consisted of three parts :

1. Fifty-nine Pseudo-Isidorian decretals, besides two from Clement to James, already in existence, going down to Melchiades.
2. Canons of Councils, chiefly genuine Isidorian.
3. Thirty-five Pseudo-Isidorian, mixed with genuine epistles from Sylvester to Gregory the Great.

The bishops universally received them. They were like the horse who was so intent on conquering the stag, that he took the bridle into his mouth from the man, and the saddle upon his back, and allowed him to mount, and was from that time a slave. The Pope conquered the metropolitans, through the bishops; and as soon as he had done this, the bishops were, *ipso facto*, enslaved. These Decretals seemed to favor the patriarchs; and yet subjected them to the Pope's authority to act in his name. All that was taken from the metropolitans fell finally to the Papal See.

But the Decretals had been preceded by other forgeries no less gross. The donation of Constantine was promulgated in the time of Adrian the First; and was based on, and connected with, a fabulous narrative of the baptism and cure of Constantine of the leprosy, at Rome by Pope Sylvester. In token of gratitude, Constantine withdrew from Rome and founded Constantinople, and gave to the Pope, Rome, Italy, and the provinces of the West.

The history and decrees of a Council that never met, were also forged. It was said to have been held at Rome in the days of Sylvester; the aim and result of it was to exalt the power of the Pope.

Whoever will, may find all of these precious documents in the history of councils by Binius, published even after Calvin and others had exposed the forgeries of the Decretals, under the sanction of the Pope, and defended by Binius. Indeed the Papacy held on to them till they were irresistibly wrung from its unwilling grasp.

The influence and effects of these Decretals are thus set forth by the learned civilian Daunou, a Roman Catholic: "So early as the end of the eighth century, the Decretals of Isidore had planted the germs of pontifical omnipotence. Gratian gathered the fruit of these germs, and made them still more fruitful; the court of Rome being represented as the source of all irrefragable decision, as the universal tribunal, which decided all differences, dissipated all doubts, cleared up all difficulties. She was consulted from all

quarters by metropolitans, by bishops, by chapters, by abbeys, by monks, by lords, by princes even, and by the untitled faithful. There was no limit to the pontifical correspondence, but such as was imposed by the tardiness of the means of communication. The affluence of questions multiplied bulls, briefs, epistles; and from those fictitious decretals ascribed to the Popes of the first ages, there sprang up and multiplied, from the time of Eugene III., thousands of responses and decrees, which were but too authentic. All affairs, religious, civil, judiciary, domestic, then were more or less embarrassed by pretended connexions with the spiritual power. General interests, local controversies, individual quarrels, all went in the last resort, and sometimes in the first instance, to the Pope; and the court of Rome acquired this influence over the *details* of human life (if we may so speak), which is of all others the most formidable, precisely because each of its effects, isolated from the others, appeared to be of no great consequence. Isidore and Gratian transformed the Pope into a universal administrator."

The agency of Gratian in this matter, to which Daunou here refers, was in brief this: In 1152, he compiled a collection of canons, commonly designated as "the Decree of Gratian." It was called by him, the concord of discordant canons (*concordantia discordantium canonum*). The study of the civil law had just been revived in Italy, by the discovery of the Pandects of Justinian. But, as the ecclesiastical power was fast gaining the ascendancy over the civil power, a similar thesaurus of the principles of ecclesiastical law was needed. Such the Decree of Gratian became. It is divided into three parts—one devoted to principles and ecclesiastical persons; the second to judgments; the third to things.

Of its character as a code, Daunou thus speaks: "Repetitions, impertinences, disorder, errors in proper names, mistakes in quotations are the least faults of the compiler. Mutilated passages, chimerical canons, false decretals, all sorts of lies, abound in this monstrous production. Its success was only the more rapid on that account. It was explained in the schools, cited in the tribunals, and invoked in treaties. It had almost become the public law of Europe, when the return of light dissipated by slow degrees the gross imposture. By it the clergy were held not to be amenable to answer in the secular tribunals; the civil powers were subjected to ecclesiastical supremacy; the state of persons, or the acts which determine it, were regulated, validated, or annulled absolutely, by the canons and the clergy; the papal power was enfranchised from all restrictions; the sanction of all laws of the Church was ascribed to the Holy See, that See itself being independent of the laws published and confirmed by itself."

By whom Gratian was employed to perform this work, the facts just stated sufficiently show. He was but a tool of the papacy. Through him the Man of Sin erected his throne, by reducing the

forged Decretals to a legal system. A translation of a few passages from Gratian will give a clear idea of the prevailing spirit of the work. He is teaching the doctrine that the Pope is not of necessity subject even to his own laws, and that if he submits to them, it is only by a voluntary humiliation, by way of example to others.

“As Christ, the Lord of the Sabbath, and of the law, submitted himself to the law of the Sabbath, so the pontiffs in the seat of supremacy, manifest reverence for the canons established either by themselves, or by others authorized by them, and by humbling themselves to obey them, they augment their authority, so that they may present them to others as their supreme law.” Again: “Sometimes, either by new enactments, or definitions, or by contravening the canons, they proclaim themselves Lords, and creators of the laws.” Again: “Upon others is imposed the necessity of obedience to the canons; but it has been made manifest that in the chief pontiffs there is an authority to obey at their pleasure; so that by observing their own decrees, they may show to others that they are not to be condemned: this they do after the example of Christ, who himself observed as an example, and that he might thus sanctify them, those sacraments, the observance of which he enjoined upon his church.”

Here we see the roots of those highest claims of papal omnipotence, and of dispensing above right, and contrary to right, which subsequent canonists carried to a still more blasphemous extreme—exalting the Pope not only to an equality with God, but above all that is called God, or is worshipped.

All these principles, first drawn from the fountain of the forged Decretals, still slumber in the canon law, like a sword returned for a time to its sheath, or like the retracted and hidden claws of a tiger. But let the state of the nation be so changed, and circumstances so favor that it can be done, and the sword will be again unsheathed, and the pontifical tiger will again rend the subjugated nations with his claws.

To translate long passages from these forged Decretals would be tiresome alike to the translator and to the reader. To form a conception of their matter and style, we need only to suppose an ecclesiastic capable of writing in the Latin style of the middle ages, first raising the inquiry what is needed to exalt the ecclesiastical power entirely above the civil, and finally to concentrate all power in the Pope, and then writing all that he could conceive of, to his heart's content, in the name of the ancient popes. A few specimens must suffice. Hear how, in the first epistle of Pius, A. D. 147, the bishops are defended against lay influence:—“Let not the sheep censure their shepherd, nor the laity accuse a bishop, nor the populace reprehend him; since the disciple is not above his lord, nor the servant above his master. But the bishops are to

be judged by God, who has chosen them as his eyes. * * * Of this the master has given an example when he drove from the temple the buying and selling priests, by himself and not by another." The judgment of God on bishops is, of course, to be exercised through the Pope. Hence the forger tells us, through Zephyrinus, A. D. 208, Ep. 1, "Let not the Patriarchs or Primate who try an accused bishop, pass a definite sentence till it has been sanctioned by apostolic, i. e. papal authority." He then proceeds to give rules as to accusers, witnesses, and the trial, and then concludes, "Let the ultimate determination of his case be brought to the apostolic seat that there it may be issued. Nor let it be finally determined before it is sanctioned by the authority of the pontiff, as was ordained by the Apostles or their successors." We notice here, as through all of these forgeries, a constant repetition, and superabundant fulness, as if the writer were determined to make assurance doubly sure, in all things relating to the papal authority.

To concentrate all power at Rome, we find passages like this :— "The Roman Church through the merits of Peter, consecrated by the word of the Lord, and sustained by the authority of the holy fathers, holds the primacy among all the other churches. To her the highest concerns, trials, and complaints of bishops, and also the important interests of all churches are to be referred, as to the head."¹

Again, Zephyrinus, Ep. 1, says :—"All, and especially the oppressed, must have recourse to the Roman Church, and appeal to her as to a mother, that they may be nourished by her breasts, and defended by her authority, and delivered from their oppressions. For the mother neither can nor ought to forget her child."

One great object of these forgeries is to give authority to papal decrees, as such, investing them with the power of laws, thus making the Pope an independent legislator and an absolute despot. Hence the forger in the name of Damasus, Ep. 4, says :—"All the Decretals, and the statutes of all our predecessors, which have been promulgated concerning the ecclesiastical orders, and the discipline of the canons, it is our pleasure and decree that you and all bishops and priests shall observe, so that if any one shall infringe them, let him know that it is an unpardonable offence."

The direct result of all this was to exalt the canons of the Pope to an equality with the canons of general councils. Hence in the canon law both kinds are mixed up indiscriminately, and, as Daunou well remarks, the forged Decretals became the source and model of innumerable and genuine papal Decretals in subsequent ages. Indeed these lying forgeries have been so thoroughly digested and absorbed into the system of the canon law, that to this day they constitute its vital principles, its very life's blood.

¹ Vigilius, Ep. ad Profuturum.

At the hazard of being tedious, we will give a few more extracts from these forgeries, showing in what manner, by impudent and reiterated assertions, the power of the papacy was established. The forger in the name of Damasus, Ep. 6, says :—"It is lawful for the metropolitans, with their provincial bishops, to investigate the causes of the bishops and other weighty ecclesiastical matters, provided the bishops are all present and agree ; but to define and decide definitely on such points, or to condemn bishops without the authority of this seat, is not lawful ; for all, if it be necessary, ought to appeal to it, and be sustained by its authority. For, as you know, it is not Catholic to convene a synod without its sanction."

The conduct of Hincmar in deposing Rothade, to which we have before adverted, shows plainly that he, though a learned canonist, had admitted no such principles as these. But when Nicholas encountered him, nullified his proceedings, and restored Rothade, he fell back upon these and similar passages of the forged Decretals for his defence, and certainly nothing could be better fitted to accomplish his purposes. It seems as if this passage had been forged with Satanic foresight for the very case in hand. Nor is it to be wondered at, that Nicholas exerted himself to the uttermost to give authority to a system by which he was invested with such absolute power.

In the Decretum of Gratian, the forged materials were mixed up with the old and genuine canon law, for the sake of hiding the cheat. In his endeavors to reconcile the discordancies thus produced, Gratian, of course, decided in favor of the new Papal law. And as during the subsequent study of the canon law, new contradictions came to light, the Popes gave new decisions, deciding, of course, in accordance with the principles of the forged Decretals. As these new decretals multiplied, it became necessary to reduce them to system. Hence in 1234, Gregory IX. employed the Dominican Raimund da Pennafort, to compile a new collection of decretals in five books, almost entirely composed of later decretals, and in accordance with the spirit of the forged Decretals. To this Boniface VIII. added a sixth book, in five parts. To these, five books of Clementine Constitutions, by Clement V., were added, and also certain Extravagantes of John XXII. and five books of Extravagantes Communes. Such was the spirit, such the origin, and such the progress and completion of the canon law. The leaven of the old canon law, retained in the Decretum of Gratian, so far as it was inconsistent with the new law, was purged out, and the papacy was placed on the basis on which it has since stood even to this day.

It is indeed a specimen of lying and forgery on a sublime scale ; and when we see all Christendom trembling before the frown of the Pope, and the intellect of all Europe engaged in studying and

commenting on this law, then we see completed the highest and most astounding result of the forged literature of the middle ages. The little fountain-head of pious fraud, which broke out in the early ages, has given rise to a mighty river, emptying itself into a boundless ocean of unfathomable delusion and fraud.

How great the influence of these forgeries has been, may be learned from the confessions even of candid Roman Catholics. The testimony of Daunou has been given. Henry, though not so severe, is no less explicit in testifying to their pernicious influence on the Church. With him coincides Bossuet; and the celebrated Charles Butler, in a brief account of the Roman and the canon law, in an appendix to his life of the Chancellor D'Aguesseau, does not hesitate to say, "To the compilations of Isidore and Gratian, one of the greatest misfortunes of the Church, the claim of the Popes to temporal power by divine right, may, in some measure, be attributed. That a claim so unfounded and so impious, so detrimental to religion, and so hostile to the peace of the world, should have been made, is strange—stranger yet is the success it met with."

It is no less strange that so intelligent a man could not discover that all the remaining claims of the Pope are alike unfounded and impious, detrimental to religion, and hostile to the peace of the world.

To give some idea of the donation of Constantine, we transcribe a few sentences. The Emperor Constantine is introduced as saying:—"We ascribe to the See of Peter all dignity, all glory, all imperial power. Besides, we give to Sylvester and his successors, our palace of Lateran, which is beyond question the most beautiful palace on earth; we give him our crown, our mitre, our diadem, and all our imperial vestments, we remit to him the imperial dignity. We give as a pure gift, to the holy pontiff, the city of Rome, and all the Western cities of Italy, as well as the Western cities of other countries. In order to give place to him, we yield our dominion over all these provinces, by removing the seat of our empire to Byzantium, considering that it is not right that a terrestrial emperor should preserve the least power, where God hath established the head of religion." For centuries a miserably forged document like this, had the force of law!

In view of such facts it is that Gibbon severely, but justly remarks, that the Vatican and Lateran were an arsenal and manufactory, which, according to the occasion, have produced or concealed a various collection of false or genuine, or corrupt, or suspicious acts, as they tended to promote the interests of the Romish Church. Before the end of the eighth century, some apostolical scribe, perhaps the notorious Isidore, composed the Decretals, and the Donation of Constantine, the two magic pillars of the spiritual and temporal monarchy of the Popes."¹ "This humble

title '*peccator*,' was ignorantly, but aptly turned into '*mercator*'—his merchandize was indeed profitable—a few sheets of paper were sold for much wealth and power." "The edifice has subsisted after the foundations have been undermined."

To form any adequate idea of these abominable and blasphemous forgeries, they must be read. They are written in an assumed style of conscientious sanctity. Their authors pretend to be watchmen for souls, accountable to God for their fidelity, and the penalty of disobedience is eternal damnation. Yet the impious forgery betrays itself on every page. Of the events and wants of their own age, they say, and seem to know nothing. With the hierarchical claims of the distant future centuries they are perfectly familiar. They do not know the times of their own lives, or pontificates, or deaths. Some date their letters before they were popes—some after they were dead. They quote the Latin Vulgate long before it was made. They quote writers who, in their day, had not written; laws that had not been made; councils that had not been held; and use words, and a style of language, then not in existence. Nor were they ever quoted before the ninth century, amid controversies on which they would have been decisive. Such are the documents which Nicholas I. promulgated in the name of God, and which for centuries ruled the world.

Let us, in conclusion, consider the subsequent state and power of the system. The Church of Rome has indeed retreated from certain positions, from which she has been irresistibly driven. But never has she abandoned the practice of the system; and if any have seemed in her name to condemn it in principle, this condemnation is but a new specimen of pious fraud. She cannot condemn it. It is wrought into her whole history. Moreover it is a case of necessity to that Church to lie. Her existence depends on it. All true history is against her. Hence we see a constant tendency to rely on and defend forged documents, in Baronius, and to forge lies, in Bellarmine, as in his infamous narrative of the death of Calvin; also, in Andrin's Life of Calvin, the same course is pursued. In the same spirit, a stupendous enterprise was once undertaken to alter and expurgate all the Fathers, on the great scale.

Hence, Platino's History of the Lives of the Popes has been altered and corrupted by papal scribes; so that only the Venice edition, 1479, and the editions published in Holland, 1640, 1645, 1664, are worthy of confidence. Hence we may account for the omission, in some editions, of the statements concerning Gregory VII., which De Cormanin quotes. Hence, too, the systematic writing of false histories, for the use of Jesuit schools; and the falsification of Ranke's History of the Popes, of which he complains, and the circulation and use of such falsified copies in Je-

suit schools, as his. Pagi says—"Much has been said of the Popes by other historians, but very little by their own."

Bower adds—"That the very little has been thought too much; whence some of them, Platino in particular, have been made in all their editions since the middle of the sixteenth century, to speak with more reserve, and to suppress or disguise some truths they had formerly told."¹

When to the influence of principles so corrupt, is added the bias of party rage, as in the long strifes of the Guelphs and Ghibbelines, or in the great schism, one can easily imagine the extent to which lying would be carried, and how much the difficulty of coming at the truth in many cases is augmented. As these parties fought with the sword, so, says Bower, did historians with more rage fight with their pens; and the same persons, especially the popes and emperors, are, by opposing writers, painted in very different colors.

Indeed so thoroughly has this leprosy of pious lying struck the Romish Church, that all who are approximating to her seem naturally to fall into it. Of this we find a striking example in the English Puseyites, who are reviving the doctrine of œconomy, or accommodation, i. e. lying, so far as is necessary to keep their hearers from revolting from their sentiments, till they can lead them along, step by step, to Rome. Hence Newman's fierce assaults on Rome, as he begun his Puseyite movement, were all a pious fraud, according to the principles of the œconomical system, to be recanted when they had enabled him to corrupt all whom he could. On the same principles, Jesuits in secret may join any church and profess anything, in order to work in the dark for Rome.

No maxim has ever been so constantly carried out in all ages, as that to lie for the Romish Church is not only no sin, but a virtue of the highest kind. On this principle, pious frauds are at this day knowingly carried on in Mexico, as described by Waddy Thompson, in Rome, and in other parts of the Romish world. Such a system under the government of God cannot last for ever; but it has a great temporary power.

For a hierarchy of priests, many of them men of education, and great intellectual power and learning, and trained to lie on system, to sustain their own corporate power and wealth, can keep the masses subjected to their power in Romish countries, in utter ignorance of the facts of history, as is universally the case; and by bold assertions can paralyse, to a certain extent, the power of history in Protestant countries.

The bold impudence of Pope Zosimus staggered all the assembled bishops of Africa. He declared certain canons of the provincial Council of Sardica to be canons of the Council of Nice, though it was held twenty years before that of Sardica.

¹ p. 15. Vol. I.

The canons of Sardica were in none of the African copies of the Council of Nice. The African bishops proposed to send for copies to Constantinople, Alexandria, and Antioch.

"It matters not," replied the conscious legate, "whether or not those canons are to be found in your copies, or indeed in any other. You must know, that the canons and ordinances of Nice, which have been handed down to us BY TRADITION, and established by custom, are no less binding than those that have been conveyed to us by writing." A fine specimen of matchless impudence. But so has Rome made tradition in all ages her grand thesaurus of lies.

The African Bishops would not be so deluded. They sent for the copies as proposed; exposed the fraud, and held up the Pope as a barefaced impostor.

Bower well calls it one of the most impudent and barefaced impostures recorded in history; yet Bishop Kenrick has not a word of censure for the Pope, and tries, like Baronius and Bellarmine, to gloss it over as a mistake.

The truth is, on the principles of that Church, there was no sin in the lie, but merely in attempting it in so bungling a way as to be found out and exposed. So did Purcell, of Cincinnati, twice lie, and was publicly exposed.

But multitudes of other impostures, equally gross and impudent, were not found out, and made the Papal power what it is; and the same impudent system of lying will still be pursued, for nothing else can preserve it from ruin. This general view should not, however, lead to despair of a final victory of truth, nor to historical scepticism. Let a man look at one of our counterfeit detectors, containing scores of pages of counterfeits. He might at first say, it is of no avail to try to distinguish between forged and true bills. But with care and practice it can be done. So is it in history. Many forgeries have been so exposed that none dare now advocate them; and notwithstanding the delusions and lies of the hierarchy, God has foretold under the symbol of the false prophet his doom. He shall be taken by the son of man and cast alive into the lake of fire burning with brimstone.

To conclude, all Protestants are simpletons who do not judge Romanist ecclesiastics in view of their principles, and their past history. He that is simple believeth every word of such men; but the prudent looketh well to his going.

In conclusion I would say that the good of our nation requires a more full exposure of this subject than we can now make, with the facts of history classified and arranged. We are contending with a matchless system of compacted fraud, and need to have a perfect understanding of it, and its principles and deeds.

ARTICLE VI.

PROGNOSTICS OF AMERICAN LITERATURE.

By PROF. N. PORTER, JR., Yale College.

"I SAID what I thought;" was the impatient answer of the fervid Rousseau, when asked wherein lay the charm of his writings, which were then electrifying all Europe.

This reply not only well describes the secret of the power of this, and of every great writer, but it suggests the best definition of the word Literature—than which no word is more vaguely, though none, it would seem, ought to be more easily, understood.

Literature, after the judgment and usage of not a few, is an amusement, a pastime, a thing of luxury and refinement. It is not the utterance of clear and strong thoughts, but the enunciation of the high and mysterious fancies of certain unhappy wights, who deem themselves inspired to say they know not what. It is not the expression of honest emotions, which have been too strongly felt not to be uttered, but rather of exaggerated and sickly feelings, which have been distorted by unnatural use, or over-refined by foolish indulgence. Then, too, to make known the thoughts and feelings of a writer, something is thought to be necessary besides human language, condensed to its utmost vigor of expression, or wrought into the highest splendor of description, or burning with the intensest fire of feeling. Instead of this, there is demanded a studied prettiness of expression, a far-fetched nicety of conceits, and a lisping effeminacy of manner, to entitle a production to a place in what is, *par eminence*, Literature. In contrast with these views of the matter and form of Literature, it should be defined as the expression of worthy thoughts and feelings, in worthy language. The theme should be worthy to be expressed, and the expression should be worthy of the theme; not only worthy to represent and convey it for the moment, but as a crystal shrine, to preserve and adorn it, if need be, for all time.

This view of Literature is, in no sense, illiberal, unworthy, or utilitarian. So far from it, it is the only view that is truly liberal, inasmuch as it is comprehensive enough to include everything which is worthy of a place within its ample enclosure. In Greek Literature, it would find room for the subtle Aristotle, the splendid Plato, the fiery Demosthenes, no less than for Homer the sublimely melodious, the sad Euripides, and the sparkling Anacreon. In the German, it would own the "all-crushing" Kant, as well as boast the all-comprehending Goethe. In the English,

it would call all its own, in its range from the profound and almost prophetic sayings of Bacon, to the tiniest song that sparkles as a diamond on the dark pall of Shakspeare's tragic muse, or that peeps out from amid the grotesque attire of his comic genius. It would comprehend whatever is grave in philosophy, whatever is serious in theology, whatever is wise or witty in the essayist, whatever is splendid or touching in fiction, whatever is musical or majestic in poetry, whatever is lively and sparkling in the tale or the song, provided it is true to nature and the heart of man, and provided, also, that it is expressed in language worthy of the theme.

Nor is it low or unworthy. That view of Literature is unworthy, which makes her the plaything of the idler, the parasite of the luxurious, or the caterer for an enervated and unmanly taste; but which gives her no place in the thoughts of the wise or among the circles of those who think and act nobly for the welfare of man. That view only gives Literature her lawful honor, which makes her the companion of the truly great, and the graceful handmaid to all that is of permanent worth, or deserves lasting fame.

Nor is it utilitarian—coldly and severely insensible to the charms of beauty in style, and to the nameless graces that move in the bright train of genius. On the contrary, it provides for all these, and would do justice to them, as it secures subjects worth the adorning, and would make them minister in exalted services. The ruby burns as brightly, and the diamond flashes as splendidly, when they adorn the hilt of the hero, who has won the freedom of millions, as when they gem the jewelled plaything that dangles at the side of a dainty "carpet knight." The pearl emits as serene a radiance, when it is set in the coronet of a high-born lady, whose virtues are her brightest jewels, as when sported by her flaunting maid of honor.

It is well to assert this view of Literature on all occasions; but it seems to be demanded when we raise inquiries in respect to the Literature of a nation. A national Literature, if it have a distinctive character, must be the expression of the nation's mind and heart. A nation, to have a Literature of its own, must, in that Literature, speak its mind and heart. The mere outside of Literature is the same with every people. The difference, the peculiar spirit and genius of each, must come from the peculiar characteristics of the nation's inner self.

What will be the features, and what is the destiny of American Literature? The question is great and interesting.

It might be thought, perhaps, that a previous question ought to be determined, whether there is to be such a thing as American Literature at all. Some have gravely doubted whether such a thing were possible. Others have confidently asserted that the

greatness of this Union was destined to be physical and commercial only ; that the line of her eminence was to be practical alone ; but that in Literature she could attain no greatness, and hope for no renown. With those of either opinion we are not disposed to argue. For ourselves, we are certain that a great people, a people with a strong intellect and a strong heart, cannot but give expression to itself in a distinctive and commanding Literature : provided that it have time enough to develop itself in this direction. Besides, to argue the question, might spoil the theme of some transatlantic critic, or his stale copyist this side the ocean. To essay to determine it might be cruelty to some one, who might lack for material on which to descant in a fiery and contemptuous strain towards the young republic. But though we shall not treat the question directly, we hope to furnish some materials towards its adjustment.

First of all, we observe, that American Literature will always be closely entwined with the Literature of England, and can never be wholly independent of it. The literature of this country is no wild plant that, after pushing its way from a chance seed upwards in some hard and rocky soil, amid conflicts with torrent and wind, forces itself at last into a strong and shapely growth ; but it is a choice off-shoot from an old and generous tree, that has grown up in the English garden, of which the soil has been mellowed by the cultivation and protection of centuries. From this soil it can never be uprooted, and we desire that it may never be deprived of its advantages. An American, disconnected from the English Literature, can never exist. It is absurd to speak of it, or to think of it. We might as well talk or dream of the American language. England and America must continue to employ the same speech. The capacities of this language will be developed by both countries in a similar direction. Improvements in vigor and power of speech, and in a flowing and easy harmony of expression, will be transmitted from the one to the other. Great truths illustrated by the one will be caught by the other. New discoveries in the spiritual world will be taken into the common stock. Great writers in poetry and fiction will be received into the common ranks of those who, in the Republic of Letters, are ennobled by a right truly divine. Great historians and philosophers will each add so much of golden treasures to the common wealth. On this kind of intellectual intercourse there can be no embargo. Non-intercourse here is impossible. The trade is free. America cannot refuse to be indebted to England, nor can England scorn, if she would, to be taught by the daughter-land.

The fact is too often lost sight of, or, at least, is not made sufficiently prominent, that in the development of our Literature, we begin where other nations end—with a Literature already matured

to our hands—a Literature too, in some respects, the richest and the most splendid the world has ever seen. Of this Literature we cannot refuse to avail ourselves. In saying this, we confess no dependence, and feel no servility. The treasures of this Literature are by inheritance ours. Shakspeare and Bacon belong to America as truly as to England. Our ancestors laughed and wept at the dramas of the one, as truly as did the fathers of the London cit, or the Yorkshire esquire. Milton wrote for our fathers, as truly as for the fathers of those who exclusively appropriate his fame. When we claim a portion of this fame, it is not with the feeling of slaves or of robbers, but by the right of sons. When we are asked, where is the American Shakspeare and the American Milton?—we reply, *your* Shakspeare and Milton are as truly American as they are English. Nay, were it worth while to contest the point, we might show that, as far as the English spirit and the national character have had influence on the English Literature, our fathers were more English than the English themselves. That which has made this Literature what it is, is not the Englishman's feudal spirit, nor his honest but subservient loyalty, nor his gruff contempt of foreigners; but it is his love of truth, his jealous spirit of liberty, his attachment to home, his unconquered zeal in intellectual labor, his hearty manhood, and his high religious faith. In all these traits, we assert for ourselves a purer blood, and a lineage more unmixed, than can our brothers at home. We freely resign to them all claim to the proud and bloody Norman spirit; for this has had little to do with Literature, except to repress and scorn it. It is the Anglo-Saxon element, which, in the features named, has raised English Literature to its unrivalled eminence. The Anglo-Saxon blood is ours. It is in the Anglo-Saxon line that Literature is an heir-loom. Our fathers, on English soil, did more than their share to cherish the love of learning, to defend free principles, which are its vital air, to foster the intellectual spirit, and to favor and reward intellectual effort; and by the best of rights do their sons claim an interest in the results of their toil.

American Literature can never bear the traces of a barbarous or aboriginal period. The American people have never known such a period. They began a civilized people. They have no recollections from the misty past, transmitted in the wild legend and still wilder song. Their history is clearly mapped out to the eye. It lies too near them to be glorified by the imagination. On this account, it has been gravely said, we cannot have a national Literature. To have such a Literature, it has been argued, we must go back to the savage state, and bring up from thence the unhewn materials for the finished structure. It might as truly be said, that to have a national costume, we must begin with garments of skins; and to create a national architecture, we

must first dwell in the bark hut of the savage. It is true that the Literature of the European nations has had such beginnings, and has been largely affected by their influence. The Moorish wars gave to Spanish Literature the poem of the Cid. The strifes in the forest and over the sea, gave to Germany the tales of the Niebelungen; and the heroic age of Britain is still renewed in England's spirit-stirring ballads, and many a song of wondrous pathos and graphic power. But a Literature of this kind we can never have. Our beginnings as a nation are too near us, and too well known, to be invested with mysterious or romantic interest. Our heroic age was made up of battles for the principles of civil and religious freedom, and cannot be the subject of that high wrought enthusiasm which pertains to more passionate strifes. To make such a Literature by force; to seek to invest our early history with an interest it does not possess to the hearts of the people, is vain affectation. It is to contend against nature, who will be sure not only to vanquish us, but to make us the laughing stock of the world. It is as if one should hope to crystallize in an hour the granite, which is the mysterious product of an unknown period; or to force into sudden life the forest that must be the tardy growth of centuries of years.

But though we are thus closely allied to the English people, and to the English Literature, and though we cannot trace back our existence to a barbarous age, does it follow that we have no nationality—or that this nationality will not give us a Literature of our own? Not in the least. We have characteristics which are American and peculiar. To know these is our wisdom, and to develope them will be our strength and glory.

The Americans are a practical people—a nation who strive to be formed and guided by the reality of things. They would, in respect to all subjects, know and rest upon the truth. The Literature of such a people will be eminently natural and truthful. It will be just in sentiment, chaste in style, life-like in its pictures of nature, faithful and true in expressing the emotions. No other Literature than this can find a response in the heart of a truthful people. None other can be the product of those gifted minds, who write to be honored and read. Now we by no means assert that we have, as yet, produced such a Literature. It would be the height of ignorance and vanity, also, to deny that we have grossly offended in the opposite direction. We have been deluded by our own credulity, mystified by our own crudeness, inflated by vanity, imposed on by ignorance, and excited by passion. But we are yet young—young enough to commit the follies of youth, and not too young to show distinct promise of a better manhood. Amid all our inconsistent and fantastic exhibitions, there is to be discerned a strong and decided shaping towards whatever the truth requires. We ask what is true in

principle, what is true in feeling, what is true in taste ; and if we ask with an honest desire to know, we shall be certain to receive an honest answer. We are disposed to be free from the prejudices of place and rank ; to disown the oppressive tyranny of the past ; to shake off the senseless maxims of mere tradition, and to give ourselves up to nature and man as they are.

The best English writers too often reveal the place of their birth and education ; and it is well if they do not drench their writings through and through with the prejudices of their sect or party. The Tory will speak out even in the novelist and the poet. The Radical will give you his creed in his songs ; and both Tory and Radical will never fail to let you know that they are Englishmen, and in a way that is not always the most agreeable. There is something in the air of the writer of aristocratic sympathies, which cannot be misunderstood, and there is no mistaking the sturdy and dogged manner of the Radical, while the allusions and images of both speak out the matter still more plainly. Now we like an intense personality in any writer ; we would have him write from the heart. But we desire to be spared his prejudices, his confessions of faith, both religious and political, and the retailing of his petty spite against his neighbors. To the Englishman, these matters constitute the man ; especially is his rank in society of supreme significance. To us, except in the eye of those whose heads have been turned by foreign travel, these are of the least importance, except as they render the man more wise or foolish, more accomplished or illiberal. Least of all are they regarded among our writers, who are great enough to commune with nature and with truth, in order that they may speak to the good sense and the good feelings of the American people. We are not so blind as to see no faults in our American democracy ; but we do most devoutly give it our thanks for breaking down this absurd deference to man's position in life ; for teaching that the great question to be asked is, what a man is, and not where he is. We could tolerate with an ill-grace that subservience to rank, and that innate and instinctive homage to feudal distinctions, which cleaves to the Englishman as closely as his skin. We mourn over it in the suppliant, who fawns that he may rise, and in the ill-concealed displeasure of the man, who seems to scorn and defy the rank which he envies. It makes us sad to see that king of men, Sir Walter Scott, count the personal attentions of his sovereign, and that sovereign George IV., a brighter recompense than the homage of the myriads of hearts of which he had made himself the monarch, and to regard his slender imitation of the stately ancestral seats of England, with a more fond complacency than the proud but unseen structure of his own intellectual fame. It makes us melancholy to see the proof on every page of English Literature, that in the republic

of letters, the Englishman overbears the man. We trust that none of our writers will dishonor themselves by feeble imitations of examples, in themselves so pitiable; and we anticipate from their emancipation from these peculiar prejudices, splendid and far-reaching consequences. These consequences will be in our lighter literature, playful ease, genuine humor, and the graceful and pleasant use of language; in poetry, the copying of nature, as we see her with the eye, as we feel her in our hearts, as we observe her in the myriads of our happy homes, and as she forms our simple manners, and makes us imitate her laws of quiet sublimity, in the easy, yet mighty movements of our free institutions. For our orators, we predict an eloquence that shall be truthful in point, in diction, and in fire, because it must be tested by the best of all tests, "its actual effects." For those who instruct us in the graver matters of philosophy, we expect a severe investigation, an honest spirit, and a simple style; for our essayists, the charms of native humor, shrewdness, and grace. Nor is this mere anticipation. Who cannot name great American writers who have dared to be true to themselves, and who, by this means, have realized these characteristics which we have named. Need we name Franklin, Ames, Hamilton, Sedgwick, Mary Clavers, H. B. Stowe, Hawthorne, Street, Bryant, Leggett, Webster, and a host besides. We say not that these have no defects, nor that these defects are not American; but we aver that they have high merits, and that these merits are American also. The time will come when such merits will be more conspicuous.

We advert to another circumstance as tending to make us true and natural. We are brought more and more closely in contact with the men, the principles, and the Literature of the great nations of Europe. Myriads of emigrants from these nations crowd themselves upon our shores, and crowd themselves on our acquaintance. Not a few of our cultivated writers make the tour of the continent, and many of them remain long enough to become accustomed to another atmosphere; while the great writers of the continent are almost as well known among us in translations, as the writers of England. A liberalizing influence must be the certain consequence. John Bull himself cannot resist it. So constant a force will make itself felt even upon him, as the powerful solvent will at last corrode the hardest and the most polished gem. We are more willing to learn than he, and shall therefore learn more gracefully, and appropriate what we learn more healthfully. We do not travel as does the Englishman, with a little England about us, of servants, and of English comforts. Nor do we make a pent-house over our heads, as if to keep out even the atmosphere of a foreign land. Nor do we, when at home, repel everything we read in a foreign book, which does not square with our national prejudices. But whether we

are abroad or at home, we seek to be instructed, and are willing that the truth should instruct us whencesoever it comes. The history, the fiction, and the poetry of Germany, are not unknown or unfelt in their influence on our writers. Sweden is unlocking to us her stores, and introducing us to the delightful circle of her domestic and quiet joy. Whatever clings to us of prejudice from our English obstinacy, or ignorance from American narrowness, will readily yield to these influences. All that we can add to our common stock, we shall cheerfully appropriate, and doing it with the tact so peculiar to us as a nation, we shall be none the less American.

The truth and naturalness of our Literature will make it a Literature for the world. Those who learn from others, do, by the very act of learning, secure a hearing for themselves. Besides, a truthful spirit is a humane and generous spirit, which of itself will win the ears and the hearts of all lands. American Literature will be certain to be pervaded by a kindly and humane spirit towards man; and thus will it gain the sympathy of man, wherever he is to be found. When the Hutchinson family, a few months since, made the tour of England, their simple melody found a response in every rank in life. It made an echo for itself in the heart of both peer and artisan, and it was because it was true to nature. But their warmest and heartiest greeting was from the middling and working classes, who gathered about them with an honest enthusiasm, and made their journey, as it were, a royal progress. It was because these simple singers were of the same rank in life, and were a living and speaking testimony to the generous spirit of the daughter-land, that cherishes worth and talent wherever it finds them, and gives them room to make the most of themselves. American Literature, if true to itself, will breathe this kindly feeling towards all that live, and the nations shall be charmed by the warm gush of its generous affection, more even than by the "native wood-notes wild" of its sweetest minstrels. Is it here objected that these influences will tend to destroy our nationality; that by learning from others, and caring for others, we shall cease to be ourselves? We answer, This is our nationality, and let it ever be so—to be true and generous to others as well as to ourselves. Let it ever be our characteristic as a nation, that we will learn of others and be generous towards them. Thus, and thus only, are we true to ourselves as Americans, and thus shall our Literature bear the impress of our national spirit.

There are peculiarities, however, which no nation can divide with us, and which, for a time at least, will secure to our Literature features strikingly our own. The principles of our political constitution are peculiar, and our Literature may be expected to assert American principles. Our theory of government is in

direct contrast to the theories of the European States. We assume as an axiom the political equality of every citizen ; a government of law as upheld by the reverence of the people, as distinguished from one embodied in a person ; and a government perpetually renewed from the original sources of power, rather than one transmitted by hereditary prerogative. The American people believe in these principles. They rejoice in their substantial blessings. They are not insensible to their inconveniences ; but they know that the inconveniences of other institutions are more numerous and intolerable. Certain of the rich, and the luxurious, and the travelled among us, may affect to be in love with aristocratic institutions, and many of the sound-minded may, at times, tremble for the stability of the Republic ; but the mania of admiring European establishments is, we believe, subsiding, and the general confidence in the continuance of the Republic is gaining strength.

In certain respects, republican institutions are not the most favorable. There is a splendor about a crown, a throne, and a royal court, that attracts and inspires. There is an elevation in the feeling of loyal attachment to a royal person. There are feelings of romantic interest, which cluster about a ruined castle, where knights have tilted in sport, or battled in blood ; where ladies have smiled as they shone in peerless beauty ; where prisoners have sighed in dark dungeons, and have been delivered by bold heroism. Such associations as these, a republic can never furnish ; but there are others that are purer and nobler, which, if they dazzle not with as brilliant and fascinating a splendor, do yet shine with a serener and milder radiance. There is something sublimely venerable in the idea of the sovereign law—the collected will of the State, upheld all the while by the consent of the State, and yet subjecting it to itself. There is much that is inspiring in the thought that men, who are alike in the eye of God, should also be alike in the eye of the State. And there is in the view of all the substantial blessings that are everywhere diffused and enjoyed, an enthusiasm which grows by what it feeds on—if it does not break forth with so impetuous a fire as that which greets a royal pageant.

Besides, in the working of free institutions there are occasions of the most exciting interest—occasions when Literature may render its most splendid services, and may afterwards hang up its arms, that have been battered and burnished by use, as its noblest trophies. Indeed, we may safely say, that the roll of Literature in all ages records, as its most splendid achievements, the productions of the mind inspired by great exigences in exciting periods ; or those of the mind when it reviews these spirit-stirring scenes. Nothing arouses the mind to its mightiest capacities, nothing enables it to use language with such a supernatural

power and eloquence, like great occasions of this kind, both when they are present, and when they are reflected on. It was in such excitements that Demosthenes formed and used his eloquence; that Dante and Milton lighted their wondrous fires. We believe no occasions can be furnished, except in a republic, equally splendid with those which Webster and Calhoun have turned to such a noble use; that no times which Burke or Erskine or Fox ever saw in the senate or at the bar, can surpass those which arouse the orator, who knows that he speaks from and to the heart of a thinking and an excited people, whose intellect he may hope to move, and whose destiny he may decide. Philosophy must be inspired by the magnitude of her audience, when she knows that she forms, for truth or error, the mind of a great nation. Poetry has rarely uttered strains more impassioned or spirit-stirring than those that in our day have been sung to freedom by a Korner and a Freiligrath.

We believe then, that as American Literature defends and asserts those principles, which it is the office of the American people to demonstrate to man, that she will find the noblest themes, and the most kindling inspiration. We believe that in affirming these principles heartily, American writers will consult their dignity and strength. To appear to admire aristocratic institutions is, for an American, a silly affectation; nay, it argues ignorance, as well as imbecility. But to know the blessings of freedom, while we are not insensible to its dangers; to be grateful for them and to defend them, is to stand strongly and surely. It is to secure a response in every true American heart, and to call into life an audience eager to catch an encouraging word; among the thinking patriots all the world over, who are striving to secure, each to their own land, the substantial blessings which they know Americans enjoy. We can hardly own those to be American writers, who do not feel this to be their duty, and their dignity also. We have little patience with those who choose to speak their own private prejudices, rather than the decisions of truth and reason; or who prefer to address a coterie of weak admirers, rather than the sound sense of this happy nation. We cannot abide the fashion, now less common than it once was, of seeking to avoid inconveniences which should have been "pardoned to the spirit of liberty," by adopting the sickly cant of the lover of monarchy.

We are displeased with this affectation, but we do not fear that it will long endure. We know our educated and thinking countrymen too well, to believe their good sense will prompt or bear with these un-American feelings. We hail with certain confidence, the period as near, when we shall know our blessings too well not to prize them; when we shall earnestly, but with no braggart spirit, assert them to the world; when philosopher

and divine, orator and essayist, poet and novelist, shall say in every word, *nil de republica desperandum* ; and with voice and pen shall give the widest and swiftest progress to the principles of intellectual and religious freedom.

The great movements of the world call for such an assertion of American principles, on the part of American writers. The spirit of freedom is everywhere awake, not merely in the dark minds of the masses who know not the blessings for which they sigh, but in the clear and calm convictions of the thinking men of all lands, who well understand the nature of that freedom, for which they would sell their lives. In England, these convictions are shaping themselves into an over-mastering public opinion in all classes, which has made the House of Lords a pageant, and may make the throne a convenient and graceful fiction. In France it will not be cajoled out of its just demands. In Italy and Poland it gathers hope. In Spain, Austria, and Russia even, it does not despair. Choice spirits, in all these countries, the nobly born, and the nobly educated, feel that Literature should be consecrated to the high service of guiding and arousing their countrymen to their duties to themselves, and to their father-land. The silent influence of America is everywhere felt as an inspiration. The noiseless spectacle of the successful career of freedom attracts the eye of the Sons of Freedom in all lands. They would also hear her voice¹ speaking in a literature worthy of her fame, and they will listen, and be instructed, and charmed. Let this voice be worthy of the message of truth and hope which it bears ; let it command as with a monarch's authority ; let it

¹ Nobly has Bryant fulfilled this obligation to be true to his country, in his lines entitled "O Mother of a Mighty Race."

"Aye, let them rail, those haughty ones,
While safe thou dwellest with thy sons.

They know not in their hate and pride
What virtues with thy children bide ;
How true, how good, thy graceful maids
Make bright, like flowers, the valley shades ;
What generous men
Spring like thine oaks from hill and glen.

What cordial welcomes greet the guest,
By thy lone rivers of the West ;
How faith is kept, and truth revered,
And man is loved, and God is feared,
In woodland homes,
And where the solemn ocean foams.

There's freedom at thy gates, and rest
For earth's down-trodden and oppress ;
A shelter for the hunted head,
For the starved laborer, toil and bread—
Power, at thy bounds,
Stops and calls back his baffled hounds."

warn as with the thunder of the Unseen, and let it charm as with an angel's song, and American Literature shall be no contemptible or insignificant thing. It shall be the teacher of the world.

American Literature will also represent American life and manners. In doing so, it will find abundant and various themes. Our physical scenery, in its wondrous diversity, and its grand features; the habits of our people in social and domestic life, as diverse from each other, as if they were distinct nations; their various origin, their local customs, furnish a field as wide and as inviting as could well be desired. The New Englander, with his noble and his laughable side; the New Yorker, with his variety of Dutch and English intermixture; the Southron, with his impetuous, yet generous fire; the settler of the vast valley of the West, with his life of adventures both merry and sad—all these furnish materials for description and the tale, as ample, and as unlike each other, as could well be conceived of. What a splendid use has more than one of our female writers made of the observations of her youth in a New England village. What a grotesque and unmatched humor has another drawn from the Dutch dynasty; and how does the native theme surpass in spirit and force, the foreign one, in the hands of the same graceful and accomplished writer. What freshness has another given to the record of her life in the clearing and the forest; and what ample materials are yet unused, for genius to turn to a golden use, when it shall have the wisdom to look at home for its themes.

Indeed, in respect to variety of manners, and even of physical characteristics of both people and country, we are a confederation of various and distinct nations, more truly than, politically, we are a union of sovereign states. We are the furthest possible from being alike, and from presenting, as we look at each other, the monotonous reflection of the same face eternally repeated. The traveller in the older states even, finds the habits of the people changing with every stage of his journey; while in each motley and mixed assemblage that rushes in and through the newer settlements, there is a tale for the historian, and a scene for the painter.

And yet, though we are thus various, we are still the same. Our political institutions, the levelling operation of social life with us, and the practical views of all, give to all these varieties of character, a certain family likeness, and bind us together by a family sympathy. Openness of manner, directness in intercourse, affability that is gratified to listen, as truly as to talk, an interest in what concerns our neighbors, with a readiness to laugh at everything which pleases us, are characteristics not to be mistaken.

What is more to the purpose, we not only furnish themes to

our writers, but we are pleased that they should make the most copious use of these themes. It is quite an American peculiarity, we believe, that we are not repelled, but rather attracted by those points in our fellow countrymen, which are unlike our own. The three marked nations that dwell together in the British Islands, are bound by a very growling and ill-natured sympathy; and though they may laugh at each other, it is with more heartiness than good-nature. But it is not so with us. No works are so popular with American readers, as those which represent American life, especially if it be life under different circumstances from those to which the reader is accustomed. We may challenge the work to be produced, which represents any American scene with spirit, which is not at once and widely popular, and does not command a ready and extensive sale. Scott and Burns are hardly cherished by their countrymen with a heartier sympathy, intense as their national feeling is, and splendid as is the genius of these favorite writers, than certain American writers have gained from myriads of their countrymen, from the fidelity with which they have depicted American life. Sedgwick, Hoffman, Mary Clavers, H. B. Stowe, Hawthorne, and the younger Dana, with others, not a few, are instances and proofs of this remark. And yet it is but recently that these themes have not been thought too homespun and common-place to be worthy our writers. It is only a few years at most, that this vein of truly native ore has been wrought. The stores are rich and exhaustless, which it may furnish hereafter.

American Literature will be an earnest literature, and therefore a literature of power. The American people are peculiar for giving themselves with their whole soul to whatever they take in hand. They aim to master it entirely. It is their genius to distance all competitors, whatever may be the odds against themselves. Whatever is to be known in respect to the subject, they are sure to learn. Whatever is to be done, they are strong-hearted to undertake. In commerce, in navigation, in the mechanic arts, they show the genius which Burke, in his time, had the acuteness to see, and the candor to describe, as unsurpassed by "the perseverance of Holland," "the activity of France," and "the dexterous and firm sagacity of English enterprise." In the fine arts, we are beginning to show the same earnestness, and to win similar success. Allston and Powers are great names, even by the side of the greatest in Europe. The ardor of our youth, and the devotedness which we give to every object, will certainly be seen in our literature, as in every other pursuit. It will make our philosophers acute and exhausting, learned yet independent. Our historians it will teach to be men of thorough research, and of original and reliable judgment. It will lead the essayist and reviewer to master the subjects of which they treat,

and to speak out their thoughts with a determined purpose to be heard. In eloquence, it will utter thoughts that are true, with a force and fire which cannot be resisted. In poetry it will by and by produce men who, having toiled early and late, to master all the resources of verse, and to gather the spoils of all literature, shall pour out their souls in strains of such bewitching music and passionate energy, that the world shall listen and own their power. It cannot be but this will be the result of our national earnestness, as applied to literature.

An earnest literature will have peculiar excellences. It will not be superficial—content if it is pleasant in its air, and pointed in expression, like the literature of France. Nor will it be satisfied with the highest activity of intellect, and the most splendid flights of genius; but it will require that this activity be expended for a worthy result, and genius be consecrated to an object equal to its splendor. A literature like the German, ingenious, peculiar, startling, nay, most elaborate and profound, but exhausting itself in its own activity, will not satisfy the fiery, but sober earnestness of the American mind. A literature with the faults of the English, conventional and clannish, conceited and dogmatic, and so far, with all its unrivalled excellences, weak and narrow—such a literature it will rise above, and will be strong in the energy of its convictions, in the intensity of its feelings, and in the power to give utterance to both. To whatever it devotes itself, it will not only master it, but the men to whom it commends it, by the resistless influence of its own strong heart. There is a magic in earnestness, wherever it is seen and felt. It wakens and inspires. It kindles thought and transmits sympathy. A literature permeated by earnestness as a distinctive element, will be a literature of power.

American Literature will be pervaded by a religious and a Christian spirit. When we speak of a literature as Christian, we do not intend simply, nor mainly, a literature largely made up of books of devotion and Theology. This will be the case, it is true, when the people are eminently religious; but a literature may have much Theology, and yet very far from being Christian. Nor do we require that a preaching tone, alike unsuitable and affected, should run through its poetry and its fiction; but we do intend that Christian Truth should be recognised as the highest wisdom and the highest truth, and that the Christian Morality should be honored as supreme, by its own right. In such a literature, a specious and scoffing Infidelity will neither be avowed nor insinuated, nor will a profane and irreverent use of spiritual truths be allowed to point a jest, or enliven a tale; but a sober and reverent recognition of the religious in man will everywhere be sustained, as alike courteous and dignified. There will be no

confounding of the obvious distinctions between virtue and vice ; no artful and seducing twilight diffused over rules of conduct, that shine out clear as the sun ; there will be no innocent adulterers, no sentimental villains, no voluptuous, yet modest angels to fascinate and befool a generation of youth, and hand them over to the corruption of sensualism and crime. Its morality will be pure, but not obtrusive ; it will be decided, though courteous and graceful. Nor need it be feared that such a literature will put constraint upon genius. She will have all the room that she chooses—provided that she “overstep not the modesty of nature.” Nature on the one hand is not an ascetic nor a prude, nor on the other is she an atheist nor a harlot.

We are sure that American Literature will be eminently a Christian literature, for two reasons. The Americans are, and ever have been, a religious people. They have been animated by a fervent faith in religious truth, and by a true regard for the Christian morality. Nothing strikes the eye of the most hasty traveller more obviously, than the number of churches that are scattered everywhere, all of which have been erected by the voluntary zeal of the people themselves. The rapidity with which the numerous infant settlements, that year by year rush into life, are supplied with religious institutions, puts to shame the tardy negligence with which older nations, with the spoils of ages at the command of the church, provide for the natural increase of a slow-growing population. No fact is more obvious and better established, than that the American people, as a people, hold the verities of the Christian Faith with strong and earnest conviction, and render an unfeigned reverence to all the manifestations of religious feeling. A strong and deeply seated regard for morality is the public feeling of our countrymen. In no country is vice more heartily rebuked, and all outrages upon morality more offensive to the public feeling. But in our country, the *people* are eminently the patrons of literature. Whatever pleases them, they purchase and read ; whatever offends them, they leave untouched. The writer who consults only his interest, will be slow to offend convictions so sacred, and feelings so hallowed. Whatever his own principles may be, he will not choose to outrage those of his readers, by scoffing irreverence or ribald license.

We have additional security from the fact that few of our writers will desire to do so. In most cases, they are of the people—connected with them by the ordinary intercourse of life, and feeling a strong sympathy with them. Their own convictions, and their own feelings, will in few cases allow them to utter sentiments decidedly unchristian. We take still further hope from the fact that literature, everywhere throughout the world, is assuming a higher tone, and becoming outwardly, and we believe, sincerely, more reverential and believing. We cannot but be con-

fidant, therefore, that it will be the glory of American Literature, beginning, as it is, to take to itself a character, at so bright an era, that it shall be ever pure from infidel scoffing and licentious corruption; that its truth, its freedom, and its earnestness shall be consecrated to the high service of giving new sanctions to the highest of truths, and new sacredness to the holiest of duties—the truths and duties which connect us with God and with the unseen world.

If “they who deny God, destroy man’s nobility,” as Lord Bacon affirms, then may we believe that the nation whose literature is the most Christian, will, if equal in other points, be the noblest, from this one cause; a literature, whose philosophy shall be the most profound; whose eloquence shall be the most lofty; whose poetry shall be the tenderest and the most sublime; whose fiction shall be the truest to nature, and the heart of man; and of which the language shall be at once the most appropriate, the most expressive, and the nearest to inspiration. Let such be the surpassing, because the Christian, Literature of America.

Such are the signs of promise, such the ample and splendid materials, in view of which we rest in the conclusion, that American Literature will be peculiar and great. Is it suggested, that though there be promise, there will be no perfection; though the materials are abundant, that they will never be shaped into a mature and finished literature, because of uncongenial influences and fatal hindrances? We ask what these hindrances are? What is there in the atmosphere of American institutions, and American society, which shall shed a withering blight upon all literary efforts, and prevent them from attaining to consummate excellence?

It may be answered that we have no “literary estate”—no class permanently devoted to literature as a pursuit. We reply, what if we have no such class as yet; this does not forbid that one should be formed. As a country, we are in our youth; physical appliances and comforts were first to be cared for, and would necessarily occupy our energies. We are now passing from this first period, and already see the beginnings of such a class, as far as we desire to see them. We are of the opinion with Coleridge, that “Literature should never be pursued as a trade;” but that it is far better it should be prosecuted in connexion with some other pursuit, that our leading writers may come freshly and constantly in contact with living men. Such a literary class may not be able to produce works of laborious and curious research, nor will they fill the bookstores with the luxuries of literary trifling; but they will have an energy and freshness which shall more than compensate for such deficiencies, and will be saved from the one-sidedness which the mere man of letters cannot but acquire. Every great writer *must* have a life of his own, and in the real world, in order to be

really great. He must be laden with fruit, gathered with his own hand, and from his own experience of joy and woe, of conflict and victory ; and therefore, we argue good to our literature, if it is to have no "Grub-street" community to maintain—poor, envious, hungry, and venal.

Not, indeed, that it is not well that men of wealth and leisure should give themselves to the elegancies of literature, and become interested in its pursuits, both as critics and authors. Let them by all means gather expensive libraries, and form literary circles, to charm by their presence, and aid by their countenance. Let the men who have fairly proved their competency to make literature a sole employment, give to it their undivided energies. But let our writers, in their training at least, be found in some active pursuit, or some honorable station, and we augur favorably to the independence, the power, and the individuality of our literature.

"But literature, to flourish, must be rewarded—amply and generously rewarded. America can furnish no noble patrons, and few wealthy purchasers of books." We confess the fact, that we have no noble protectors of literature ; but we deny the inference. There may be advantages from the patronage of rank ; but there is certain servility and prostitution. Freedom has been found essential to the vigorous growth of literature. An ignorant and bigoted censorship is its brutal foe. And so is that depressing influence, which the man of rank must ever exert upon the man of thought. An aristocracy may in the main be accomplished ; it may be liberal, it may be generous, and thoughtfully courteous towards the man of letters ; and yet the patron can never forget, and the patronized will not fail to remember, that in their relative position, conventional nobility takes precedence of the nobility of nature. If the man of thought meekly acquiesces in this state of things, he cannot but be constrained in the presence even of the most courteous of patrons ; while through the whole intellectual atmosphere, a depressing and unnatural influence will prevail, as stifling as the choke-damp. Let the free thought be spoken out, that greatness of nature is not necessarily the fellow of greatness of rank, and the harmony of things is disturbed. But all men of rank, even in England, are not courteous and refined towards those above them in genius and culture. The uncultured noble will now and then break out in offensive and insulting words, which shall chafe the proud yet sensitive spirit. So much for patronage. Give us rather the patronage of our own self-respect. Give us the inspiration of the thought, that with us, nothing can hinder intellect from taking the rank which God has marked upon her brow.

"But writers must have purchasers, and whence are these to come?" We reply—from the people. We grant that there are among us fewer purchasers of heavy and expensive works, than in older countries—fewer, who, as a thing of course, will buy a copy

of every book that is issued, to place upon the shelves of unread and ponderous libraries. The scale of rewarding literary labor is not as generous as it is elsewhere; and yet the case is far from being as bad as it might be. There is a constant and ready sale for all those works, which constitute the staple of literature, especially of literature for the people. Instances might be named to show, that for works of scientific interest there is a greater demand with us than in England; that the purses of our poor scholars are worth more to remunerate certain authors, and of the highest order too, than the wealth, and taste, and rank of Great Britain. We have multitudes of professional men, who buy their books as regularly as they buy their bread. We have a wide and still widening circle of reading men in easy circumstances, who are the regular purchasers of all the books that are really valuable. We have multitudes on multitudes in whom the taste for substantial reading is increasing and just commencing. A successful author, whether of a larger or smaller work, is sure of a generous recompense. There are transatlantic writers, who would be eager to exchange the American against the English sale of their works, even at the American rate of paying.

“But a writer must have an audience worthy of himself—he writes not for money as his highest stimulus, but under the inspiring feeling that he speaks to hundreds and thousands of his fellows, who will appreciate his efforts, and will be kindled by them to noble thoughts and noble deeds. Such an audience cannot be found in America.”—Why not in America? Because literature is popular with the million, shall not the thousands be excited by the intense activity about them, to the highest attainment possible? Because there are myriads, who think superficially, shall not men of genius and enterprise be led to think profoundly, and thus bring others up to their own height? Intellect, in a country like ours, is the element of our being; we live by it—we are formed by its energies. All the movements of society, the great and the small, the political and the religious, wait on eloquence as their impulse and guide. Our history in the past is not a record of passive changes, wrought by the sluggish flood of time; but is a succession of monuments of triumphs of mind over mind. Every day that we live, witnesses some effort of genius, shaping our destiny. There is no literature, the world over, in which mind has such omnipotence over mind. No country in which the wakeful and strong spirit can march so directly to the minds of its fellows, and mould them at its will, and leave upon them the impress of itself. No country in which *forms* are of so little account, and the *reality* of so much; no country in which reverence for old principles and old customs stands so little in the way of the truth, demonstrated and enforced. Hence, our literature is characterized above all the world beside, by its appeals to principle, and the tasking of

the mind to the highest efforts to influence others. Where can a writer ask for a higher inspiration than is furnished here? Where can he find one that is so noble and spirit-stirring, as there is in the thought, that he has before him a multitude of wakeful men, whom he can approach with as little prejudice as is possible, and on whom he can try the utmost that argument and illustration, eloquence and description can accomplish? The time may not be far distant, when the English writer shall esteem his transatlantic audience nobler than the one which he finds at home; when he shall think oftener, as he writes, of those who are to read him in America, than of his critics in England.

“But there may be intellectual power, without culture of the highest order—there may be much mental excitement with little mental refinement.” We grant it, and know well that here is our deficiency and our danger—danger that the highest cultivation of language shall not be sought, and the monitions of a just taste shall be too little regarded by the majority of our writers and readers. For this cultivation time is requisite, and the general advance of society. This advance with us is sure, and even rapid. It is of ignorance and stupidity alone that it is said, that this advance is only in things gross and physical. Everything testifies that it is equally rapid in all that pertains to the highest culture. Scholarship with us is becoming more and more profound; accuracy in minute particulars, more and more esteemed; language is cultivated with a constant reference to the use of it with skill and effect; and whatsoever is essential to an intellect, that shall be graceful in its movements, and finished in its culture, is sought after with greater assiduity. Criticism is becoming more and more rigid, and yet more truly liberal. In some quarters, it would seem that mere refinement had advanced so far as to be tending to enervation, and grace is substituted for strength. No candid and observant man will deny that, as the strong proportions and noble features of our country’s literature are more and more developed, they are softened and shaped by the indescribable graces of spiritual beauty.

It might seem to be in place, to refer to the actual achievements of the literature of America, as an argument for what it may be expected to accomplish; to look upon the past and the present, as signs of higher promise for the future. The argument is a just one, and no American can ponder upon the inference which it warrants, without just pride, and still more exulting hope. But to review our literature, would lead us aside from the theme proposed. To speak freely and fully of our great writers, asserting their merit, and defending them from illiberal criticism, would unreasonably prolong this essay. Besides, there is less occasion for this argument year by year. Transatlantic critics, fiery in spirit, and brazen in audacity, may now and then indulge in wholesale

and sarcastic remarks concerning the superficial and contemptible character of American literature. But the generous and fair, all the world over, are more and more offended with such criticism, and are welcoming our writers to a high place in the world's regard, with more and more deference in their manner. American literature speaks for herself across the sea, and there is the less need that the most ardent of her defenders should speak for her. Our great writers in some departments of science, and even of letters, are already the instructors of England, and their elaborate works are owned as authorities.

Two of our writers may, however, be named without invidious distinction, because each occupies a place so peculiarly his own. They are Prescott and Webster. Of these, the historian has given to Spain herself, the best histories of her proudest and most significant period, and of the conquest of one of her most important colonies. The materials for these histories were both gathered from annals recorded in a foreign language, and locked up in jealous archives. These ancient chronicles were not only to be deciphered from this dialect by a stranger from that new world, which Isabella's favorite captain brought to light, but by that stranger, when denied the use of his own eyesight; in a service too, which more than any other, requires the keenest optics of the inquirer. In spite of this double disadvantage, an American scholar has written two histories, which are owned, by haughty Spain herself, to be more complete than any which she herself has produced; histories, accurate in research, just and acute in philosophy, sound in principle, and clothed in a clear and easy style.

Of Webster, we speak not as of a man, filling all the stations to which he has been called, with a dignity peculiar and uniform, whether the keen strifes of the bar, the higher conflicts of the senate, or the still more exalted labors of the statesman. We lose sight of him as the politician or the partisan, in the brightness of the lustre with which he is invested as a contributor to our literature. For if the writings of Burke are justly deemed one of the noblest possessions of which English literature can boast, then may those of Webster be enrolled upon the permanent records of the literature of America. We open these writings; what just thought displays itself in every line; what massive sense loads every sentence. What a sound philosophy is condensed into maxims that shall always last. What complete and exhausting hold of the subject; what splendor of diction, now rising into lofty declamation, and then stooping with grace to the level march of some great argument—here scathing with an unsparing sarcasm, and there hurled in a thunder-bolt of defiance. As we trace in these writings the progress of his mind, we see him first rejoicing in the luxuriance of his youthful promise; then in the pride of his

powers a mailed warrior with all his armor on ; and then calm in the dignified and mellowed wisdom of a mind fully ripe—and in all his progress, we say of him, as a star of our own literature, what he himself has said of the greatest of our citizens—"he is all—all our own"—Webster is an American.

We name not the other stars that are now ushering in the dawn of American literature. They will occur to the minds of all. But as we behold them, each shining with its own peculiar light, we say with exulting pride—"if these be the morning stars of American literature, glorious indeed shall be the rising of the Day."

ARTICLE VII.

TASTE AND MORALS:—THE NECESSITY OF ÆSTHETIC CULTURE TO THE HIGHEST MORAL EXCELLENCE.

By PROF. HENRY N. DAY, Western Reserve College, Ohio.

It is now a century since Baumgarten gave reality, by giving a name, to the Science of Taste. Whatever opinions may be entertained in regard to the etymological appropriateness of the term, *æsthetics*, by which this new science was denominated, the ready reception of the name, and the general and rapid extension of it in the different European languages, abundantly show how wide-felt was the necessity of its introduction. The æsthetic element of our nature, that element which finds its employment and its gratification in the forms of things, as distinguished from their essences, is working in society now, with a force and a prevalence that are giving character to the age, and are moulding the destiny of coming generations. Whether this rising force shall ultimately prove to be an antagonist or an auxiliary to the sensualizing influences now at work in society, will depend, under a redeeming Providence, upon the vigilance, the sagacity, and the energy of the wise and good, who, from their elevated position, observing the rise and tendency of the blind instinctive impulses of society, interpose in time to guide them in safe and beneficent directions.

It is in ART, comprehending the various embodiments of the beautiful by human skill, as distinguished from *nature*—the repository of the Divine creations, that the taste finds its first food and entertainment. It imports a certain degree of cultivation and development, that the beautiful forms in the natural world give pleasure. And it is in *impure Art*—if the designation may be allowed to distinguish that department of Art in which the end of

the product is not an æsthetic one; but for instance, one of knowledge, as in literature, or of utility, as in architecture, from *pure Art* in which the end in the production, and the regulating form of producing, are exclusively æsthetic; it is in impure Art that the nascent taste seeks its earliest nutriment. It was in the meridian perfection of Grecian art only, that even artists, not to say the students and admirers of Art, could grasp a purely æsthetic end. The progress and the decline of Art are decisively indicated by the more or less exclusive preference in its productions, of other un-æsthetic ends, as of historical or moral teaching, and the like.

Further, we must not be surprised if we find an infantile taste preferring the lowest and grossest kinds of even impure Art. The child will turn away from the most finished painting, to entertain itself with the roughest outline of a familiar object; and readily exchange a perfect statue for the most mis-shapen puppet which it can caress and fondle. Yet the power of Art will show itself in the fact that imitation will be preferred to reality—the likeness to the original. In this respect, society is as the individual. The first dawnings of taste are to be detected in the demands for the grosser forms of Art. Fine buildings will appear before fine statues, a tasteful literature before beautiful paintings; as a man will possess himself of a house before he will ornament it, and acquire thoughts before he will care to see them depicted in soft and graceful colors. Thus, in fact, in the infancy of the art of landscape gardening, we find that straight lines and angles are universally preferred; while in the progress and maturity of the Art, the expression of true æsthetic sentiments, by a partial imitation of the freedom and ease of nature, is uniformly demanded.

If these observations be just, we shall not look for proof of the widely diffused prevalence of an æsthetic awakening and growth in society at the present time, in the number of our professional artists, or in the perfection of their products, as compared with those of other ages. We must seek it in the useful, rather than in the fine arts. We must not reject it because it shows an immature, rude, or even a gross and perverted taste.

The indications of an awakening and developing taste, are to be detected in the general and earnest requisition, that æsthetic principles be applied to the useful arts; the prompt rejection of such products of skill as evince neglect or disregard of those principles, and the eager reception of such as exhibit some trace of their application. They are to be detected, also, in the demand for instruction in the principles of taste as applied to these arts; the readiness with which it is received, and the devoted study of those principles both in books and in models. Thus, in architecture, it is not enough that a mere shelter be provided from the elements, that arrangements be made for convenience and comfort; but the taste must be consulted. Architecture must not be merely a use-

ful art ; it must be elevated to the rank of an elegant art ; not, indeed, of a perfectly pure art, but yet of an art that, with an un-æsthetic end—utility, conforms, in its production, to regulative æsthetic principles. Landscape gardening, too, in all its branches, is studied and cultivated with an unprecedented zeal and devotion. Its sister art of agriculture shows the influence of this æsthetic spirit, and even the plough is now required to turn a graceful furrow.

So, likewise, if the greediness with which the light, licentious literature of the day is received, proves a low, vitiated taste ; it still proves there is an æsthetic want awakened, demanding gratification. For with all the thirst for knowledge, and all the base love of whatever ministers to the grosser sense, which characterize this reading age, it is apparent that an æsthetic element is regulating both the supply and the demand. Illustrative and decorative art is as severely plied, as the mere productive ; and imagination is required to give plumage as well as wings to science.

This æsthetic passion has entered the sphere of manners and religion. In the forms of fashion and the rites of devotion, its presence and its power are discoverable.

Like indications are to be found in the culture of the critical art. Such, indeed, is the fecundity of this modern Art, that criticism is well nigh out-measuring and weighing down productive art itself. Nor must we hastily infer with some, that this fact is rather proof of the decline than of the rise of true creative art. It is a great mistake to suppose that criticism is quickened into being only in the decay of Art. That it appears only after some progress in taste and refinement, only proves that the material must have its existence prior to the product. That it survives Art is but natural ; for the memory of the dead is pleasant. It were sad, indeed, if the great and the good were at once forgotten after they have passed away. But that Art is admired after the age of its birth and growth, certainly does not prove that it was slighted and rejected before. The truth is, art and criticism grow up and flourish together. Useful art is the birth of necessity ; and may, perhaps, come forth, like its mythological patron, in perfect maturity at first. Imaginative, æsthetic art, has an Apollo's experience. It grows up under trial and hardship. Its imperfections must receive the unrelenting blows of a stern criticism ; and its shape be perfected by the rough rubbings, as well as by the unguents of the gymnast. If criticism must await the appearance of Art as the necessary occasion of its existence, still critical principles must precede the perfection of Art. Indeed, as is true of every art, theory and practice go together, and help each other on in their way. The names of Goethe, Schiller, Herder, Lessing, West, Coleridge, and many others illustrious in German and in English art, will recall to every one corroborations enough of the

fact that Art and criticism flourish contemporaneously. It is, then, an encouraging circumstance in regard to modern Art, that criticism is so abundant. It proves that Art has a strong hold on the interest of the age.

With all these varied indications of the presence of the æsthetic element in the developments of society at the present time, there are likewise to be discovered certain grosser tendencies and characteristics, to which the culture of the taste is the appropriate and indispensable antidote. Indeed, to him who recognises a directing and disposing Providence in the affairs of men, steadily aiming at the final redemption and perfection of the race, and undeviatingly pursuing this high aim, the correspondence between the supply and the demand—the excited want and the furnished provision to meet it, will be apparent; and he will need no labored demonstration to be convinced that every wise coöperator in this great work will make the fullest use possible of the gracious provision.

These grosser tendencies and characteristics may be summed up and generalized, in the prevalent disposition to subordinate the inward and spiritual to the outward and sensual; the enduring and changeless, to the immediate and transient; fixed rational principles living deep in the soul, to superficial impulsive and therefore vapid, spiritless feeling; a subordination of spirit to sense, specifically distinguished from the gross sensualism of other times, by its substitution of sensual imaginations and forms for pure carnality. The age of sottishness and debauchery is past. While, indeed, human nature remains a compound of flesh and spirit, and until the perfect triumph of the spirit over the flesh in the anticipated redemption of the race, men will occasionally fall victims to brutal lusts; but we are not to expect to see the struggle renewed between this grossest form of sensualism and a pure spirituality. Asceticism was the proper opposite of this gross animalism, into which men, ever prone to the furthest extremes, in avoiding a Scylla, to rush into a Charybdis, naturally fell, in their immoderate endeavors to escape an obviously ruinous sensualism; and as the one, so also the other, has passed away. That battle is not to be fought over.

But the bondage of sense is not therefore broken. There is a sensualism still to be overcome, as real, as ruinous, if not as gross, as that which has passed away—passed away, we mean, as a characteristic stage in the progress of society. And the first form of it we have to notice, is what we may call *imaginative sensualism*—a sensualism which finds its gratification through the images presented through the sight and the hearing.

There is a sensual world for the eye and the ear, as well as for the lower senses and appetites; and in that, may aliment be found

for a corrupt and debased spirit. There may be as truly, as really a sensual indulgence, poisonous to all true morality and virtue, in the gratifications of the sight and hearing, as in the gratifications of those other senses in which the object comes in immediate contact with the sense. If we rise above mere animalism, when we substitute the pleasures of the sight and the hearing for those of the taste and the touch, we do not yet, by this alone, attain to that proper spiritual elevation which the Bible commands, and our rational natures demand. There is a sphere of sensualism above the animalism that has characterized other ages, and yet far below even the lowest form of a pure morality among men, to say nothing of angelic, unfleshy natures—a sphere in which sense may have as complete and as fatal a control. We prefer to characterize rather than to define that sphere; equally distrustful as to the perfected accuracy of our own views, and to the unequivocalness of the language we are compelled to employ.

We say, generally and in its more outward characteristics, it is distinguished from mere animalism, as the senses of sight and hearing are distinguished from the other senses. Sight and hearing possess this high distinction above the other outward senses, that in them, reference is never made to the organ through which the object is conveyed to the mind. When we see and hear, we are sensible of no impression made on the eye or the ear. The visible object or the sound seems to us to be removed from us, and not to be in immediate control with the organ, at least not so as to produce upon it any sensible impression. In the taste, the smell, the touch, on the other hand, there is an organic impression which is distinctly sensible. We unavoidably refer the impression to the organic part on which it is made, and feel it to be there.¹

Gratifications of these latter senses, are, accordingly, more grossly sensual, more strictly corporeal, than those of the sight and hearing. They may, for the sake of distinction, be denominated *the animal senses*. They predominate and rule in the brute. The eye and the ear are, in the mere brute, only subservient and ministerial to these other senses. They only indirectly and instrumentally minister to mere animal gratification; while, in man, they have a peculiar function, we may say, a properly spiritual function, which the brute, however perfect otherwise these senses may be, yet knows nothing of, and which in it they can never exercise. They minister directly to man's æsthetic nature. They gratify his love of beauty—a passion which the brute has not—which, perhaps, more immediately and precisely than anything else, characterizes the rational nature, and distinguishes it from the animal. The eye and the ear may thus, to distinguish them from the others, be denominated *the æsthetic senses*. As will appear

¹ See Introduction to Lord Kames's *Elements of Criticism*.

further on, sights and sounds furnish one distinct department of the æsthetic domain.¹

We may then properly characterize that condition as mere animalism, in which these æsthetic senses are wholly denied the exercise of their higher function, and are bound down to a low servitude, to animal appetites and passions; and the proper animal senses receive a higher respect and devotion.

Now the sensualism of the present day is not animalism. The brothel, the tippling house, are not the types of the morality prevailing with us. The concubinage and polygamy of oriental nations, the pederasty of the Greeks, the enervating baths with their unguents and shampoos, and the table epicureanism of the Romans, are not the characteristics of our times. These animal vices do appear, indeed, to a most lamentable degree; but not on an organized scale, not as determining the forms of society, not as institutions and customs. Our sensualism is of a less gross, of a somewhat more elevated type. What society will not endure in the form of this gross animal gratification, it allows or rather experiences, in the form of images addressed to the eye and the ear. A literature that will supply the imagination with pictures of sensual indulgence, that will excite it to creations of its own, of a similar character, in which the sensualized soul may revel in all its vacant hours, habitually and not occasionally, as in gross animalism, such a literature is the product, the delight, the characteristic of the present day. Philosophies, so called, of sense, works of imagination in which the entire material is of sense, physiologies and romances, furnish the supply to this debased sensual propensity, which the temples of Aphrodite in Greece, and the Orgies of the Bacchanalia in Rome, furnished to the brutalized Pagan. If the modern may boast the refinement of his sensualism, the ancient may congratulate himself that his could only be occasional in its indulgences, and was not so habitually corrupting in retired and private hours. We shall not stop to weigh the question, which of these forms of sensualism is the more corrupting and debasing; whether it is worse for man to yield occasionally, as outward

¹ Since the text was written, the following passage, in Schiller's Letters, "on the *Æsthetic Culture of Man*," for the first time came under our eye.

It is nature herself which elevates man from the reality to the form, since she has furnished him with two senses, which alone conduct him through the form to the knowledge of the real. To the eye and the ear the impressing matter is aloof from the sense, and the object is at a distance from us, which, in the animal senses, we immediately touch. That which we see through the eye, is different from that which we feel; for the understanding leaps out over the light to the object. The object of the touch is a force which we feel; the object of the eye and the ear is a form which we create. So long as man remains uncivilized, he enjoys only with the senses of feeling, to which the senses of the form are only subservient. He either does not raise himself at all to vision, or he does not satisfy himself with that. So soon as he begins to enjoy with the eye, and seeing acquires for him an independent value, he is æsthetically free, and the æsthetic impulse (*spieltrieb*) has developed itself. Letter 26th, pp. 117, 118, Cotta's ed.

temptations may assail the animal sense, with little check or restraint from the moral tone in society, or, with as little check from prevailing manners, to gloat over foul obscenities and animal excesses, painted to the eye and ear in language or in art, or spawned from a diseased and filthy imagination ; to plunge for the moment, recklessly and without thought of evil to character or reputation, into the worst excesses of brutal vice, or wallow habitually in the rottenness and filth ejected from a thoroughly sensualized mind and fancy ; whether, if vice must be worshipped, it be worse to dedicate to her worship a temple abroad in the street, or to consecrate to her an altar on the hearth and by the fireside. We wish here only to mark this characteristic of the age, as indicative of the need of æsthetic cultivation. The sensualism and corruption which we have now to combat, comes in this seeming æsthetic form. It has taken this sphere of the sight and the hearing, the properly æsthetic senses. And it must be met on its own ground, and vanquished by its own weapons.

Another prominent characteristic of society at the present day, which discovers a like necessity for æsthetic culture, is its commercial spirit. Whether, in the strong commercial tendencies of the times, we regard the object and aim towards which they are directed ; the accumulation of wealth, or the means by which the object is attained—the active intercourse and intermingling of nations, communities, and castes, the outward motion and bustle, and the mental collision and impulse, we see liabilities to evil of a most formidable character, which urgently demand control and guidance, and which can be effectually controlled and directed, and overruled to good, only through the aid of our æsthetic nature.

That, through the constitution of man, and the determination of his relations to the natural world, the power of accumulating wealth was given him by his Maker, for wise and beneficent purposes, none will doubt. If, on the one hand, through perversion and excess, the love of money is a root of all evil ; if there is no evil of which it may not be a spring and source, still, on the other hand, there is no good of which it may not be made an efficient instrument and helper. The proper function of wealth, in the beneficent economy of Providence, is not limited to the sphere of merely animal wants. It has a higher office than merely to sustain corporeal existence in comfort and health ; to provide for necessary physical wants in the possessor himself, or in others to whom he may, through it, become an almoner. If this were the whole province of wealth, as designated and intended by the Creator, to be the prudent or beneficent minister to the necessities of our animal life, why should man, in his instincts and his capabilities, have been differently constituted from the ant or the beaver ? Why should he ever feel the promptings to labor and

toil, in order to amass beyond what is needful for this purpose? Why do not reason and conscience and revelation speak out, and condemn accumulations beyond this as excessive, as worse than needless?

If we seek to learn the uses of wealth, either as shown in its own nature, or as indicated by Providence, in determining the manner of its employment, and as set forth in history, we shall be led to believe it to be one of its leading functions, to minister to the æsthetic nature of man, and through that, instrumentally to redeem and elevate him. In all ages of the world, wealth (and we use the term as one of degree, and as denoting what is above a mere competence for comfortable subsistence), wealth has found its natural outflow in this direction. Grant that vanity and pride and ambition have had much to do with this determination of wealth; still the fact is not sufficiently accounted for by the supposed operations of these corrupt motives. For, why should pride seek this mode of gratification? Surely there must be something intrinsically good in this appropriation of wealth, or pride could find no gratification in it.

No man condemns the accumulation of wealth to any degree, if it be effected by honest industry, and without encroachment on other spheres of duty. The greater the accumulation, if accompanied by no accidental evils or liabilities, the more truly enviable is the lot universally regarded. The allowable degrees in this accumulation far exceed any demands of personal necessity or beneficence. The appropriation to æsthetic uses, to objects which are fitted to refine and elevate the heart through the taste, has ever been approved, where there was no room for imputation of corrupt motives. Æsthetic wants can be supplied only through accumulations of wealth beyond the demands of the mere necessities of life. If not diverted to the supply of these wants, it will unavoidably be perverted to a ruinous ministry, to sloth or sensuality or sordid avarice. The tendency to this perversion is a feature of the age, indicating the necessity of opening some other channel for the appropriations of wealth, in which it shall flow out for the refinement and elevation of society.

So, too, the healthful motion in society, prompted and directed by the commercial spirit in the pursuit of its aim, the intercourse and intermingling of its particular elements, will, even to a superficial observation, furnish like evidence of the need of an æsthetic influence to regulate and purify it. There is danger that this intercourse will assume a merely sordid character; that men will meet men only in strife for the better part of the bargain, in the spirit of counting-house calculation; and will measure one another only by their credit and tact on 'change or in the market;—that all the agitation and activity, which commerce has aroused, will only sharpen the appetite for gain, and bind down society in a

bondage to avarice hardly better than that of gross animalism. In counteracting this tendency to commercial sordidness, and in overruling it to the true elevation of society, virtuous principle, while it ever must instil the spirit of benevolence, and inculcate the second of the two great laws of human duty, must, to be fully successful, avail itself of the æsthetic elements of our nature, and through them, work upon the manners, the specific aims, the spirit of commercial intercourse. What a check on the indulgence of sordid propensities would the urbanity, the courtesy, the refinement which true taste dictates, create and maintain ? How elevating would be the influence on commercial pursuits, if an aim ulterior to mere accumulation of wealth, were generally recognised in the travel and traffic of commercial men ; if an æsthetic sentiment were to pervade commercial enterprise ; if all the motion to and fro, which it prompts, were accompanied by a decidedly æsthetic spirit ; if upon all the varied forms of beauty which successively reveal themselves on the track of travel, an eye of taste could look out, and images of spiritual peace and beauty be conveyed to a mind prepared to receive and profit by them.

A third prominent feature of society as it now exists, which shows the necessity of æsthetic culture, is *the superficial philanthropy* of the times. It is a happy characteristic of the age, that there is so much sympathy for the sufferings of others—so much solicitude expressed for others' welfare. But there is need that this commendable sympathy be properly grounded and rightly directed. If it proceed, as there is much reason to fear is the case, from mere distress at present, seen, momentary want and wretchedness ; if it overlook the spiritual well-being, in its anxiety for the relief of outward and temporary suffering, it is, at best, but a "rose-water philanthropy," which would apply perfumes, rather than the knife, to a mortifying limb, and complacently see the sufferer die in inward anguish and alarm, if he but breathe out his spirit in outward sunshine, and bed his lifeless body in flowers. There is an alarming degree of this miserable, puling, sentimental philanthropism in modern society. It is poisoning healthful discipline in families and schools ; corrupting and enervating government ; and diverting the extraordinary beneficence of the age from true and real, to merely superficial and outward wants.

Without stopping now to show how a true æsthetic culture will furnish the most effectual antidote to this spreading contagion, and thus anticipating what will find a more appropriate place elsewhere, we pass to name, and merely to name, one other feature of society which evinces the existence of the same want. It is *the religious formalism* which has lately revived and flourished with so much vigor. Its history and its progress, as well as its destructive tendencies, are too familiar to the minds of all to require any notice here.

We discover, then, in these four aspects of society, as contemplated from a view of the direction of man's activity towards himself, external nature, his fellows, and his Maker, existing evils and threatening tendencies, which, as has been already in part, and in the sequel will be more fully shown, demand for their removal and correction the instrumentality of æsthetic culture. All these developments of society are, as will more clearly be seen hereafter, in the æsthetic sphere;—that is, they are all in the same sphere in which all art is comprehended. We shall endeavor to show the direct tendency of a true æsthetic culture to correct or remove them. We do, however, in this endeavor, by no means suffer the important truth to escape us, that all these evils are the product of a depraved heart, for which the only effectual cure is the gospel; and that exclusive reliance on any other means for their removal must, as God is wise and true, result in an aggravation of them all.

Nor, on the other hand, are we the dupes of that philosophical mysticism which would identify the true artistic spirit with the religious sentiment; which, in true pantheistic consistency, recognises in every creative genius a real incarnation of the Deity, and only there; which, first shutting out from the æsthetic sphere, its highest province, the relations of man to God as sovereign, makes the Divine perfection to consist in artistic excellence in its lower departments merely. It still remains true that religion works its great recovering and redeeming through instrumentalities. If the æsthetic mysticism and pantheism of the present century be no more promising, of itself, for man than was the Illuminism of the last; still, it may be true for all this, that Christianity must work through the taste, as it must work through the intelligence. An accidental perversion and false elevation should no more lead us to reject the one than the other; the instrumentality of the taste more than that of the intelligence. Judging *a priori*, how can we but conclude that the love of the beautiful in man's nature, is as proper a medium through which Christianity is to reach the heart, as the love of the true; that it is not as really necessary in order to its perfect work, if not in as high a degree, as necessary in some part of the work, if not in all? If intelligence precede, necessarily, the development of the taste, still, may not the culture of the taste be indispensable to the ultimate perfect triumph of the gospel? Are we to conclude, hastily, that, because the gospel has spread without the use of this instrumentality to a very prominent extent, therefore it will be unnecessary in confirming and perfecting its power over society? Is the millennial age to be a rude, gross, barbarous age? Is its approach to be harbingered by no increase of refinement in manners, no unwonted loveliness in the shapes that a purer virtue shall assume, no higher, purer relish for the beauty and glory that invest Divinity?

But, in order to determine more exactly and more precisely, the bearing of a true æsthetic culture on morals and religion, let us examine more closely the relations and connexions between these two departments of human activity ; and, particularly, by determining the sphere of æsthetics and the influences which it may send out on morals.

The sphere of æsthetics is, then, objectively ascertained and determined by beauty ; as is that of intelligence by truth. Wherever beauty is to be found, there extends the domain of taste. And there is as truly objective beauty as there is objective truth. As truth is not determined as to its being by the percipient mind, so neither is beauty. We may easily distinguish between the eternal object and the inward affection ;—the *ab extra* cause or occasion and the internal effect. If there be no object of beauty without us, then, obviously, there can be no exercise of the love of the beautiful upon it ; and our nomenclature is all wrong. To speak of a love of the beautiful is absurd. If there be no objective beauty, that is, if our emotions of beauty be entirely independent and irrespective of what is without the mind, then we must take up with a pure idealism, and deny all outward or objective reality ; not only all material existence, but, also, all divine and spiritual. For precisely the same arguments and reasonings will avail in the case of æsthetics, as in pure philosophy and in morals. All but idealists must admit that the awakening of the taste, the exercise of the love of the beautiful, is dependent on occasions, not determined by anything in the mind itself. The appearance of the rainbow on the thunder-cloud wakens this love into pleasing exercise ; and whatever may be true of the psychological explanation of the pleasure thus produced, there is something in the cloud without us which has occasioned it. And this something, whatever it be, is rightly denominated objective beauty.¹ If we allow that which is most true, that subjective beauty is an emotion and not a mere sensation ;—that it is consequent on the sensation, and that the sensation must intervene between the external object and emotion, still, the remote cause of the emotion may yet be in the external object ; just as the perception of a geometrical truth may depend on the sensible impression made by a geometrical figure, while there is still a reality existing without the mind, which is the object of the perception, and is necessary to its existence. Beauty cannot be the mere pleasure which is experienced in a train of thoughts originated by a sensation. It is the source of the plea-

¹ The theory of Alison in his justly celebrated work on Taste, by the richness of its illustrations and the beauty of its style, entitled to the first rank among the æsthetic treatises in our language, is, in our opinion, defective in this respect, that it makes all beauty subjective. It is in the opposite extreme from the theory of Burke, who resolves all beauty into external sensuous impressions, or sensations of softness, smoothness, and the like, of which a mere brute is as susceptible as man. The truth lies between.

sure ; as the perception of truth is the source of intellectual pleasure. There may be beauty, as every one must testify, which, in consequence of accidental associations, may, to a particular mind, be attended with pain ; just as there may be truth which may be painful to an individual mind. It may be true, still, that both truth and beauty are, in their own nature, grateful to a rational love.¹

Further, beauty resides in the forms of things. It is herein distinguished from truth ; and æsthetics from proper science. Science respects the essence of things ; æsthetics, their forms. Not all forms, however, are beautiful. The sphere of beautiful forms is limited. On the one hand, all mere corporeal impressions, the sensations of taste, touch, and smell, being purely organic, lie out of this sphere. On the other, all intellectual abstractions are excluded from it. It is impossible that either a mere object of any one of the animal senses, or a mere abstract truth, of itself, should ever awaken the emotion of beauty. Within this sphere are to be found only the world of sights and sounds, constituting the *outward æsthetic sphere* : and the conceptions of body, imaginations, emotions, and moral states, constituting the ideal æsthetic. In other words, in sights and sounds in the sensible world, and in the concrete mental exercises mentioned, and their outward expressions, is contained all objective beauty.

In the sensible æsthetic sphere, are found the harmonies and melodies of music ; and the various products of art and nature, which exhibit themselves to the sight, among which are embraced those of painting, sculpture, architecture, as well as all the diversified beauties of the natural world. In the ideal æsthetic are included, not only the intellectual creations of poetry and elegant

¹ The sight of Desdemona was, to Othello, after he became the victim of Iago's deception, a source of the extremest anguish. Yet had she lost none of her beauty even to him. Both remarks are fully evidenced in the following extract from Act iv., scene 2.

Had it pleased heaven
To try me with affliction ; had he rained
All kinds of sores, and shames, on my bare head ;
Steeped me in poverty to the very lips ;
Given to captivity me and my utmost hopes ;
I should have found in some part of my soul
A drop of patience ; but, alas ! to make me
A fixed figure, for the time of scorn
To point his slow unmoving finger at,—
Oh ! Oh !

Yet I could bear that too ; well, very well ;
But there where I have garnered up my heart ;
Where either I must live, or bear no life ;
The fountain from the which my current runs,
Or else dries up ; to be discarded thence !
Or keep it as a cistern, for foul toads
To knot and gender in !—Turn thy complexion then !
Patience, thou young and rose-lipped cherubim,
Ay, there, look grim as hell.

literature, but also all the free exercises of the moral nature, in the lower department of manners, and the higher sphere of strict morals.

But to determine more precisely and definitely, the sphere of objective beauty, let us endeavor to ascertain what, in these various departments of beauty, is common to all, and enables us thus to comprehend them in a class. What is this beauty which we identify in all these various objects of the æsthetic world? If we find ourselves as unable to define beauty as to define truth or color;—if we can only refer to experience, and designate it by the occasion on which it is revealed to the æsthetic sense, we may, yet, by an enumeration of its specific forms, rise to a more perfect conception of its nature. At all events, we shall be enabled to see more clearly and satisfactorily, the moral bearings of æsthetic study and culture.

If we survey the whole field of æsthetic objects as already determined, we shall find that the beauty which characterizes them, lies in one of three things. There are three distinct kinds or elements of beauty.

In the first place, we discover in a product of Art, as in an Apollo or in a Laocoon, something represented in the subject itself, which we unhesitatingly designate as beautiful; while in a Gorgon, in other respects as perfectly conceived and executed by the artist, we recognise no such beauty of subject, but only what is hideous and revolting. We may admire the representation, given with so much true artistic skill by Scott, of Meg Merrilies; but the subject is a hag, revolting to our æsthetic sense, which we contemplate only with pain; while in Rebecca in *Ivanhoe*, we rest with an undisturbed delight on the loveliness of character in the subject of the representation. When we observe that the landscape gardener has, in the decoration of his grounds, given expression to the sentiments appropriate to his design—we will suppose, by the skilful arrangement of his trees and his shrubbery, has represented to us the sentiments both of seclusion and retirement, and also of cheerfulness and innocence, as the reigning sentiments to be realized in domestic scenes; we admire with a true æsthetic pleasure, the subject itself represented—the sentiments of seclusion and cheerfulness, as well as the skill of the artist, and the various other qualities of beauty which the scene may reveal to our minds. We will denominate this species of beauty lying in the subject of the representation, or, more generally, inhering in the representation itself, absolute beauty.

In the next place, we observe a beauty in certain motions, and in certain states of repose the results of former motion. There is a beauty in the free motions of supple infancy; and a beauty, too, in the easy composure of its limbs in quiet sleep, and the gentle curved lineaments which innocence and health have left impressed

on its countenance. This element of beauty has already received its appropriate designation—grace, in the language even of common life.

In the third place, we find objects or scenes in which we recognise the presence of beauty, which we cannot resolve into either of the two elements named. There is a beauty in decorum, in naturalness, in fitness, in proportion. These and other terms of the same class, denote but specific instances of propriety. They may all be resolved into this one thing; the expression of what is proper, or of what belongs to the subject, the end or the means. In oratory, it is the giving to the theme, the object, the occasion, the audience, the speaker himself, what belongs to them respectively. In painting, it appears in the appropriateness of the subject, the correspondence and harmony of the parts, the suitableness of the coloring; all these various qualities, which awaken in us the sense of beauty, may be comprehended under the generic term—propriety; which means nothing more nor less than conformity to truth, in the largest sense of the phrase, and as applied to the exercise of artistic power.

It is to be remarked, respecting this last element, that it is indispensable in all perfect art, in all true beauty. There may be absolute or inherent beauty without grace; and there may be grace without inherent beauty. There may be propriety without either, but not conversely. There can be no beauty or grace without propriety. The conception of a mermaid, regarded as a whole, however perfect and beautiful might be its parts, is hideous and revolting. Yet propriety approaches to the character of a negative element or condition of beauty; while the other two are exclusively positive in their nature.

All those properties in objects which awaken the emotion of the beautiful, it is believed, may be reduced to these three classes—inherent beauty, grace, and propriety. Indeed, *a priori*, we might be safe in affirming that all beauty must lie in the properties of the object, inherent and fixed, or accidental and changing, or in their relations. Positive beauty, including the two first-named elements, embraces that which lies in the properties, inherent or changing, of objects; propriety respects their relations.

It may elucidate the distinction given between absolute beauty and grace, and help to show its logical correctness, to add the remark, that, as all beauty respects the forms of things, and the forms of things are, to our apprehension, either those of space or of time, absolute beauty is distinguished from grace in this, that while it is predicable only of those properties of objects conceived of under the relations of space, or analogous relations, grace respects only what is conceived of under the conditions of time. Thus grace ever respects motion, which necessarily implies succession in time.

Let us now endeavor to ascertain, more fully, the nature of objective beauty, from a distinct consideration of these different elements. Let us take, first, absolute beauty, or that department which lies in the fixed and inherent properties of a concrete beautiful object, and begin with an object in the sensible æsthetic world. We will take the rainbow spread out on the bosom of a black storm-cloud. We will abstract the absolute element, and shut out from view, for the time, the grace we discover in its easy curving, its soft repose on the buoyant cloud, the delicate blending of its hues, as if a hand of grace had pencilled it there, and exclude, also, all the various species of propriety, whether merely physical or moral, which it exhibits. Fixing our eye solely on the absolute beauty, we see there brightness, purity, peace. The external splendor, its unsullied clearness, and its motionless quiet, make their impression on our outward sense. But there is certainly no beauty in that sensible impression merely. The eye of the stupid brute has that sensation more perfectly, perhaps, than man; but it feels no beauty; it has no emotions. As the bodily eye discerns, through the impressions made on its retina, these physical properties, so the mental eye, we should rather say the rational eye, sees through these animal sensations, something that belongs, not to the sphere of sense—something that belongs to its own moral world. The brightness, purity, and peace it sees, are, subjectively, emotions, not sensations; and, objectively, they are images of rational, moral properties, not of physical properties of color and extension. They are what the brute cannot discern. The mere natural man, even, discerns them not, for they are only spiritually discerned. They are apprehended by a spiritual sense. But they are there—that moral brightness, purity, peace; as truly as the ideas of them are in those verbal designations. Those physical properties are, like the names of them, the symbols of the spiritual. They are not drawn up into the mind by association; they are fixedly there—there not for to-day merely, but ever there, when the divine Iris reveals herself from the threatening heavens. Her message is ever the same, and invariable to every rational observer. The spiritual eye looks up and reads the characters there. They are seen by intuition, not suggested. If the eye that perceives is within, what is perceived is without. It is not association that reveals grief in tears, joy in smiles. We see those emotions there. The brute sees them not. We see them not merely, because by association we have learned to connect the emotion with an outward phenomenon, which, of itself, possesses no significance. The elements of beauty in the rainbow are seen as truly. The emotions are the effect of a cause operating from without; not the accidental accompaniment of a train of thoughts put in motion by a sensation. And these emotions respect moral properties; the moral brightness, purity, and peace, which are the objects of the emotions.

An easy induction would bring us to the same conclusion in regard to an absolute or inherent beauty ; that it belongs only to moral sentiments and states. While, on the one hand, the revelation of them is communicated through the medium of sense, still all mere outward sensations, all that are possible to the mere animal, are excluded ; and, on the other, while only what is peculiar to the rational world, comes within the sphere of beauty, all mere rational abstractions, all pure intellectual states are also excluded ; and an absolute objective beauty lies in the moral world. All such beauty is moral in its essential nature ; and, so far as it is studied, it will exert on the admiring student, the influence—the assimilating and moulding influence, of a purely moral subject.¹

If we pass now, to the other department of positive beauty, the separable and changing, as distinguished from the fixed and inherent, denominated *grace*, we perceive that inasmuch as it depends on motion, it implies necessarily a cause operating in time. Let us take, as before, for the investigation of its more precise moral bearings, an exemplification of grace in the sensible world, and in its lowest department. The wavy ascent of a sky-rocket produces within us the effect of grace. That the grace does not consist in the mere sensible impression, is plain from the fact that the eye of a child or of a brute even, may receive that as fully and perfectly as the eye of the æsthetic beholder. The sensible impression is but the medium of the effect of the grace, just as light is the medium of the sensation itself. It is not, further, the mere motion that produces the grace ; for the heavy fall of the rocket-staff has no grace. There is something peculiar to that motion, which it belongs not to every kind of motion to express. The mere power which all motion expresses, but which still none but the eye of reason can discern in any motion, is not the source of the emotion of grace. It is *the freedom*, with which the power seems to act, which is the object of the emotion ; that attribute which essentially characterizes a moral being, and is most perfect in the most perfect moral state. Yet is it not, so to speak, blind arbitrary freedom ; it is not the freedom of caprice ; it is the freedom of reason. In other words, in all expressions of grace, wherever found in nature, or in its own proper moral field, there is ever represented the presence of a power working freely, yet rationally, or in reference to an end. There is no grace in the irregular leaps of a witch-quill. But in the continued upward flight of the rocket, there is apparent progress towards a destined end ; while at the same time, the easy wavings seem to indicate freedom from

¹ Grecian Art, at its perfect stage, was exclusively elevating and purifying in its moral influence. Its subjects being, exclusively, of a pure æsthetic character in all departments of Art where the subject was free to the artist, as in painting and sculpture, and the expression of the subject being conformed to the most perfect æsthetic rules, it could have but one tendency and effect. It is mainly by the corruption of Art in the selection of low, immoral, and consequently un-æsthetic subjects, that Art came to be rather an auxiliary, than an antagonist to vice.

all outward constraint. It is the picture of a living thing, possessing freedom, directing its motions in compliance only with its own rational will. True, in this case, except on the theory which excludes the operation of second causes in the physical world, it is a kind of illusion. Yet is it to the sense the form which freedom, acting rationally, might present ; and through the form, the rational eye discerns the reality represented ; as the mere superficial forms of a picture, when the pencil of a Guido Reni has drawn in them the scene of the crucifixion, move our tears of sympathy and gratitude, as if the reality were before us ; or as the mutterings of a maniac, repeating words which are to him unmeaning sounds that have lost their significance, still carry to the rational listener, a sense which the wretched madman had not thought to put into his utterances. All grace in the physical world is, thus, the form caught up without the life, which an irrational nature repeats, and yet knows not what she utters. He that was made in the image of her Creator and fashioner, recognises its origin, however ; to him even the dead form utters a living divine that has, at least, once animated it ; and he yields with a ready pleasure to the sweet illusion.

The same conclusion would follow from examining an instance of the grace of repose. Although the result only of motion, it is yet only as the motion is recognised, that grace is discerned. The graceful composure of an infant's limbs in sleep, excites the idea of the previous grace of motion that has left its trace behind.

We come, then, in this department of beauty, to the result at which we arrived in our consideration of fixed or absolute beauty :
ALL GRACE IS THE REVELATION OF MORAL FREEDOM.¹

But grace is a higher department of beauty than the other ; for it more directly and immediately reveals moral life. Grace implies at once the living person moving freely and rationally. It reveals a moral action ; while fixed beauty expresses only a moral state. It has a more engaging charm. Absolute beauty fixes in mute admiration ; in pleasing contemplation. Grace vanishes with a resistless attraction. According to the beautiful Grecian myth, the goddess of beauty charms only with her girdle of grace ; with qualities of beauty which are not inherent, but only changing and separable from the wearer.²

¹ The view here presented is conceived to be harmonious, or, rather, identical with that of Göthe, given in various of his writings, and summed up in the following of his aphorisms :

"Man is only many-sided," i. e. perfect as an artist, "when he strives after the highest, because he *must* (in earnestness), and descends to the lesser, when he *will* (i. e. to sportiveness)."

His demand, in perfect art, of the union of earnestness, seems to amount to nothing else, when strictly interpreted, than to a demand of freedom, working rationally, i. e. to a destined end. Perhaps, however, as perfect grace must ever be conformed to propriety, since perfect rational freedom must ever be conformed to truth, this element—propriety, may be regarded as included in his representation.

² See Schiller's Essay on Grace and Dignity.

The third department of beauty is *propriety*, or conformity to truth in artistic products. We need spend no time in showing the close alliance this sustains to morals. Indeed, when we undertake to explain the essence of abstract morality, the moral power itself, and the specific form of it being left out of view, we naturally fall upon terms identical, or synonymous with those by which we define artistic propriety, and all propriety, applied to art, which, as we have seen, lies in a moral, because æsthetic sphere, partakes itself of a moral character.

How essential propriety is, in all art, is obvious. Grace itself must conform to the prescriptions of propriety; and all absolute beauty lies bounded and moulded by the determining lines of propriety, just as all moral states are shaped harmoniously with truth. Just so far as propriety is violated, or seemingly so, the impressions of beauty are hindered. Thus the highest beauty becomes repulsive, if not disgusting, when out of place, out of time, out of character. Hence it is, that a training which is essentially moral in its character, which, in other words, habituates to a practical conformity to every behest of duty, is so indispensable in the accomplished artist.

From this consideration of the elements of objective beauty, it appears that the entire matter of æsthetics lies in the moral world. Beauty is, however, still distinguishable from morality or virtue. It is right revealed to sense. It is holiness, rectitude, purity, moral perfection, clad in its own proper vestment, embodied, rather, in its own proper form of sense, coming down into the sphere of man, and wooing to its embrace by its native charms made manifest to human sense. While it is not the essence, on the one hand, it is not the mere outward, dead form, on the other. It is the harmony of both; the harmony of sense and spirit. It constitutes precisely that sphere in which man must effect his transition from flesh to spirit; in which, on the one hand, the dominion of the flesh must be thrust off, and, on the other, the freedom of the spirit must be embraced.

Let not this nature of beauty be lost from view. We are prone to imagine the existence of a world of beauty, entirely distinct from the world of truth and reality. We are prone to conceive of a world of art, of imagination, entirely removed from the world of fact and reason. We thus separate beauty from truth, the form from the substance, neither of which can be without the other. And we are in danger of doing this, not only in our speculations, but also in our practice. We press our speculative analysis into the real concrete; and act as if virtue had no form of loveliness peculiar to itself, and necessary to its perfect existence, at least in this present world of sense; and, as if the lovely and graceful in life were a mere empty bubble, devoid of reality, fit, indeed, to amuse those who have leisure or capacity to be amused, but worth-

less otherwise. This is a grand, pernicious, yet prevalent mistake. The consequence is, deformed, haggard asceticism and religious purism, on the one hand, and, on the other, vapid sentimentalism and heartless formalism. We may not hesitate, perhaps, if obliged to choose between these extremes. We may prefer the substance, haggard, misshapen, repulsive as it is, to mere outside. But they are extremes both. Neither can be perfect without the other ; as there cannot be perfect vigor of intellect in an unsound body, nor a perfect human body without a healthy spirit to animate it.

Truth and beauty stand in this vital relation to each other, each implying the other, and distinguished only as the substance which ever involves the form, is prominent in our idea of the one, and the form which ever presupposes the substance, is prominent in our idea of the other. In a proper worship of truth, we do not, or need not reject her native form ; in a proper homage to beauty, we need not reject its essence. Indeed, as we have seen, beauty is but the revelation of moral truth, in its proper form to the human sense.

The whole system of recovering grace provided for man, darkly delineated in the features of his natural constitution, and of the physical world about him, and expressly, and in word, set forth in revelation, proceeds upon this principle, that man is to be emancipated and elevated through the attractions of pure virtue revealed to the sense. What is the power of the cross on the soul of man, but the power of Divine love and compassion set forth in resistless beauty and loveliness ? What is the power of Christ's incarnation, of his life in the flesh, but the power of perfect beauty and loveliness ? We speak of the instrumentality only, employed by the Divine Sanctifier. What was the revelation of the Son of God in the Apostle Paul, but the revelation of Divine excellence and love in its perfect attractiveness ? What does the Apostle mean, when he speaks of the assimilating power of a contemplated Christ, changing into the same image from glory to glory, in the manner and way of the sanctifying Spirit ? What is Christ formed within us, but the lovely image of his perfect character, enstamped by him whose office it is to show Christ to men ? That the gospel has a voice for the ear of conscience, is true. But so far as the gospel is distinguished from the law in its peculiar province and power, it works through the heart ; though the æsthetic sense—the capacity within us of discerning and feeling the beauty of perfect moral excellence, of experiencing its ravishing power, and through the sympathies. “ We love him, because he first loved us.” While love has a contagious, self-propagating power, through our sympathetic nature, it has also an æsthetic power, awakening our admiration, ravishing the sense, and captivating the affections to itself. If the law impels, working from within—from the conscience, the gospel draws, working from without upon the

love of what is good and perfect. If the law commands and drives, the gospel woos. And this motive—influence from without, that thus draws and woos is, aside from the power of sympathy involved with it, essentially an æsthetic influence working upon our admiration of what is great and good, our love of what is excellent, and our consequent desire to make such admired and loved excellence our own. God, as worthy to be obeyed, is revealed to the conscience; God, as worthy to be loved, is revealed to the heart in its æsthetic susceptibilities. All natural beauty is the express image of the Creator's moral perfections. It is the revelation of his perfect freedom, working unrestrained, and with a high rational aim in its department of grace; and the revelation of his perfect character, all whose thoughts and sentiments and moral states are pure and lovely, in whatever it has of fixed and inherent beauty. While the accordance of all in nature which excites our admiration, and our æsthetic love, with the principles of propriety, evinces to us the harmony of his character and acts with the absolute standard of right. Even the beauty of human art has the same tendency and effect remotely. For man himself, as a free-working artist, is so far only the image of his Maker; and his works, so far as possessing artistic excellence, are but the similitudes of the Divine creations.

All æsthetic beauty thus discovers a God—a being perfect in character, and worthy of universal homage and love. All its discoveries are in perfect accordance with the revelations of God in the strictly moral world, whether made through the conscience, or through the allotments of the external world, exhibiting moral sanctions and inculcating moral duties. It leads up in its own proper tendency, to the perfect living Creator and governor of all. It displays him to the soul with a power peculiar to itself;—not in the inanimate form of abstract influence and deduction; not in the repelling, overwhelming terrors of mere rigorous sovereignty and dominion; but in the bright, attractive, wooing character of a God of perfect loveliness. It furnishes evidence to the heart, deeper, stronger than any which the speculative reason, marking the correspondence of all the revelations of wisdom and power in nature with its own ideal of a perfect being, or the conscience testifying to the demands made upon it from without, can furnish. It is evidence which, tried by the most critical philosophy, must be pronounced valid and authoritative. The soul of man, thus trained under a true æsthetic culture, is ushered into a world of moral light and power, in which it feels the mightiest impulses, encouragements, and aids to holiness; finds at once its model and end, and its needed means and instruments.

With all this, we are to bear in mind that the moral influence of æsthetic culture reaches men in their own sphere of sense. Imprisoned, as he is, in the flesh, it visits him in his prison, and with a gentle hand unrivets his fetters. It takes the wise in their

own craftiness, and with the weapons of sense destroys the dominion of sense. The elevation and purification of men, instrumentally through their æsthetic culture, is thus a process fitted to their condition ; adapted to reach the soul without awakening its prejudices or its apprehensions ; inviting and attracting in its outward character, and drawing under its influence, and effecting its work before the subject is hardly aware of its design. While the perverse will and the corrupt heart turn away, in deep aversion and stubborn opposition and hatred, from the unveiled substance of duty and right ; under the attractive, subduing power of its lovely form, they bend, and meet, and receive a new impress and a new law of guidance.

There is another aspect of the influence of æsthetics on practical morality, not less worthy of consideration than this view which we have taken of its objective influence on the bearing of the essential nature of its object on moral refinement and elevation. True virtue appears even in a perfect form. Perfect beauty and loveliness is the appropriate body of perfect virtue, in which it ever seeks to embody itself ; through which it must develope, expand, and invigorate itself. In the culture and invigoration of true virtuous principle, therefore, provision must be made for its proper embodiment. The proper form must be provided. In other words, it must be furnished with the opportunity and means of assuming its own proper form and outward development.

In mere nature, where blind instinct only rules, the form is purely spontaneous. The developing germ, by a law within itself, determines its appropriate form. And the analogy has been carried into the moral world. There have been those who have insisted that the unregulated, spontaneous development of the human soul is the only proper development, and the only one that will give it perfection. They have overlooked the fact that there is something in man besides mere nature. There is a power to control his own development ; to make it good or evil. He is his own law to a certain extent. He is, at least, the former and shape of his own character. He is to determine for himself the external conditions under which he is to shape his moral growth. His development and growth, in fact, are determined and fashioned by the models which he proposes to himself. His ideal of character will be his law of growth. Hence the necessity of his proposing to himself, as ever present, determining models of his forming character, which is perfect in form.

He is a creature of training. Weak, dependent, ignorant, blind at first, he is trained to what he subsequently becomes. He acquires, by slow learning, his principles and his moulding ideas of character. He can be trained to give his necessary or spontaneous motions, such as have in themselves and necessarily, no moral character, forms of grace. His habits of observation may

be so formed, as that the shapes of beauty and loveliness shall be everywhere the first to reveal themselves. His feelings may be so educated as that this discovered beauty shall make a ready and deep impression on them. He may, in short, be so trained as that the proper æsthetic influence shall be the controlling, the ever-present influence of his life. This may be, indeed, with nothing of the vitality of real virtue. He may have the form of godliness and know nothing of the power. But while this is supposable, it is yet hardly probable. The form invites the substance, as the substance seeks the form. The thirst for the beautiful and graceful, which has been awakened and strengthened into a permanent passion and habit, by the study of its forms in nature and in art, will urge, with an eagerness, which the will must be stubborn indeed to resist, to see it in the higher, purer, lovelier sphere of manners and morals. The divine image it has loved to contemplate, as reflected in the outer world, it will long to see directly realized and revealed in its own inner being. Not only will a proper æsthetic culture thus bring before the forming and developing soul, the reality of true and perfect virtue, as an assimilating and modelling power; not only will it exclude and forestall the occupation of the soul with gross sense; but it will furnish the external habits congenial to virtue, and suitable to become its embodiment, inviting the exertion of virtuous principle, and urging to it by all the power of an excited and confirmed love of true beauty and excellence.

In the present world, where the grosser sense so much predominates, and where pure virtue meets with hindrances and obstacles in every endeavor to express and expand itself, the distinct culture of the outward and formal seems indispensable to the highest moral perfection. It is a radical mistake to suppose that principle will, of itself, unaided, always secure an appropriate expression. It is not so with regard to any mere mechanical principle in any of the manual arts. The study of the manner is as essential to rapid progress, as the knowledge of the end, and the purpose and physical strength to accomplish it. A poetic thought, and a poetic impulse, will not secure a poetic product. There is needed a power to secure the form requisite—the poetic body; and the mere poetic conception and impulse will not bring this power. The body is of sense; and until power is attained in the domain of sense, the very matter in which the form is wrought, and the poetic conception embodied, is beyond the control of the fashioning artist. Homer, assisted by all his gods, could never have embodied his divine Iliad in the language of a Hottentot. The body may be worthless without the indwelling soul. A specious art may sacrifice the substance to the form. Still the life must have its body, its appropriate body, or it has no reality in this present world. Both are needful; and each is indispensable

to the perfection of the other. Virtue has a Herculean work, indeed, before it, to reduce the grossness of a besotted sensualist; to restore brightness to his dull eye, and elasticity and spring to his rigid limbs; to express itself in its appropriate form. How far more readily does principle enter the channels through which external purity, gentleness, kindness, and integrity, have habitually expressed themselves? Not that the forms of virtue should be taught or acquired before or without the substance, or the substance without the form, where there is freedom to inculcate both. But, unhappily, depraved man is totally averse to the substance of virtue; and, enchained in sense, must needs be reached by the form, and be captivated to virtue through the very sense that binds him. Herein appears the wisdom of the gospel system which redeems men, not by the abstract inculcation of the reality of, and abstract nature of, holiness, nor by a revelation of the divine to his mere speculative reason, but by "God manifest in the flesh."

A true æsthetic culture being thus beneficial, not to say indispensable, to the propagation and perfection of all virtue, it will be seen to be peculiarly necessary as a corrective and antidote to the evils which have been enumerated, as characterizing modern society.

The refined sensualism of the present day can be effectually met and overcome only by the revelation of true moral beauty to the excited sense. If the view we have taken be correct, then it would seem that the proper cure of this sensualism is by a decided, vigorous effort put forth into all the departments of Art, and extended to the early training, to fix the eye on real beauty; to elevate and enlighten the æsthetic sense, and turn it upon the only proper object in all æsthetics, true moral beauty. Thus the sensual tendencies of the times may, by being overruled and directed aright, be made subservient to a spiritual development and progress.

Thus, too, the commercial spirit of the age may be sanctified to a holy end; and its mission be made serviceable to true virtue. Let the wealth which it generates be applied to one of its proper objects or ends—the supply of æsthetic materials, of objects of taste; and let the same be at the same time æsthetically trained, so as to be capable of discerning in every form of beauty and grace the representation of moral excellence; let æsthetic principles and habits so predominate and rule in society, that the intercourse of man with man shall be under their control; and commerce shall work a work for the world that mammon never dreamt of,—which shall destroy its power for evil, and convert a threatening destroyer into a most efficient benefactor.

The absoluteness, the unchanging worth and true moral excellence of all true beauty, is the antidote, also, to that puling philanthropism so rife at the present time, which sees no deeper than the surface, and is ready to let every foundation of virtue and morals fall away, if it may only build up a wall against the spread of this

outside evil, and will spill the life-blood, if it may stanch a little purulent sore on the surface. Such short-sighted philanthropy, such superficial sentimentalism can be cured only by the inculcation of the true worth of the spirit as compared with the body, and by a discovery to it of the true seat and ground of all that is good, all that is lovely—true moral excellence, pure spiritual life.

The true æsthetic doctrine, moreover, is a corrective of the religious formalism of the times. It teaches, and more effectually than any abstract reasoning can teach, how absurd it is in rational man to rest in sense and show, when their office is only to reveal the spiritual and real. A true æsthetic experience, a cultivated and confirmed habit of reading in every form addressed to the outward sense, its spiritual import, will never be in danger of laying the foundations of its spiritual hopes and aims on shadowy sense.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE NARRATIVE OF THE SYROPHŒNICIAN WOMAN.¹

By PROF. W. M. REYNOLDS, Gettysburgh, Pa.

THE language of our Savior in his conversation with the Syrophœnician woman, seems to me to admit of a more satisfactory explanation than I have ever yet seen given of it. Even Olshausen, in his commentary upon the passage, expresses himself thus: "It seems as though he who knew what is in man, should at once have helped this woman, as her faith could not have been unknown to him; and although he had his wise purposes, which induced him to confine his efforts to the Jews, yet in her case also (as he had done in others, compare Matt. 8: 10.) Jesus might have made an exception, without distressing her with harshness. In fact the harshness seems so severe, the bitterness so bitter, that it is difficult for the Christian heart to look upon this as a part of the lovely portraiture of the mild and merciful Son of man. Christian experience alone enables us to understand what is here stated."

This last remark is doubtless true; but no one knew better than Olshausen, that a "right understanding" of Christ is to be obtained only by taking his words in their highest, which is their proper import. We cannot agree, therefore, that it was the main design of our Savior here, as Barnes expresses the common idea, "to test her faith, and exhibit to the Apostles an example of the effect of

¹ Matt. 15: 21-28. Mark 7: 24-30.

persevering supplication." These were indeed incidental results, as Olshausen beautifully develops them in the conclusion of his remarks, *in loc.* "As God himself is compared by the Savior to the unjust judge, who frequently refuses to listen to proper requests;¹ as the Lord wrestles with Jacob at the ford of Jabbok, and thus makes him Israel;² as he would kill Moses³ when interceding for his people; so faith often experiences that the heaven is brass, and seems to mock its petitions. Our Savior here proceeds in a similar manner. The withholding of his grace, the manifestation of a mode of dealing entirely different from that which the woman may at first have expected, operated as a dam does upon a mighty mass of water; the whole inward power of her living faith now burst forth, and the Savior allowed himself to be overcome, as the Lord had done in his contest with Jacob. In the mode in which Christ here answers a request for aid, we, therefore, see but another form of his love. Weakness of faith he meets by anticipation; from strong faith he stands aloof, in order to perfect it."

Whilst we are willing to take this statement as generally correct, we observe, that it does not meet the great difficulty, before alleged, of the apparent harshness in our Savior's language to this woman, whose humility was as deep as her faith was exalted. "God," we are told, "resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble;" and this was especially true of Jesus, in whom was exactly fulfilled that prophetic declaration,—"A bruised reed shall he not break, and smoking flax shall he not quench;" so that when "he had opened the book" and read those words, "the Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor, he hath sent me to heal the broken-hearted," &c.; he could say, "this day is this scripture fulfilled in your ears." And all the people "bore him witness, and wondered at the gracious words that proceeded out of his mouth."⁴

I believe, therefore, that something further than has yet been given, is still wanting to exhibit the true import of our Savior's language to this poor and afflicted Canaanitish woman. This defect we think is supplied by the consideration, that it was his design to show both her, and his disciples, and all succeeding ages, who were the genuine children of Israel, and rightful heirs of all the promises and blessings of that kingdom of heaven which he came to establish upon earth. Taking this view of the case, we shall find but little difficulty in the interpretation of the passage.

Mark tells us (v. 24), that the Savior "wished no one to know" that he was in the neighborhood of Tyre and Sidon, whither he had retired from the fury of Herod, and the persecutions of the Jews. Nor did he wish to make himself known to the Gentile

¹ Luke 18: 3. ² Gen. 22: 24, et seq. ³ Exod. 4: 23. ⁴ Luke 4: 16-22.

inhabitants of that country, for the time for his manifestation unto the heathen had not yet come. As a general thing, they were not yet prepared to receive him. But "he could not be hid" from those who expected, longed for, sought after, and believed in him, as did this Greek who had heard of his fame and miracles, and believed that he was the "son of David," the long-promised Messiah, prophecies of whom, heathen writers tell us, had long pervaded the East, and would easily reach this country bordering upon Judea.¹ Her faith stimulated by her necessities, her "daughter grievously vexed with a devil,"² doubtless led her to pray for the appearance of this deliverer, this "star out of Jacob, and sceptre out of Israel,"³ and when it is revealed to her that he had actually come into her very neighborhood, she went forth at once (ἐξελθοῦσα) in search of him, and with her petition already prepared, she publicly acknowledged his dignity and implored his assistance, "Have mercy on me, O Lord!"

The Savior's silence,⁴ and apparent indifference to this touching appeal, would both excite the Apostles' attention, and impress them more deeply with what was to follow. The woman is not discouraged. She sees compassion in that noble countenance, pity in that melting eye. She draws nearer, falls at his feet, worships him, and urges her suit with still greater earnestness. Even the Apostles, despite all their Jewish prejudices against the Gentiles, are moved; they also intercede for her; "Grant her request and send her away" (for so, with Kuinoel *in loc.* we understand the phrase, "ἀπόλυσον αὐτήν", non est simpliciter *dimitte*, imo majus quid involvit, *auxilio tuo recreatam dimitte*," is his apposite remark.) "For she crieth after us," in this connexion, does not indicate merely vexation, but rather sympathy.

Jesus never forgot in his own practice, the theory which he inculcated upon others. He had said,⁵ "give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine;" and when sending them forth to proclaim the coming of the kingdom of heaven, he had charged them,⁶ "go not into the way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not; but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel." It is well known that the Jews considered all Gentile, heathen, or foreign nations as "dogs," deeply defiled, and utterly abominable in the sight of God, unfit to come into the congregation of the people of Jehovah here upon earth, and shut out from all hope of heaven. They, the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were exclusively the people of God, and the sole objects of his care. Does our Savior sanction these narrow and fanatical ideas? Does he mean by "the house of Israel," the lineal descendants of that patriarch?

¹ See the well known passage in Tacitus, Hist. v: 13.

² Matt. 5: 22. ³ Numb. 24: 17. ⁴ Isaiah 42: 2.

⁵ Matt. 7: 6. ⁶ Matt. 10: 5, 6.

Does he make them the only "children" of God, and stigmatize all others as "dogs" and "swine?" Assuredly not. On the contrary, we consider him as here giving a practical exemplification of what he meant by those terms, and the sense in which they should be used.

Even his forerunner, John the Baptist, had already attempted the eradication of this national prejudice, as we find him in Matt. 3 : 8, 9, using the pregnant language, "Bring forth, therefore, fruit meet for repentance, and think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father: for I say unto you that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham." Where Kuinoel well remarks, "do not," says he, "suppose that you have a right to citizenship in the kingdom of the Messiah, and may not on any account be excluded from that kingdom, because you are Jews, and the posterity of Abraham. I assure you, you shall be excluded, and most severely punished, if you do not lay aside that perverse mode of thought and of action, whereby you are characterized." And Olshausen, after stating satisfactory reasons for rejecting Kuinoel's idea that John had referred to "the stones lying upon the shores of the Jordan," concludes, "It appears to me, therefore, more appropriate to understand by the λίθοις (stones), the people who may have been composed in part of heathen (comp. Luke 3 : 12, 14), and always regarded by the Pharisees as accursed. The purport of John's words thus becomes somewhat prophetic, inasmuch as the kingdom of God was actually transferred from the children of Abraham to the dead heathen and publicans, among whom, by divine omnipotence, a spiritual life never anticipated, was awakened."

In like manner did our Savior show himself completely raised above all low national prejudices, not only in that beautiful narrative of the good Samaritan, wherewith he answered¹ the inquiry of the subtle lawyer, "and who is my neighbor?" but likewise when, early in his ministry,² he remained two days at Shechem, instructing the Samaritans that the time was already come "when the true worshippers should worship the Father in spirit and in truth," not merely upon Mount Gerizim or at Jerusalem, but wherever they would "worship him in spirit and in truth."³ I consider the whole of our Savior's intercourse with the publicans, and others of that class, as incidentally illustrating this point; but passing that by, shall confine myself to that which is more direct. And for this a single passage may suffice. In John 8 : 31-49, we have a conversation between Jesus and the Jews, in which the latter, in order to assert their title to freedom, say, "We be Abraham's children, and were never in bondage to any man." To which Christ replies, "I know that ye are Abraham's seed" (v.

¹ Luke 10 : 25.

² See Robinson's Greek Harmony, pp. 20-21, where the amazement of the disciples is portrayed.

³ See John 4 : 4-42.

37), which may be either taken ironically, or mean to admit that in one sense they are indeed the descendants of Abraham. But in the following verse, they are told that they are the children of a very different father. And when (v. 39), "They answered and said unto him," with indignation, "Abraham is our father," Jesus utterly denies their claim, in the emphatic words; "If ye were Abraham's children, ye would do the works of Abraham. But now ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth: this did not Abraham." Where it is perfectly clear that spiritual children are spoken of, Abraham being taken as a type of faith, the father of the faithful, and only those who have his spirit, his faith, being considered as his children. In the same way is the term Israel used by Jesus himself, when he saw Nathaniel "coming unto him, and saith of him, Behold an Israelite indeed, in whom there is no guile." Which idea Paul brings out very fully,¹ where he says, "For they are not all Israel, which are of Israel; neither because they are the seed of Abraham, are they all children; but of Isaac shall thy seed be called. That is, they which are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God: but the children of promise are counted for the seed." And he had before said (2: 29), "For he is not a Jew which is one outwardly; but he is a Jew which is one inwardly." In fact, the whole fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans is employed in proving that "Abraham is the father of all them that believe," whether they be circumcised or uncircumcised.

It would be useless to multiply quotations to prove that, in the New Testament generally, the term "dogs" is used to indicate the impure and sinners, that is, those who are destitute of true faith. It is sufficient merely to refer to the passage above quoted,² and to Phil. 3: 2, and Rev. 22: 15.

When, therefore, the Savior says,³ "I am not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel," I understand, and think the context clearly shows, that he addresses the Apostles, to whose intercession for the woman he thus replies: "You Jews expect me to bless you exclusively, to restore the kingdom again unto Israel; and it is true, that I am sent to save only the lost sheep of the house of Israel; but I wish you to observe those whom I think worthy of that name." Then the woman comes forward (v. 25), and "worships him" as her king, and prays to him as her only Savior, "Lord, help me!" Jesus answers,⁴ "Let the children first be filled," that is, you acknowledge me as a king; as such, I am the father of my people, and do you not think that I ought first to feed, to supply the wants of my own subjects, who are my family? Besides, are you a proper subject of my bounty? Do you indeed believe that I am the Messiah, not of the Jews merely, but the

¹ Rom. 9: 6-8.² Matt. 15: 24.³ Matt. 7: 6, and Phil. 3: 2, and Rev. 22: 15.⁴ Mark 7: 27.

Savior of the whole world ; and have you that moral character, that purity and faith that become my disciples ? For, if you have not, "it is not meet to take the children's bread and cast it unto the dogs." To which, in the language of deep humility and genuine faith, she answered with the publican,¹ "God be merciful to me a sinner." For such I take to be the true import of *καὶ* (which both evangelists have), and which Kuinoel renders "*obsecro te, domine*" (I beseech thee, Lord) ; and adds in explanation, "It is not so much the language of one affirming, *yes, it is so* [or as our English version has it, "Truth"] ; or, as others suppose, of one conceding, *be it so* ; but rather of one entreating and urging, *I beseech thee*, which is also its force in Philemon v. 20, and Rev. 22 : 20." The expression reminds me of what Paul says, Rom. 6 : 26-27, "The Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings that cannot be uttered." But she acknowledges that she has no claim whatever upon him ; she is utterly unworthy of his notice or favor ; but she still prays that he would have mercy upon her, "for even the dogs eat of the crumbs which fall from their master's table ;"² "beneath" which they are, whilst the children are seated at it (comp. Mark 7 : 28) ; and where alone she considers herself worthy to be. Whereupon the Savior replies, "O woman ! great is thy faith." Thou art a true daughter of Abraham—an Israelite indeed ; for like him of old, thou hast wrestled with thy God, and wilt take no denial, wilt not let me go, until I bless thee ;³ therefore "be it unto thee even as thou wilt." And well might it be said of her, "Thou shalt no more be called "a dog," "a Greek," "a Syrophœnician," a "a Canaanite ;" "but Israel, for us a prince" (a child of God), "hast thou power with God and with man, and hast prevailed."⁴

Now, although this explanation may appear too refined and far-fetched to those who are satisfied with that which has hitherto prevailed, yet is it not without support even among those who have taken a very different view of the passage in general. Thus Kuinoel, in the commencement of his observations upon Matt. 15 : 23, 24, says, that "Christ did not answer the woman imploring his aid a single word, in order that he might prove her constancy and faith, and exhibit her true character to his disciples, and might thus gradually prepare them to embrace that doctrine which Paul afterwards so frequently expounded in his letters, viz. that through Christ all distinctions between Jews and Gentiles were abolished," Comp. 8 ; 11.

Still more decidedly is this the view of Luther, for, although he commences his sermon upon "the woman of Canaan" by saying, "In this text is set forth unto us an example of a constant and steadfast faith," and illustrates this idea throughout this brilliant specimen of pulpit eloquence, yet he concludes the third

¹ Luke 18 : 13.² Matt. 15 : 27.³ See Gen. 32 : 26.⁴ Gen. 32 : 28.

point that he makes thus: "He was now taken: for the crumbs under the table are given to the dogs, as that to which they have a perfect right; here, therefore, Christ being overcome, opens himself wholly, and granteth the desires of the woman, and showeth that she is not a dog, but a true Israelite."

He then proceeds to say, "These things are written for our instruction and comfort, and we hence learn how deeply Christ sometimes hideth his grace from us, and that we must not judge of God according to our own notions, but only according to his words; for we see here that, although Christ showeth himself very hard to this woman, yet he did not plainly deny to help her, but all his answers, though seemingly denials, were not in fact denials, and though they left the matter in doubt, yet left an opening, however small, for faith. * * * All these things seem rather a denial of help than room to hope; but in reality they did contain in them rather a promise and hope than a denial; yea, there was nothing but a promise, though most deeply hid and concealed beneath that silence, and those answers, although hard, had but the sound of a denial." Here, I think, we have the germ of that idea which I have endeavored above to develope more fully and consistently.

ARTICLE IX.

LUTHER'S TABLE TALK.

By ALFRED H. GUERNSEY, New York.

LUTHER was every way—physically, intellectually, and morally, a man of mark. The rudest wood-cut presents his rugged features as faithfully as the most finished picture. The square, burly form, with its "Atlantean shoulders;" the face, repulsive at first sight, the massive brow—that surest sign of intellectual strength—crushing, as it were, the organ beneath; the firm-set mouth, are alike preserved in all portraits which have come down to us. He is not the less recognisable in the "word-pictures," which undertake to set him forth. Bossuet's terrible delineation—terrible because the likeness is so recognisable—presents the same Luther as Merle D'Aubigné's mezzotint. Physically and intellectually, he is the type and emblem of the great Teutonic race, formed, so runs the wild old legend, of the grey rock of the Hartz Mountains, a race indomitable and born to empire. But the loveliest valleys lie embosomed amid the most rugged mountains, and seem all the lovelier from their stern environment; so there were in Luther's character phases of the most loving tenderness. If no

man was ever more hated by his enemies, none was ever more loved and prized by his friends. There have been many revolutionists, who were nothing but the slime thrown up from the bottom by the fierce current of human affairs, who must, therefore, either be carried on by that current, or sink into it again. Such was not Luther. He remained to a good degree the director of the revolution which he had brought about. So gifted, it was but natural that his followers should be inspired with the warmest personal feelings for him. They hung upon the words which fell from his lips; and when those lips were closed in death, they treasured up his sayings and opinions as oracles of wisdom. Scarcely had he passed from his labors, when collections of his sayings and opinions began to be put forth. These were at last gathered and arranged by Johannes Aurifaber, and in the edition before us, printed at Frankfort on the Maine, in 1571, form a volume of about a thousand pages. It contains his opinions upon all sorts of subjects, literary, historical, philosophical, and especially theological, gathered from every variety of source. In such a mass of matter, thus brought together, there is undoubtedly more or less which is to be received with caution. Much may be perverted by falling upon unappreciable hearers, or by being severed from its context. But as a whole, this book of *Tischreden*, or Table-Talk, is undoubtedly genuine, and is to us the most interesting of all the books emanating from the great Reformer. His conversational and theological writings will always possess an interest. Such a man could not write four-and-twenty quarto volumes, upon subjects in which his whole soul was engaged, without giving utterance to many brave and noble thoughts—thoughts which, “that the world should be aware of, would be for their benefit.” Their interest, however, arises more from their associations than from themselves. Their value has something of an antiquarian character. As instruments of practical use, they have been superseded by books better adapted to their purpose, but which, nevertheless, we would see perish, sooner than those of Luther. Gutenberg’s printing-press was doubtless a rude affair; but were it now to be brought to light, it would be more prized than the best of modern construction. It is a memorial of a great work, and as such, has a value. Luther’s volumes are memorials of the Reformation, and therefore hold deservedly a high place. But the two main questions, practically, in regard to any man, are: “*What did he do?*” and “*What did he become?*” For the answer to the first of these questions, as respects Luther, we need not have recourse to the ponderous black letter tomes which we call his “Works.” His true works are around us and in us. Our Protestantism, and all therefrom springing, are his work. We read, that when he was on his way to the Diet of Worms, the people adjured him from the housetops and the windows, not to recant. The ear to

which the voices of the future had been audible, would have heard other accents joining in the petition. The generations of mankind are linked together by indissoluble bonds. Our voices, the voices of the whole Protestant world which has been or is to be, united in the prayer to Luther, not to desert us. We are his works—not the four-and-twenty volumes in our libraries.

This volume of Luther's Table-Talk is to us of special value, because it solves to a great extent that other question: *What did Luther become?* He stands there portrayed before us, so that we can know him better than those who daily sat around his table. For we can regard him from a higher point of view. Though infinitely smaller than he, we stand upon a height from which we can look down upon him. We can see him as he appeared in his moments of relaxation, in the bosom of his family, in the circle of his friends, at the bed-side of his dying child. Matters which the foolish "dignity of history" thinks quite unworthy of notice, but which are yet the stuff of which all history which is worth anything is made, are here recorded.

The title-page of the book presents Luther at the head of a table, around which are seated Melancthon, Justus Jonas, Creuziger, Bugenhagen, and others. At a modest distance stand, cap in hand, a company of youthful students. Through the open door appear the fantastic gables of the good town of Wittenberg. The apartment is modest enough. A few flowers occupy the window-seats; a narrow shelf contains some half-score folios, with massive clasps. On the table is a single loaf and a dish of grapes. But nectar and ambrosia, to say nothing of mere earthly viands, form but a small part of the "suppers of the gods;" and the discourse of such men as were gathered around that board, would compensate for much humbler fare. From this Table-talk, we present some specimens, taken almost at random.

Of the Bible.—"Dr. Martin once said to Master Philip Melancthon and Doctor Justus Jonas, respecting the Bible, that it was a great and wide forest wherein stood many and various trees, from which one might pluck fruits and berries of every sort. For in the Bible is the richest consolation, doctrine, instruction, admonition, warning, promises and threatenings; and there is no tree in all this forest upon which I have not beaten, and from which plucked or shaken a few apples or pears."

The Bible is of God.—"He once proved the Bible to be the book and word of God, because everything in the world, and how it came to pass, and exists, stands recorded in the first book of Moses. King Alexander the Great, the kingdom of Egypt, the empire of Babylon, the Persian, the Grecian and Roman monarchies, Julius and Augustus Cæsar also, had all tried to uproot and destroy this book. They were all unable to do it.

They have all passed away, but the book remains unchanged and complete, just as it was written. Who preserves it? Who protects it with such mighty power? No one save God himself, who is its author. It is a great wonder that God has so long maintained and defended this book, for the Devil and the world is its enemy. I do verily believe that the Devil has utterly destroyed many good books in the Church, just as he has destroyed and made away with many saints of whom we know nothing at all. But the Bible he must leave alone. In like manner do baptism, the sacrament of the altar, the real body and blood of Christ, and the sacerdotal office, remain, in spite of so many tyrants and heretics. The Lord God has taken especial care of all these. There must be baptism, preaching, and administration of the sacrament, and no one can prevent or hinder it. Homer and Virgil, and the like, are excellent and useful books; they are old books; but are nothing when compared with the Bible."

Difference between the Bible and other books.—"The Holy Scriptures are full of divine gifts and virtues. The heathen books teach nothing of faith, hope, and love, for they know nothing of them. They look only at present things, which the understanding can lay hold of, feel, and comprehend. But they contain nothing of confidence in God, and hope in the Lord. These we must learn from the Psalms and the book of Job, which treat of patience, faith, hope, and prayer. In fine, the Bible is the best book, full of consolation in trial, for it teaches of faith, hope, and love, in a manner which the understanding cannot feel, experience, or comprehend. When things go ill, it shows how these virtues can shine therefrom, and teaches that there is another and an eternal life beyond this poor and miserable one."

The best Theologian.—"He who is well grounded in the text is the right pastor; and it is my best and most Christian counsel that we should draw from the springs and fountains of water; that is, should diligently read the Bible. He who is well grounded and exercised in the text will be an excellent theologian, since a single passage or text from the Bible is worth more than many comments and glosses, which are not strong and sound, and do not touch the point."

The Bible inexhaustible.—"God's word is unsearchable. It is impossible thoroughly to explore and exhaust a single word in the Holy Scripture. It is the word of the Holy Spirit, and spite of scholars and theologians, is too high for men. The new-born Christian has only the first-fruits and tithes of it. I have sometimes undertaken to meditate upon the Ten Commandments, and when I have merely touched upon the first words '*I am the Lord thy God,*' I stick fast at the '*I*;' I cannot understand the little word '*I*.' Whoever, therefore, has but a single word of God, and cannot make a sermon from it, should never be a preacher.

Though I am an old Doctor in the Holy Scriptures, I have not yet got beyond my hornbook. I do not rightly understand the Ten Commandments and the Lord's Prayer. I cannot study them out and learn them to the bottom. But I daily learn therein, and say the Catechism, with my son Hans and my little daughter Magdalene. How can one thoroughly and fully understand the first words in the Lord's Prayer—"Our Father, who art in heaven!" If I understand these words, and believe that God who created heaven and earth and all creatures is my father, then I conclude certainly that I am a lord of heaven and of earth; that Jesus Christ is my brother, and that all things are mine; Gabriel is my attendant, Raphael my guide, and all angels are servants to me in my need. For they have been charged by my heavenly Father, to guard me in all my ways, that I never dash my foot against a stone."

The Bishop of Mayence.—"At Eisleben, just before his death, Dr. Luther said that at the Diet of Augsburg, in the year 1530, Albert, Bishop of Mayence, has just been reading in the Bible, when a counsellor came suddenly to him and said, 'Most Gracious Elector and Lord, what thinks your Electoral Grace of that book?' The Bishop answered, 'I do not know what sort of a book it is, for everything in it is opposed to us.'"

The discovery of the Latin Bible, in the University of Erfurth, was no light thing for Luther. The Bible became to him the veritable and authentic words of God, as though they had fallen from his own lips, and he himself had heard them addressed to him personally and individually. Upon that Bible he founded himself as upon a rock. To that he brought everything to be tried. His whole life was an exemplification of his noble words at Worms. "Till when I have been convicted and refuted by proof from Holy Scripture, or by fair reason and argument, I neither can nor will recant, for it is neither prudent nor safe to do anything against conscience. Here I take my stand; I can do no otherwise, God help me, Amen!" His interpretation of Scripture was, doubtless, sometimes erroneous, for it is man's necessity to err. But let the Scripture once speak, and the point was decided, there was no further room for argument. Joshua bade the sun and moon to stand still. They stood, saith the Scripture; therefore they had both been moving; and therefore the Copernican system is false. Again, our Lord said, this is my body, therefore the body of our Lord is really and truly in the sacrament of the altar, though hidden from our foolish senses: and be he who denies it, Anathema Maranatha. But there is nothing said of a change of the bread into the body of our Lord; therefore transubstantiation is a falsehood, an invention of the Pope and the Devil to deceive and delude poor Christian souls. He and all true preachers were, when setting forth the Word of God, and administering the ordinances, but mouth-pieces, instruments. Thus alone

could he explain it that he, a peasant's son and a monk, had been the chosen instrument to strike such a trenchant blow at the head of that Colossus, the shadow of which, projected by the slant rays of the sun low in the horizon, darkened all Christendom. It was God's word, what mattered it whether it was spoken by the holy Paul, by Doctor Martin Luther, or by Balaam's ass.

The Preacher an Instrument.—"We will not give place to, or admit the metaphysical and philosophical distinctions which the reason has spun out, that it is man who preaches, threatens, administers discipline, alarms, and consoles, but that it is the Holy Spirit who works the effect:—that the minister baptizes, absolves, administers the sacrament of our Lord Christ, but that God purifies the heart and forgives sin. Oh, no. We affirm that God himself preaches, threatens, disciplines, alarms, consoles, baptizes, administers the sacrament of the altar, and grants absolution. So says the Lord Christ; 'Whoso heareth you, heareth me,' 'Whatsoever ye loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven;' 'it is not ye that speak, but the spirit of my father which speaks through you.' So am I certain when I go into the pulpit and preach or read, that the word is not mine, but that 'my tongue is the pen of a ready writer,' as saith the Psalms. Let not, therefore, God and man be separated, according to the opinions and judgments of human reason. But let men speak out straightly, 'What this man, prophet, apostle, true preacher and teacher, speaks or performs from God's word and ordinance, that God himself speaks and perform, for the man is but a mouth-piece and instrument. And let the hearer also conclude and say, 'It is not Paul, or Peter, or a man that I perceive speaking, or baptizing, granting absolution, disciplining, excommunicating, or administering the sacrament. Dear Lord, what consolation could a poor, weak, and troubled conscience derive from such a preacher, if he only believed and was assured, that the word and consolation were God's word, consolation, and his earnest meaning. Therefore we say boldly, that God works through his word, which is a means whereby man may rightly learn him. The words of Balaam's ass were not the ass's, but God's words. So also are the words which we speak to the tortured soul: 'Be of good cheer, thy sins are forgiven thee.'"

God's Providence.—"The great and manifold gifts of God overwhelm and confound us. Great as they are, we think little of them because they are so common. And so we act towards the Lord God, as little children do towards their parents, who do not so much prize their daily bread as they do an apple, pear, or other fruit." * * * * * "No man can reckon up what God expends in providing nourishment for the birds alone, who are yet of no use at all. I do verily believe that it costs God more every year to maintain merely the sparrows, than all the revenues of the King of France, to say nothing of all other birds."

The Good outweighs the Evil.—"Though our original sin deserves that there should be many wild and evil hearts who should do harm to man, such as lions, wolves, bears, serpents, and the like, yet has our compassionate and gracious God mitigated our punishment, so that there are many more animals that serve us and are useful to us, than there are that harm us. There are more sheep than wolves, more lobsters than scorpions, more fish than serpents, more oxen than lions, more hares than foxes, more geese and fowls than kites and ravens. Thus any one who will carefully balance the one against the other, will find that there are more useful than noxious beasts in the world, more benefit than disadvantage. No man can conceive how much good God does us through the four elements. Who can count what he receives from the earth? There are trees, animals of all sorts, metals, streams of water, fountains, all kinds of corn and herbs, wool. There is fire, at which we warm ourselves and cook our food. The seas and waters are our cellars and magazines; the woods and forests our hunting ground. The earth is full of gold, silver, iron, copper, and other metals; it produces all sorts of grain for us; is our bread-chamber and store-house. For everything is ours, and made for our sakes."

The Worst things spring from the Best.—"From Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, the patriarchs, and holy fathers, came the Jews, who crucified Christ. From the Apostles came Judas the traitor. From Alexandria, where was a celebrated school, and many learned and pious Christians, came forth Arius and Origen. From the Romish Church, which has furnished many holy martyrs, comes the last Antichrist, the Pope. From the hermitages of Arabia came the Mohammed. From Constantinople, that noble city, where so many pious Emperors have reigned, comes the bloody Turk. Adulteresses come from wives, harlots from virgins, the bitterest foes from brothers, sons, and friends. The devils come from angels, tyrants from kings. From the gospel and divine truth come devilish lies. Heretics come from the Church. Filth comes from food when its natural use is perverted. Precious wine causes harm. From the blood in the body is produced pus. From Luther came Müntzer, the rebels, the Anabaptists, and the Sacramentarians. There must be evil things, or else the good would always prevail. There must be good, or such evils could not be endured."

Of Paradise.—"Some one asked the Doctor what sort of a place Paradise was, and where it was situated. He answered, that the whole world was properly so called, but that Moses described what came before the eyes of Adam. It was called Paradise on account of its beauty and pleasantness. When Adam was created, he dwelt toward the East, in Syria and Arabia. After he had sinned, it was no longer that pleasant place, no longer a

paradise and garden of delight. So, also, Moses calls the regions of Sodom and Gomorrah a paradise. Judea and Samaria were once a very beautiful land; but we are told that the Holy Land, once praised for its golden meadows, has become very sandy. God has cursed that beautiful land on account of sin, and made it unfruitful. Where God gives not his blessing, nothing grows; where he blesses, there everything flourishes and is beautiful."

There have been few men better qualified to discourse of trials and temptations than was Luther. They assailed him from within and without, and his whole life was one continued struggle against them. There are men too delicately constituted to be capable of much suffering, mental or physical. Luther was not one of these. Though of a robust frame, and capable of great labor and endurance, his health was never good. Few frames could have endured the half of his physical suffering. A tithe of his mental conflict would have driven most men into insanity. Towards the close of his life, he spoke of a period of spiritual temptation, when, for fourteen days, he could neither eat, drink, nor sleep. "Then," says he, "I contended much and with great impatience with our Lord God. I cast up before him all his promises. Then the Lord taught me rightly to understand the Scriptures. We do not know much of God's Word when all goes well with us. He will not have us become impatient. He therefore demands that we should be strong and hope, as the Psalm says, 'I will be strong in the Lord from one morning until another;' and then if God does not help us, he gives us grace that we may endure temptation." "Such trials are necessary for us. They are not sent, as many think, to destroy us, but to instruct and admonish us. The Christian should know and be convinced, that without temptation he cannot know Christ aright. They are a school in which we can learn to know the Savior. I once complained of them to Staupitz. He said he had never felt them, 'but this much I do understand,' said he, 'that they are more needful for you than food or drink.' If Satan had not thus plagued me, I could not have known how hostile he was."

Luther was a man not of the nineteenth century, but of the sixteenth. Though the foremost man of that century, he was still of it. A very foolish man of our day may be wiser on many points than he. He is clearly of opinion that the Jews should not be tolerated. "If I were lord here," says he, "I would call all the Jews together, and would ask them why they call Christ the son of a harlot, and his mother a harlot. If they could prove it, I would give them a thousand crowns. If they could not, I would have their tongues torn out of their throats. We ought not, in fine, to suffer the Jews among us; we should neither eat nor drink with them." It has already been stated, that he in no wise admits the truth of the Copernican system of astronomy. He says:

On Astronomy.—"There are three motions of the heavenly bodies. The first is *primi mobilis et raptus*. The whole firmament moves quickly and nimbly around, and revolves in twenty-four hours, in a course of thousands of miles, which is perhaps ordered by an angel. It is wonderful that such a great edifice can turn in so short a time. If the sun and stars were made of iron, silver, gold, or steel, they would soon melt in such a rapid career. The second movement is that of the planets. These have their own special and peculiar motions. The third is a wavering motion, which is called Trepidation, and has been lately discovered, and is very uncertain. I think highly of astronomy and mathematics; for they deal in demonstrations and certain proofs. A new sort of astronomy has been proposed, which would prove that the earth revolves, and not the firmament, the sun, and the moon; as when one rides in a carriage or boat, he thinks that he is still, and that the trees and shore are moving. So it goes; any one who would be thought wise, must be contented with nothing which another does; what he himself does is better than all. The fools would overthrow the whole science of astronomy. But the Holy Scriptures show that Joshua commanded the sun and moon, not the earth, to stand still."

On Astrology.—"I believe nothing in astrology. It is very true that the astrologers can announce the future to the ungodly, and tell what death they shall die; for the devil knows their thoughts, has them in his power, and directs them as he will, as he is the prince of this world. But there is no power or efficacy in the stars, who may justly complain of the astrologers and star-gazers, who attribute to them a power and efficiency which God has not given them, and ascribe to them the harm which should be attributed to comets, which portend only evil, that star only excepted which appeared to the wise men in the East, and announced that the manifestation of the gospel was at hand. That astrology is a real science, neither Philip nor any one else can convince me. He has often endeavored to do so, but I hold to my own opinion. I have often narrated to him my whole life. I am a peasant's son; my father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, were all peasants. That I should become Bachelor and Master of Arts, and a monk, was not ordered by the stars. Then that I should lay aside the crown cap; that I should fall into the Pope's hair, that he should oppose me, that I should marry a runaway nun, and become the father of children—who has seen all this in the stars? Who could have predicted that it would happen? I should like to have this argument answered: Esau and Jacob were born of one father and one mother, at the same time, and under the same constellations, and yet they were of entirely opposite nature, character, and disposition. In short, what belongs to God and is his work, should not be attributed to the stars. The true Christian religion opposes

and confutes all such fables and folly. Without religion the world is Epicurean and Lucianish, just as Erasmus has become."

Luther's combats with the devil are well known. He had not refined the prince of the power of the air into a metaphysical abstraction, a personified principle. To the popular belief, in all rude ages, the universe is full of unseen and spiritual agencies. The invisible denizens of every land take their form and likeness from its visible inhabitants.

In the iron mines of Eisleben and Mansfield, where the youth of Luther was passed, the visible and invisible worlds were equally populous. But the demons who appeared to those coarse eaters and strong drinkers, were homely of visage, and coarse of feature. They were a band of ill-conditioned demons—the very peasants and miners themselves stripped of their virtues, and with their vices only remaining. These took strong hold of the youthful imagination of Luther; and when he grew up, his imagination, reacting upon the outward senses, presented them continually before him visibly and audibly. All the tales of the peasants' fire-sides found ready access to his belief; and he relates them with the most undoubting faith. How they steal upon his hours of privacy, filling his mind with doubts and anguish; how they take delight in petty annoyances; how they steal children from the cradle, leaving in their steads changelings who will eat more than four stout ploughmen, though fortunately these imps seldom survive the age of nineteen or twenty years; how they assume the form of either sex, making themselves generally mischievous in all earthly affairs—all this he relates with the most undoubting confidence, confirming the tales by incidents from his own personal experience. Luther's whole life was passed in conflicts with this invisible world. His combats with its prince were not less real than with the Pope; nay, were more so, as the walls of his Patmos at Wartburg bear visible testimony to this day. Satan bandied with him texts of Scripture and quotations from the Fathers as stoutly, and to Luther's belief as really, as did Eck and Emser. All this, of course, comes out in his table-talk, and without the delineation of these features, no correct picture can be given of his intellectual appearance. At Eisleben, in 1546, just before his death, he gave the following story of how he was plagued at Wartburg.

"When I left Worms in 1521, and was taken prisoner near Eisenach, and was kept in my Patmos in the castle at Wartburg, I was in an apartment far from all people, and where no one could come near me save two noble youths, who twice a day brought me my food and drink. They one day brought me a sack of hazelnuts, of which I ate. I put them in a chest at night, went to bed in an adjoining chamber, having put out the light. As I lay in bed it seemed to me that the nuts were moving and rattling against each other, and against my bed. But I asked no questions,

as I was somewhat sleepy. Then arose on the stairs a great noise as though a number of barrels had been flung down the stairs. Yet, I knew very well that the staircase was so guarded by bolts and chains that no one could ascend it, or roll the barrels down it. I got up from my bed to see what was there, and cried out—‘Are you there?—very well, be it so!’ and commended myself to the Lord Christ, of whom it is written, ‘Thou hast put all things under his feet,’ and lay down again on my bed. The wife of John Von Berlibs came to the castle, suspecting that I was there, and wished to see me; but was not permitted to do so. They took me into another chamber, and put the woman in mine. There was such an uproar in the chamber that she thought there were a thousand devils there. The best way to drive him away is to call upon Christ, and despise the devil; he cannot bear that. We must say to him, as I did at Eisenach, ‘Art thou a greater lord than Christ?’ ”

The Devil and his Works.—“No disease comes from God, for he is good, and does good to all; but all misery comes from the devil. When he comes among lawyers he makes discord, and turns the right into wrong. He has great influence among potentates, princes, kings, and emperors, and so brings about war and bloodshed. He comes among theologians, where he brings about such evils as no human cunning could devise. He robs the people by false doctrine, of goods and honor, life and soul. God only, by his word, can silence or master him.” “It was a great mercy under the old dispensation, that God fixed himself in a definite place, where he might be found; in the place namely, where the mercy-seat was, towards which they prayed; first at Shiloh and Sichem, afterwards at Gibeon, and finally in the temple at Jerusalem. The Greeks and other heathen imitated this, and built temples in various places for their gods, as that of Diana at Ephesus, and of Apollo at Delphi. Whenever God built a church the devil set up a chapel close by. As among the Jews the holy of holies was dark, without any light at all, so the places where the devil gave out his oracles was darkened in like manner, as at Delphi and elsewhere. For the devil is always trying to ape God. A village priest at Liptz, near Torgau, complained once to Luther that the devil made a great disturbance in his house by night; broke his pots and dishes, and flung the fragments at his head; plagued and derided him every way; that he could often hear him laughing, but could never see him. He had carried this on for more than a year, so that his wife and children dare not stay in the house. Luther encouraged him. ‘Dear brother, be strong in the Lord, make sure of your faith in Christ, and do not give way to this murderer, the devil; endure his utmost mockery and uproar, and this temporal damage of breaking your pots and dishes. He cannot harm you in life and soul, as you have expe-

rienced, for the angel of the Lord keeps guard about you, and protects you. Therefore let him have his sport with your dishes; but do you and your wife and children pray to God, and say, 'Off with yourself, Satan, I am master in this house, and not you!' And should he come of his own accord, without being invited by your sins, say to him, 'I am by divine command and authority master of this house; and have a heavenly call to be pastor of this church. I confront you with testimony from heaven and earth. But you devil, creep into this house like a thief and a murderer; you are a villain and a murderer. Why did you not stay in heaven? Who invited you here? Then sing him a Litany and Legend, and let him play his time out.'

Changelings.—The Devil plagues people with changelings and *killkropffs*. He will seize a maiden in the water, violate her, and keep her by him till she is delivered of a child. He will then lay this imp in the cradle and carry off the true child; but such changelings, they say, seldom live more than eighteen or nineteen years. Eight years ago, I, Doctor Martin Luther, saw and handled such a changeling at Dessau. He was twelve years old, and his countenance and appearance were the same as those of a genuine child. He would do nothing but eat, and that as much as four threshers or peasants. If any one approached him he would weep; and if anything happened amiss in the house he would laugh with joy. 'These two were all the faculties he had. I told the Prince of Anhalt if I were lord here, I would have the child flung into the Moldau, and would run the risk of homicide. The Prince would not follow my advice. Then, said I, prayers should be offered in the church that God would take the devil away. This was done every day; the brat died the next year, and there was an end of it.'

Luther's method of dealing with all those annoyances, that which he recommended to others and practised himself, could not have been wiser had he attributed them to their true cause, an overtasked brain, excited nerves, and impaired digestion. The whole college of physicians could have given no better prescription than music, cheerful conversation, avoidance of too much brooding solicitude, and trust in God. "The devil is a melancholy spirit," says he, "and makes people melancholy. He cannot endure joyfulness. He, therefore, flies as far as possible from music, and will not stay where one sings, especially spiritual songs. Thus David with his harp calmed the anguish of Saul when Satan vexed him." . . . "You must not be too much alone, for you are too weak for the devil, since he is stronger than a thousand worlds. Our Lord himself did not like to be alone, as is said in the sixteenth chapter of John, where he comforted himself with these words, The Father is with me."

The keenness of Luther's attacks on the papacy, and on all

whom he looked upon as having perverted the gospel truth, has taught us to regard him as the iron man of the old poem, who passed through the world upon a terrible mission, invincible and irresistible, to be feared not loved. But the bonds which bound him to the great human family were strong in proportion to the strength of the passions which tended to drive him away. So that his being still revolved in the orbit of humanity. To know him aright, we must look upon him not only as braving men and devils, at Worms and Wartburg, but also in his humble home at Wittenberg, amid his grave friends and laughing children, moralizing upon all natural objects, and finding in all, food for admiration and reflection. One evening he saw a bird sitting upon a tree. "This little bird," said he, "has taken his evening meal, and here he will sleep in safety. He troubles himself not; cares not for the morrow; just as David speaks of the man who dwelt under the shadow of the Almighty. He sits contentedly upon his twig, and lets God care for him." "Ah! if Adam's fall had not marred everything, what a noble and beautiful creature man would have been, adorned with all knowledge and wisdom! What a blessed life he would have lived, without any disease, disquiet, or misfortune. He would have had joy in all creatures, and every change and alternation would have been a delight; and would finally have laid aside this temporal life, and been changed without tasting of death. Yet even in this poor life in how many of his creatures has God depicted and set forth the resurrection of the dead." "Pythagoras says that the moving of the constellations produces a most delightful harmony and melody; but men have become unmindful of it by continual custom. So it is with us. We have beautiful creatures all around us, but they are so common that we regard them not." "It is wonderful to how many uses, for all men throughout the wide world, the Lord God has adapted wood. There is wood for burning and for building, for tables and chairs, for wheels and pails. Wood is one of those indispensable things which men must have."

Of Death.—"We ought not to be afraid of death, since we have laid fast hold of the Word of Life, yea, of the Lord of Life himself, who has conquered death for us." "It is before God a precious and noble thing to die for the name and cause of Christ. We are all mortal, and must die for the sake of sin; but if we die for Christ's sake, it is a most honorable death. We thereby acquire a heavenly heritage, and sell our lives dearly enough. When Christians pray for a long life and for tranquillity, they do it not for their own sakes, for death to them is gain; but for the sake of posterity and the Church." "The fear of death, is death. He who has got the fear of death out of his heart, neither tastes nor feels death itself." Some one asked him what the taste of death was. He answered, 'Ask my Kate there, if

she felt anything when she was all but dead.' She replied : ' Herr Doctor, I felt nothing at all.' He rejoined, ' Therefore say I that the fear of death is the greatest part of dying. What, and how great is the taste of death, we may learn from Christ in the Garden, when he exclaimed, ' My soul is sorrowful, even unto death.' Christ died in the Garden, for to taste of death is to die. But what do you think of the words, ' My soul is sorrowful, even unto death ? ' I look upon them as the weightiest words in the whole Bible, though that was a great cry which Jesus uttered upon the cross, ' My father, my father, why hast thou forsaken me ? ' No man can express it in words. No angel can understand it. The blood poured through the gout of sweat. For this tasting of death, we are told, a creature strengthened the Creator."

That touch of nature which " makes the whole world kin," was nowhere more strikingly manifested than in Luther's conduct at the death-bed of his daughter. She died at the age of fourteen. While she lay sick the father said, " She is very dear to me ; but, dear Lord, if it is thy will to take her hence, I shall know with joy that she is with thee." Approaching her as she lay in bed, he said to her, ' Magdalene, my little daughter,¹ thou wouldst gladly remain with thy father here, and thou wouldst also gladly go to thy father there.' Said she, ' Yes, dear father, as God will.' Then said the father, ' Thou dearest little daughter, the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak ;' and turning away he added, ' she is very dear to me. If the flesh is so strong, what must the spirit be ? ' As she was at the point of death, the father fell upon his knees by her bedside, and weeping bitterly, prayed that God would release her. She expired in his arms. At the grave he said, " I have sent a saint to heaven ; yea, a living saint." When he saw his wife very sorrowful, weeping, and lamenting, he said to her, " Bethink thyself, my dear Kate, where she has gone. It is well with her. But flesh will quiver, and blood will flow. Do the best thou canst. Children do not dispute. They believe what they are told. All with them is simple. They die without pain or anguish, without agony of body, without the struggle of death, just as though they fell asleep."

The anguish of grief soon wears itself out. The stern realities of life pressed too hard upon the great Reformer to allow him long to do otherwise than rejoice that his child had passed away from the evil to come. " A boy," said he afterwards, " can take care of himself in any country, if he will but work ; but a poor girl must have some support. A boy can attend the schools and become a great man ; not so the poor girls. And so I very willingly give up this my daughter to the Lord God. I would, as far as flesh goes, gladly have had her by me longer. But he has taken her away, and I thank him." And afterwards, " If my daughter

¹ The tenderness and pathos of the original is unapproachable in a translation—*Magdalenichen, mein Töchterlin.* * * * * * *Du lieber Töchterlin.*

Magdalene could be brought to life, and could bring me the whole Turkish empire, I would not take it. With her it is well ; for ‘blessed are the dead who die in the Lord.’ Whoso is dead, has the surety of eternal life. I would that I, too, and all my children might depart, for evil times are coming. There is no more help or counsel on earth, that I can see, save the judgment day ; and I do hope that God will not long delay it, for covetousness and license increase, and are no longer even a scandal. Princes and rulers can no longer govern.”

Were one to ask, Was Luther a happy man, we would answer, No. He had a hard task to perform on earth, and was too sorely beset with trials within and without, to be happy, in any ordinary sense of the word. But he did more than achieve happiness. He fulfilled the task laid upon him. All men, as Plato said of old, are placed here upon a military post, which they may not leave without permission. Luther not only did not desert his post, but defended it to the last, with heroic endurance, and died with his armor on. He did not even have a foresight of the stately tree which would grow up from the feeble shoots which he planted. He died in the full persuasion that the last days were at hand, and that he lived in the midst of that great apostasy, which he believed was the sure precursor of the final judgment.

God sees not as man sees.—“This is finely shown by Adam. When he had only two sons, the first-born was called Cain. ‘That which is made the head of the house ;’ Adam and Eve thought Cain was to be the man of God, the blessed seed who was to bruise the serpent’s head. When Eve again conceived, she hoped it would be a daughter, that the dear son might have a wife. When she brought forth another son, she called him Abel, that is, ‘vanity, nothingness,’ as though she had said, ‘It is all over with my hope ; I have been deceived.’ This is an image of the world, and of the church of God ; and we may hence see how it is always wont to turn out. Cain, the godless scoundrel, became a great lord on the earth, while the pious Abel was his servant and subject. But God reversed all this, for Cain was rejected, and Abel accepted, and became the dear child of God, though it did not seem so, but the contrary. Ishmael, too, had a fine name, ‘whom God heareth,’ while Isaac was naught. Esau was called ‘the doer, the man,’ as though he would do everything ; but Jacob was nothing at all. Absalom is ‘the father of peace.’ Such a show and pretence do the wicked always make in the world. But they were, in truth and fact, despisers, mockers, and rebels. We can judge and decide upon these matters from God’s Word ; let us therefore prize the dear Bible, and diligently read it.”

The Decalogue—“The Decalogue is a doctrine above all doctrine. The Apostles’ creed is of worth above all worth. The Lord’s Prayer is a prayer above all prayers. The litany is a joy above all joy.” “We should preach and insist upon the

affirmative, part of the Decalogue: 'Thou shalt, etc.' "The first table is of small account in the world; the second stands in some little estimation, because transgressors are now and then punished." "The decalogue is the logic of the gospel; the gospel the rhetoric of the decalogue. Christ has all that is in Moses, but Moses has not all that is in Christ." "The first commandment imports that God is and will be our God. This will continue of force throughout all eternity. All the other commandments will come to an end; for in the future life, all worship, and polity, and regimen, will cease. But God and the first commandment will remain here, there, everywhere, and for evermore." "We can see that Moses was a good doctor, by the great care with which he lays down and treats of the first commandment. David is a gate, a door, leading out of Moses. He had diligently studied Moses, and so became a great poet and orator. 'The Psalms are nothing but syllogisms upon the first commandment; as, God regards the poor; I am poor; therefore God regards me.' " "Sins which we know to be such, are against the second table, and men often turn from them when repentance is preached to them. Sins which we do not know to be such, are against the first table; men seldom repent of these. Saul sinned against the first, David against the second table. Ah! dear Lord, let me rather fall into sins which I know to be such, as murder, theft, adultery, than into those which I do not consider sins. Our Lord God hates nothing more sorely, than that men will not allow that they have sinned, as we see in the case of Saul."

Of the Works of God.—"God is a perfect master of all trades. As a tailor, he makes a coat for the deer, which he may wear a thousand years, and it will never tear. As a shoemaker, he makes for him shoes, his hoofs, which outlast himself. He is a cook, too, for the sun, which is his fire, cooks and ripens everything." "There go our preachers, the beasts of the field—the milk-makers, the butter-makers, the cheese-makers—who preach to us daily, of faith in God, of trust in him as our father, that he will care for us, and provide for us." "God has made enough for us all, the seas are our cellar, the forests our chase, the earth is full of silver and gold, and of fruits innumerable, and all made for our sakes; the earth itself is our corn-bin and store-chamber."

Pre-requisites for understanding the Bible.—"No one can understand Virgil, in his *Bucolics*, unless he have been five years a shepherd. No one can comprehend Virgil in the *Georgics*, unless he have been five years a husbandman. No one, I think, can fully understand Cicero, in his *Epistles*, unless he have been twenty years conversant with great affairs of state. Let no one think he has mastered the Holy Scriptures, unless he have for a hundred years directed the affairs of the Church with the prophets, as did Elijah and Elisha, John the Baptist, Christ and his apostles."

ARTICLE X.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Eclectic Moral Philosophy, prepared for Literary Institutions and general use.* By REV. J. R. BOYD, A.M. Harper and Brothers, pp. 424, 12mo.

There is a peculiarity in the plan of this work which struck us unfavorably, until on examination, we discovered the great skill and ability with which its obvious difficulties were not only obviated, but turned to a good account. The compiler has first laid out the comprehensive frame-work of a moral system, the filling up of which is constituted of detached passages of some twenty of the best writers on morals, so much of their writings only being used as bears upon, or explains the dogma under consideration. Thus, on the topic of the immutability of moral distinctions, his argument is derived from Dewar; that on the rule of moral obligation, from Wardlaw; the argument on the ground of moral obligation from Dr. Dick, Dr. Chalmers, and Dr. Dewar; and in the argument against Expediency, great use is made of Dymond. So through the whole work, the various positions are explained, argued, or illustrated, by the writings of standard authors, so pared and trimmed as to dove-tail handsomely into the main structure. Of course, this system of practical eclecticism is not carried out without some sacrifice of unity, both of style and of sentiment; but the surprise is that the compiler has been able to make his vast piece of Mosaic hold together so well, and to present a surface so seemly and agreeable. As it is, it is a really trustworthy and admirable system of morals, imbued with a truly Christian spirit, pursuing its end with a method and aim which many a treatise of single authorship fails to show. The moral principles of the system we are not disposed to discuss. It will sufficiently characterize them for the purpose of such a notice as this, to say that, in the main, they are not dissimilar to those of Dr. Wayland's well known work, whose pupil and friend the compiler confesses himself to be. The work has an additional advantage, which no other of the kind can possess, of suggesting to the pupil the works and authors where the various topics are more extensively treated. It is, in fact, an excellent guide-book for an exploration of the wide and tangled field of moral science.

2. *A History of Rome, from the Earliest Times to the Death of Commodus, A.D. 192.* By DR. LEONHARD SCHMITZ, F. R. S. E. Harper and Brothers, pp. 568, 12mo.

This is designed as a popular history of the Roman empire; and has its chief recommendation in its adoption of the principles and views of Niebuhr. We believe it is the first attempt at a popular Roman history, since the German Hercules purged the Augean stables of fiction, legend, and nonsense, of which our former notions of the origin of that nation were mainly composed. Dr. Schmitz was a friend and disciple of Niebuhr, and in constructing his history, has carried Niebuhr's historical pyrrhonism quite far enough; but it is certainly time that our manual histories of Rome should begin to conform to the aspects of that history as understood by the learned. The careful, earnest fidelity of the author, his great learning and comprehensive views, and especially, the true classic spirit with which his mind and heart are imbued, give so great a literary superiority to the work, that we cannot doubt it will become the text-book on the subject, wherever it is known.

3. *History of the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century.* By J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNÉ, D.D. Translated by H. WHITE, B.A. The translation carefully revised by Dr. D'Aubigné. 4 vols., 12mo. American Tract Society.

The religious world are pretty generally aware that the American Tract Society issued some two years since, an edition of this great work as it was then published, with a few erasures of what were supposed to be sectarian or denominational remarks of the author, in order to adapt it to the catholic principles on which the Society is based. The omissions were, however, thought by some to be too important

to be allowed, and at the suggestion of its friends, the Society applied to the author to prepare an edition with special reference to their wants, if it could be done consistently with his views of historic integrity, and fidelity to the truth. After some delay, the present work is issued as the result of the author's compliance with this request. It appears divested of all remarks or allusions of a character that can give offence to the various evangelical denominations co-operating together in the Society, and yet containing everything the author deemed desirable to the historical narrative, or the reflections and truths he wished to inculcate along with it. The author has prepared a preface for this edition, which is excellent in its way, and has taken the responsibility of all the alterations made from the original copy. The publication of a work like this, by a Society whose agencies and channels reach all sections of the land, and overstep the bounds of almost every sect or society, is to be deemed a most auspicious and important event. Beyond all other instrumentalities, this Society has the means of circulating the book, and its engaging, precious truths, in just those places, and among that portion of our population, where they are most needed. The book is perhaps the best antidote to Romanism that exists in the language, except the Bible; and while it is important that the older and more enlightened communities should be quickened by its spirited narratives, and instructed by its lessons, it is incalculably more important that it should be scattered broadcast over the West, and through those unprotected regions, where the enemy is pouring in like a flood, to find a territory all ready and ripe for his influence. We should be glad to know that the means are had for placing the work in every family in the land.

4. *Paley's Natural Theology, with Selections from the Illustrative Notes, and the Supplementary Dissertations of Sir Charles Bell and Lord Brougham.* Edited by ELISHA BARTLETT, M. D., with numerous wood cuts. Harper & Brothers. 2 vols. 12mo.

We have here the original text of Paley untouched, and a variety of interesting illustrations, comments, and arguments, derived from these eminent annotators of Paley, placed in the body of the work, but distinguished from it by brackets. It is also prefaced by a brief, but well-written life of the author. These annotations are valuable, not only for their intrinsic instructiveness, and as ingenious illustrations of great truths, but, especially, as supplying those deficiencies in the scope of Paley's argument which have always been felt, and at the present day, peculiarly detract from the usefulness of his work. The work itself, as now expanded and fortified, though less valuable than an original argument covering the above field, is by far the best popular presentation of the truths of Natural Theology that our language contains. The exquisite concinnity of Paley's style, and the clearness and force of his reasoning, have never been surpassed.

5. *The Church Member's Manual of Ecclesiastical Principles, Doctrine, and Discipline.* By WILLIAM CROWELL, with an Introductory Essay, by HENRY J. RIPLEY, D.D., Professor at the Newton Theological Institution. Boston; Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. pp. 276, 12mo.

Our design is simply to describe, not to analyse or argue with, the present work. It is a defence of the ecclesiastical polity and doctrinal tenets of the Baptist denomination, as they are entertained in the Northern Churches. The pure Congregational church theory, hyper-Calvinistic theology, and the Baptist views of the ordinances, are the book's main positions; and these are defended with a vigor and clearness of argument that reflect great credit upon the learning and tact of the author. There is an air of practical good sense, and a spirit of candor and good feeling towards other denominations, which give the book additional value, and will, undoubtedly, enhance its usefulness.

6. *Harpers' Edition of the Pictorial History of England.*

Since our last issue, ten or twelve parts of this serial edition have been published. The work more than realizes the promise its first numbers gave of value and interest. Differing in its plan from the histories of the old model, and embracing in its sketches, the annals of the nation's progress in industry, wealth, commerce, and the useful arts, as well as a more minute and genial account of the people, it does not supersede, but supplies the deficiencies of, the other histories, and presents aspects of the subject which have the freshness of novelty, and the importance of truth. The

illustrations, finely executed on wood, are a pleasing and useful feature of the work, often answering a better purpose than pages of description, and giving to the narrative that life-like aspect which is history's highest charm. The numbers, as they are issued, are elegantly bound in large volumes.

7. *General History of the Christian Religion and Church; from the German of Dr. AUGUSTUS NEANDER.* By JOSEPH TORREY, *Professor in the University of Vermont.* Vol. I. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. pp. 740, 8vo.

The public was led, years ago, to expect a translation of Neander's great work by Professor Torrey, the long delay of which is now explained. After the completion of Professor Torrey's translation, Neander published a second edition of his first two volumes, containing so many alterations and improvements, that the translator bravely resolved to recast the whole, and present an English version of the work as Neander left it. The delay is amply paid for, and we trust the fidelity of the worthy translator will also meet with due appreciation. To say that it is incomparably the best version of Neander that exists in the language, by no means describes the merits of the work. It is a singularly accurate and beautiful transfusion of the very thoughts of the great author into our own vernacular, so clearly and perspicuously that the reader scarcely remembers that he is a German, or that this flowing, easy English, is extracted from the tough periods of one of the most intensely idiomatic writers in Germany. We cannot doubt that it will supersede all the versions, and become identified with the work itself in its English history.

Of Neander's work itself, the pages of the Repository have so often and so minutely spoken, that its extraordinary merits must be too well known to need a new description. It comes nearer to a true ideal of a history than any work we know of. It is not a cold record of ill-understood events, occurring at a vast distance; but the fresh, glowing narrative as of an eye-witness. The author has thrown himself so completely into the times and scenes he depicts, and so thoroughly mastered the men, the manners, the doctrines, and the events of his annals, that he portrays them with the distinctness and finish of a contemporaneous sketch. And when it is remembered what those events were, which compose the history of the Church,—the doctrines developed, the heresies broached, and the abstruse discussions in which the progress of theology consists; it will readily occur, how extraordinary must be the learning which has thoroughly mastered, and the skill which has adequately described them all. Without thinking it faultless, we regard it a matter of congratulation that so erudite and complete a work has been brought to the access of American scholars and clergymen, in so excellent a manner.

8. *The Life of Wesley; and the Rise and Progress of Methodism.* By ROBERT SOUTHEY, Esq., LL.D. *With Notes by the late S. T. Coleridge, and Remarks, with Life and Character of Wesley, by Alexander Knox, Esq.,* by REV. CHARLES C. SOUTHEY. *Second American Edition, with notes, &c.,* by REV. DANIEL CURRY, A.M. 2 vols. 12mo. Harper & Brothers.

The appendages of this work add not a little to its value. As it originally came from the author's hands, it was one of the finest pieces of biography in the language, however unjust in some of its statements, and partial in its views. It is evident that the great elements of Wesley's character, which really made him a hero, were keenly appreciated by the poet; and they are described with that singular felicity of style and enthusiasm of feeling which rendered Southey one of the finest prose-writers of the age. Coleridge's notes were written without a thought of publication, and are, therefore, the frank out-pourings of his fine mind as excited by the glow of the narrative, or the contemplation of its subject. That they are acute, sagacious, learned, and admirable, is only to say that they are Coleridge's. The estimate of Wesley by Knox, the friend and correspondent of Bishop Jebb, is remarkably candid, considering the theological differences of the two. Mr. Curry has added a review of Southey's performance by Dr. Watson, and some judicious notes of his own. The whole medley makes an unusually interesting and valuable work, which the lovers of fine writing, and the admirers of noble traits, and of lofty Christian character will unite in approving.


9. *Exercises in Hebrew Grammar, and Selections from the Greek Scriptures to be translated into Hebrew. With Notes, &c.* By H. B. HACKETT, Professor in the Newton Theological Seminary. Andover: Allen, Morrill & Wardwell.

An admirable idea is realized in this little work,—the use in the study of the Hebrew, of those exercises in writing and translating, which are now so generally adopted in the study of all other languages. The praxis is so constructed as to introduce the difficult business of writing Hebrew in a gradual and easy manner, and accompanied with such grammatical and lexicographical references, as to impart a knowledge of the structure, idioms, and genius of the language more thoroughly than we should suppose to be possible in any other method. The first lessons are in pointing, the whole philosophy of which is perspicuously illustrated, and rendered familiar. It then proceeds to writing Hebrew sentences, in doing which all the grammatical principles involved are clearly exhibited. We should think it of inestimable value for a thorough mastery of this language. There are traces throughout of the finest and most accurate scholarship, and a practical acquaintance with the business of teaching, which will render the work useful for the purposes it aims at.

10. *History of the Conquest of Peru, with a Preliminary View of the Civilization of the Incas.* By WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT. 2 vols., 8vo. Harper & Brothers.

A new product of Mr. Prescott's pen is an event in our literary history, in which none will fail to take an interest. His fame has become identified with the literary reputation of this country, and the unquestionably great success which he obtains is a matter of honest pride with his countrymen. In some of the higher characteristics of the historian, he has no living superior; and his works, as they are successively produced, are not only seized with the avidity of a deep present interest, but are placed at once in the select rank of standard historical compositions. It is, therefore, a pleasing duty to announce the issue of another work, which will not detract at all from the fame which his previous efforts have won.

The present work is a counterpart of the *History of the Mexican Conquest*—another stage of the same stirring and romantic career—and possessing all the elements of interest, excitement, and wonder, which invest that work with so unwonted a charm. The Incas, previous to their destruction by the Spaniards, presented a civilization as elaborate and wonderful as the Aztecs; and the Conquest, though not so difficult and protracted, brought out a bravery and a brilliancy of exploit quite as striking. These exciting scenes, as well as the whole gorgeous history of Spanish conquest, Mr. Prescott portrays with a minuteness and accuracy of knowledge, a graphic power, and a true philosophical spirit, which are rarely exhibited, and impart an inexpressible charm and value. We have only need to say to the readers of the Mexican history, that the present is a picture equally strange and moving, and wrought with the same masterly skill, to suggest the highest inducement for its perusal. The mechanical execution is greatly to be commended, as well as the moderate price at which the publishers afford a work which might reasonably be held at a much higher rate.



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